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ABSTRACT
Humean philosophy has been de f ined  in  th e  fo llow ing  ways, ( a )  A system based on th e  c l a s s i c a l  in f lu e n c e  of C ice ro ,  (b )  An a t te m p t  to  o f f e r  a p a r a l l e l  in  moral ph ilosophy  to  S i r  Isaac  Newton's c o n t r ib u t io n  to  th e  p h y s ic a l  s c ie n c e s ,  ( c ) In tu i t io n is m  based on th e  Shaftesbury /H utcheson  t r a d i t i o n .
I f  we c ons ide r  Hume's s c h o la r ly  ou tp u t  as  a whole, i t  would appear d i f f i c u l t  to  s e l e c t  one work and claim  t h a t  i t  r e p re s e n ts  a d e f i n i t i v e ,  f i n a l  p o s i t i o n .  The approach which i s  taken  in  t h i s  s tudy i s  t h a t  o f  fo llo w in g  th e  development o f  Hume's th in k in g ,  from h i s  e a r ly  educa t ion  th rough  to  t h a t  s ta g e  in  h is  c a re e r  which saw the  com pletion o f  h i s  major p h i lo s o p h ic a l  works. For a s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  o f  th e  l a t e r  pe riod  o f  b is  c a re e r  he broke no new ground in  h is  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  s tu d i e s ;  but was c o n te n t  to  r e v i s e  h i s  e a r l i e r  works, t u rn in g  a t t e n t i o n  in s te a d  to  l i t e r a t u r e ,  h i s to r y  and r e l i g i o u s  d i s p u te s .
When t h i s  approach i s  followed i t  becomes obvious t h a t  the  s e c u la r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Humean ph ilosophy , which has gained a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  accep tance  t h i s  c e n tu ry ,  i s  f a r  from conv inc ing . Hume in  f a c t  w rote a f a i r l y  c o n s e rv a t iv e  work on N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n .  Moreover, h i s  I n t u i t i o n ­ism makes l i t t l e  sense w ithou t th e  r e l i g i o u s  foundation  which S ha f te sbu ry  and Hutcheson had taken  f o r  g ran te d .
What new, s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r ib u t io n  did Hume make? His work can be looked upon as  a  f i n e  example o f  'a p p l i e d  p h i lo s o p h y ' ,  a n t i c i p a t i n g  th e  i n s ig h t s  o f  modern c l i n i c a l  psychology a t  a number o f  p o i n t s .
I t  i s  im portan t  to  see Hume as working in  an ed u c a t io n a l  t r a d i t i o n .  S c o t t i s h ,  h u m an is t ic .  Reformed. His fam ily  was P re s b y te r i a n ,  and th e  young Hume would have rece iv ed  a good C h r i s t i a n  t r a i n i n g .  Although he was not conside red  an o u t s t a n d in g ly  b r ig h t  p u p i l ,  he a t te n d e d  Edinburgh U n iv e rs i ty  a t  an e a r ly  age ,  and soon developed a v o rac io u s  a p p e t i t e  fo r  read in g  s c h o la r ly  l i t e r a t u r e  on h i s  own. The deep ly  i n t r o s p e c t iv e  s id e  o f  h is  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  s tu d ie s  may w ell  have come 
from h is  P re sb y te r ia n  background.
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1.
INTRODUCTION.
When faced w ith  th e  q u e s t io n  -  'how should David Hume's ph ilosophy  
be defined*?  s c h o la r s  have given q u i te  d i f f e r e n t  answ ers. Some have 
found in  him th e  C l a s s i c a l  t h in k e r ,  in f lu e n ce d  to  th e  very  end o f  h i s  
c a re e r  by C i c e r o ' s  e th i c s ;  o th e r s  have h ig h l ig h te d  h i s  debt to  th e  
I n tu i t i o n i s m  o f  F ra n c is  Hutcheson; and ano the r  group see in  him th e  
Newtonian p h i lo s o p h e r ,  so much under th e  s p e l l  o f  S i r  I sa a c  Newton 
t h a t  he aspired a t  one p o in t  to  become ' t h e  Newton o f  th e  moral s c ie n c e s ' ,^  
Most s c h o la r s  have accep ted  th e  view t h a t  Hume le d  th e  movement in  
B r i t a in  which sought to  d iv o rc e  th e  study o f  moral ph ilosophy  from 
r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f .  In support  o f  t h i s  view they  would a rgue  t h a t  h® 
a l t e r e d  what he had i n h e r i t e d  from C h r i s t i a n  s c h o la r s ,  to  g ive  i t  a 
s e c u la r  s l a n t .  Many s c h o la r s  would see t h i s  as  t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  
f e a t u r e  o f  Hume's work, and would claim  to  be fo llo w in g  him in  t h i s  aim.
I t  has taken  a long  t im e  to  unders tand  and a n a ly se  Humean ph ilosophy . 
Not w ithou t  r e a s o n ,  i t  has o f te n  been remarked t h a t  Hume's l u c i d ,  
e le g a n t  s t y l e  b e l i e s  th e  com plexity  o f  h i s  th o u g h t .  On th e  s u r fa c e  h is  
p o s i t i o n  appears t o  be s t r a ig h t f o r w a r d ,  but c lo s e r  study in v a r i a b ly  
r e v e a ls  l a y e r  upon l a y e r  o f  new l e v e l s  o f  th in k in g .  That i s  why i t  
i s  q u i te  wrong t o  s e l e c t  one o f  h i s  works and c la im  t h a t  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  
a f i n a l ,  d e f i n i t i v e  p o s i t i o n .  One s e t  o f  works may r e p r e s e n t  b e s t  h is  
ou t lo o k  a t  one p e r io d  i n  h i s  c a r e e r ,  whereas a n o th e r  a q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  
s ta n d p o in t  a t  a l a t e r  p e r io d  in  h i s  c a re e r .  To unders tand  Hume's f i n a l  
and most c o n s i s t e n t  p o s i t i o n  on a l l  th e  main q u e s t io n s  which he 
a d d re s se d ,  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  fo llow  th e s e  q u e s t io n s  as he explored 
them in  a l l  h i s  works. As i t  w i l l  be q u i te  im p o ss ib le  to  unders tand  
th e  Hume o f  th e  Enquiry or of  A T r e a t i s e  o f  Human N a tu re , w ithout 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  h i s  home background and ed u ca t io n , a  study o f  th e se  
e a r ly  in f lu e n c e s  i s  though t  to  be th e  r i g h t  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  in  t h i s  
exam ination o f  th e  c la im s which have been made about what 'he b e l ie v e d .
pageI .  The L i fe  o f  David Hume. by H.C. Mossner.Oxford a t  C larendon P r e s s ,  in  1980, 132
2 ,
As we fo llo w  t h i s  approach th e  im pression  t h a t  Hume should be remembered 
as  th e  s e c u la r  B r i t i s h  p h i lo so p h e r  who sought to  d iv o rc e  th e  s tudy o f  
moral ph ilosophy  from r e l i g i o u s  p re s u p p o s i t io n s ,  beg ins  to  l o s e  c o n v ic t ­
io n .  He may have s e t  out w ith  t h a t  i n t e n t i o n  when he w rote  th e  Enquiry 
or A T r e a t i s e  o f  Human N ature  as  w ell  as  o th e r  unpublished  works which 
were cons ide red  p ro v o ca t iv e  because o f  t h e i r  s e c u la r  character*, but 
c lo s e r  s tudy o f  h i s  work r e v e a ls  a t  l e a s t  two f e a t u r e s  which i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  he was never  f u l l y  happy w ith  t h a t  p o s i t i o n .  This  can be i l l u s t r a t e d  
by a q u o ta t io n  from a l e t t e r  from S i r  James MacDonald w r i t in g  in  P a r i s  to  
an E ng lish  co rre sp o n d en t:  " 'So t h a t  poor Hume,' w rote  S i r  James
M acDonald... 'who on your s id e  o f  th e  w ater was though t  to  have too  l i t t l e  
r e l i g i o n ,  i s  h e re  thought to  have too  much' «" 2
F i r s t l y ,  Hume's ou tlook  was to  change c o n s id e ra b ly  as  he t r a v e l l e d  
from th e  C on tinen t  back t o  S c o t la n d ,  and as  he s c r u t in i z e d  h i s  e a r l i e r  
work more c r i t i c a l l y .  He could be ve ry  f ra n k  about h i s  d isa p po in tm en ts ,  
and made no a t te m p t  t o  concea l  h i s  u n c e r t a in ty  about arguments which
were c r u c i a l  to  th e  s e c u la r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  His p o s i t i o n  made him
js c e p t i c a l  about so many th in g s  t h a t  he was seldom dogmatic about a n y th in g .  1IAs p a r t  o f  h i s  change o f  ou t look  in  m id -c a re e r ,  we f in d  him, fo r  example, 1Is e t t l i n g  down q u i t e  h ap p ily  i n  Edinburgh S o c ie ty .  He i s  no lo n g e r  so |
!much a t  loggerheads  w ith  C h r i s t i a n  s c h o la r s , or M in is te r s  o f  th e  K irk , o r  )
Anglican B ishops, Dr. B u t le r  having  everywhere recommended some of h i s  ^
works. I t  i s  d u r ing  t h i s  p e r io d  t h a t  he i s  w i l l i n g  to  s i t  down and 
w r i t e  about h i s  th o u g h ts  on N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n .  This  l i t t l e - n o t i c e d  work 
l e a d s  in  f a c t  to  f a i r l y  c o n s e rv a t iv e  c o n c lu s io n s .  I t  can h a rd ly  be 
d e sc r ib ed  as  th e  p roduct o f  th e  pen of  someone who has thrown overboard 
every r e l i g i o u s  convic tion . Î This  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  Hume to  th e  Hume who 
had complained from P a r i s  -  " ' I  have been accus tom 'd  t o  meet w ith
n o th in g  but I n s u l t s  and I n d i g n i t i e s  from my n a t i v e  C o u n t r y . . . '  "
3
Secondly, t h e  th e o ry  which he espoused in  Moral Philosophy and clung 
to  th roughout h i s  l i f e  was no t r e a l l y  a l l  t h a t  s e c u la r  a t  a l l .  I t  was
2 . Mossner op. c i t .  485
3 .  The Ph ilosophy  o f  David Hume, by N.K. Smith. London,MacMillan and C o . , i n  1941. 395
3 .
th e  In tu i t io n is m  which had been passed on to  him by F ranc is  Hutcheson.
We w i l l  co n s id e r  Hume's a t tem p t to  break away from Hutcheson 's  
s p i r i t u a l  I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  but th e  conc lus ion  to  which we a r e  d r iven  i s  
t h a t  the  a t tem p t was l e s s  than com pletely  s u c c e s s fu l .  The reason  why 
Hume became and remained fo r  th e  r e s t  o f  h i s  l i f e  an I n t u i t i o n i s t , had 
no th ing  whatever to  do w ith  h is  s e c u la r  ten d e n c ie s .  From th ese  
ten d e n c ie s  i t  would have been much more n a tu r a l  fo r  him to  have adopted 
th e  se c u la r  R a t i o n a l i s t  p o s i t i o n .  Hume could not p ro p er ly  account 
fo r  h i s  I n tu i t i o n i s m .  I t  d id  n o t ,  fo r  example, grow out o f  h i s  'new 
n a t u r a l i s t i c  w o r ld ' .  The reason  why he became an I n t u i t i o n i s t  was 
because he i n h e r i t e d  i t  from F ra n c is  Hutcheson* I t  could 
be adapted to  f i t  in  w ith  h i s  o th e r  view s, but i t  was not th e  product 
of  them. He chose t o  make i t  harmonize with  them. And so Hume's 
s to u t  defence  o f  h i s  I n tu i t io n is m  th roughout a l l  h is  w r i t in g s  i s  
eloquent tes t im ony  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  was always something 
s p i r i t u a l  a t  th e  ce n tre  of  h i s  th in k in g ,  fo r  which he could not f u l l y  
accoun t .
More g e n e ra l ly ,  in  t h e  ph ilosophy  o f  r e l i g i o n  deba te  he I s  much 
l e s s  p r e d i c ta b l e  than  h i s  s e c u la r  i n t e r p r e t e r s  would have us  b e l i e v e .
In th e  deba te  between th e  T h e i s t s  and th e  D e i s t s ,  he appears  to  lea n  
towards Theism. He does in  f a c t  make r e f e r e n c e  to  ' t r u e  T heism '.  On 
th e  s t a t u s  of th e  ' t h e i s t i c  p r o o f s 'a s  a whole, he may even have been 
more c o n s e rv a t iv e  th an  Kant who undermined a l l  th e  arguments a p a r t  
from th e  Moral Argument, whereas Hume, acco rd ing  to  A .J .  Ayer 
" . . .n o w h e re  p roc la im s  h im se lf  an a t h e i s t .  On th e  c o n tra ry ,  in  The 
N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n  and elsewhere in  h i s  w r i t in g s ,  he p ro fe s s e s  
to  accep t  t h e  argument from D e s i g n . H u m e ' s  p o s i t i o n  in  th e  Dialogues 
Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n  c a l l s  fo r  c a r e f u l  d e f i n i t i o n ,  a s  can be 
seen in  a l a t e r  s e c t io n .  Even in  h is  e x p lo ra t io n  o f  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  
q u e s t io n s  such as  -  'how we form our b e l i e f s ' ,  i t  i s  no t c l e a r l y  
ev iden t  t h a t  h i s  re a so n in g  le d  him t o  s e c u la r  c o n c lu s io n s .  The sc ie n c e
4 . Hume, by A. J ,  Ayer. P ub lished  by th e  Oxford U n iv e r s i ty  P ress  in  1930:  23
4-.
o f  th e  s tudy  o f  man g r e a t ly  exc ited  him because he f e l t  t h a t  i t  would 
be seen to  be th e  foundation  o f  a l l  th e  o th e r  s c ie n c e s .  But a s  he 
s tu d ie d  t h i s  sc ie n c e  c lo s e r  he came to  a p p re c ia te  t h a t  ' s c i e n t i f i c *  
and 'm o ra l '  qu es tio n s  did not f a l l  i n to  th e  same c a te g o ry .  He was one 
o f  th e  f i r s t  moral ph i lo so p h e rs  to  i n s i s t  t h a t  you cannot d e r iv e  an 
"ought" from an " i s " .
There i s  something s t r i k in g  about Hume's a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  model. I f  
i t  i s  accep ted  t h a t  th e  C h r i s t i a n  outlook  i s  p o s i t i v e  and o p t im is t i c  -  
o p t im is t i c  about l i f e  as  w ell  as  about human n a tu r e  -  th en  th e r e  i s  
much of t h i s  cheery o p t im is t  in  Hume's a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  model.
20th  c e n tu ry  adm irers  o f  Hume's ph ilosophy , l i k e  Mossner, c la im  t h a t  
he l a i d  down th e  f i r s t  " . . . a l l - i n c l u s i v e  Science  o f  Human N a tu re ,"  and 
t h a t  t h i s  s c ie n c e  has now become th e  " . . .  study o f  s p e c i a l i s t s  in  many 
f i e l d s . T h e  immediate o b je c t io n  to  M ossner 's  c la im  i s  t h a t  Hume was 
not r e a l l y  working from a se c u la r  a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  model a t  a l l .  That 
i s  a p o s s ib l e  o b je c t io n  t o  a l l  th e  a t t e n p t s  t h a t  have been 
made t o  defend Hume's ph ilosophy from a se c u la r  b a s i s .
Did Hume's c o n t r ib u t io n  to  ph i losophy , th e r e f o r e ,  lead  t o  s i g n i f i c a n t  
new advances? His gen e ra l  in f lu e n c e  was s u b s ta n t i a l  and im p o r ta n t .
This  ' i n f l u e n c e '  i s  no t  always easy to  d e f in e  and P ro fe s so r  Passmore 
may be r i g h t  to  d e s c r ib e  h i s  se n t im e n ta l  psychology, fo r  example, a s  a 
th in g  o f  sh reds  and p a tc h e s .  ^ Here we a re  reminded of what R.N.
Berki s a id  about Locke 's  p o l i t i c a l  ph ilosophy , when he c a l l e d  i t  a 
th in g  o f  sh reds  and  p a tc h e s .  But th e n ,  S i r  E rn es t  B a rk e r 's  opinion y 
was t h a t  L ocke 's  hodden grey i s  more to  be r e l i e d  upon than  R ousseau 's  
p a r t i - c o lo u r e d  s i l k .  That op in ion  may have an a p p l i c a t io n w i th  reference 
to  Hume's t h e o r i e s  as w e l l .
D esp ite  i t s  shaky c o n s t ru c t io n  and tho roughly  dangerous te n d e n c ie s ,  
something s u rv iv e s  th e  f i n a l  examination which le a d s  us  t o  f e e l  t h a t  
Hume was on th e  r i g h t  l i n e s  as  he mapped out th e  ground f o r  what was
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to  become th e  sc ie n c e  o f  psychology. Where ph ilosophy  ends and psycho­
logy beg ins  i s  a m a t te r  which has to  be decided upon b e fo re  c o n c lu s io n s  
about t h e  s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  Hume's work can be a r r iv e d  a t .  At th e  ve ry  
l e a s t ,  h i s  work can be looked upon as  a f i n e  example o f  'a p p l i e d
p h i lo s o p h y ' , a n t i c i p a t i n g  th e  i n s i g h t s  o f  modern c l i n i c a l  psychology 
a t  a number o f  p o in t s .
6 .
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Hume's Bducatioria l Background.
David Hume grew up in  Sco tland  du r ing  a p e r io d  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  change. 
Sco tland  was emerging out o f  th e  feuda lism  o f  th e  Middle Ages and f a s t  
becoming a modern, e n e rg e t ic  n a t io n ,  eager to  come a lo n g s id e  and be on 
equal terms w ith  England, her Southern  ne ighbour .  Scotland  was becoming 
more aware o f  what was ta k in g  p la c e  in  th e  wider world and wanted to  be 
in  th e  vanguard o f  p ro g re s s .
The changes which were to  ov e r ta k e  S c o t la n d 's  c a p i t a l  Edinburgh du r ing  
Hume's l i f e t i m e ,  were, by S c o t t i s h  s ta n d a rd s ,  a s to u n d in g .  In  th e  L i fe  
o f  David Hume. Mossner t r a c e s  t h e  changes from th e  p r im i t iv e  c o n d i t io n s  
o f  l i f e  in  th e  Old Town, t o  l i f e  i n  th e  New Town, which ware g ra d u a l ly  
t ra n s fo rm in g  Edinburgh i n to  one o f  E u rope 's  most b e a u t i f u l  c a p i t a l s :  
t r u l y ,  an Athens o f  t h e  North .
But th e  S co tland  o f  Hume's boyhood was a l s o  s o l i d l y  P r e s b y te r i a n .  The 
proceed ings o f  t h e  G eneral Assembly had a b e a r in g  on every  f a c e t  of  
S c o t t i s h  l i f e .  Through th e  i n f lu e n c e  o f  Andrew M e lv i l l e  and Alexander 
Henderson, academic s ta n d a rd s  in  t h e  S c o t t i s h  u n i v e r s i t i e s  has r i s e n  
to  a l e v e l  were th ey  had become comparable w ith  European s ta n d a rd s .  Hume 
enjoyed many advan tages  th rough  fo llow ing  a S c o t t i s h  ed u ca t io n . The 
dourness  and d rabness  w ith  which S c o t t i s h  P re sb y te r ia n ism  has sometimes 
been a s s o c i a te d ,  may have much l e s s  t o  do w ith  th e  in lu e n c e  o f  Genevan 
Calvinism  th an  i s  g e n e ra l ly  a p p re c ia te d .  As many C a l v i n i s t i c  in f lu e n c e s  
came to  S co tland  v i a  E n g l ish  P u r itan ism  r a t h e r  th an  d i r e c t l y  from th e  
C o n t in e n t ,  i t  i s  n e c e s sa ry  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between what grew out o f  th e  
S c o t t i s h  Reform ation and what d id  n o t .  By Hume's day th e  in f lu e n c e  of  
E n g l ish  P u r i ta n ism  on S c o t t i s h  P re sb y te r ia n ism  had in c re a se d  c o n s id e ra b ly ,  
and t h i s  may e x p la in  why he was pu t o f f  by th e  h e a v ie r  d e v o tio n a l  
l i t e r a t u r e  which he was expected t o  read  on th e  Sabbath . I t  could  be 
t h a t  th e  popu lar  image o f  S c o t t i s h  P re sb y te r ia n ism  has a s  much to  do
w ith  th e  S c o t t i s h  c h a ra c te r  and c l im a te  as w ith  th e  te a c h in g s  o f  John 
C alv in!
Genevan Calvinism  was, fo r  example, much more open to  European 
humanism than  e i t h e r  Roman or Lutheran s c h o la r s h ip .  Roman s c h o la rsh ip  
had been so t h i r l l e d  to  A r i s t o t e l i a n  philosophy t h a t  
G a l i le o  was fo rced  to  withdraw h is  claim t h a t  th e  e a r th  was no t  the  
c e n t r e  o f  our u n iv e r s e .  The p i e t i s t i c  emphasis which pervaded the  
Lutheran outlook  l e f t  i t  w ith  a legacy  o f  h o s t i l i t y  to  human reason . 
Lutheranism seemed to  c r e a te  a dichotomy between f a i t h  and reason  
which l e f t  many a re a s  o f  s tudy  under s u sp ic io n .  Whereas Reformed 
humanism, which C alv in  r e p re se n te d  b e s t ,  as  he, o f  a l l  th e  Reformers 
had th e  th e  most thorough humanist education ; could r i g h t l y  be d e sc r ib ed  
as one o f  th e  most en lig h ten ed  movements o f  t h i s  p e r io d .  That i s  why 
i t  i s  no t  u n reaso n ab le  to  c la im  t h a t  much of  Hume’ s work, deqpLte i t s  
o r i g i n a l i t y ,  could have come from o th e r  pens i n  th e  S co tland  o f  th e  
l 8 th .  c e n tu ry ,  because he was working in  a p a r t i c u l a r  t r a d i t i o n  and 
fo llow ing  th rough  an a l r e a d y  e s ta b l i s h e d  method. Much o f  h i s  work was 
no t o r i g i n a l  a t  a l l ,  as Norman Kemp Smith has shown in  The Philosophy 
o f  David Hume., in  which he i n d i c a t e s  F ra n c is  H u tcheson 's  
in lu e n c e  on Hume's d e c is io n  to  become an I n t u i t i o n i s t .
So t h a t ,  a lo n g s id e  Reformed s c h o la s t ic is m  which he ld  to  a h igh  view 
o f  s c h o la r s h ip ,  a more p i e t i s t i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  Calvinism  had 
permeated i n t o  S c o t t i s h  P re sb y te r ia n ism  through popular  d e v o tio n a l  
w r i t e r s .  I t  he ld  to  a very  d i f f e r e n t  view of  th e  v a lu e  o f  s c h o la r s h ip .  
M acIntyre draws a t t e n t i o n  to  t h e  s t r i c t u r e s  t o  which Hume would have 
been s u b je c t  d u r in g  a t y p i c a l  S c o t t i s h  Sabbath, d u r in g  which he would 
have been expected to  read  works such as  B o s to n 's  Human N ature  in  th e  
F ourfo ld  S t a t e .
In The L i fe  o f  David Hume. Mossner shows in  some d e t a i l  how s e r io u s ly
t h e  Hume fam ily  took t h e i r  f a i t h .  Mrs. Hume was p robab ly  e v a n g e l ic a l  
and p i e t i s t i c ,  David was " . . . ' r e l i g i o u s  whai he was y o u n g ' . . . "
"Taking h i s  r e l i g i o n  u n u su a l ly  s e r io u s ly ,  t h e  young David Hume was 
a t t r a c t e d  to  th e  t a s k  o f  s o u l - s e a rc h in g ."  But Mrs. Hume a l s o  b e liev ed  
in  g iv in g  her  fam ily  every  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  do w e l l  i n  t h e i r  e d u c a t io n ,  
s t im u la t in g  her c h i ld r e n  to  s tudy  d i l i g e n t l y  on t h e i r  own, and to  t h a t  
end she p rov ided  them w ith  a good l i b r a r y .  David was cons ide red  a 
b i t  slow. I t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  he d id  not show much outward enthusiasm  
f o r  what he was re a d in g .  There was a l s o  a deeply  i n t r o s p e c t i v e  s id e  to  
him. Only much l a t e r  in  h i s  c a re e r  d id  i t  become ap p a re n t  how 
much he had rea d :  "The boy David Hume was, i t  i s  c l e a r ,  a l r e a d y
b eg inn ing  t o  th in k  fo r  h im se lf  and to  deem moral i s s u e s  o f  paramount 
i mp o r t a n c e . . . I t  i s  no t  p o s s ib l e  to  get away from th e  im press ion  
t h a t  th e  deep i n t r o s p e c t io n  which was t o  c h a r a c te r i z e  h i s  m ature  work 
as  a moral p h i lo so p h e r ,  came from h i s  P re s b y te r ia n  u p b r in g in g  w ith  i t s  
s t ro n g  emphasis on s o u l - s e a rc h in g .  This can be seen from th e  ex p ress io n  
he u se d ,  such a s ,  " .. .W hen I tu rn  my eye i n w a r d . . . F r o m  having read  
d u t i f u l l y  t h e  d ev o tio n a l  l i t e r a t u r e  which was used  on th e  Sabbath  and 
h i s  school t e x t -b o o k s ,  David Hume, th e  y o u th fu l  u n d e rg ra d u a te ,  began 
to  develop a v o rac ious  a p p e t i t e  fo r  s c h o la r ly  l i t e r a t u r e  from every 
p e r io d  and background, "Edinburgh was undoubtedly  se e th in g  w ith  
new id e a s  o f  s c ie n c e ,  ph ilosophy  and l i t e r a t u r e . . . "  I t  had now become 
a s t im u la t in g  c e n t r e .
Mossner c la im s th a t  Hume gave up r e l i g i o n ,  " . . . s l o w l y ,  and r e l u c t a n t ly  
and even a g a in s t  h i s  w i l l . . . ' '^ ^  Hume h im se lf  a t t r i b u t e d  h i s  doubts  to  hla 
r e a d in g  o f  Locke and C la rke .^  This change of  ou t look  a f f e c te d  h i s  e t h i ­
c a l  s ta n d a rd s ,  as he confessed  to  Frances Hutcheson, " . . . I  d e s i r e  to  
t a k e  my C ata logue  o f  V i r tu e s  from C ic e r o 's  O f f i c e s . . . " ^
The in f lu e n c e  of French sc ep t ic ism  and Hume's c o n ta c t  w ith  France  i s  
an im p o r tan t  p iec e  of t h e  j ig - s a w .  I t  may have been t h a t  t h e  c lo s e
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r e l a t i o n s h ip  between S co tland  and France over many c e n tu r ie s  had th e  
e f f e c t  of making th e  young s tu d e n ts  o f  Hume's g en e ra tio n  more open to  
th e  French in f lu e n c e .  Although h i s  spoken French was not im p re ss iv e ,  as 
a g i f t e d  l i n g u i s t ,  he would have had l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  in  u n d e rs tand ing  
French p h i lo s o p h ic a l  w r i t i n g s .  In Hume's I n te n t io n s  Passmore c la im s 
t h a t  th e  w r i t in g s  o f  La ird  and Kemp Smith have shown t h a t  Hume's m a t te r  
as w e ll  as  h i s  tone  was in fe c te d  by French in f lu e n c e ,  " . . . h i s  borrowings 
from Malebranche and P i e r r e  Bayle were conspicuous and s u b s t a n t i a l . ' ^
But Hume a l s o  read  B r i t i s h  e m p i r ic i s t s  such as  Locke, Berkeley and 
Newton, who had he ld  on to  t h e i r  r e l i g io u s  b e l i e f s  and wrote as  convinced 
C h r i s t i a n s .  He was aware of t h a t  and took t h e i r  arguments i n to  accoun t .  
L a te r ,  on th e  C o n t in en t ,  he was to  a c q u ire  a new r e s p e c t  fo r  the  
a p o lo g e t ic s  o f  some Roman C a th o lic  s c h o la r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the  J e s u i t s .  This 
must have c o u n te ra c te d  th e  in f lu e n c e  of s c e p t i c s  such as P ie r r e  Bayle, 
and c i r c l e s  o f  a t h e i s t s  which were becoming q u i te  common on th e  C o n tinen t .
Although Hume worked on the  Dialogues Concerning N atura l  R e l ig io n  
r i g h t  up u n t i l  th e  end o f  h i s  l i f e  and a t ta c h e d  g re a t  s ig n i f ic a n c e  to  
t h e i r  p u b l ic a t i o n  -  a s  i f  to  i n d ic a te  t h a t  they  r e p re s e n te d  h i s  mature 
de fence  o f  h i s  s c e p t ic i s m ,  h i s  l i f e l o n g  and ' i n c u r a b le '  scep t ic ism  -  i t  
i s  a t  l e a s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t ,  in  them, he a t t a c k s  th e  f a sh io n a b le  Deism 
which was held  by people  l i k e  t h e  p e tu l a n t  Mrs.
M a lle t ,  who, " . . .m e e t i n g  him one n ig h t  a t  an assem bly, bo ld ly  accos ted  
w ith  th e s e  words -  'Mr. Hume, Give me lea v e  to  in tro d u c e  m yself to  you.
We D e is ts  ought to  know each o t h e r ' .  -  'Madam', r e p l i e d  he, ' I  am no 
D e i s t .  I do na s t y l e  m yself  so, n e i th e r  do I  d e s i r e  to  be known by t h a t  
Appelât ion ' . His own r e l i g i o u s  education  had been in  Theism and among 
C h r i s t i a n  a p o lo g i s t s ,  he r e sp e c te d  most T h e is ts  such as B u t le r  and 
B erkeley . Greig  r e f e r s  to  an account o f  Hume a t  ano the r  s o c ia l  evening 
in  t h i s  con n ec t io n ,  which i s  c r u c i a l  to  t h i s  p o i n t i -
7 * S i m ? b y  J . Passmore. London, the Duckworth 
P ress  1980. ^
8 " The Philosophy  o f  David Hume, by N.K. Smith London.th e  MacMillan P r e s s ,  in  1941. 3 9 5
11
"Once Hume was d i n . in g  a t  th e  B a ro n 's ,  and th e  c o n v e rsa t io n
tu rn e d  to  Atheism -  no t an uncommon to p ic  t h e r e .  The g u i l e l e s s
David made h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n .  He had met D e i s t s ,  p l e n ty  o f  them;
he might a g re e  t o  be c a l l e d  one h im s le f ,  though upon th e  whole,
i f  he must be c a l l e d  something, T h e is t  was a b e t t e r  d e s ig n a t io n ;
but a s  f o r  A th e i s t ,  he r e a l l y  d i d n ' t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  they  e x is t e d .  At
any r a t e ,  he had y e t  to  meet one. Atheism -  why, they  might
remember t h a t  in  t h i s  connec t ion  Bacon sa id  . . .  But he was
i n t e r r u p t e d  by th e  l a u g h te r  o f  th e  o th e r  g u e s t s .  'My dear D av id ! '
c r i e d  Baron. 'Never seen an A th e is t !  Look about you. Here a r e
f i f t e e n  around th e  t a b l e ' . " 9
A fte r  t h i s  experience  Hume was by no means c o n s i s t e n t  in  ho ld ing  to  
th e  view t h a t  a t h e i s t s  d o n ' t  e x i s t ,  indeed , some o f  h i s  own w r i t in g s  
became deeply  a g n o s t ic  in  c h a r a c te r ;  but h i s  e a r l i e r  a t t i t u d e  to  
a the ism  cannot be ignored  because i t  con tinued  to  be a p e r s i s t e n t  
and s i g n i f i c a n t  in f lu e n c e  on h i s  work th roughout h i s  c a r e e r .  Nor 
was he com fo r tab le  w ith  h i s  s c e p t ic ism  and where i t  o f te n  led  him.
" I t  i s  w e ll  known from Hume's tes t im ony  t h a t  he was d r iv e n  by 
th e  a n a l y t i c  s p i r i t  i n to  s c e p t ic ism  -  ' t h e  b a rre n  r o c k ' ,  he c a l l s  
i t  -  where he i s  reduced 'a lm o s t  to  d e s p a i r ' upon r e a l i z i n g  ' t h e  
i m p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  amending or c o r r e c t in g  th e  wretched c o n d i t io n ,
weakness and d i s o r d e r  o f  th e  f a c u l t i e s ' . " 10
That i s  why we sometimes see  Hume r e a c t i n g  to  t h a t  experience  by 
b reak ing  o f f  from t h a t  a re a  of  s tudy  com ple te ly  f o r  a w h i le ,  or 
escaping  from th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  by seek ing  th e  company o f  h i s  f r i e n d s .  
His s c e p t ic is m  produced ve ry  s t r a n g e  f e e l in g s  in  him a t  t im e s ,  and the  
way in  which he d e s c r ib e s  them i s  s im i la r  to  what Helen Gardner 
w rote  in  th e  Tragedy o f  Damnation about M arlowe's Doctor F a u s tu s i -
"From a proud p h i lo s o p h e r ,  m aster o f  a l l  human knowledge, to  a
9 * David Hume, by J .Y .T .  G re ig .  London, by J o n a th a n  Cape in  193?: 298
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a t r i c k s t e r ,  to  a s la v e  o f  phantoms, to  a cowering w retch : t h a t  i s  
a b r i e f  s k e th  o f  Dr. F a u s tu s ." 11
The p a r a l l e l  w i th  Dr. F aus tu s  i s  no t  o f  course  t o  be p ressed  too  
s t r o n g ly ,  but Hume's p ro g re s s  d id  a t  t im es make him look  u n d ig n i f ie d .  
Rushing one moment t o  be th e  f i r s t  to  ta k e  up a new, d a r in g  p o s i t i o n ;  
th e n ,  a t  a n o th e r ,  th rough  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered defend ing  i t ,  
r e t r e a t i n g  in  confus ion  t o  a suspension  o f  what he had p re v io u s ly  
a f f i rm e d .
" . . . ' I  fancy  m yself  some s t r a n g e  uncouth monster
" . . . ' F a i n  wou'd I  run i n t o  t h e  crowd fo r  s h e l t e r  and w a r m th ' . . . "13
" ' I  have exposed m yse lf  t o  th e  enmity o f  a l l  m e ta p h y s ic ia n s ,  
l o g i c i a n s ,  m a them atic ians ,  and even theo log ians*
" 'When I tu rn  my eye inw ard, I  f in d  no th in g  bu t doubt and 
ig n o r a n c e ' .
As a p io n e e r in g  p h i lo so p h e r  Hume was t o  expe rience  a l l  th e  hazzards 
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  championing new, c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i d e a s .  He was l i v i n g  a t  
a tim e o f  momentous change. In  Scotland th e  te n s io n s  between th e  o ld e r  
P r e s b y te r i a n  a t t i t u d e s  and th e  new European ou tlook  were enormous. Hume's 
mind became t h e  b a t t le g ro u n d .  I t  took  a long time b e fo re  h i s  c r i t i c s  
began to  a p p r e c i a t e  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  much o f  what he was sa y in g .  And y e t ,  
as s c h o la r s  began to  a n a ly se  h i s  work a c le a r  s h i f t  i n  ou t look  d id  ta k e  
p la c e .  One o f  th e  changes which must have p leased  him most i n  t h e  l a t e r  
p a r t  o f  h i s  c a re e r  was t o  see  h i s  e a r l i e r  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  works h a i le d  as  
among th e  f i n e s t  w r i t in g s  o f  h i s  age.
Hume's development as  an o r i g i n a l  ph i lo sopher  began w ith  th e  d iscovery  
of  key p h i lo s o p h ic a l  works from d i f f e r e n t  p e r io d s .  I t  would appear t h a t
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he began to  read  widely on h i s  own from an e a r ly  p e r io d .  I t  i s  no t  
hard  to  i d e n t i f y  which w r i t in g s  had th e  g r e a t e s t  in f lu e n c e  on him. The 
d e c i s iv e  in f lu e n c e  of  one o f  h i s  con tem pora r ies ,  F ra n c is  Hutcheson, has 
been mentioned a l r e a d y .  There was a l s o  a major c l a s s i c a l  v e in  runn ing  
th rough  h i s  th in k in g .  When we examine Hume's l a t e r  p o s i t i o n ,  a s  r e p r e s e n ­
te d  f o r  example by h i s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  th e  D ia logues Concerning N a tu ra l  
R e l ig io n ,  should be p u b lished  a f t e r  h i s  d e a th ,  we a r e  reminded o f  th e  
enduring  in f lu e n c e  of h i s  c l a s s i c a l  mentor -  C ic e ro .  He always r e f e r r e d  
t o  C ice ro  w ith  th e  g r e a t e s t  r e s p e c t .  As P e te r  Jones  obse rves ,  
" P h i lo s o p h ic a l ly ,  h i s  beginnings a r e  ro o ted  in  th e  s c e p t ic i s m ,  n a tu r a l i s m  
and r h e t o r i c a l  method o f  C i c e r o . . . "
"Every educated re a d e r  could d isc e rn  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  i t s  posthumous 
p u b l i c a t i o n ,  t h a t  Hume's Dialogues Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n .  
was modelled on C ic e r o 's  De Natura Deorum. Most r e a d e r s ,  no 
doubt, could a l s o  d isc e rn  th e  C ice ron ian  in f lu e n c e  on th e  e a r l i e r  
N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n .  . . . "
P e te r  Jones  cla im s t h a t  th e r e  a re  fou r  ge n e ra l  th e s e s  o f  C ice ro  which 
Hume was happy to  ad o p t.
" 1 , I n s i s t e n c e  on th e  s o c ia l  dimension o f  man, and r e c o g n i t io n  
of  i t s  im portance as  a n ecessa ry  c o n d i t io n  o f  s t a b i l i t y  and 
coherence in  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  rea lm .
2 . R ecogn ition  t h a t  we should seek t o  l i v e  i n  harmony w ith  
n a tu r e ,  and t h a t  honestum and m odera tlo  ought to  form th e  core  
o f  m o ra l i ty ;
3 . The adop tion  o f  moderate sc e p t ic ism  on ly ,  and r e j e c t i o n  o f  
extreme s c ep t ic ism  as  incom patib le  w ith  a p r a c t i c a l  l i f e ,  and as  
i n d i c a t i v e  o f  egoism;
4 . I n s i s t e n c e  on th e  ca u sa l  p r i n c i p l e ,  t o g e th e r  w i th  a  r e j e c t i o n  
o f  f a t e ,  chance, d iv in a t io n ;  and an a t t i t u d e  o f  s c ep t ic ism  
towards p h i lo s o p h ic a l  theo logy  and most r e l i g i o u s  p r a c t i c e s .
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The i n f l u  en œccC C ice ro ,  acco rd ing  to  Jo n e s ,  i s  t o  be found i n  Hume's 
e a r l i e s t  e s sa y s .  In  F rance  w r i t e r s  such as  F on te n e l l e  and Bayle had 
a l r e a d y  accep ted  C ic e r o 's  p o s i t i o n ,  and in  B r i t a i n  i t  had been a c cep ted  
by th e  D e is ts  and o th e r s  such as S h a f te sb u ry .  I t  was from C ice ro  t h a t  
Hume was a b le  t o  r e c o n c i l e  th e  s tudy  o f  ph ilosophy  w ith  th e  demands o f  
l i f e  i n  th e  r e a l  world .
Although not a r a t i o n a l i s t ,  Hume had been fo l lo w in g  w ith  i n t e r e s t  t h e  
e f f e c t  which Newton's id e a s  having  on th e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  s tudy  of 
'how th e  p h y s ic a l  u n iv e r s e  w o rk s ' .  Hume's i n t e r e s t  in  Newton's work 
i s  o f  the  g r e a t e s t  im portance , because Newton was a s c i e n t i s t .  Like 
G a l i l e o ,  Newton was engaged in  a branch o f  s c ie n c e  which was i n c r e a s in g ­
l y  d i s t a n c in g  i t s e l f  from th e o lo g ic a l  and p h i lo s o p h ic a l  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .  
They had both cha llenged  th e  C hurch 's  t r a d i t i o n a l  te a c h in g  abou t th e  
u n iv e r s e ,  and they  were undermining much of  A r i s t o t e l i a n  p h i lo sophy  on 
th e  q u es tio n  o f  c a u s a t io n .  A r i s t o t e l i a n  ph ilosophy  had always been 
much more em p ir ic a l  than  P la ton ism , but now t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  were 
d isc o v e r in g  n a tu r a l  fo rc e s  and fo llow ing  th e  movement o f  th e  p l a n e t s  
w ith  accu racy , A r i s t o t e l i a n  f i r s t  p r in c i p l e s  were seen to  be unsound.
This  was posing  a dilemma fo r  p h i lo s o p h e rs ,  because  i f  p h i lo sophy  could 
n o t  lea d  them t o  a sound u n d e rs ta n d in g  of f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s ,  th en  th e  
s c i e n t i s t s  would soon t a k e  t h e i r  p la c e  i n  o f f e r in g  a d e f e n s ib le  view o f  
th e  world. T h is  dilemma comes a c ro s s  very  c l e a r l y  i n  a passage  from 
th e  Enquiry i n t o  Human U nderstanding . -
"But may we no t hope, t h a t  ph ilo sophy , i f  c u l t i v a t e d  w ith  c a r e . . .  
may c a r r y  i t s  r e s o u rc e s  s t i l l  f a r t h e r ,  and d i s c o v e r ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  
some d e g re e ,  th e  s e c r e t  sp r in g s  and p r i n c i p l e s ,  by which th e  
human mind i s  a c t i v a t e d  in  i t s  o p e ra t io n s?  Astronomers had long  
con ten ted  them selves  w ith  p rov ing , from th e  phenomena, th e  t r u e  
m otions, o rd e r ,  and magnitude o f  th e  heaven ly  bod ies ;  T i l l  a 
p h i lo so p h e r ,  a t  l a s t ,  a ro s e ,  who seems, from th e  h a p p ie s t  reasoning^
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t o  have determined th e  laws and fo rc e s ,  by which th e  r e v o lu t io n s
of th e  p la n e ts  a re  governed and d i r e c te d .  The l i k e  has been
performed with  regard  to  o th e r  p a r t s  of n a tu r e .  And t h e r e  i s  no 
reason  to  d e s p a i r  o f  equal success  in  our e n q u i r i e s . "  iQ
Although Hume r e f e r s  to  Newton as a 'p h i lo s o p h e r '  i n  t h a t  passage ,
in  to d a y 's  language we would c a l l  him a s c i e n t i s t .  In  some ways th e
work of th e  p h i lo sophe r  was considered  to  cover most b ranches o f  le a rn in g ,  
and to  be one r e q u i re d  th e  a b i l i t y  to  dem onstra te  t h i s  
knowledge in  th e  development o f  id e a s ,  however s p e c u la t iv e .  As we now 
know, many o f  t h e s e  id ea s  were of a s p e c u la t iv e  n a tu r e .  That i s  why 
Hume f e l t  t h a t  what Newton had dem onstrated from th e  p h y s ic a l  u n iv e r s e  
had an a p p l i c a t i o n  in  th e  u n d e rs tand ing  of human n a tu r e  a s  w e l l .  At 
t h i s  time th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between moral ph ilosophy and e m p ir ic a l  
psychology was not a t  a l l  c l e a r .  'The study o f  th e  human body' Hume 
may have f e l t ,  was th e  way to  u nde rs tand  human n a tu r e .
"Not only i s  t h e r e  an e x p lan a tio n  fo r  ev e ry th in g  which happens, 
but t h e s e  e x p lan a tio n s  a r e ,  when p ro p e r ly  u n d e rs to o d ,  capab le  
of forming a 'com plete  system of th e  s c i e n c e s ' . "
This approach may have led  him to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  some p h y s ic a l  method 
would be found t o  account fo r  th e  way in  which we form our b e l i e f s .
Some see th e  'p r i n c i p l e  o f  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  v i v a c i t y '  as be ing  an analougus 
fo r  Newton's n o t io n  o f  th e  ' t r a n s f e r  of  momentum'. We get a  f la v o u r  of 
t h i s  kind o f  approach in  th e  T r e a t i s e  where Hume w r i t e s ; -
" . . . v h e n a n y  im pression  becomes p re s e n t  to  u s ,  i t  n o t  only 
t r a n s p o r t s  th e  mind t o  such id e a s  as  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  i t ,  bu t 
l ik e w i s e  communicates t o  them a share  o f  i t s  f o rc e  and v i v a c i t y .
These p o s s i b i l i t i e s  were never pursued w ith  much th o roughness ,  f o r  a 
rea son  which i s  aga in  supp lied  in  th e  T r e a t i s e ; -
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" . . . a s  th e s e  depend on n a tu r a l  and p h y s ic a l  c a u se s ,  th e  exam ination 
o f  them would le a d  me too f a r  from my p re s e n t  s u b je c t ,  i n to  th e  
sc ie n c e s  of  anatomy and n a t u r a l  ph ilo sophy .
From Ockham, Hume adopted  a th e o ry  o f  common sense  which in  a B r i t i s h  
c o n te x t  l a i d  th e  fo u n d a t io n  fo r  t h e  S c o t t i s h  school o f  common se n se ,  and 
l a t e r  l i n g u i s t i c  ph i lo so p h y .  Ockham along  w ith  Malebranche had cha llenged  
th e  A r i s t o t e l i a n  d o c t r in e  o f  'n e c e s s a ry  c o n n e c t io n ' .  In s te a d  th e y  argued 
t h a t  d iv in e  omnipotence should be a b le  to  do e v e ry th in g .  But, th e  
Newtonian concep tion  o f  c a u sa t io n  was to  c h a l le n g e  fundam en ta lly  th e  
p h y s ic s  on which much of  .medieval theo logy  had been b u i l t .
As Hume r e f l e c t e d  on th e  re le v a n c e  of Newtonian ' ph i lo so p h y ' to  th e  
new study o f  human n a tu r e  which he was endeavouring to  p io n e e r ,  i t  
became in c r e a s in g ly  c l e a r  to  him t h a t  th e  's tu d y  o f  th e  human body' 
could  only  y i e ld  a c e r t a i n  type  of in fo rm a t io n .  From t h i s  s tudy  i t  would 
be q u i t e  im poss ib le  to  account f o r  many o f  our b e l i e f s .  We know t h a t  he 
saw t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  ve ry  c l e a r l y  because he was one o f  th e  f i r s t  ph i lo so p h e ­
r s  t o  ex p la in  th e  meaning o f  th e  ' n a t u r a l i s t i c  f a l l a c y ' .  'You c a n ' t  d e r iv e  
an ought from an i s '  i s  what he was now i n s i s t i n g ,  and w hile  t h a t  a s s e r t ­
ion  can be c h a llenged  on th e  b a s i s  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  o n to logy , on th e  b a s is  
of  Hume's i t  could  n o t .  Hume's d i s t i n c t i o n  on t h i s  q u e s t io n  has proved 
h e lp f u l  in  th e  s tudy o f  moral philosophy, down to  th e  p re se n t  t im e.
In  f a c t  Hume's e a r ly  approach lacked  what Kant was to  make p ro v is io n  
f o r  in  h is  moral th e o ry .  A C a te g o r ic a l  Im p e ra t iv e .  K a n t 's  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t  
was d i f f e r e n t .  He d id  no t  a t tem p t to  begin to  e x p la in  human n a tu r e  by 
s tu d y in g  th e  human body. I n s te a d ,  he saw th e  n e c e s s i ty  fo r  moral im p e ra t ­
iv e s  which could  only  be unders tood  and accounted f o r  a g a in s t  th e  
background of  human s o c ie ty ,  w ith  a l l  i t s  customs and i n s t i t u t i o n s  and 
i t s  moral codes. In Kant t h i s  more s p i r i t u a l  s id e  of human b e l i e f s  
i s  a t  th e  ve ry  f o r e f r o n t  o f  h i s  ph ilo sophy . From h i s  own onto logy  Hume
by N. C a p a ld i .
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knew t h a t  he could no t  supply th e  'o u g h ts '  which would give 
impetus to  moral p r i n c i p l e s .  On i t s  own, any ana logue o f  Newton's 
un d e rs tan d in g  o f  how th e  fo rc e s  which govern th e  u n iv e r s e  work, could 
not supply an answer to  moral q u e s t io n s .  I f  i t  was Hume's i n te n t i o n  
to  'become a Newton of  th e  moral s c i e n c e s ' ,  then  th e r e  must have come 
a p o in t  when he r e a l i z e d  t h a t  th e  a t tem p t had f a i l e d .  The whole e n te rp ­
r i s e  had been m isconcieved , because  i t  was j u s t  no t  p o s s ib le  t o  be 
'a  Newton o f  th e  moral s c i e n c e s ' .
Now we see t h a t  th e  I n tu i t i o n i s m  which F ra n c is  Hutcheson had passed 
on to  him, was of v i t a l  im portance  t o  hlca. I f  t h e  em p ir ic a l  s c ien ces  
could not y i e ld  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  moral th e o ry ,  th e n ,  human n a tu re  
i t s e l f ,  in  a l l  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  f e e l in g s  and i n s i g h t s  would. There can 
be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  t h i s  i s  what Hume b e l ie v e d ,  so t h a t  in c r e a s in g ly  
in  h is  w r i t in g s  he took  i t  f o r  g ran ted  t h a t  human i n t u i t i o n s  a r e  th e  
sou rce  of our moral c o n v ic t io n s .
F ra n c is  Hutcheson succeeded Gershorn Carmichael t o  th e  Chair  o f  Moral
Philosophy a t  Glasgow U n iv e r s i ty  in  1729. Hutcheson tau g h t  and wrote
as  a convinced I n t u i t i o n i s t .  "C e n tra l  to  H utcheson 's  ph ilosophy  was
th e  con fidence  which he p la c e s  i n  human n a tu r e . "  T.D. Campbell22
d e s c r ib e s  Hutchison as  th e  ' f a t h e r ' o f  th e  S c o t t i s h  Enligh tenm ent. 
Campbell goes on to  a rgue  t h a t  Hume's e th i c s  were l a r g e ly  H utchesonian, 
and he i s  p repared  to  s id e  w ith  Kemp Smith when he a rgues  t h a t  
"H utcheson 's  s e n t i m e n t a l i s t  approach  to  moral th e o ry  was th e  i n s p i r a t i o n  
f o r  Hume's e n t i r e  e p i s t e r a o l o g y . A c c o r d i n g  to  Campbell, Hutcheson did 
much of  t h e  spadework which p repared  th e  way fo r  th e  next g en e ra t io n  
o f  S c o t t i s h  p h i lo s o p h e rs .
"While none of  th e  fo l lo w e rs  o f  Hutcheson can p ro p e r ly  be c a l le d  
h i s  d i s c i p l e s ,  s in c e  each endeavours to  p rov ide  a comprehensive 
and to  an e x te n t  novel ph ilosophy  of  h is  own, a knowledge' of 
H u tcheson 's  p io n e e r in g  work in  tu rn in g  th e  i n s i g h t s  o f
22 . S c o t t i s h  E n l ig h te n m e n t .  E d ited  by T.D. Campbell and A.S.S k in n e r .  Edinburgh J» Donalson, in  1982. 122
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S h a f te sb u ry  i n t o  a developed and cohesive  ph ilosophy  o f  p r a c t i c e  
does enab le  us t o  see t h e i r  achievements in  p e r s p e c t iv e .
H u tcheson 's  work, both in  h i s  w r i t in g  and te a c h in g ,  p rov ided  
an a t t r a c t i v e  model, adopted  by many subsequent S c o t t i s h  l i t e r a t i ,  
which p ro v id e s  a b a c k c lo th  f o r  any adequate  view of  t h e i r  l a t e r  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,
I t  i s  w orth n o t in g  t h a t  H u tcheson 's  p o l i t i c a l  ph ilosophy was capab le  
o f  a r a d i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  which was not n e c e s s a r i l y  t y p i c a l  o f  th e  
S c o t t i s h  c h a r a c t e r .  I t  may have been t h a t  he was endeavouring to  sow 
th e  seeds o f  a novel approach to  p o l i t i c s ,  much c lo s e r  to  Locke 's  
id e a s  than  th o se  he ld  by th e  E r a s t i a n s .
"Hutcheson a rgues  t h a t  men a r e  capab le  o f  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  lo v e ,  or 
t h e  d e s i r e  o f ,  o r  d e l i g h t  i n ,  th e  Good o f  o t h e r s .  His c h ie f  
concern  i s  to  d em ons tra te  a g a in s t  Hobbes and M andeville  t h a t  t h i s  
'p u b l i c  a f f e c t i o n ' cannot u l t im a te ly  be f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  
benevo len t  person  g e ts  from seeing  o th e r s  happy, s in c e  such 
p le a s u r e  presupposes  a p r io r  d e s i r e  t h a t  th e y  be happy,"
25
There can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  Hutcheson was a T heis t*  Mary Shaw 
Kuypers r e f e r s  t o  him as  th e  p rophet o f  th e  M oderate M in is te r s  in  
t h e  Church o f  S co tland  o f  h i s  day, which means t h a t  we can f a i r l y  
conclude  t h a t  he would have cha llenged  th e  s t r i c t u r e s  o f  th e  s t r i c t  
P r e s b y te r i a n  code; bu t he had no t  been swept i n t o  t h e  camp o f  th e  
f a s h io n a b le  Deism which was g a in in g  ground in  England. His ' I n tu i t io n is m '  
s t i l l  r e l i e d  on th e  Revealed R e l ig io n  o f  Theism. The t h i r d  E a r l  of 
S h a f te s b u ry ,  who was r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  p o p u la r iz in g  I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  was 
much more open to  Deism, a l though  even t h a t  c la im  must be m o d if ie d ,  
because , he remained a devout member of  th e  Church o f  England, r e c e iv in g  
Communion t h r e e  to  fou r  t im es a y e a r .  His then  was no o rd in a ry  Deism.
He was undoubted ly  opposed to  r e l i g i o u s  f a n a t ic i s m ,  but h i s  'Deism' 
was so sym pathe tic  to  much o f  C h r i s t i a n  te a c h in g  t h a t  i t  must have been
24 . S c o t t i s h  E n ligh tenm en t .  Edited  by T.D, Campbell and A.S. M  S k i n n e r .B d i n b u r g Q  j . Donalson, in  1982.
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adapted  to  f i t  in  w ith  th e  d o c t r in e s  o f  th e  Church o f  England. I f  i t  i s  
a t  a l l  t r u e  t h a t  Newton's in f lu e n c e  was opening th e  door f o r  a  Deism 
which would hold to  a m e c h a n is t ic  view of  th e  u n iv e r s e ,  S h a f te s b u ry 's  
i n f lu e n c e  was t ra n s fo rm in g  " . . . t h e  metamorphosed God th e  watchmaker 
i n to  God th e  A r t i s t . " 26
There a r e  many p a r a l l e l s  between S h a f te s b u ry 's  and R ousseau 's
i d e a s .  The f u l l  e x te n t  o f  S h a f te s b u ry 's  in f lu e n c e  on Rousseau may not 
be known, but i t  must have been c r u c i a l .  "S ince  Rousseau b e l ie v ed  w ith  
S h a f te sb u ry  t h a t  ' t h e  p e r f e c t i o n  and h e ig h t  o f  v i r t u e  must be owing to  
a b e l i e f  i n  God, Em ile , l i k e  S h a f te s b u r y 's  P h i lo c le s  in  The M o ra l is t  
must be given a d e i t y ,  f o r  he must have an i d e a l  a f t e r  which he can 
model h i s  own l i f e . " M o r e o v e r , "E m ile 's  God l i k e  t h a t  o f  S h a f te sb u ry  
w i l l  be supremely good, supremely i n t e l l i g e n t ,  a l l - p o w e r f u l ,  and 
a l l - j u s t . " ^ g
S h a f te s b u ry 's  r e l i g i o u s  view o f  th e  world i s  l i k e  t h a t  o f  L e ib n iz ;  i t  
i s  o p t im i s t i c .  This i s  th e  b e s t  o f  a l l  p o s s ib le  w orlds .  What i s  t r u e  o f  
t h e  world i s  t r u e  of human n a tu r e .  " I f  a l l  human be ings  a r e  born good, 
and a r e  equipped w ith  th e  n a t u r a l  i n s t i n c t s  o f  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n ,  sympathy 
and a sense  o f  beau ty ,  how can moral e v i l  e x i s t  in  th e  un iverse? '^^
But Hume would have i n s i s t e d  t h a t  e v i l  does e x i s t  i n  th e  u n iv e r s e  and 
we must account f o r  i t .  That i s  one o f  th e  c e n t r a l  q u e s t io n s  which i s  
debated  in  th e  D ia logues Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n .  S h a f te sb u ry  
seemed to  j u s t  sweep t h i s  whole q u e s t io n  a s i d e ; -
" I t  has been sa id  o f  Spinoza t h a t  he was in to x i c a t e d  w ith  th e  
id e a  o f  God. I t  might be s a id  w ith  equal t r u t h  o f  S h a f te sb u ry  
t h a t  he was i n to x i c a t e d  w ith  th e  id e a  of v i r t u e ,  and V i r tu e  w ith  
him meant, above a l l  t h in g s ,  benevolence and c a re  fo r  o th e r s .
Nor was S h a f te s b u r y 's  benevolence simply o f  a p r iv a t e  c h a ra c te r .  
Though th e  asthma from which he s u f f e re d  p reven ted  him from 
ap p e a r in g  much in  P a r l ia m e n t ,  he was always i n t e r e s t e d  in  p u b l ic
26. S h a f te sb u ry  and th e  French  D e i s t s ,  by Dorothy B. ...S c h le g e l .  P ub lished  by th e  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  N orth  C a ro l in a  in  195» »'
27. S c h leg e l  op. c i t .
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a f f a i r s ,  and ready  to  s a c r i f i c e  to  what he deemed th e  p u b l ic  
i n t e r e s t  o f  h i s  t im e ,  h i s  money and even h i s  h e a l th .
His D e i ty  was 'Suprsne  G oodness '.  This b e l i e f  shaped h i s  e t h i c a l  
th e o ry .  His was a system made up of i d e a l s .  These inc luded  'B enevolence, 
Moral Beauty, and a Moral S e n s e ' .  Each i n d iv id u a l  person  could a l s o  be 
p a r t  o f  t h i s  system as  th e s e  i d e a l s  were adop ted .
S h a f te s b u ry 's  th e o ry  th e n ,  c o n t r a s t s  markedly w ith  Hobbes' a t tem p t 
to  b u i ld  up a system of  m o ra l i ty  which r e s t e d  on th e  s e l f i s h  f e e l i n g s ,  
or w ith  M a n d e v i l le 's  view t h a t  " . . . b e c a u s e  our v i r t u e s  took  t h e i r  r i s e  
i n  s e l f i s h  or b r u t a l  forms, they  a re  s t i l l  b r u t a l i t y  and s e l f i s h n e s s  in  
m a s q u e r a d e . H o b b e s  and M andeville  emphasized th e  n e g a t iv e  s id e  o f  
human n a tu r e ,  whereas S h a f te sb u ry  th e  p o s i t i v e  s id e .  We w i l l  f in d  Hume 
a g re e in g  w ith  S h af tesbu ry  about th e  im portance o f  g iv in g  a c e n t r a l  p lac e  
to  th e  good q u a l i t i e s  which we see in  peop le ,  bu t  he does no t  ig n o re  
t h e i r  bad or even dark q u a l i t i e s  e i t h e r .  I t  i s  th ro u g h  h i s  e t h i c a l  th eo ry  
t h a t  we d isc o v e r  th e  n a tu r e  o f  S h a f te s b u ry 's  r e l i g i o n s -
" . . . i n  th e  in c e n t iv e s  t o  w e l l-d o in g  and t h e  d e t e r r e n t s  from e v i l -
doing a r e  t o  be sought n o t  s o le ly ,  or even m ain ly , in  th e  opin ion
of mankind, or in  th e  rewards and punishments o f  t h e  m a g i s t r a te ,
or i n  th e  hopes and t e r r o r s  of a  f u tu r e  w orld , but in  th e  answer
of  a good co n sc ien ce ,  approving v i r t u e  and d isapp rov ing  v i c e ,  and
th e  lo v e  o f  God, who by h i s  i n f i n i t e  wisdom and h i s  a l l - e m b ra c in g
b e n e f icen ce ,  i s  worthy o f  th e  lo v e  and a d m ira t io n  o f  His c r e a tu r e , "
32
From S ha f te sbu ry  t h i s  s p i r i t u a l  I n tu i t io n is m  passed  t o  Hutcheson and 
from Hutcheson t o  Hume and from Hume to  Bentham. C e n t ra l  t o  t h i s  th eo ry  
i s  a t r u s t  i n  human i n s t i n c t s  a t  t h e i r  n o b le s t  and a concern f o r  th e  
common good. This  l a t t e r ,  a cco rd ing  t o  Fowler, l i e s  more on th e  s u rfa c e  
i n  Cumberland and seems to  be im plied  in  th e  e t h i c a l  s p e c u la t io n s  of
Bacon. (Fowler: op . c i t .  p . 163)
30. S h a f te sb u ry  and Hutcheson. (E n g l is h  P h i lo s o p h e r s )  by T.Fow ler. London," Sampson, Low, M arston , S e a r l e  and R iv ing ton
in  1882. 37
31. Fowler op. c i t .
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Hume's New N a t u r a l i s t i c  World.
Hume’ s e d u c a t io n a l  development took p lac e  a t  a tim e when th e  a p p l i c a ­
t i o n  o f  s c ie n c e  was having an e f f e c t  on every f a c e t  o f  l i f e .  No lo n g e r  
was th e  p h i lo so p h e r  to  be allow ed to  argue  a p r i o r i  from i n h e r i t e d  
A r i s t o t e l i a n  or any o th e r  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  p r in c i p l e s  about th e  oider of th e  
p h y s ic a l  u n iv e r s e ,  because  sc ie n c e  was now o f f e r in g  a very  d i f f e r e n t  
e x p la n a t io n .  Even man h im s e lf  was p a r t  of t h i s  s c i e n t i f i c  enqu iry .  The 
sc ie n c e  o f  Anatomy was dem o n s tra t in g  w ith  i n c r e a s in g  accuracy how 
d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  of th e  human body work. The human body which u n t i l  t h i s  
tim e had been he ld  to  be so m y s te r io u s  t h a t  only  th e o lo g ia n s  or p h i lo s o ­
phers  could e x p la in  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  was now being  seen to  be a 
p h y s io lo g ic a l  s t r u c t u r e  s u p e r f i c i a l l y  no t d i s s i m i l a r  to  o th e r  an im als  
such as mammals. For some, s c ie n c e  now he ld  th e  answer to  e v e ry th in g ;  
and, because of  t h a t  was h a i l e d  as  a new r e l i g i o n .  Although th e  l 8 t h .  
cen tu ry  was no t  th e  c e n tu ry  o f  th e  I n d u s t r i a l  R evo lu tion , t h a t  r e v o l u t ­
ion  was now only round th e  c o rn e r .  The " . . . p r a c t i c a l  b e n e f i t s  of th e  
new sc ie n c e  had been c o n s ta n t ly  s t r e s s e d  by Bacon, D e sc a r te s ,  and 
Sp inoza, and had a l r e a d y  been dem onstra ted  in  m ining, m edic ine , and 
m e ta l lu rg y ,  in  th e  a r t s  of w a r fa re ,  n a v ig a t io n ,  and a r c h i t e c tu r e . " ^  Where 
was t h i s  new approach  going to  le a d  ? From Locke, S h a f te sb u ry ,  
"Mandeville, Hutcheson and B u t l e r ,  Hume found th e  example o f  t h e  new 
approach: th e  approach  which sought to  " . . .  put th e  sc ien ce  o f  man on 
a new f o o t in g  . . . "  ^ But Hume knew s t r a i g h t  away t h a t  t h i s  would c r e a te  
a d i f f i c u l t y ,  because s c ie n c e  has no th ing  to  say to  us about moral i s s u e s .
As a p h i lo so p h e r  who deemed moral i s s u e s  to  be of  th e  h ig h e s t  im portance , 
he knew t h a t  h i s  t a s k  would be to  work out how ' t he  sc ience  o f  man' 
r e l a t e s  to  moral p h i lo so p h y .  His a t te m p t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  would be to  
" . . . i n t r o d u c e  th e  ex p e r im en ta l  method of  rea so n in g  in to  moral s u b je c ts ." ^
And t h a t  g e n e ra l  aim sums up f o r  us what Hume a t  t h i s  po in t  s e t  out to  
a c h ie v e .
At f i r s t  he was supremely o p t i m i s t i c .  Beginning with h i s  elem entary
11 . Hume's P h i lo s o p h ic a l  Development, by J .  Noxon. Pub lished  jby the  Oxford a t  C larendon  P re ss  in  1973. 32 |
-i2 . The L ife  o f  David Hume, by 3 .G. Mossner. Pub lished  by the  iOxford P ress  in  1973. 74 J
3 . Mossner op. c i t .  32 |
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u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  what was being d isco v e red  th rough  s c i e n t i f i c  r e s e a rc h ,  
he jumped to  t h e  co n c lu s io n  t h a t  a s c i e n t i f i c  un d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  
workings o f  th e  human body would f i n a l l y  e x p la in  a l l  th e  m y s te r ie s  of 
human knowledge and b e l i e f .
"From th e  beg inn ing  he was e q u a l ly  concerned w ith  de te rm in ing  th e  
law fu l  l i m i t s  o f  human knowledge and b e l i e f  w ith  u n d e rs tan d in g  
human p r e f e re n c e s ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s .  He s t a r t e d  
w ith  th e  c o n v ic t io n  t h a t  expe r im en ta l  psychology would y i e ld  a 
th eo ry  o f  human n a tu r e  from which s o lu t io n s  to  th e  problems of 
ep is tem ology  and o f  a e s t h e t i c s ,  e t h i c s ,  and p o l i t i c s  could  a l l  be 
d e r iv e d ." 4
Was he th en  becoming a hard-headed  r a t i o n a l i s t ?  Indeed n o t .  According 
to  Hoxon he was becoming p a r t  o f  th e  c r i t i c a l  " . . . r e a c t i o n  t h a t  had 
a l r e a d y  d is p la c e d  D esca r te s  in  favour of Locke and Newton a t  home.
From c o g i to ,  e rso  sum D e sc a r te s  had s t a r t e d  to  b u i ld  " . . . w i t h  
supreme confidence  in  pu re  r e a s o n ." ^  Hume, however, was to  r e j e c t  th e  
concept o f  th e  pu re  o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  l o g i c a l  th in k in g .  He was to  begin 
w ith  a th eo ry  of  human n a tu r e  which would be th e  b a s is  fo r  th e  moral 
s c ie n c e s ,  and which, a cco rd in g  to  Noxon, would se rv e  as a fo unda tion  
fo r  an e m p ir ic a l  " . . . s c i e n c e  of  man. " ^
"Hume t e l l s  us t h a t  ' t h e  sc ie n c e  of man i s  th e  only  s o l id  
fo u n d a tio n  fo r  th e  o th e r  s c ie n c e s '  t h a t  'Even M athem atics, N a tu ra l  
Philosophy and N a tu ra l  R e l ig i o n , '  a r e  in  some measure dependent 
on th e  ' s c i e n c e  o f  m an ', and t h a t  th o se  sc ie n c e s  'which more 
i n t im a te ly  concern  human l i f e '  can be m astered  only a f t e r  we 
have taken  command o f  th e  sc ie n c e  o f  man." 8"He u n d e r ta k e s  to  do t h i s  by g e n e t ic  i n q u i r y ,  supposing, a s  a 
good Lockian would, t h a t  i f  he can d isc o v e r  how men do i n  f a c t  
a c q u ire  knowledge and b e l i e f  he w i l l  be a b le  to  show which o b jec ts  
and methods conform to  th e  n a tu r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  human unders tand ing
4 .  Noxon op. c i t .  ^
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and which do n o t .  I t  seems t h a t  Hume o r i g i n a l l y  conceived t h i s  
problem as one o f  e m p ir ic a l  psychology t o  be re so lv e d  by an ad ap tio n  
of t h e  experim en ta l  method, to  which he was r e p u te d ly  a t t r a c t e d  
th rough  h i s  a d m ira t io n  f o r  Newton.
Noxon r a i s e s  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  how f a r  Hume's ph ilosophy  was 'shaped  by 
N ew ton ian ism ', b u t ,  a s  Newton was a T h e i s t ,  t h i s  c r e a te s  problems f o r  
Noxon's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  N'oxon i s  p repared  to  admit t h a t  Newton had a 
profound in f lu e n c e  on Hume, even on q u e s t io n s  such a s  th e  C h r i s t i a n  argument 
from Design.
"What Newton had c o n t r ib u te d  to  t h i s  v e n e ra b le  p roo f  -  t h e  one o f  
A q u in as 's  F ive  Ways a n t i c ip a t e d  as  f a r  back as  Anaxagoras -  was th e  
s t r e n g th e n in g  o f  th e  major p rem iss .  Evidence of des ign  must have 
impressed t h e  e a r l i e s t  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  obse rver  o f  th e  n a t u r a l  o rd e r .
Noxon a p p r e c ia t e s  t h a t  t h i s  adm ission has c re a te d  a d i f f i c u l t y  f o r  h i s  
own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Hume's a t t i t u d e  to  th e  T h e i s t i c  p ro o fs ,  and so he 
a s k s ,  'Hume a c c e p ts  th e  p rem iss ,  bu t q u e s t io n s  t h e  in fe rence*  ( t h i s  
claim  can be ch a l len g e d  by some very c le a r  s ta te m e n ts  which appear  in  h is  
l a t e r  w orks ;,  Noxon c o n tin u e s ,  'Does he, th e n ,  m e r i t  h i s  r e p u t a t i o n  as  
a Newtonian m e th o d o lo g is t '?  The d i f f i c u l t y  i s  o f  Noxon' s own making, 
because he has committed h im s e lf  to  one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Hume's a t t i t u d e  
t o  th e  T h e i s t i c  p r o o f s .  I f  we examine a l l  Hume's w r i t in g s  on t h i s  question 
we w i l l  d isc o v e r  t h a t  he l e f t  open th e  door f o r  th e  r e l i g i o u s  in fe r e n c e  
which Newton was seek ing  to  draw from th e  Design argum ent. Noxon concludes 
t h i s  d i sc u s s io n  by making th e  u n f o r tu n a te  c la im  t h a t : -
" . . . i n  t h e  end i t  was Hume who he ld  c o n s i s t e n t l y  to  th e  b a s ic
m eth o lo g ic a l  p r i n c i p l e .  Newton and h i s  fo l lo w e rs  were prepared  to
r e l a x  t h e i r  s ta n d a rd s  in  order t o  accommodate th e  r e l i g i o u s  hypothesis.'
i i
I t  may be conven ien t  f o r  Noxon to  a rg u e  t h a t  view in  order t o  defend h is  
own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  but i t  i s  f a c t u a l l y  i n c o r r e c t .  In  h i s  N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o l  
R e l ig io n  Hume w r i t e s : -  "The whole fram e o f  our n a tu r e  bespeaks an i n t ^ l i g .  
ent a u th o r ;  and no r a t i o n a l  en q u ire r  can , a f t e r  s e r io u s  r e f l e x i o n ,  suspend 
h i s  b e l i « f  a moment w i th  r e g a rd  t o  t h e  p rim ary  p r in c i p l e s  o f  genuine- 
Theism and R e l ig io n .  " ( p . 25 London, Oxford a t  t h e  Clarendon P re ss  1976)
9 . Noxbn op. c i t .  6
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Not a l l  t h a t  Newton propounded has stood th e  t e s t  o f  t im e , and E i s t e i n  
fo r  example, has advanced views of th e  u n iv e r s e  which a r e  fundam enta lly  
d i f f e r e n t .  From a t h e o l o g ic a l  p o in t  of view, P ro fe s s o r  T .F. Torrance 
has shown t h a t  Newton's t h e o r i e s  in  any case  opened th e  door f o r  Deism.12But what i s  no t  in  doubt i s  t h a t  Newton argued as  a  convinced and devout 
C h r i s t i a n  t h a t  ' t h e  heavens d e c la re  the  g lo ry  o f  God'.
At a t im e  when th e  case  f o r  t h e  argument from Design was b reak ing  on 
th e  l 8 t h .  c e n tu ry  world i n  ever g r e a te r  wonder as  a  r e s u l t  o f  th e  s tudy  
of  ph y s ic s  and astronomy, h ig h l ig h t in g  th e  amazing d e s ig n  p re s e n t  in  th e  
C re a t io n ,  i t  was only t o  be expected t h a t  many were t o  sha re  Newton's 
f a i t h  in  th e  argument from Design. I f  th e  d isc o v e ry  t h a t  th e  e a r th  
was no t  th e  c e n t r e  of th e  u n iv e r s e  had overthrown one ch e r ish ed  r e l i g i o u s  
i n f e r e n c e  from th e  study o f  th e  p la n e ts , th e f t  the  clockwork p r e c i s io n  o f  
th e  movement o f  th e  p l a n e t s  them selves as seen th rough  th e  e a r ly  t e l e s c o p ­
e s ,  must have s tre n g th e n e d  a n o th e r .  Newton's C h r i s t i a n  f a i t h  had no t  
been th e  p roduct of a c lo se d  mind, but o f  one of t h e  most eminent o f  
s c i e n t i s t s  of th e  l 8 t h .  c e n tu ry .  Hume was keen ly  aware of t h i s .  Newton 
was a m aster in  a f i e l d  which was no t h i s .  Hume's t r i b u t e  to  Newton i s  
one o f  t h e  most fulsome we w i l l  f in d  him making t o  any th in k e r  of h is  
a g e : -
" In  Newton t h i s  I s l a n d  may boast  o f  having produced th e  g r e a t e s t  
gen ius  t h a t  ever a ro s e  f o r  th e  ornament and i n s t r u c t i o n  o f  th e  
s p e c ie s .  C au tious  in  a d m i t t in g  no p r in c i p l e s  but such as were 
founded on experim ent; bu t r e s o l u t e  to  adopt every such p r in c i p l e ,  
however new or u n u su a l ;  from modesty ig n o ra n t  of h i s  s u p e r io r i t y  
above th e  r e s t  o f  mankind; and thence  l e s s  c a r e f u l  t o  accommodate 
h i s  r ea so n in g s  to  common apprehensions ;  more anxious to  m erit  
than  a c q u i r e  fame: he was, from th e se  c a u se s ,  long unknown to  
th e  w orld .
^3» The H is to ry  o f  England, by David Hume. ( As quoted by Noxon in  
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In s p i t e  of th e  f a c t  t h a t  he had not answered the  most im portan t  
q u e s t io n s  which were v i t a l  to  t h i s  new cosmology which he was contem pla­
t in g  -  t h i s  new n a t u r a l i s t i c  world -  Hume s t ro d e  forward w ith  boundless 
optimism, convinced t h a t  f i n a l l y  a l l  th e  p iec e s  would f i t .  We w i l l  now 
fo llow  in  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  what became of t h i s  a t te m p t .
The l3 th .  c e n tu ry  was a tim e when a number o f  c r u c i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n s  
between ph ilosophy  and th e  sc ie n c es  were being unders tood . The o ld e r  
approach in  ph ilosophy  had been to  b r in g  every branch o f  l e a r n in g  under one 
um b re l la .  The a n c ie n t  p h i lo so p h e rs  s t ro v e  to  ach iev e  an in te g r a te d  
and a l l - e m b ra c in g  ph ilosophy  of l i f e .  By th e  e ig h te e n th  c e n tu ry  i t  was 
being a p p re c ia te d  t h a t  one person could no t ach ieve  a complete command 
of  every branch o f  l e a r n in g .  The study of psychology on a p roper  
s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s ,  fo r  example, was c r e a t in g  major d i f f i c u l t i e s  fo r  
moral p h i lo so p h e rs  l i k e  Hume. The te n s io n  between ph ilosophy  and 
psychology has continued  from Hume's time to  the  p re s e n t  day. Some 
p h i lo so p h e rs  make a p o in t  of m a in ta in in g  a c le a r  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
ph ilosophy  and psychology. Some accuse Hume of  having become a 
p s y c h o lo g i s t .  Others defend him from the  charge .  In some ways the  
deba te  i s  f i n e l y  ba lanced , because he was o f te n  s t r a d d l in g  th e  
border  between them. His approach would have been th e  o ld e r  p h i lo so p h ­
i c a l  one, which saw l i t t l e  need fo r  any c le a r  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  but fo r  
some 20 t h .  c e n tu ry  p h i lo so p h e rs  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  has come to  assume 
a ve ry  g re a t  s ig n i f i c a n c e .
There can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  Hume a t  f i r s t  e n te r ta in e d  th e  c o n v ic t ion  
t h a t  psychology would throw up much v a lu a b le  in fo rm a t io n  which would 
be o f  r e le v a n c e  in  th e  study o f  moral ph i lo sophy . But t h i s  i n t e r e s t  
should no t be o v e r - s t r e s s e d .  B r ic k e 's  op in ion  t h a t  Hume's " . .b ra n d  
of s c e p t ic is m  commits him to  the  p l a in  m an's m e ta p h y s ic s . . . "  " . . . w i t h  
a t i n c t u r e  o f  experim en ta l  s c ie n c e " ^ ^ g e ts  i t  about r i g h t .  There i s  no
1'+. Hume's Ph ilosophy  o f  the  Mind, by J .  B r ick e .  Pub lished  by the  Sdinburgh U n iv e r s i ty  P re ss  in  19ÜO. 43
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evidence  t h a t  he showed any deep i n t e r e s t  in  th e  f i n e  d e t a i l s  o f  any 
e m p ir ic a l  s c ie n c e .  The c o n t r a s t  between Newton and Hume i s  q u i t e  c l e a r .  
The d i v i s i o n  between sc ie n c e  and ph ilosophy  was now so d e f i n i t e  t h a t  
we can c a l l  Newton a s c i e n t i s t  and Hume a p h i lo so p h e r .  Psychology a t  
t h i s  s ta g e  was in  i t s  in fa n c y .  I t  was p a r t  sc ie n c e  and p a r t  ph ilo sophy .
In t h i s  f i e l d  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  a p p re c ia t io n  o f  th e  need to  p re s e rv e  a 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between th e  two. That i s  why th e r e  i s  today  so much 
c o n tro v e rsy  over whether Hume should be regarded  a s  a p io n ee r in g  
p s y c h o lo g is t  or a t r a d i t i o n a l  p h i lo s o p h e r .  Noxon argues  in  favour 
of th e  l a t t e r ; -
"But p sy c h o lo g ic a l  th eo ry  i s  n o t ,  I  s h a l l  a rgue  a g a in s t  p r e v a i l in g  
c r i t i c i s m  in  p a r t  IV, th e  b a s i s  o f  h i s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  a n a ly s i s ,  nor 
even an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  i t .  P sy c h o lo g ic a l  e x p la n a t io n s  of 
concep tua l  confus ion  a r e  s u b s id ia ry  to  th e  a n a ly s i s  o f  
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  te rm s . . . " 2 5
Some p h i lo s o p h e rs  a r e  ve ry  je a lo u s  o f  t h e i r  own p rov ince  and r e f u s e  
to  e n t e r t a i n  any sug g es t io n  o f  overlap  w ith  o th e r  d i s c i p l i n e s .  I n : -
"Languaee. T ru th  and L o g ic , w ith  e x p l i c i t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  Hume 
A .J .  Ayer p rocla im s t h a t  ' t h e  d i s c u s s io n  of p sy c h o lo g ic a l  
q u e s t io n s  i s  out o f  p la c e  in  a p h i lo s o p h ic a l  e n q u i r y ' ."
Passmore does accuse  Hume d i r e c t l y  of reduc ing  philosophy  t o  psychology 
and, up t o  a p o in t  he a rgues  w ith  p l a u s i b i l i t y : -  «But on Hume's view
t h i s  task ,  a s  t h e  m etaphys ic ian  conceives  i t ,  i s  an 
im p o ss ib le  one; a l l  he can hope to  do i s  t o  d e s c r ib e  th e  way 
in  which we come to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  one t h in g  i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  
connected w ith  ano the r  -  which i s  j u s t  p r e s c r ip t i v e  psychology.
He expounds what he means by t h i s  f u r t h e r  when he w r i t e s : -
"Hume's p o s i t iv i s m  s u b s t i t u t e s  psychology fo r  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l
15* Noxon op . c i t .  7
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m etaphys ic s . . . " lo
At th e  end of th e  day i t  a l l  b o i l s  down to  how you d e f in e  a p sy c h o lo g is t  
and how you d e f in e  a p h i lo s o p h e r .  Accepting th a t  many o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
assum ptions in  philosophy were proving u n ten ab le ;  a t  th e  very  l e a s t ,  th e  
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  study o f  what we now c a l l  psychology was bound to  undergo 
major change. This was even t r u e  o f  methodology. In the  p a s t  th e  
m etaphysic ian  was f r e e  to  develop t h e o r i e s  which simply came out o f  h is  
own head. Now t h a t  was no lo n g e r  p o s s ib l e .  The ph ilo sopher  could no 
longer  a f fo rd  to  ig n o re  th e  work o f  th e  ana tom is t  or the  p h y s io lo g i s t .  
T h a t 's  what Hume had come to  a p p r e c ia t e .
" . . . e x p e r im e n ta l  psychology would y ie ld  a theo ry  of human n a tu re  
from which s o lu t io n s  to  the  problems of epistemology and o f  
a e s t h e t i c s ,  e t h i c s ,  and p o l i t i c s  could a l l  be d e r iv e d .
The approach o f  the  p h i lo so p h e r  simply had to  change. I f  he was working 
in  th e  A r i s t o t e l i a n  t r a d i t i o n ,  th en ,  th e  e m p ir ic a l  approach would not 
have been f o re ig n .  I t  was what fo llow ing  t h a t  approach was b r in g in g  to  
l i g h t  t h a t  was so s u r p r i s i n g ,  and i t  l e f t  th e  ph ilo sopher  w ith  a major 
ta sk  to  t r y  and make sense  o f  i t .
The problem of where psychology belongs has s t i l l  no t been re so lv e d  
f u l l y ,  whether you look a t  i t  from th e  s id e  of philosophy or o f  s c ie n c e .  
There i s  a s c i e n t i f i c  s id e  to  i t ,  f o r  i t  aims to  begin w ith  e m p ir ic a l  
physio logy  and p ro g re s s  through to  a hos t  of experiments designed  to  c a s t  
l i g h t  on human behav iou r .  While t h e r e  can be l i t t l e  debate  about th e  
s c i e n t i f i c  c r e d e n t i a l s  o f  experim ents  based on p h y s io lo g ic a l  d a ta  about 
which th e  s c i e n t i f i c  community i s  in  agreement, claims made from some 
o f  th e  o th e r  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  experim ents  a re  much more open to  q u e s t io n .
To begin w ith  Hume was no t aware t h a t  the  approach to  th e  study of 
psychology which today  we c a l l  Behavlour ism, would never d i s p la c e  
ph ilosophy . According to  Noxon's account o f  Hume's p o s i t i o n ,  he d id 
a t  one s ta g e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  ' t h e  s c ie n c e  o f  m an ', would prove to
1 8 . Passmore op. c i t .  71,.
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be th e  p roper  fo u n d a tio n  f o r  a l l  th e  o th e r  s c ie n c e s ,  ary so conseq u e n t ly  
o f  ph ilosophy  as  w e l l .
Aware t h a t  t h i s  charge  would le a d  to  th e  c o nc lu s ion  t h a t  Hume had 
reduced ph ilosophy  to  psychology, Noxon r e s p o n d s : -
"Thus Hume's 'red u c t io n  o f  ph ilosophy  to  psychology ' of which
Passmore speaks , ta k e s  p la c e  only  a f t e r  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  a n a ly s i s
has shown t h a t  n e c es sa ry  connection  c a l l s  f o r  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  r a t h e r  
th an  f o r  cosm olog ica l  t h e o r i z i n g .
In f a c t  i t  was th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  s c ie n c e  o f  man was s i l e n t  on 
key p h i lo s o p h ic a l  q u e s t io n s  which le d  Hume to  conclude t h a t  i t  was not 
th e  p roper  fo u n d a tio n  fo r  moral p h i lo sophy , k c l e a r  change o f  a t t i t u d e  
can be d isc e rn e d  in  Hume's ou t look  from t h a t  p e r io d  when he r e tu rn e d  
from th e  C on tinen t ,  b r im - f u l l  o f  confidence  t h a t  a s c i e n t i f i c  unde rs tand ing
o f  man would so lv e  our moral problems; to  th e  Hume who claimed t h a t  i t
was f u t i l e  t o  t r y  and s o r t  out th e s e  problems o b je c t iv e ly  and r a t i o n a l l y ,  
because th e  on ly  hope o f  f in d in g  an answer l a y  in  look ing  w i th in .  To 
i l l u s t r a t e  th e  p o in t  th e s e  Two s e t s  o f  q u o ta t io n s  a r e  s e t  out
s id e - b y - s id e .
" . . . t h e  s c ie n c e  o f  man i s  th e  only s o l id  foundation  f o r  th e  o th e r  
s c i e n c e s . . . "  "Even M athem atics, N a tu ra l  Philosophy , and N a tu ra l
R e l ig io n ,  a r e  in  some measure dependent on th e  sc ie n c e  o f  M an .. ."21
and,
"Mathematics, indeed , a r e  u s e f u l  in  a l l  mechanical o p e ra t io n s ,  
and a r i t h m e t i c  in  a lm ost every a r t  and p ro fe s s io n :  But ' t i s  not
o f  them selves  they  have any in f lu e n c e .  Mechanics a re  th e  a r t  o f  
r e g u la t i n g  th e  motions o f  bodies to  some d e s ig n 'd  end or ouroose ; 
and th e  rea son  why we employ a r i th m e t ic  in  f ix in g  th e  p ro p o r t io n s  ■ 
o f  numbers, i s  only t h a t  we may d isco v e r  th e  p ro p o r t io n s  o f  t h e i r  
i n f lu e n c e  and o p e ra t io n .  . . .  A b s tra c t  or dem onstra tive  rea so n in g .
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t h e r e f o r e ,  never  in f lu e n c e s  any of our a c t i o n s ,  but only as i t  
d i r e c t s  our judgement concern ing  causes and e f f e c t s ;  which lea d s  
us to  th e  second o p e ra t io n  o f  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g ." ^ ^
"S ince  reaso n  a lo n e  can never produce any a c t i o n ,  or g ive  r i s e  to  
v o l i t i o n ,  I i n f e r ,  t h a t  th e  same f a c u l ty  i s  a s  in c a p a b le  o f  p reven­
t i n g  v o l i t i o n ,  or o f  d i s p u t in g  th e  p re fe re n c e  w ith  any p ass ion  
or  em otion . "22
In th e s e  two s e t s  o f  passages  we have th e s e  c o n f l i c t i n g  views s e t  
fo rw ard . The f i r s t  p rocla im s g re a t  f a i t h  in  th e  ' s c i e n c e  o f  man*, which 
i s  cons ide red  so fundam ental to  every branch o f  l e a r n in g ,  t h a t  i t  i s  
b a s ic  to  ph i lo so p h y .  The second t e l l s  us t h a t  exac t  sc ie n c es  such as 
mathematics have n o th in g  to  say about human m o tiv a t io n .  Of what u se  then  
i s  th e  in d is p e n s a b le  foundation  o f  the  's c i e n c e  o f  man'? This i n  Noxon's 
an sw e r :-
" . . . s u p p o s i n g ,  as  a  good Lockian would, t h a t  i f  he can d isc o v e r  how
men do in  f a c t  a c q u i r e  knowledge and b e l i e f ,  he w i l l  be a b le  t o
show which o b je c t s  and methods conform to  th e  n a tu r a l  p r in c i p l e s  
of th e  human u n d e rs ta n d in g  and which do n o t .  I s  seems t h a t  Hume 
o r i g i n a l l y  conceived t h i s  problem as one of e m p ir ic a l  psychology 
t o  be re so lv e d  by an a d a p tio n  o f  th e  expe r im en ta l  method, to  which 
he was r e p u te d ly  a t t r a c t e d  through  h i s  a d m ira t io n  fo r  Newton.
" I t  i s  w e l l  known from Hume's own tes t im ony  t h a t  he was d r iv e n  by 
th e  a n a ly t i c  s p i r i t  i n to  sc ep t ic ism  -  ' t h e  b a rre n  ro c k '  he c a l l s  i t  
where he i s  reduced 'a lm os t  to  despair*  upon r e a l i z i n g  
' t h e  i m p o s s ib i l i t y  of  amending or c o r r e c t in g  . . .  th e  wretched 
c o n d i t io n ,  weakness and d is o rd e r  of th e  f a c u l t i e s ' . "25
So t h a t  w i th in  th e  T r e a t i s e  i t s e l f  we f in d  t h a t  th e r e  i s  a t r a n s i t i o n
i n  Hume's th in k in g  away from th e  f i r s t  view and towards th e  second. The
im portance  o f  th e  e m p ir ic a l  s c ie n c es  in  h e lp in g  us to  a r r i v e  a t  a f u l l e r
22. A T r e a t i s e  o f  Human N a tu re .  by D. Hume. P a r t  I I I  (Edited ,  by M acIntyre i n  Hume's E th ic a l  W r i t in g s ) New York, Macmlllaris 196% 178
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u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  n a t u r a l  world or o f  human n a tu r e  was no t  being 
qu e s t io n e d  by t h i s  change o f  o u t lo o k ,  but th e  range  o f  q u e s t io n s  i t  
could  d ea l  w ith  was reduced  d r a s t i c a l l y .
For t h a t  rea son  i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  t o  conclude t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a p h i lo so p h ­
i c a l  s id e  to  th e  s tudy  of psychology, and Hume was beginning  to  e xp lo re  
t h a t  s id e  as  w e l l .  Modern psychology owes much to  Hume. The f a c t  t h a t  he 
came t o  a p p re c ia te  t h a t  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  s id e  to  psychology would only ever 
he lp  us to  unde rs tand  b e t t e r  e . g . ,  how th e  b r a in  and nervous system 
work, enabled him to  a c c e p t  t h i s  branch w ithou t  making th e  m is take  o f  
supposing t h a t  i t  had d e a l t  w ith  th e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  q u e s t io n s  as w e l l .
That i s  why much of  Hume's work on p sy c h o lo g ic a l  q u e s t io n s  i s  r e a l l y  an 
e x p lo ra t io n  o f  th e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  im p l ic a t io n s .  A .J . Ayer was unhappy 
w ith  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  " . . . ' t h e  d i s c u s s io n  of 
p s y c h o lo g ic a l  q u e s t io n s  i s  out of p la c e  in  a p h i lo s o p h ic a l  e n q u i r y ' . . . "26And Passmore, a s  we have n o te d ,  charged Hume w ith  reduc ing  ph ilosophy  to  
psychology. But Noxon was r i g h t  to  i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an a re a  of 
o v e r la p  between phys io logy  and psychology which can only be d e a l t  w ith  
by ph ilo sophy , and to  defend Hume's r e p u t a t i o n  as  a ph i lo so p h e r  when he 
d e a l t  w ith  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  q u e s t io n s .
I f  Hume did then  come to  a c ce p t  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between ph ilosophy  
and psychology, where d id  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  how we form our b e l i e f s  f i t  
i n to  h i s  'new, n a t u r a l i s t i c  w o r ld '?  To begin  w ith  he worked on a c au sa l  
mechanism which would account f o r  th e  way in  which ' i d e a s '  a re  transform ed 
i n to  ' b e l i e f s ' .  His t e c h n ic a l  d e f i n i t i o n  of a b e l i e f  i s  a " . . .  l i v e l y  
id e a  r e l a t e d  to  or a s s o c ia te d  w ith  a p re s e n t  i m p r e s s i o n , A s  i f  th e  
s ig n a l s  which pass th rough  th e  senses  in to  th e  mind e tc h  them selves on 
th e  memory, so t h a t ,  w hile  th e  s ig n a ls  them selves a re  f a i n t ,  t h e i r  
re p e a te d  im press ion  in  th e  form o f  an i d e n t i c a l  s e r i e s  of p a t t e r n s .
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e v e n tu a l ly  c r e a t e  an enduring  se n sa t io n  which can be c a l l e d  a b e l i e f .
This  s e n s a t io n  i s  th en  fed back from the  memory t o  a p o in t  c lo s e r  t o  th e  
sense  o rgans , only  t h i s  tim e t o  be a c t i v a t e d  much more e a s i l y  from th e  
f a i n t ,  p e r i s h in g ,  incoming s ig n a l s .  The s tro n g  a s s o c i a t i o n  between 
memory and b e l i e f  i s  s t a t e d  in  Hume s "Thus i t  appears  t h a t  b e l i e f  or 
a s s e n t  which always a t t e n d s  th e  memory and th e  s e n s e s ,  i s  n o th in g  but 
t h e  v i v a c i ty  th ey  p r e s e n t . " ^ g  In  t h i s  connection  Passmore c la im s;  "Hume 
wants to  show t h a t  th e  c o n te n t  o f  a b e l i e f  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w ith  t h e  c o n te n t  
o f  what i s  be ing  e n t e r t a i n e d , .
But t h a t  i s  j u s t  t h e  beg inn ing  o f  th e  s to r y ,  because , as  N.K. Smith 
has a rgued , Hume d id  no t  propose to  " . . . j u s t i f y  our u l t im a te  b e l i e f s . . . "  
only t o  t r a c e  them " . . . t o  t h e i r  sources i n  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  our 
human n a tu r e . "  So t h a t  we must go beyond th e  t e c h n ic a l  d e f i n i t i o n  
which Hume g ives  us to  dem onstra te  how th e  b e lie f-m ak in g  p rocess  may 
ta k e  p la c e  in  th e  nervous system and th e  b r a in ,  t o  a c o n s id e ra t io n  of 
th e  in p u t  which forms th e  raw m a te r ia ls  out o f  which b e l i e f s  a r e  made.
1 . D ivine R e v e la t io n .
The e x is te n c e  o f  t h i s  source  of knowledge would have been q u es tioned  
by Hume, but n o t  r e j e c t e d  com ple te ly .  We have s t i l l  to  come t o  h i s  
a t t i t u d e  t o  Theism, and th e  T h e i s t i c  view o f  D iv ine  R e v e la t io n ,  bo th  
General and S p e c ia l ,  would no t  n e c e s s a r i ly  have c o n t r a d ic te d  Hume's 
th e o ry  o f  how we form our b e l i e f s ,  i . e . ,  h i s  'c a u s a l  th eo ry  o f  perceptions. 
According to  B ricke ;  "Hume claim s t h a t  th e  mind i s  a system o f  c a u sa l ly  
r e l a t e d  p e r c e p t i o n s . T h e  T h e is t  would want t o  a rgue  t h a t ,  n o t  only i s  
Behaviourism wrong when i t  focuses  too  much on human p h y s ic a l  responses  
t o  th e  exclusion o f  m an's s p i r i t u a l  dimension: b u t , man's sou l i s  of th e  
g r e a t e s t  im portance .  The T h e i s t i c  unde rs tand ing  of th e  sou l would lead  
us t o  conclude t h a t  man i s  more than  a machine, whose workings we can 
u nde rs tand  p e r f e c t l y ;  and more than an advanced mammal which may bear 
s u p e r f i c i a l  s i m i l a r i t i e s  t o  man but la c k s  a human b ra in  or developed
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r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s ;  and more than  man d ep ic ted  as  a m a t e r i a l i s t  or 
s e c u l a r l i s t ;  an e lu s i v e  s p i r i t u a l  q u a l i ty  i n s p i r e s  him to  seek 
fo r  God. There can be no doubt t h a t  Hume was ta u g h t  t h a t  man has a sou l  
i n  h i s  home, i n  church and a t  sch o o l.  This b e l i e f  may have been soundly 
shaken by th e  'new, n a t u r a l i s t i c  world*which he had espoused, but had 
i t  d isappea red  com plete ly?  I t  i s  very  d i f f i c u l t  to  read  th e  mature Hume 
and b e l ie v e  t h a t  i t  had. In  The N a tu ra l  H is to ry  of R e l ig io n  he adopted 
an a t t i t u d e  to  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  which i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  to  t h a t  found 
in  h i s  s c e p t i c a l  w r i t i n g s .  Here i s  what he had to  say about th e  n a tu re  
of m an;-
"Adam, r i s i n g  a t  once, in  p a ra d i s e ,  and in  th e  f u l l  p e r f e c t io n  of 
h i s  f a c u l t i e s ,  would n a t u r a l l y ,  as r e p re s e n te d  by M ilton , be 
a s to n is h e d  a t  th e  g lo r io u s  appearances  of n a tu r e ,  th e  heavens, 
th e  a i r ,  th e  e a r t h ,  h i s  own organs and members; and would be led  
to  a sk ,  whence t h i s  w onderfu l scene a ro s e ."
"Any of th e  human a f f e c t i o n s  may lead  us i n to  th e  no t io n  o f  i n v i s i b l e  
i n t e l l i g e n t  power; hope as  w e ll  as f e a r ,  g r a t i tu d e  as w ell  as  
a f f l i c t i o n ;  But i f  we examine our own h e a r t s ,  or observe what 
passes  around u s ,  we s h a l l  f in d ,  t h a t  men a re  much o f tn e r  thrown 
on t h e i r  knees by th e  m elancholy than  by th e  a g reeab le  p a s s io n s ,
T h is ,  th en ,  i s  no t th e  a re a  where Hume and th e  T h e is t  have p a r te d
company. The 'c a u s a l  theo ry  of p e rc e p t io n '  in  th e  fo rm ation  o f  b e l i e f s  
i s  no t damaging to  t h e  T h e i s t i c  view of man, because th e  T h e is t  has 
a l s o  to  accep t  t h a t  t h e r e  must be an i n t e r a c t i o n  between man's p h y s ic a l  
body and h is  s p i r i t u a l  d imension be fo re  he can form h i s  b e l i e f s .  The 
T h e is t  n e i th e r  e x a l t s  th e  human body so t h a t  th e  s p i r i t u a l  dimension i s  
downgraded, nor does he e x a l t  th e  realm of th e  s p i r i t  a t  th e  expense of 
r e a l  l i f e  in  a human body. This i s  ve ry  im p o r ta n t ,  because physio logy  -  
th e  s tudy  o f  th e  p h y s ic a l  s t r u c t u r e  and workings o f  th e  body -  t e l l s  us 
l i t t l e  about a person's b e l i e f s  and how they  a re  formed. The r i c h  i n t e l l e c -
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t u a i  l i f e  in  which Hume r e v e l l e d ,  fo r  example, could  never be d isco v e red  
th rough  examining th e  workings o f  h i s  b r a i n .  Were a p s y c h o lo g is t  or a 
p h y s io lo g i s t  given th e  assignm ent o f  e s t a b l i s h in g  a p e r s o n 's  b e l i e f s  
p u re ly  from a p h y s ic a l  exam ination  o f  t h a t  p e r s o n 's  b o d i ly  p ro c e s s e s ,  on ly  
a ve ry  l im i t e d  amount o f  in fo rm a t io n  could be o b ta in e d .  Had Hume's o r i g i n a l  
hunches proved c o r r e c t ,  such a p h y s ic a l  exam ination  would have brought t o  
l i g h t  a p h y s ic a l  mechanism which c re a te d  b e l i e f s .  We have a l r e a d y  looked 
a t  th e  th eo ry  t h a t  'an  enduring  s e n s a t io n '  could  be such a mechanism.
I t  would be e q u a l ly  m is taken  t o  imagine t h a t  such an exam ination could 
t e l l  us n o th in g .  The d o c to r  or n u rse  working in  a p s y c h ia t r i c  u n i t  could 
t e l l  us o th e rw is e .  What i s  happening to  our body can co lou r  our b e l i e f s .
A p e r s o n 's  o p in ions  when i n  p e r f e c t  h e a l th  and a t  th e  h e ig h t  o f  h i s  powers 
a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be d i f f e r e n t  to  th o se  which he may f l e e t i n g l y  exp ress  when 
d e l i r i o u s  w ith  a f e v e r .
N e v e r th e le s s ,  t h e  human s p i r i t  i s  very  s t r o n g .  Most o f  a l l  in  t h a t  p a r t  
o f  our s p i r i t u a l  and p s y c h o lo g ic a l  make-up connected w ith  th e  fo rm ation  
and ho ld ing  on t o  of our b e l i e f s .  And, w hile  e d u c a t io n ,  severe  i l l n e s s ,  
p e r s e c u t io n  and t o r t u r e  may have th e  e f f e c t  o f  changing our ou t look  fo r  
a t im e , given th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  r e c o v e r ,  i t  i s  rem arkable  how f u l l y  th e  
former b e l i e f s  can be r e s t o r e d .  The r e s i l i e n c e  o f  th e  human s p i r i t  i s  no t 
t o  be u n d e re s t im a te d .
Thus we a re  brought to  see  t h a t  th e  in te r -d e p e n d en c e  o f  th e  body and 
th e  human s p i r i t  i s  t o t a l .  B r icke  p o in ts  out t h a t  Hume was an i n t e r a c t i o n -  
i s t ,  so t h a t  h e re  too  we f in d  t h a t  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  s im i la r  to  t h a t  he ld  by 
th e  T h e i s t .  The C h r i s t i a n  too  welcomes a l l  th e  in fo rm a t io n  t h a t  can be 
gleaned about th e  way in  which our p h y s ic a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n  a f f e c t s  what we 
b e l i e v e .  Hume's i n t e r e s t  in  t h i s  f i e l d  was f u l l y  j u s t i f i e d ,  a l th o u g h  he 
undoubtedly  o v e res t im a ted  what could be le a rn e d  from th e  in fo rm a t io n  which 
m edical r e s e a rc h  was u n co v e r in g .
3 6 .
"Although Hume i s  a mind-body d u a l i s t  one looks  in  v a in  to  him
fo r  a developed account of  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between th e  m ental and
p h y s ic a l ;  between p e rc e p t io n s  and th e  f e a tu r e s  o f  p h y s ic a l  o b j e c t s . "
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However we d e s c r ib e  h i s  a n th r o p o lo g ic a l  model, he d id  a t  l e a s t  concede 
t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  con tem pla te  God's e x i s t e n c e : -
"When we a f f i rm  t h a t  a God i s  e x i s t e n t ,  we simply form th e  id e a  of 
such a b e i n g . •
To con tem pla te  God's e x is te n c e  a t  a l l  would have p re se n ted  a major 
problem f o r  th e  o u t-a n d -o u t  C o n t in e n ta l  a t h e i s t .  And y e t ,  Hume observed , 
con tem pla te  God's e x is te n c e  we in  f a c t  do. Such con tem pla tion  i s  common­
p la c e .  Top of th e  l i s t  of many p e o p le 's  b e l i e f s  i s  t h a t  God e x i s t s .
Under Hume’ s e x p o s i t io n  of a l l  t h e  m a te r i a l s  o f  th in k in g ,  we can see 
t h a t  th e  way in  which he accoun ts  fo r  t h i s  b e l i e f  i s ,  " . . . we simply 
form th e  id e a  o f  such a b e i n g . . . " g g  Ideas  belong ing  to  t h i s  ca tego ry  
would, in  Hume's system, come b e fo re  ' b e l i e f s  p r o p e r ' .  But th e  d i s t i n c t ­
io n  between th e  c a te g o r i e s  i s  no t  easy t o  m a in ta in .  Hume was aware t h a t  
th e  p rocess  o f  b u i ld in g  up b e l i e f s  was a p ro g re s s iv e  one; th rough  images, 
p e rc e p t io n s ,  id e a s  and then  b e l i e f s .  'B e l i e f s '  made th e  r e t u r n  journey  
from th e  memory, i n t o  th e  f o r e f r o n t  o f  our th in k in g  to  meet th e  stream  of 
s ig n a l s  coming from th e  se n se s .  But what v a lu e  could be a t t a c h e d  t o  an 
id e a ,  such as  an id e a  o f  God, a t  any p o in t  on th e  inward journey  to  th e  
memory or t h e  r e t u r n  journey  to  th e  senses?  Or how could th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  
one idea  be judged in  r e l a t i o n  to  ano the r  e q u a l ly  c l e a r  idea?  And, a r e  
th e  senses  r e l i a b l e ?  Hume's f i n a l  answer to  th e s e  b a s ic  q u e s t io n s  was 
t h a t  our f a c u l t i e s  a r e  in c a p a b le  of p ro v id in g  us w ith  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  
answer. In  a d m i t t in g  th e  f i n i t u d e  o f  th e  human mind in  th e  f a c e  o f  th e  
q u e s t io n s  r a i s e d  by th e  id e a  o f  an i n f i n i t e  God, he was l a y in g  bare  what 
la y  a t  th e  h e a r t  of h i s  s c e p t ic i s m .
In o rder  t o  e x p la in  how b e l i e f s  a re  formed, we need to  be a b le  t o  tak e
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in to  account a l l  t h a t  can be l e a rn e d  from l i f e .  Hume a t  t im es 
was g u i l t y  o f  im agining t h a t  the  ques tion  of b e l i e f s  could be 
s e t t l e d  on th e  b a s is  o f  th e  e m p ir ica l  approach a lo n e .  Whereas, l i f e ' s  
r e a l l y  big q u e s t io n s  have to  do w ith  w ith  a sphere  which i s  beyond 
human ex p e r ien ce .  To give one obvious example, Hume's id ea s  as a 
p h i lo sophe r  (which, in  the  co n tex t  o f  th e  p re s e n t  d i sc u s s io n  we can 
c a l l  b e l i e f s )  were no t e x c lu s iv e ly  th e  product o f  h i s  own e xpe r ience .
Far from i t .  A ll  th e  tim e he was drawing on a body of wisdom which he 
had encountered from h is  e a r l i e s t  y e a r s .  This body o f  wisdom was 
p a r t l y  made up of  knowledge which had been gleaned from th e  p r a c t i c a l  
experience  of l i f e ;  we may c a l l  i t  em p ir ic a l  knowledge. But i t  was 
a ls o  made up of r e l i g i o u s  and a r t i s t i c  id e a s ,  as w e ll  as a g re a t  d ea l  
o f  mythology; and t h i s  a d d i t i o n a l  in fo rm a t io n  was o f  equal im portance 
t o  th e  f i r s t  ca teg o ry  in  th e  forming o f  th e  most im portan t  b e l i e f s .
That i s  why th e r e  can be no m eaningful d isc u s s io n  o f  b e l i e f s  w ithou t 
r e f e re n c e  t o  t h i s  second c a te g o ry ,  because human experience  can only 
be exp la ined  ad e q u a te ly  in  i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to  th e  e n t i r e  c re a te d  o rd e r .  
Hume was no t prepared  f o r  t h i s  d isc o v e ry ,  and, when confron ted  w ith  i t  
he e i t h e r  r e a c te d  in  a v e ry  i n c o n s i s t e n t  m anner:-
"VJe f in d  him even a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  th e  p e c u l i a r i t y  of th e  b e l i e f  
l i e s  in  the 'm anner of th e  c o n c e p t io n ' ,  q u i te  as  i f  ' b e l i e f  were, 
a f t e r  a l l ,  an a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  b e l i e v e r ,  as  d i s t i n c t  from a p roper ty  
of  th e  b e l i e v e d ."
Or e l s e ,  he i s  d r iv e n  t o  b e l i t t l i n g  th e  powers o f  the  human f a c u l t i e s : -
"Hume c o n s ta n t ly  employs t h a t  sp e c ie s  of s c e p t i c a l  argument to  
which Berkley in  p a r t i c u l a r  o b je c te d ,  th e  argument t h a t  th e  
f a c u l t i e s  we have a re  few, and th o se  designed  by n a tu re  f o r  the  
support  and p le a s u r e s  o f  l i f e ,  and no t to  p e n e t r a t e  in to  the  
inward essence  and c o n s t i t u t i o n  of th in g s  . . .
Hume tended  to  evade r e f e r e n c e s  to  th e  t r a n s c e n d e n t ,  t h a t  i s  to  a
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realm  beyond a c tu a l  e x p e r ie n c e .  This i s  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  because i t  s ta n d s  
in  c o n t r a s t  to  an e a r l i e r  outlookw hich he adopted when he r e tu rn e d  from 
th e  C o n t in en t ,  f lu sh e d  with  th e  confidence  o f  s e c u la r  humanism. His 
a t t i t u d e  then  was t h a t  the  human mind was so r e l i a b l e  t h a t  i t  could be 
c o n s id e red  th e  measure o f  a l l  t h i n g s .  He was now p r o t e s t i n g  t h a t  th e  
powers of th e  human f a c u l t i e s  were s t r i c t l y  l im i t e d .
The way in  which he made h i s  p r o t e s t ,  however, c losed  him o f f  from 
a s a t i s f a c t o r y  answer t o  man's f i n i t u d e  -  th e  I n c a r n a t io n .  The In c a rn a ­
t i o n  p rocla im s u n iq u e ly  t h a t  in  C h r i s t  th e  g u l f  between D iv ine  T ra n sc ­
endence and human f i n i t u d e  has been spanned. The Gospel re c o rd s  o f  
th e  N a t iv i t y  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  f o r  us ve ry  w e l l .  In  them we see  a human 
baby born i n t o  our world i n  c ircum stances  which must have r e c u r r e d  a g a in  
and ag a in  a t  th e  tim e  o f  a cen su s ,  du r ing  th e  Roman occupation  o f  
P a l e s t i n e .  There was n o th in g  so very  unusua l about th e  manner o f  J e s u s '  
b i r t h .  And y e t ,  th e  w r i t e r s  o f  th e  Gospels in  common w ith  a l l  th e  
e a r ly  C h r i s t i a n s  saw in  t h a t  b i r t h  something which was f a r  from o rd in a ry .  
They saw in  th e  b i r t h  o f  J e su s  th e  p resence  o f  D iv ine  t ra n sc en d e n c e .  The 
b i r t h  i t s e l f  i s  th e  f i n i t e  e lem ent, because i t  was ro o ted  in  human 
e x p e r ien c e ,  an e x p e r ien ce  which i s  known to  every fam ily .  The i n f i n i t e  
e lem ent, th e  b e l i e f  s e t  forward so c l e a r l y  in  th e  Creeds t h a t  t h i s  baby 
was a l s o  'v e ry  God o f  ve ry  God' was no t  obvious t o  a l l :  i t  was no t
p a r t  of th e  a c tu a l  expe rience  o f  a l l  th e  people  who were l i v i n g  in  
P a l e s t i n e  a t  th e  t im e  of  J e s u s '  b i r t h ,  as could be seen by th e  a t t i t u d e  
o f  th e  Roman a u t h o r i t i e s  who, a t  th e  most, though t  t h a t  an i n f a n t  had 
been born who some of  th e  Jews might want t o  b e l ie v e  was t h e i r  f u tu r e  
k in g .  So t h a t  a c cep tan ce  of our L o rd 's  t r u e  d e i ty  i s  r e a l l y  an a r t i c l e  
o f  f a i t h .  And y e t ,  an ex trem ely  im portan t  a r t i c l e  fo r  n o n -C h r is t ia n s  
and u n b e l ie v e r s  as w e l l ,  because in  th e  person  of J e su s  C h r i s t  th e s e  
two i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s  -  th e  f i n i t e  and th e  t ra n s c e n d e n t  -  a r e  brought 
t o g e t h e r ,  Hume was d is c o v e r in g  t h a t  t h i s  was o f  th e  g r e a t e s t  importance
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in  h i s  work as a p h i lo s o p h e r .  As h i s  c a re e r  p rog ressed  he tu rn ed  away
from th e  t ra n s c e n d e n t  and from th e  r a t i o n a l i s t  approach to  th e  use o f
th e  mind, to  th e  much sm a l le r  world of p r iv a t e  i n t u i t i o n s .  In  K a n t 's  
C r i t i q u e  o f  P r a c t i c a l  Reason we f in d  what was o f te n  m issing  in  Hume's 
ou tlook :  a ba lance  between th e  in n e r  l i f e  o f  th e  i n d iv id u a l ,  and th e
t ra n s c e n d e n t  expanse o f  th e  sky above.
"Two th in g s  f i l l  th e  mind w ith  ever new and in c r e a s in g  a d m ira t io n  
and awe, th e  o f tn e r  and more s t e a d i ly  we r e f l e c t  on them: th e
s t a r r y  heavens above and th e  moral law w i th in .
2 . E duca tion .
In  th e  end Hume, acco rd ing  to  Passmore, was d r iv e n  to  advancing  th e  
r a t h e r  e lem entary  e x p la n a t io n  t h a t  education  i s  what forms ' b e l i e f s '  
which a re  no t a s s o c ia te d  w ith  ' i m p r e s s i o n s ' .  This must in  p a r t  have 
been th e  r e s u l t  of p e rs o n a l  ex p e r ien c e .  He had s e t  out on h i s  c a re e r  
as  a f u l l y - f l e d g e d , f r e e - t h in k i n g  p h i lo so p h e r ,  convinced t h a t  he was 
now m aster of h is  d e s t i n y .  His s tu d ie s  and t r a v e l  d id indeed a l t e r  h i s  
ou tlook  s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  But when he came to  r e f l e c t  on t h a t  most p r i v a t e  
o f  p o sses s io n s  -  h is  a c tu a l  b e l i e f s  -  th e  b e l i e f s  which had su rv ived  
a l l  h i s  t r a v e l s  and which he had now no d e s i r e  to  change -  t o  h i s  
amazement, they  were th e  b e l i e f s  which had been in c u lc a te d  d u r in g  h i s  
upb r in g in g  and e d u c a t io n .
In  a nuaber o f  r e s p e c ts  t h i s  was c o n tra ry  to  what he had been expounding 
when he had d e c la re d  t h a t  s ta n d a rd s  o f  r i g h t  and wrong were u n iv e r s a l  and 
had no connec tion  w ith  r e l i g i o n ,  because, when he looked c lo s e ly  a t  
t h e  b e l i e f s  towards which he f e l t  an a t tachm en t,  he found 
t h a t  he was b iased  in  favour o f  th e  b e l i e f s  of h i s  u p b r in g in g  and 
e d u c a t io n .  He had d isc o v e red  t h a t  i t  was no t a t  a l l  easy to  c ro ss  over 
th e  ' r i g h t '  and 'wrong' boundaries  with  im punity . T h e re fo re ,  to  f in d  
out about a p e r s o n 's  b e l i e f s  i t  was necessa ry  to  g ive  up any p re ten ce
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t h a t  they  could  be d iscovered  by examining them in  some p h y s ic a l  way. 
I n s te a d ,  i t  was necessa ry  to  f in d  out about t h e i r  e d u c a t io n .  The in p u t  
here  was v a s t l y  more complex than  could be accounted f o r  by simple 
s c i e n t i f i c  experim en ts .  On moral q u e s tions  most o f  a l l ,  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  
approach was seen t o  be out of p la c e .
Hume’ s c a re e r  as a p h i lo so p h e r  i l l u s t r a t e s  ve ry  w e l l  the  argument
from e d u c a t io n ,  f o r  he was l e s s  of a sy s te m a t ic  t h in k e r  than  a ’magpie* 
who immersed h im se lf  in  lea rn ed  l i t e r a t u r e  of a l l  k in d s  from every  
age, and then  t r i e d  to  make sense of i t .  Because of h i s  o u ts ta n d in g  
g i f t s  he was ab le  to  keep up t h i s  h e c t i c  pace and pursue  s e v e r a l  
t h e o r i e s  s im u l ta n e o u s ly ,  only  to  f i n d  t h a t  when he unders tood  them 
th ey  d i f f e r e d  so fundam en ta lly  t h a t  th e y  could not be r e c o n c i l e d .
We look in  v a in  f o r  the  f i n a l  system which modern s c h o la r s  c la im  to  
have found, i n  the complete Hume. And th i s  d e s p i t e  the  a t tem p ts  of 
the  Mossnars- and Noxons to  expound t h i s  system and make up f o r  the  
d e f i c i e n c i e s  in  i t  as propounded by Hume. The one system which he d id  
adhere  to  c o n s i s t e n t l y  was the Inbuitjbnism of S h a f te s b u ry  and Hutcheson.
I t  on ly  made sense  a g a in s t  a r e l i g i o u s  background. There i s  l i t t l e  
doubt t h a t  Hume a ttem p ted  to  develop the  system which the Mossnars 
and the  Noxons have in  mind, b u t  i t s  d e f i c ie n c ie s  were obvious
to  him, even a t  a f a i r l y  e a r ly  s ta g e  in  h is  c a r e e r .  In  the  end he 
was d r iv e n  to  o f f e r  apo log ies  in  the  p lac e  of argum ents. He was s t i l l  
the  p ro d u c t  of h i s  e d u c a t io n .  F a i t h f u l l y  he could  reproduce  the  
arguments of a g e n e ra t io n  of le a d in g  th in k e r s ,  b u t  seldom ab le  to  o f fe r  
an a l t e r n a t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e i r  view which e l im in a te d  the defect* 
and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s .  He extended a number of t h e o r i e s  to  t h e i r  l o g ic a l  
c o n c lu s io n s ,  on ly  to  f in d  t h a t  th ey  led  to  d ead -ends .
Becebuse he was so com ple te ly  the  p ro d u c t  of h i s  u p b r in g in g  and 
e d u c a t io n ,  the  c o n t r ib u t io n  made to  h i s  ideas  by  P r e s b y te r ia n  teach ing  
may have been c o n s id e ra b le .  That i s  why, in  s p i t e  of h i s  scep tic ism
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c le a r  t r a c e s  of a C h r i s t i a n  u pb r ing ing  and e d u c a t io n  can be found in  
h is  ’b e l i e f s ’ . I t  could  be argued t h a t  t h a t  i s  t ru e  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  
because of the  account which he  developed about how our b e l i e f s  are  
formed. There can be no dou b tin g  the s t r o n g  C h r i s t i a n  in f lu e n c e  in  h is  
u p b r in g in g ; -
"( One wonders i f  David Hume, s i t t i n g  in  h i s  bedroom, ever  l e t  
h i s  a b sen t  mind wander back f o r t y - f i v e  y e a rs  to  N inew ells  and 
a n o th e r  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  bedroom, Mrs. Home’ s ,  where he s a t  
working a t  D e s p a n te r ’ s L a t in  Grammar, while  the Rev, George 
Home d isc o u rsed  upon the  C ovenan ters . 40
I n  The l i f e  of David Hume E rn e s t  Campbell Mossner f i l l s  in  the  
background of Hume’ s u p b r in g in g  and e d u c a t io n .  ’’I n  r e l i g i o n , ’’ he t e l l s  
u s ,  ’’ . . . t h e  N inew ells  fa m i ly  were P r e s b y te r i a n s ,  . . .  Church of 
S c o t l a n d . . Mossner r e a d i l y  concedes t h a t  ’’ . . .  as a young boy 
David had no p r e p o s s e s s io n s  a g a in s t  r e l i g i o n . . . ’’q_2 On the  c o n t r a ry ,  
because ,  of h i s  " . . .  k ic k in g  over the s a b b a t i c a l  t r a c e s  as a boy, 
th e re  i s  no t  the  s l i g h t e s t  i n d i c a t i o n .  On h is  own word he was 
’r e l i g i o u s  when he was young’ And,  "Taking h is  r e l i g i o n  
u n u s u a l ly  s e r i o u s l y ,  the  young David Hume was a t t r a c t e d  to the  t a s k  
of s o u l - s e a r c h in g . "  There can be l i t t l e  doubt then  about the  form
of h i s  e a r l y  e d u c a t io n .  M acIntyre draws a t t e n t i o n  to  the  s t r i c t u r e s  
to  which Hume would have been s u b je c t  during  a t y p i c a l  S c o t t i s h  
Sabbath , when he would have been expected  to  rea d  heavy d e v o t io n a l  
works, such as Human N ature  in  the  F o u rfo ld  S t a t e .  He became a member 
of the Church of S c o t la n d .  His p ro g re s s  up u n t i l  t h i s  p o in t  was 
e x a c t ly  t h a t  of a young member of the  Church o f  S c o t la n d ,  who would 
one day become an E l d e r .  That was the  image of the  young David Hume 
which many in  h i s  P a r i s h  must have had. We know t h a t  th e re  was ano ther  
s id e  to  t h i s  young, in te n s e  u n d e rg ra d u a te ’ s c h a r a c te r ;  because, 
in  a d d i t io n  to  r e a d in g  the s e t  Sabbath  d e v o t io n a l  works which h i s  
mother would have d i s t r i b u t e d  to  the fam ily ,  he was a lso  read ing
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w idely  in to  s e c u la r  s u b je c t s ,  p robab ly  aga in  a t  the  i n s t i g a t i o n  of h is  
m other. As he became a s tu d e n t  a t  Edinburgh U n iv e r s i ty  h e encountered  
the w r i t in g s  of the  s c e p t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h e rs ,  and t h i s  was to  awa -ken 
in  h is  own ou tlook  a s c e p t i c a l  a t t i t u d e  to  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  and the 
C h r i s t i a n  i n s t r u c t i o n  which he had re c e iv e d  in  h i s  yo u th .  J u s t  how 
obvious t h i s  change of ou t look  was i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  t e l l .  There i s  
much ev idence  to  su g g e s t  t h a t  he d id  no t  make a p o in t  of a d v e r t i s i n g  
i t .  The f o lk  in  h i s  own P a r i s h  may no t even have been aware of i t  
u n t i l  some of h i s  more p r o v o c a t iv e ly  s c e p t i c a l  works were p u b l is h e d ,
I  t  i s  t ru e  t h a t  among s c e p t i c a l  s c h o la r s  he d id  f e e l  f r e e  to  exp ress  
h i s  s c e p t ic i s m ,  b u t  even here  i t  was always w ith  so many r e s e r v a t io n s  
t h a t  they  seldom found i t  co n v in c in g .  The f a c t  t h a t  he never  sought 
to leave  the membership of the  Church of S co tland  must undermine the  
c la im s of h i s  s e c u l a r  ad m ire rs ,  when they  t r y  to  dem onstra te  t h a t  
he r e p r e s e n te d  the  'new, n a t u r a l i s t i c *  outlook  of the C o n t in e n ta l  
s c e p t i c s .  I t  d id  come to  h i s  n o t ic e  t h a t  th e re  were moves a fo o t  to 
excommunicate him from the K irk  a t  a meeting of the  General Assembly, 
and a lthough  he t r i e d  to make l i g h t  of i t ,  i t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  he
d id  no t  d ism iss  t h i s  t h r e a t  as something of no consequence. In  a
volume e n t i t l e d  Few L e t t e r s  o f  David Hume we f in d  t h i s  fo o tn o te  which
has an im portan t  b e a r in g  on h i s  a t t i t u d e  to  the  G eneral A ssem bly:-
"The compliment to  the  Church of S co tland , composed by Hume 
r ea d s :  'You ma ybe  a s su re d  t h a t  the P r e s b y te r i a n  Church of
S co t lan d ,  as b y  law e s t a b l i s h e d ,  w i l l  always meat w ith  Our 
support  to  the  f u l l  enjoyment of t h e i r  r i g h t s  and p r i v i l e g e s ;  
and We a re  convinced t h a t  the  same wise conduct,  which has so 
o f te n  m a n ife s ted  i t s e l f  in  your former m ee tings ,  w i l l  be 
e x e r te d  on the  p r e s e n t  o c cas ion , and t h a t  c o r d i a l i t y ,  unanim ity , 
and b r o t h e r l y  love w i l l  a t t e n d  a l l  your p ro c e e d in g s ,  and be the 
means of s e c u r in g  a. happy and s a t i s f a c t o r y  c o nc lu s ion  of t h i s  
p r e s e n t  m eeting  of the G enera l  Assembly.
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So much then  fo r  the  f a c t s  about Hume's upb r in g in g  and e d u c a t io n .
On the  b a s i s  of h is  p s e u d o - s c i e n t i f i c  account of the  way in  which 
b e l i e f s  a re  formed, th e r e  i s  r e a l l y  no d i f f i c u l t y  in  s t a t i n g  t h a t  ' h i s  
b e l i e f s '  were formed by an e d u ca t io n  which was s o l i d l y  P r e sb y te r ia n *
But d id  t h i s  P r e s b y te r i a n  u p b r in g in g  in f lu e n c e  h i s  b e l i e f s  as a p h i lo s o ­
pher?  According to  the  view which i s  b e in g  defended in  t h i s  s tu d y ,  i t  
d i d .  The re a so n  f o r  t h a t  c la im  can be found in  h i s  q u i te  d e l i b e r a t e  
d e c i s io n  to  adopt th e  I n tu i t i o n i s m  of a T h e i s t ,  F ra n c i s  Hutcheson, 
r a t h e r  than  take  the  more c o n s i s t e n t  l i n e  f o r  a s c e p t i c ,  which would be 
the  a t h e i s t i c  r a t i o n a l i s m  which was b e in g  propounded on the  C o n t in e n t .
" D e sc a r te s '  p h i lo so p h y  f i r s t  ga ined  a h e a r in g  in  S c o t la n d  through 
Gershom C arm ichael,  one o f  H utcheson’ s t e a c h e rs  d u r in g  h i s  unde r­
g rad u a te  days in  Glasgow U n iv e r s i ty .  I t  was, however, m ainly  
o u ts id e  C a l v i n i s t  S c o t la n d ,  in  the  much more g e n ia l  c l im a te  of 
D ub lin , t h a t  Hutcheson -  h im se lf  I r i s h - b o r n ,  of P r o t e s t a n t - U l s t e r  
p a re n ta g e  -  found o p p o r tu n i ty  to a c q u a in t  h im se lf  w ith  the 
newer p h i lo s o p h ic a l  in f lu e n c e s  then  a t  work in  E n g l a n d . " ^
Although Hutcheson was to encounter  o p p o s i t io n  w i th in  P r e s b y te r i a n  
S c o t la n d  f o r  in t ro d u c in g  some of these  newer p h i lo s o p h ic a l  in f lu e n c e s ,  
h i s  ou t lo o k  was b a s i c a l l y  t h e i s t i c ,  as was t h a t  of o th e r  le a d in g  B r i t i s h  
p h i lo s o p h e r s ;  which meant t h a t  he was n o t  in  fundam enta l d isagreem ent 
w ith  S c o t t i s h  P re s b y te r ia n is m ,  even a lthough  h i s  account of the  d i f f e r e n c e  
between good and e v i l  would have been q u e s t io n e d ,
"Owing, however, to  H u tcheson 's  t h e i s t i c  ou tlook  (Lockean, r a t h e r  
than  C a r te s i a n  in  ty p e ) ,  he expounds th ese  views in  a co n tex t  
which tends to  co n cea l  t h e i r  u l t im a ta  im p l ic a t i o n s .  He i s  assuming 
t h a t  human n a tu re  i s  so p r o v i d e n t i a l l y  o rdered  t h a t  in  our 
i n s t i n c t i v e l y  de te rm ined , common-sense judgements we a re  only 
a n t i c i p a t i n g  what, as ho ld ing  c o rre sp o n d in g ly  to  a ' s u p e r i o r  Kind, 
analogous to our Moral S e n s e ' , has s a n c t io n s  which rea so n ,  when 
t h e o l o g i c a l l y  employed, may s u f f i c e  to  e s t a b l i s h .
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So long as Hume adhered to  H u tcheson 's  I n tu i t i o n i s m  he was ab le  to  
en joy  h i s  f r i e n d s h i p ,  b u t ,  once he began to  g ive i t  a more s e c u la r  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h e i r  f r i e n d s h i p  coo led , and Hutcheson who must have in  
many ways admired Hume's g i f t s ,  opposed h i s  appointment to  the  P r o f e s s o r ­
sh ip  a t  Edinburgh U n i v e r s i t y ,
3 .  P le a s u re  and P a in .
I f  b e l i e f s  govern ing  the  " r igh t*  and 'wrong* d i s t i n c t i o n  came, 
acco rd ing  to  Hume's systenv from the ' s e n s i t i v e *  r a t h e r  than  the  'c o g n i ­
t i v e '  s id e  of human n a tu r e ;  th en ,  a s p e c ts  of the  way in  which the 
' s e n s i t i v e  s id e '  worked cou ld  be t ra c e d  to  the  emotions of p le a s u re  
and p a in .  This  th e o ry ,  which he had in h e r i t e d  from Locke, l a i d  the  
fo u n d a t io n  f o r  what was to  become U t i l i t a r i a n i s m .  "To the q u e s t io n  why 
j u s t i c e  i s  approved the  on ly  answer i s  by r e f e r e n c e  to  u t i l i t y
h .  Reason.
I f  p le a s u re  and p a in  r e p r e s e n t  the  b a s ic  p a s s io n s  in  Hume's th eo ry  
from which we d e r iv e  our 'good and evil*  d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  th e re  i s  an
a s s o c i a t i o n  between th ese  emotions and reason  b e fo re  we a r r i v e  a t
c l e a r l y  p e rc e iv e d  b e l i e f s .  He he ld  s t r o n g ly  to  the view t h a t  " . . p l e a s u ­
r e  i s  c o n d i t io n e d  by  o b j e c t i v e l y  d i r e c te d  p a s s i o n * . . "  and t h a t  
p a s s io n  i s  a l s o  the  source  of energy  fo r  the re a so n in g  a c t i v i t y  which 
tak es  p la c e  in  the  mind. That i s  why 'b e l i e f *  in  Hume shou ld  be seen
as c lo s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o ' r e a s o n * .  " . . . ' b e l i e f '  i s  coming to  have an
h o n o r i f ic  meaning, to  s u g g e s t  rea sonab leness . '*  The Reason-Sense50
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  a complex one and t h a t  f a c t  was a p p re c ia te d  in  a n t i q u i t y .
" A n t i th e s i s  of t h i s  s o r t  -  Reason a g a in s t  I n s t i n c t  and Reason 
a g a in s t  Sense , Reason a g a in s t  Reason -  a re ,  of cou rse ,  a f a v o u r i te  
s c e p t i c a l  d e v ic e ;  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  Hume i s  here  im i ta t in g  the 
p r a c t i c e  of Sex tus  Em piricus
Smith op. c i t .
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I f  Hume d id  accep t  the  connec t ion  between ' r e a s o n '  and ' b e l i e f ,  
he was a ls o  d r iv e n  to  admit t h a t  ' r e a s o n '  could lea d  to  s c e p t ic i s m .
In  Volume One o f  th e  T r e a t i s e  he s t a t e s  t h a t  reason  cannot be 
defended by rea so n .  Moreover, moral d i s t i n c t i o n s  a re  not d e r iv e d  from 
rea so n .
" I t  would be t e d io u s  to  r e p e a t  a l l  th e  argum ents, by which I 
have p ro v 'd ,  t h a t  reason  i s  p e r f e c t l y  i n e r t ,  and can never  e i t h e r  
p rev en t  o r  produce any a c t io n  or a f f e c t i o n .
Reason i s  th e  d isc o v e ry  o f  t r u t h  o r  fa ls e h o o d .  T ru th  o r  f a l s e ­
hood c o n s i s t s  in  an agreement or d isagreem ent e i t h e r  to  th e  
r e a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  i d e a s ,  o r  to  r e a l  e x is te n c e  an4 m a t te r  o f  f a c t .  
W hatever, t h e r e f o r e  i s  n o t  s u s c e p t ib le  o f  t h i s  agreemet o r  
d isag reem en t,  i s  in c a p a b le  o f  being t r u e  o r  f a l s e ,  and can never 
be an o b je c t  o f  our re a so n .  Now ' t i s  ev id en t  our p a s s io n s ,  vAitions, 
and a c t i o n s ,  a re  no t s u s c e p t ib l e  o f  any such agreement or d i s ­
agreement; being o r i g i n a l  f a c t s  and r e a l i t i e s ,  compleat i n  theom- 
s e lv e s ,  and im ply ing  no r e f e r e n c e  to  o th e r  p a s s io n s ,  v o l i t i o n s ,  
and a c t i o n s .  'T is  im p o ss ib le ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  they  can be pronounced 
e i t h e r  t r u e  o r  f a l s e ,  and be e i t h e r  c o n tra ry  o r  comformable to  
r e a s o n ."
The r o l e  which ' r e a s o n '  then  p lay s  i n ,  f o r  example, th e  making o f  
moral cho ices  i s  s t r i c t l y  l im i t e d .  In a l a t e r  s e c t io n  we w i l l  examine 
in  g r e a t e r  d e p th  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between R a tiona l ism  and I n t u i t i o n i %  
R ationa l ism  a t t a c h in g  much g r e a t e r  im portance to  th e  v a lu e  o f  ' rea so n ' 
than  I n tu i t i o n i s m ;  and why Hume can be p laced so f i rm ly  i n  th e  second 
camp.
5 . A s s o c ia t io n .
A s s o c ia t io n  a ls o  p layed  an im por tan t  p a r t  in  Hume's account of the  way 
in  which we form b e l i e f s .  The p rocess  of pondering in fo rm a tion  which
52. T r e a t i s e  op, c i t .  (E d ite d  by M acIntyre  in  .Huifle!.»
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has been s to re d  in  th e  memory, so th a t  one concept o r  idea  can be 
compared w ith  a n o th e r ;  le a d s  to  th e  jo in in g  to g e th e r  of r e l e v a n t  items 
of in fo rm a tion  so t h a t  a p e r s o n 's  grasp o f  f a c t s  and p r in c i p l e s  i n c r e a ­
s e s .  N.K. Smith c la im s t h a t  what p reven ted  Hume from a r r i v i n g  a t  a 
p s y c h o lo g ic a l  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  was, " . . . h i s  la c k  o f  c l e a r ­
ness in  regard  to  th e  n a tu r e  and grounds o f  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
o b je c t s  o f  imoEdiate expe rience  and the  o b je c t s  o f  b e l i e f .
6 . R e c a p i tu la t io n .
Hume unders tood  th e  f u l l  com plexity  of  what tak e s  p lac e  i n  tte 
fo rm ation  o f  a b e l i e f .  There i s  the  r e tu r n  o f  ' b e l i e f s '  
from the memory to  th e  f o r e f r o n t  o f  th e  se n se s .  But, o th e r  b e l i e f s  
formed in  the  p a s t  have an in f lu e n c e  as w e l l  on th e  fo rm ation  of  a 
b e l i e f ,  making i t  n e c e s sa ry  to  ta k e  i n to  account what Green has 
r e f e r r e d  to  as th e  'n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y  of  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' . ^  He 
sugges ts  th e  v a lu a b le  analogy  from geology, p o in t in g  out t h a t ,  j u s t  
as a g e o lo g is t  must " . . . t r e a t  th e  p re s e n t  conform ation o f  the  earth  
as  the  r e s u l t  o f  a c e r t a i n  s e r i e s  o f  p a s t  e v en ts ,  and y e t ,  in  
d e s c r ib in g  th e s e ,  should assume the  p re s e n t  conform ation as a determ ­
in in g  element i n  e a c h ." ^ ^  So too must th e  p sy c h o lo g is t  i n t e r p r e t  ' t h e  
p re s e n t  con fo rm ation ' o f  someone's given b e l i e f  in  the  l i g h t  o f  e a r l i e r  
e x p e r ie n c e s .  In  Hume ve can t r a c e  th e  same aim to  examine 
in  dep th  human consc iousness  and th e  fo rm ation  o f  a b e l i e f .
"No one has pursued i t  w ith  s t r i c t e r  prom ises , o r  made a f a i r e r  
show o f  be ing  f a i t h f u l  to  them, than  Hume. He w i l l  begin  with 
sim ple  f e e l i n g . . . b y  i n t e r p r e t i n g  th e  e a r l i e r  consciousness  i n  
terms o f  th e  l a t e s t ,  i t  pu ts  the  l a t t e r  in  p la c e  o f  the  fo rm e r . .* "
56
This s tudy  led  him to  a p p r e c ia t e  th e  ' i m p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a t te m p tin g  
to  reduce s e l f - c o n s c io u s n e s s  to  a s e r i e s  o f  e v e n ts '  (my paraphrase  
of Green) because s e l f - c o n s c io u s n e s s  i s  so complex. The more a n a ly t i c
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Hume's approach to the  q u e s t io n  o f  how we form our b e l i e f s  became, the  
more he a p p re c ia te d  t h a t  a n a ly s i s  w i l l  only ever t e l l  us so much. That 
i s  why, f o r  th e  purposes o f  t h i s  s tudy , we w i l l  fo llow  Passm ore 's  
account o f  Hume's f i n a l  d o c t r i n e  o f  how we form our b e l i e f s  -  which 
i s  t h a t  i t  i s  ed u ca t io n  which forms b e l i e f s  n o t  a s s o c ia te d  with 
' i m p r e s s i o n s ' .  There i s  in  any case  a s tro n g  argument in  favour  o f  
th e  view t h a t  Hume's o th e r  more t e c h n i c a l ,  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  e x p la n a t io n s  
can a l l  be accommodated w i th in  t h a t  acco u n t .  That i s  why some a t t e n t i o n  
w i l l  be given to  h i s  own e d u c a t io n a l  background. A b r i e f  sk e tc h  o f  
t h a t  background has a l r e a d y  been given ( s e e  pages 7 -1 2 ) .  From i t ,  
i t  i s  obvious t h a t ,  i f  ed u c a t io n  i s  the  fo rm a tive  in f lu e n c e  in  th e  
shaping o f  our b e l i e f s ,  then  we would expect Hume's ou t look  to  be 
C h r i s t i a n .  That i s  a c la im  which we w i l l  have a t  th e  back o f  our
minds th roughout the  r e s t  o f  t h i s  s tu d y .  Does th e  c la im  s tand  up to
a c lo se  s c r u t in y  o f  h i s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  w r i t in g s ?  According to  th e  case  
which i s  being argued in  t h i s  s tudy  i t  does , and th e  c o n c lu s iv e  evidence 
in  support  o f  t h a t  view l i e s  in  h is  I n tu i t i o n i s m .  A f te r  h is  f i r s t  
v i s i t  to  th e  C on tinen t  Hume could have become an a t h e i s t i c  R a t i o n a l i s t .
There i s  much about what has been d e sc r ib ed  as 'h i s  new, n a t u r a l i s é e
world ' which would have f i t t e d  i n  b e t t e r  w ith  t h a t  approach . But he 
chose q u i t e  d e l i b e r a t e l y  to  rem ain an I n t u i t i o n i s t . As th e  r e l a t i o n d i p  
between th e  v a r io u s  types  o f  I n tu i t i o n is m  and R a tiona l ism  i s  so germane 
to  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n ,  a  major s e c t io n  has been devoted  to  i t s  s tu d y .  But 
a l r e a d y ,  i n  the  s e c t io n  covered by pages 3 8 - 4 3 ,  we a r e  in tro d u ced  
to  the  rea son  why Hume remained an I n t u i t i o n i s t  as w e ll  as to  o th e r  
a s p e c ts  o f  h is  e d u c a t io n a l  background.
For th e  purpose o f  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  Hume, a  c l e a r  grasp o f  h is  
a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  model i s  e s s e n t i a l .  Were we to  examine i t  s u p e r f i c i a l l y ,  
we might be led  to  conclude t h a t  i t  was a p roduct o f  th e  E n l ig h ta im en t.
48.
As we have been d i s c o v e r in g  from our s tudy  o f  h is  'new, n a t u r a l i s t i c  
world', i t  c o n ta in s  s t ro n g  Enlightenm ent emphases. There i s  p r e s e n t  the  
new p reo c c u p a tio n  w ith  the  p h y s ic a l ,  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  p ro ce sse s  in f lu e n c in g  
behav iou r ,  in c lu d in g  th e  t o t a l  m ental s t a t e .  This had in  i t s  favour 
th e  f a c t  t h a t  f o r  th e  f i r s t  time psychology was being  given a  soundly 
e m p ir ic a l  b a s i s .  A lthough s e v e r a l  o f  Hume's hunches were rea so n ab ly  
a c c u r a te ,  i t  must be remembered t h a t  most o f  h i s  c o nc lu s ions  were o f  a 
com ple te ly  s p e c u la t i v e  n a tu r e .
That was one s id e  o f  th e  p i c t u r e .  The p h y s ic a l  and' the  p h y s io lo g ic a l .  
Because t h e r e  was s t i l l  p le n ty  o f  room l e f t  f o r  a u n iv e r s e  o f  s p i r i t u a l  
a c t i v i t y  -  and t h i s  in c lu d ed  th e  e spousa l  o f  s tro n g  moral c o n v ic t io n s  -  
h i s  model he ld  to  much more than  a c rude ly  m ec h a n is t ic  view o f  th e  human 
body. So t h a t  i t  i s  im p o r ta n t  to  bear  in  mind th e  two extrem es. That 
o f  a c ru d e ly  r e d u c t i o n i s t i c  ' p s y c h o lo g ic a l  d e te rm in is m ',  on th e  one 
hand; and o f  a s p i r i t u a l  l i f e  ve ry  much roo ted  in  th e  G a lv in is tL c  
Edinburgh o f  th e  p e r io d ,  on th e  o t h e r .  Hume was much more in  tune w ith  
w ith  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  Edinburgh l i f e  than many of  h i s  s e c u la r  i n t e r p r e t e r s  
have been w i l l i n g  to a c c e p t .  He must, f o r  example, have l i s t e n e d  to  
p re a c h e rs  l i k e  John Brown, f o r  he sa id  o f  him -  "That man p reaches  as  i f  
C h r i s t  s tood a t  h i s  elbow. By p re s e n t -d a y  s ta n d a rd s  he would have been 
co n s id e red  p r u d is h ,  as modern s c e p t i c s  appear  l i t t l e  concerned about 
q u e s t io n s  r e l a t i n g  to  modesty! His ' s c e p t i c i s m ' had no t produced a 
r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  a n th r o p o lo g ic a l  model.
1. The P re su p p o s i t io n s  Behind Hume's Model.
Although Hume q u i te  o f te n  adopted the  a i r s  o f  an i m p a r t i a l  f r e e th i n k e r ,  
i t  would be wrong to concede from the  o u t s e t  t h a t  h i s  ou tlook  was 
u n a f f e c te d  by r e l i g i o u s  id e a s .  At a l l  tim es h is  a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  model 
must be viewed as th e  p roduct  o f  a th in k e r  w ith  h ig h ly  developed 
r e l i g i o u s  id e a s .
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Two major p re s u p p o s i t io n s  a re  p re s e n t  in  h i s  a n th r o p o lo g ic a l  model. The 
f i r s t  was the  I n tu i t i o n i s m  which he i n h e r i t e d  from F ra n c is  Hutcheson.
The second, an on to logy  and cosmology which in c o rp o ra te d  i n to  i t s  t o t a l  
framework, something a k in  to  K a n t 's  ' a b s t r a c t  m oral i d e a s ' .
a .  'An I n tu i t i o n i s m  which he ld  to  a r e l i g i o u s  view o f  m an '.  In view of 
th e  f a c t  t h a t  Hume, in  Book I I I  o f  th e  T r e a t i s e , i n s i s t s  t h a t  "Moral 
D i s t i n c t i o n s  a r e  Not D e r iv 'd  from R e a s o n a n d  bases much o f  th e  rea so n in g  
in  the  middle s e c t io n  o f  th e  T r e a t i s e  on t h a t  c la im , we cannot read  or 
i n t e r p r e t  him w ithou t  c o n f ro n t in g  h i s  I n tu i t i o n i s m .  I t  i s  the  key to  h is  
moral th e o ry .
He a ttem pted  to  make t h i s  m oral th eo ry  work by u n i t i n g  the  I n t u i t i o n i s t  
approach w ith  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  de te rm in ism . He had a l re a d y  explored  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  f in d in g  a 'p h y s i c a l  mechanism fo r  b e l i e f ' ,  on ly  to  r e a l i z e  
t h a t  i t  led  to  a dead-rend. The new a t te m p t ,  t h a t  o f  combining th e  
i n t u i t i o n i s t  approach  w ith  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  de te rm in ism , was p rov ing  to  be 
much more sound. I t  sought to  b r in g  to g e th e r  the  e m p ir ic a l  and non-empi- 
r i c a l  f a c t o r s  in  human b eh av io u r .  I t  i s  a l s o  t r u e  t h a t  he s t r u c k  th e  
ba lance  w e l l .  Psychology was endeavouring to pu t  the  s tudy o f  human 
n a tu re  on a s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s .  This  had no t been done p ro p e r ly  b e fo re .  
Much im portan t  in fo rm a t io n  was to  be g leaned from fo llow ing  t h i s  approach . 
But psychology could on ly  answer a l im i te d  range o f  q u e s t io n s .  There i s  
a s id e  o f  human n a tu re  which i t  could no t e x p la in ,  because t h a t  s id e  
cannot be examined by e m p ir ic a l  t e s t s .  H .J ,  Paton has exp la ined  t h i s  
w e ll  in  h i s  In t r o d u c t io n  to  th e  Moral Law. He w r i te s  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  
th o se  who, " . . .w e r e  no t  c o n te n t  to  regard  them selves as the  v ic t im s  of 
i n s t i n c t i v e  movements over which they  have no i n t e l l i g e n t  c o n t r o l . H u m e  
was aware o f  t h a t  c o n v ic t io n ,  and he accounted f o r  i t  through h i s  v e rs io n  
o f  I n tu i t i o n i s m .  In  h i s  w r i t in g s  we see th e s e  two s id e s  o f  h i s  a n th ro p ­
o l o g ic a l  model s id e  by s id e ;  on th e  one hand th e r e  i s  the  Empiricism 
o f  the  p sy c h o lo g ic a l  approach , on the  o th e r  h i s  I n tu i t i o n i s m .
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So t h a t  we ve ry  qu ick ly  find ouse lves  between th e s e  two approaches, 
hav ing  to  make a number o f  va lue - judgm en ts .  For example, f o r  reasoning, 
' o f  th e  h ig h e s t  q u a l i t y '  to  be achieved  s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  had to  be 
in  o r d e r .  The p h i lo so p h e r  would have to  have ach iev ed  a c e r t a i n  l e v e l  
o f  e d u c a t io n .  But, as w e l l  as having a c l e a r ,  w e l l - t r a in e d  mind, he 
would a l s o  have needed to  be a b le  to  c o n c e n t ra te  h i s  mind ' a t  t h a t  
particu lar  t im e* . Moreover, what i s  meant by -  ' r e a s o n in g  o f  the  
h ig h e s t  q u a l i t y ' ?  Scho lars  need not be u n i te d  t h a t  such and such a 
work i s  a c l e a r  cu t  example o f  t h a t .
More and more Hume was having to  r e l y  on a s e t  o f  va lu e - ju d g m en ts .
How d id  he account fo r  them; from where d id  th ey  come? A stroig case  
has been argued a l re a d y  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  up b r in g in g  and educa t ion  as 
th e  main in f lu e n c e s  which shape our b e l i e f s .  That i s  how we f e e l  o b l ig e d  
to  answer th e  q u e s t io n  on Hume's b e h a l f .  In  Hume's c a se  t h e r e  i s
no dou b tin g  the  in f lu e n c e  o f  C h r i s t i a n  value- judgm en ts  on h i s  e a r ly  
t r a i n i n g .  In  view of  h i s  l a t e r  education  i t  may be f e l t  t h a t  t h a t  
accoun t i s  j u s t  too s i m p l i s t i c ,  and we have taken  account o f  th e  
much more complex ro u te  he was to  fo llow  once h i s  e a r l i e r  t r a i n i n g  had 
been completed; n e v e r th e l e s s ,  a thorough study o f  h i s  l a t e r  works 
w i l l  confirm  t h a t ,  in h i s  b e l i e f s ,  he was g r a v i t a t i n g  more and more back 
in  th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  h i s  s p i r i t u a l  r o o t s .  His 'p h i lo so p h y  o f  r e l i g i o n '  
w i l l  be examined in  a l a t e r  s e c t io n .
I f  t h a t  was th e  c a se ,  and we can f in d  in  th e  l a t e r  Hume a scfbening 
o f  h i s  a t t i t u d e  to  the  f a i t h  of h i s  ch ildhood , th e n ,  we can on ly  conclude 
t h a t  h i s  adherence  to  I n tu i t i o n is m  was accompanied by an in c r e a s in g
r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  th e  im portance o f  r e l i g io u s  b e l i e f s  to  th e  fundam ental
va lue - judgm en ts  in  q u e s t io n .  I s  Hume's an th ropo logy  s im i l a r  in  a number 
o f  r e s p e c t s  to  th e  r e l i g i o u s  a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  model we f in d  in  the  B ible?
The model o f  th e  ' i n t e g r a t e d  p e r s o n a l i t y ’ does f in d  f u l l  and b e a u t i f u l
ex p re s s io n  in  th e  B ib le .  I t  may be necessa ry  to  s e a r c h ,d i l i g e n t l y  f o r  i t
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but i t  i s  a rg u ab ly  t h e r e .  I t  may no t be c l e a r  from one chap te r  o f  th e  
B ib le  or from one book o f  the  B ib le  a lo n e ,  and t h a t  i s  what lea d s  one 
b i b l i c a l  sc h o la r  to  say t h a t  i t s  view o f  man i s  one th in g  whereas ano ther  
s c h o la r  says something q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t ;  and y e t  i f  fo llow  the  main 
tea c h in g  of  most o f  th e  books o f  th e  B ib le ,  an o p t im is t i c  view o f  man 
and h i s  f u tu r e  does emerge. There i s  a passage  in  th e  Dialogues 
Concerning F a tu r a l  R e l ig io n  in  which Hume p r e s e n t s  to  us an o p t im is t i c  
view o f  man -  " . . .w h e n  a man i s  in  a c h e e r f u l  d i s p o s i t i o n ,  he i s  f i t  
f o r  b u s iness  or company or en te r ta in m e n t  o f  any k i n d . . . " ^ g  This 
' c h e e r f u l  d i s p o s i t i o n '  concept r e p r e s e n t s  an im p o r ta n t  i d e a l  s t a t e  f o r  
Hume, and i t  i s  one to  which we w i l l  r e tu r n  in  th e  s e c t io n  which 
examines h i s  I n tu i t i o n i s m .
The 'o p t i m i s t i c  view o f  man' and th e  'c h e e r f u l  d i s p o s i t i o n '  i d e a l  
s t a t e  were not a l l  t h a t  common in  th e  f i r s t  cen tu ry  A.D. The b o d y / s p i r i t  
union, which some would regard  as a legacy  o f  c e n tu r i e s  of C h r i s t i a n  
t e a c h in g ,  was q u i te  r a r e  in  o th e r  r e l i g io n s  and c u l t u r e s .  G nostic ism , 
f o r  example, tended to  e le v a te  the  s p i r i t u a l  a t  th e  expense o f  th e  
p h y s ic a l .  I t  c re a te d  a dichotomy which made i n t e g r a t i o n  im p o ss ib le .
On account o f  t h i s ,  a low view of th e  human body r e s u l t e d .  What th e  
body did was o f  l i t t l e  consequence. "The sou l o f  s a lv a b le  man i s  a 
spa rk  o f  d i v i n i t y  imprisoned in  the  b o d y . . ." ^ ^  Redemption meant th e  s o u l 's  
escape from c o rp o re a l  d e f i le m e n t ,  and i t s  a b s o rp t io n  in to  i t s  so u rce .
At th e  o th e r  ex trem e, th e  l a t e r  Epicureans tended to  p la c e  th e  emphasis 
on th e  p h y s ic a l  to  the  d e tr im e n t  o f  th e  s p i r i t u a l .  That was why they 
gave them selves over to  th e  g r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  vo luptuous
a p p e t i t e s ,  Epicurean te a c h in g  was m a t e r i a l i s t i c  and in  t h i s  way 
th re a te n e d  s p i r i t u a l  v a lu e s .
When we compare some 20 th .  cen tu ry  p h i lo s o p h ie s  w ith  Hume's 
' c h e e r f u l  d i s p o s i t i o n '  i d e a l  s t a t e ,  we a re  reminded o f  how dismal some 
o f  them can be. Some e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  p h i lo so p h e rs  would want to f in d  a
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p la c e  fo r  the  d a rk e r  shades in  human n a tu r e ,  on th e  ground t h a t  they  a re  
a p a r t  o f  r e a l  human e x p e re in c e .  As such, they should n e i t h e r  be 
d im in ished  nor d e n ie d .  Because o f  th a t ,  ambiguous a t t i t u d e s  to  the  same 
t r a i t s  can be d isc e rn e d  a t  th e  p r e s e n t  t im e, in  popu lar  as w e l l  as 
high-brow c u l t u r e .
Whereas Hume, we a r e  t o l d ,  had an " . . . o p e n ,  s o c ia l  and c h e e r f u l  humour."
6 )He wanted no t ru c k  w ith  th e  G nostic  dichotomy, or the  Thom istic  s p e c u la t io n  
concern ing  th e  ' s u b s i s t e n c e  o f  th e  so u l* .  At the  same tim e, he d id  n o t  
j u s t  see man as a 'n ak ed  a p e ' ,  as  suggested  by some a n th r o p o lo g ic a l  s tu d i e s  
o f  the  2 0 t h .  c en tu ry  in  which man i s  seen p r im a r i ly  as the  h ig h e s t  o f  th e  
p r im a te s .  Hume saw th e  human s p i r i t  as having tremendous p o t e n t i a l  and 
because of t h a t  was f o r  a c u l t i v a t i o n  of a l l  t h a t  was a c c e s s ib l e  in  the  
realm  o f  m o r a l i t y .  That was why h i s  sc e p t ic ism  d id  no t p reven t  him from 
p r a i s in g  what look s u s p ic io u s ly  l i k e  C h r i s t i a n  v i r t u e s .
I t  i s  no tew orthy t h a t  U t i l i t a r i a n s  were l a t e r  to  in tro d u c e  a ' f e l i c i f i c  
c a l c u l u s ' ,  o r  s c a l e  o f  human p l e a s u r e s ,  in  o rd e r  to  t r y  and remove the  
im press ion  t h a t  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  was only concerned w ith  the  g r a t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  lower p l e a s u r e s .
Hume took th e  t r o u b le  to  d e f in e  in  broad terms what he unders tood  by 
v i r t u e .  " I t  i s  indeed obvious t h a t  w r i t e r s  o f  a l l  n a t io n s  and a l l  ages 
concur in  app laud ing  j u s t i c e ,  humanity, magnanimity, p rudence , v i v a c i t y ;  
and in  blaming th e  o p p o s i te  q u a l i t i e s . "  A s e l e c t i o n  which would no t  lookOS.
ou t  o f  p la c e  in  the  New Testament! S im ila r  q u a l i t i e s  a re  p ra i s e d  o u t s id e  
a C h r i s t i a n  c o n te x t ,  bu t no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h a t  s e l e c t i o n  o r  in  harmony w ith  
th e  way in  which Hume would have in t e r p r e t e d  them. These were very 
im portan t  f o r  an u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  h is  ' c h e e r f u l  d i s p o s i t i o n '  i d e a l .
The f u l l  b i b l i c a l  view of  th e  C h r i s t i a n  way o f  l i f e ,  however, went 
f a r  beyond Hume's i d e a l  s t a t e .  The New Testament speaks o f  th e  C h r i s t i a n  
as th e  "new c r e a t i o n " ;  " . . . a  reborn  microcosm belonging to  th e  e s c h a to lo -
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g i c a i  macrocosm o f  th e  new heavens and the  new e a r t h . "  The C h r i s t i a n65would a rgue  t h a t  t h e r e  must be a renewing o f  o n e 's  moral judgment as w ell  
as o f  o n e 's  r e s o lv e  to  do good. There i s  a h in t  o f  t h i s  approach in  one 
o f  Hume's l e t t e r s  to  Hutcheson -  " . . . i n  your o b se rv in g ,  t h a t  th e re
wants a c e r t a i n  Warmth in  the  Cause of  V i r tu e ,  which, you th in k ,  a l l  good 
Men wou'd r e l i s h . . . I  in te n d  to  make a new T ry a l ,  i f  i t  be p o s s ib l e  to 
make th e  M o ra l i s t  and M etaphysic ian  ag ree  a l i t t l e  b e t t e r . B u t  nowhere 
does he o f f e r  the  p ra y e r  o f  i  T hessa lon ians  5; " . . . t h e  God who g ives  us 
peace , make you holy  in  every  way, and keep your whole be ing , s p i r i t ,  
so u l  and body, f r e e  from every f a u l t  a t  th e  coming o f  our Lord Je su s  
C h r i s t . "67
2 . The accep tance  o f  a b s t r a c t  moral s ta n d a rd s .
To Hume's I n tu i t i o n i s m  must be added h is  ' a b s t r a c t  moral s t a n d a r d s ' ,
because I n tu i t i o n i s m  on i t s  own i s  too s u b je c t iv e  to  y ie ld  a c l e a r l y
d e f in ed  moral code. When he a s s e r t e d  t h a t ,  " I t  i s  indeed obvious
t h a t  w r i t e r s  o f  a l l  n a t io n s  and a l l  ages concur in  app laud ing  j u s t i c e ,
humanity, magnanimity, p rudence , v i v a c i ty :  and in  blaming the  o p p o s i te
q u a l i t i e s . "  he put forward in  c l e a r ,  p r e p o s i t i o n a l  terms the  o u t l i n e  o f  68
a s e t  o f  a b s t r a c t  m oral s ta n d a r d s .  Perhaps H .J . P a to n 's  comment w ith  
r e f e r e n c e  to  K a n t 's  cosmology h e lp s  to  ex p la in  what i s  meant by t h i s .
" In  the  fac e  o f  t h i s , "  Paton w r i t e s ,  " . . .K a n t  o f f e r s  us a defence  
o f  rea so n a b le n e ss  in  a c t i o n :  he reminds us t h a t ,  however much th e  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  m o ra l i ty  may va ry  w ith  va ry in g  c irc u m stan c e s ,  a 
good man i s  one who a c t s  on the  s u p p o s i t io n  t h a t  th e r e  i s  an 
uncond it ioned  and o b je c t iv e  moral s tandard  ho ld ing  f o r  a l l  men in  
v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  r a t i o n a l i t y  as human b e ings .
'An uncond it ioned  and o b je c t iv e  moral s tandard  ho ld ing  f o r  a l l  men in  
v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  r a t i o n a l i t y ' . To d isc u s s  t h i s  f u l l y  would tak e  us in to  
a major s tudy  o f  B a to n 's  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  Kant, bu t  he does appear to
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be saying  two th in g s  which a r e  o f  re le v an c e  to  what i s  being sa id  about 
Hume. F i r s t ,  t h a t  Kant was p o s tu l a t i n g  an o b je c t iv e  moral s ta n d a rd .  
Second, t h a t  t h i s  i s  recogn ized  because o f  our ' r a t i o n a l i t y *  as human 
be in g s .  In t h i s  c o n te x t  t h a t  d e s c r ip t i o n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  because he appear 
to  be su g g es t in g  t h a t  t h i s  i s  something which th e  mind apprehends, r a t h e r  
than  the  in n e r  s e l f  i n t u i t s .  As we w i l l  see  l a t e r ,  among th e  T h e i s t i c  
P ro o fs ,  Kant s t i l l  r e t a in e d  a h igh reg a rd  f o r  th e  'm oral a rg u m e n t ' .  Hume 
too  i s  committed to  saying something s i m i l a r .  In  th e  passage  j u s t  quoted 
he appears  to  be say ing  t h a t  th e r e  i s  an 'u n c o n d it io n ed  and o b je c t iv e  
moral s ta n d a rd '  by which rea so n a b le  peop le  everywhere can a r r i v e  a t  
s im i la r  c o nc lu s ions  over a v a s t  range o f  moral q u e s t io n s .  His In tu i t ion ism . 
d e c la re d  t h a t  man has an in n a te  c a p a c i ty  to  d i s c e r n  between r i g h t  and 
wrong. C iv i l i z e d  man has become m orally  aware. E q u a l ly ,  th e  range o f  
s i t u a t i o n s  in  which man can d i s c e r n  the  p resence  o f  f a c t o r s  which speak 
to  t h i s  moral sense  i s  very  wide. Man's environment i s  charged w ith  
moral im p l ic a t io n s .  Hardly th e  view o f  th e  world expressed by P h i lo  in  
th e  Dialogues Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l i g i o n . , when he d e sc r ib ed  i t  as 
" . . . b l i n d  n a tu r e .
And so i t  i s  ev id e n t  t h a t  Hume's emphasis on th e  im portance o f  examining 
e m p i r ic a l ly  th e  p h y s io lo g ic a l  f a c t o r s  u n d e r ly in g  behaviour in  no way 
dim inished  th e  r ic h n e s s  of m an's s p i r i t u a l  l i f e .  In  th e  same way a soundly 
based un d e rs tan d in g  of th e  p h y s ic a l  p ro c e s se s  a t  work in  th e  world as 
m an's h a b i t a t ,  d id  not d im in ish  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  p re se n ted  to  him 
moral q u e s t io n s .  Man may have an in n a te  c a p a c i ty  to  d i s c e rn  between 
r i g h t  and wrong, but to  ach ieve  what Hume was endeavouring to  ach iev e  -  
th e  fo rm u la t ion  o f  a new moral th eo ry  -  i t  was a l s o  n ecessa ry  to  th in k  
about th e  need f o r  moral d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  as w e l l  a s  about th e  rea sons  why 
most people  throughout th e  world tend to  approve o f  one s e t  o f  va lu e s  
and d isapprove  o f  a n o th e r .  For Kant a s  w e ll  as Hume th ese  q u e s t io n s  
were o f  the  g r e a t e s t  im portance .
a .  To prove th e  a n t i q u i t y  o f  the  major ' v i r t u e s '  Hume quoted Juvenal
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and C ic e ro .  The accep tan ce  o fsuch  v i r t u e s  over a long pe riod  o f  t im e, 
somehow e s ta b l i s h e d  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y .  They stood f o r  the  wisdom o f  the  
a g e s .
I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  t h i s  view i s  in  c o n f l i c t  w ith  some of  th e  im p l ic a t io n s  
o f  an e v o lu t io n a ry  ph ilo so p h y ,  which p laced  the  emphasis on th e  s u p e r i o r i t y  
o f  th e  e t h i c a l  systems which developed in  more r e c e n t  t im es .  The way in  
which t h i s  th eo ry  was a p p l ie d  to  the  Old Testament p e r io d ,  led  some 
s c h o la r s  to the  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  the  c h ro n o lo g ic a l  o rd e r  g iven t h e r e ,  cou ld , 
w ith  con fidence  be r e - a r r a n g e d  to  conform to a more l i k e l y  t im e - t a b l e .
What were f e l t  to be ' e a r l i e r  r e l i g i o u s  id e a s '  were a s s o c ia te d  w ith  a 
p r im i t iv e  e th i c ;  and, what were f e l t  to  be ' l a t e r  r e l i g i o u s  i d e a s '  to  a 
developed e t h i c .  This i s  s t i l l  th e  ou tlook  in  l i b e r a l  b i b l i c a l  th eo logy . 
There i s  undoubtedly  a g ra in  o f  t r u t h  in  the  l i b e r a l  c a se ,  because 
C h r i s t i a n  orthodoxy i t s e l f  tea c h e s  t h a t  r e v e l a t i o n  has been p r o g re s s iv e ,  
but t h i s  p o in t  has been d i s t o r t e d  and exaggera ted .  Archaeology has s,hown 
t h a t  the  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  framework which some sc h o la r s  have imposed on the  
Old Testament cannot be c o r r e c t  in  many p la c e s .  And, we can see t h a t  i f  
Hume was say ing  t h a t  moral v i r t u e s  have an a b id in g  v a l i d i t y  because o f  
t h e i r  a n t i q u i t y ,  then  he was c u t t i n g  a c ro s s  much o f  what l i b e r a l  Theology 
has come to  ta k e  f o r  g ra n te d .
The t r u t h  i s  t h a t ,  w ithou t  an ' uncondit ioned  and o b je c t iv e  moral s ta n d ­
a r d '  , n e i t h e r  Hume nor the  l i b e r a l  th eo lo g ia n s  have any kind o f  adequate  
c r i t e r i o n  f o r  p a s s in g  judgment on e a r l i e r  or l a t e r  r e l i g i o u s  i d e a s .  What 
they  were a t te m p t in g  demanded p re s u p p o s i t io n s  o f  a T h e i s t i c  k in d .  That i s  
why i t  i s  f e l t  t h a t ,  once a g a in ,  he was drawing on a T h e i s t i c  way of  
look ing  a t  th e  w orld . Herman Dooyeweerd was c e r t a i n l y  g iv ing  exp ress ion  
to  t h a t  view when he w r o te : -
"So we may p o s i t  t h a t  th e  norm of  c u l t u r a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  i n t e g r a ­
t i o n  and i n d iv i d u a l i z a t i o n  i s  r e a l l y  an o b j e c t iv e  norm of  the  u n fo l ­
d ing  p rocess  o f  human s o c i e t y .  I t  i s  founded on the  d iv in e  world-
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o r d e r ,  s in c e  i t  i n d i c a t e s  the  ne c essa ry  c o n d i t io n s  o f  t h i s  
p ro s p e c t iv e  u n fo ld in g  p ro c e s s ,  w ithou t which mankind cannot f u l f i l  
i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  t a s k  committed to i t  by the  g re a t  c u l t u r a l  commandm­
e n t .  Furtherm ore , i t  p ro v id es  us w ith  an o b je c t iv e  c r i t e r i o n  to  
d i s t i n g u i s h  t r u l y  p ro g re s s iv e  from re a c t io n a ry  te n d e n c ie s  in
h i s t o r y , "71
Hume was a t te m p t in g  to  say something s im i l a r .  He too wanted an o b je c ­
t i v e  c r i t e r i o n  by which to d i s t i n g u i s h  'p r o g r e s s iv e  from r e a c t io n a ry  
te n d e n c ie s  in  h i s t o r y ' .  However, the  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  because c e r t a i n  
v i r t u e s  were h ig h ly  regarded  in  a n t i q u i t y  they  should s t i l l  be regarded  
as such today; by i t s e l f ,  d id  no t p rov ide  him w ith  i t .
b. To the  argument 'f rom  a n t i q u i t y '  he added t h a t  o f  u n i v e r s a l i t y .  The 
v i r t u e s  which he he ld  up c ro ssed  n a t i o n a l ,  e th n ic  and c l a s s  bounda rie s .  
Only in  l a t e r  times d id ,  " . . . p h i l o s o p h y  o f  a l l  k in d s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  e t h i c s . . . "  
come to be " . . .m o r e  c lo s e ly  l in k e d  w ith  theo logy , than they  ever were 
w ith  the  h e a t h e n s . T h e i r  a n t i q u i t y  and u n i v e r s a l i t y  suggested  t h a t  
th e r e  was something about the  g ivens o f  l i f e  on our p l a n e t ,  in  a n c ie n t  
and modern t im es ,  which made th e se  v i r t u e s  in d is p e n s a b le ,  even i f  no t  
always a t t r a c t i v e .
Hume o f fe r e d  no conv inc ing  a c co u n t ,  on a n a t u r a l i s t i c  b a s i s ,  f o r  such 
a sweeping c la im  about th e  u n i v e r s a l i t y  o f  moral v i r t u e s .  I t  could be 
argued t h a t  he was f a r  too s e l e c t i v e .  By c o n c e n t ra t in g  on th e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  
he ignored the  d i f f e r e n c e s  between ra c e s  and r e l i g i o n s .  The d i f f e r e n c e s  
have always been r e a l  and deep . And, even i f  i t  were t r u e  t h a t  c e r t a i n  
moral v a lu e s  a r e  accep ted  u n i v e r s a l l y ,  would t h a t  make them v i r t u e s ?  In 
our i c o n o c l a s t i c  age th e r e  a r e  a n a r c h i s t s  who seem a l l  too eager to 
o v e r tu rn  t r a d i t i o n a l  v a lu e s !
This ve ry  c l e a r  d e f i c ie n c y  in  Hume's theo ry  could  have been made good 
by th e  C a l v i n i s t i c  b e l i e f s  o f  l 8 t h .  c e n tu ry  S c o t la n d .  I t  i s  not
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being claimed t h a t  Hume recogn ized  t h i s  p o in t  o r  f e l t  i n c l in e d  to  use 
such a system, but t h a t  t h i s  s e p a r a te  account was being ta u g h t  by the  
th e o lo g ia n s  o f  h i s  day. The Reformers d id  have a c o n s is te n t  th eo ry  
reg a rd in g  th e  reasons  why c e r t a i n  v i r t u e s  a re  seen to  be v a l i d  u n iv e r s ­
a l l y  and in  every age .  They a t t r i b u t e d  t h i s  to God's Common Grace. 
D eriv ing  th e s e  v i r t u e s  from God's c h a r a c te r ,  as w itnessed  to  "by His 
workings in  P rov idence , the  Reformers a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h i s  was th e  
c o n s i s t e n t  e x p la n a t io n  f o r  a sense  o f  moral awareness throughout the  
r a c e .
Deism a ls o  o f f e r e d  an e x p la n a t io n  f o r  t h i s  sense  o f  moral aw areness . 
D e is ts  tended to  l a y  th e  s t r e s s  on th e  in h e re n t  goodness o f  ev e ry th in g  
n a t u r a l ,  i n c lu d in g  human n a tu r e .  P e o p le 's  v ic e s  could  be a t t r i b u t e d  
to  t h e i r  l a c k  o f  ' n a t u r a l n e s s ' .  Had they  been allowed to  grow up n a tu r a ­
l l y ,  what they  would have given e x p ress io n  to would have been goodness. 
Rousseau, f o r  example, urged t h a t ,  " . . . c h i l d r e n  brought up ' n a t u r a l l y '  
would be w ithou t th e  v ic e s  o f  a d u l t s . "  This was because, " . . . t h e i r  
'n a t u r a l  im p u ls e s ' . . .were i n h e r e n t l y  noble  and j u s t . B u t  th e  D e i s t i c  
case  d id  not much im press Hume. We a re  made aware o f  t b l s  by the  
f o rc e fu ln e s s  o f  h i s  r e j e c t i o n  o f  D e i s t i c  n a tu ra l i sm ," N o th in g  can be 
more u n p h i lo s o p h ic a l  than  th o se  systems which a s s e r t  t h a t  v i r t u e  i s  
n a tu r a l  and v ic e  u n n a tu r a l . "  This  lea d s  him to conclude t h a t ,  "Every 
kind o f  v i r t u e  i s  no t  n a t u r a l ; . . . "  but i s  " . . . s o m e  a r t i f i c e  o r  c o n t r i v ­
ance e .g .  j u s t i c e .
As we t r y  to  d isc o v e r  what was to  se rv e  Hume as a gu ide, in  the  
e v a lu a t io n  o f  human ' a r t i f i c e s  and c o n t r i v a n c e s ' , we can see  th a t  
he s e t  a cou rse  i n to  the  morass o f  su b je c t iv ism :  th e  morass in to  which
s e c u la r  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  has f i n a l l y  led  u s .  When g r e a t  minds d i f f e r  
d i a m e t r i c a l l y ,  who i s  to  de te rm ine  whose op in ion  i s  r i g h t ?  As man, who, 
acco rd ing  to  Hume, i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  to  reason  m ora l ly  endeavour* to 
show why one s e t  o f  ' a r t i f i c e s '  a re  to  be p r e f e r r e d  to  ' t h e  course  of
73. The P sy c h o lo g ic a l  Development o f  the  C h i ld ,  by P.H. Mussen.New Jers ey, P r e n tic e -H a lli9 6 3 , 2
74. T r e a t i s e  op. c i t .  (Ed. M acIntyre , o p . c l t , )  203
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n a t u r e ' , how i s  he to  defend h is  choice? Does th e  answer l i e  i n  a 
p e r s o n 's  educa t ion :  o r  i s  i t  m erely a m a t te r  o f  s h i f t i n g  'o p i n io n '?
These were im p o r ta n t ,  t e l l i n g  q u e s t io n s .  They served  to  show how much 
Hume's world-view  had deve loped . They a l s o  showed why, w ithou t th e  
f a i t h  which had t r a in e d  h i s  enqu ir ing  mind, they  were proving hard to  
answ er.
We have a l r e a d y  noted t h a t  th e  young Hume was given to  s o u l - s e a rc h in g .  
For Hume the  t h in k e r ,  th e  m ora lly  aware in d iv id u a l  must a ls o  look  
w i th in .  The approach i s  t h a t  o f  P re sb y te r ia n  i n t r o s p e c t io n .  According 
to  t h a t  approach; th e  God who " . . .know s us a l t o g e t h e r . . . "  who 
" . . .e x a m in e s  u s ,  proves u s ,  and t r i e s  our r e i n s . . . " ^ ^ I s  a b le  to  awaken 
us out o f  s p i r i t u a l  slumber and moral l a x i t y ,  to  s p i r i t u a l  a l e r t n e s s
and moral c a r e f u ln e s s .  So t h a t  i t  i s  much more than  a q u es tion  o f
en su r in g  t h a t  our p h y s io lo g ic a l  p rocesses  a re  working w e l l .  P r e s b y te r i a -  
nism would have held  t h a t  th e  body can be in  p e r f e c t  h e a l th  and y e t  
th e  consc ience  a s le e p .  None o f  t h i s  comes a c ro s s  to  us in  Hume's
w r i t i n g s .  His language i s  t h a t  o f  moral ph ilo sophy . And y e t  th e
emphasis i s  in  many ways s i m i l a r .  I f  the  language o f  P r e s b y te r ia n  
i n t r o s p e c t io n  i s  s u b s t i t u t e d  w ith  t h a t  o f  Hume's I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  then  
we may f in d  t h a t  th e  a c t i v i t y  in  which the  in d iv id u a l  i s  engaged i s  
s i m i l a r .  In h i s  c a se ,  th e  answer to  a moral problem i s  found by look ing  
w i th in .
75 . Psalm 139.
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H utcheson 's  I n tu i t lo n ls m  and Hume's.
The p o l a r i s a t i o n  between R ationa l ism  and In tu i t io n is m  in  the  l 8 t h .  
c e n tu ry  was h ig h ly  s i g n i f i c a n t .  I t  d iv ided  sc h o la r s  in to  two camps w ith  
q u i te  d i f f e r e n t  ways o f  look ing  a t  the  w orld . I t  led  a lso  to  th e  in t r o d u c ­
t i o n  o f  a new, h ig h ly  i n f l u e n t i a l  I n tu i t io n is m ,  fo llo w in g  a new i n t e r p r e ­
t a t i o n  by David Hume. I f  we were to ask today f o r  a b r i e f  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  Humean p h i lo so p h y ,  a  major p a r t  o f  th e  answer would be t h a t  he was 
a s e c u la r  I n t u i t i o n i s t .  I f  we were to  ask lea d in g  Humean s c h o la r s  what 
i t  i s  t h a t  they  f in d  so f a s c i n a t i n g  about h i s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  id e a s ,  ag a in  
they  would p o in t  to  th e  s e c u la r  I n tu i t i o n is m  which i s  developed so 
c l e a r l y  in  h i s  major works. He s tands  in  a t r a d i t i o n .  He i s  a very  
im portan t  f i g u r e  i n  t h a t  t r a d i t i o n .  A g re a t  d e a l  o f  h is  in f lu e n c e  hinges 
on the  n a tu re  o f  h i s  I n tu i t i o n i s m .
Frances Hutcheson ( 1694- 1746) held  to  a s p i r i t u a l  I n tu i t i o n is m  which 
had been developed in  th e  T h e i s t i c  t r a d i t i o n .  Another major I n t u i t i o n i s t  
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  Hutcheson was Anthony Ashley Cooper, the  t h i r d  E a r l  o f  
Sh a f te sb u ry  (167O-1713), who had developed h is  own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  
C h r i s t i a n  I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  o n ly ,  in  h i s  c a se ,  much more in  tune  w ith  the  
f a s h io n a b le  Deism o f  h i s  age .  W h i l s ' t  r e j e c t i n g  th o se  e lem ents i n  th e  
popu lar  C h r i s t i a n  th in k in g  o f  h i s  day which smacked o f  extremism, h is  
I n tu i t i o n i s m  depended upon C h r i s t i a n  b e l i e f s .  Indeed , i t  would be t r u e  
to  say t h a t  S h a f te s b u ry  was th e  main in f lu e n c e  i n  th e  p o p u la r iz in g  o f  
I n tu i t io n is m  th roughou t B r i t a in  and the  C o n t in en t .
R a t io n a l ism , on th e  o th e r  hand, w h i l s ' t  a t t r a c t i n g  s e v e ra l  le a d in g  
C h r i s t i a n  th in k e r s  i n  the  T h e i s t i c  t r a d i t i o n ,  had, e s p e c i a l l y  on th e  
C o n t in en t ,  g iven  r i s e  to  a r a d i c a l l y  new school o f  thought which sought 
to  p re s e n t  a view o f  th e  world which l e f t  r e l i g io u s  b e l i e f s  ou t  o f  th e  
p i c t u r e  co m p le te ly .  A f te r  Hume, th e re  was a s e c u la r  I n tu i t i o n i s m  which 
p rovided  a n o th e r  s e c u la r  a l t e r n a t i v e  to  s e c u la r  R a t io n a l ism . We have 
a l r e a d y  been fo l lo w in g  th e  development o f  Hume's I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  and in  
doing so have been impressed by the  soundness o f  i t s  c o n s t r u c t io n .  I t
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was th a  p roduct  o f  c a r e f u l  thought and d e l i b e r a t e  c h o ic e .  Hume defended 
i t  r e s o l u t e l y  in  the  f a c e  o f  a su c ce s s io n  o f  c h a l le n g e s  from o th e r  e t h i c a l  
system s. Indeed, once h i s  I n tu i t i o n is m  has been g rasped , a m ajor s te p  has 
been taken to  u n d e rs ta n d in g  h i s  f i n a l  p o s i t i o n .  N ear ly  a l l  th e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
c o n t r ib u t io n s  which he had to  make can be t ra c e d  back to  i t .  That i s  why 
i t  i s  so im por tan t  t h a t  th e  R a t i o n a l i s t  and I n t u i t i o n i s t  systems be 
s tu d ie d  s id e  by s id e .
For our purposes we can observe  t h a t ,  whereas I n t u i t i o n i s t s  tended to  
p lac e  the  emphasis on human f e e l i n g s ,  R a t io n a l i s t s  tended  to  p la c e  the  
emphasis on rea so n .  I n t u i t i o n i s t s  be liev ed  t h a t  th e  source  o f  our though ts  
and a c t io n s  la y  in  the  s e n s i t i v e  p a r t  o f  man, whereas R a t i o n a l i s t s  
be liev ed  t h a t  to  have a p roper  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  w orld , we must begin 
w ith  th e  mind. In  Hume's Ph ilosophy  o f  Human N ature  (pp 203 -  220)
John L a ird  d i s c u s s e s  R a t io n a l ism  in  r e l a t i o n  to  I n tu i t i o n i s m ;  and, in  
David Hume; the  Newtonian P h i lo so p h e r  N icho las  C apald i  d i s c u s s e s  the  
R a t i o n a l i s t  model.
David Hume had been exposed to  a t h e i s t i c  R a tiona l ism  (a s  he ld  by th e  
P h i lo so p h e s )  a t  a f a i r l y  e a r ly  p e r io d  in  h i s  c a r e e r .  C apa ld i  t e l l s  us 
t h a t  he was " . . . g r e a t l y  in f lu e n c e d  by P i e r r e  B a y le 's  D ic t io n a ry  o f  
P h i lo so p h y . J . F ,  L iv e ly  in  The Enlightenm ent has s e t  Bayle a g a in s t  
the  background o f  th e  movement led by th e  P h i lo so p h e s .  I t  was w hile  
Hume was s e c r e ta r y  to  th e  B r i t i s h  Embassy in  P a r is  t h a t  he met most o f  
the  le a d in g  f ig u r e s  of th e  French E n ligh tenm ent. The ve ry  concep ts  which 
he uses  in  A T r e a t i s e  o f  Human N a tu re , such as ' t h e  s c ie n c e  o f  man', 
appear to  r e v e a l  a R a t i o n a l i s t  c a s t - o f - m in d , but i t  would be wrong to  
conclude t h a t  t h i s  led  him to  espouse s e c u la r  R a t io n a l ism . The in f lu e n c e  
o f  th e  P h ilosophes  on him was undoubtedly  h ig h ly  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  and we 
can f in d  c le a r  t r a c e s  o f  t h a t  in f lu e n c e  i n  most o f  h i s  w r i t in g s ;  but 
th ese  same works c o n ta in  a conv inc ing  o u t l i n e  o f  th e  reasons  which led  
him to  p a r t  company w ith  the  P h i lo so p h e s .  What he was saying in  the
page1 . David Hume (The Newtonian P h i lo s o p h e r ) ,  by N. C apald i.B oston , M a s s .T w a y n e  P u b l is h e r s  i n  1975. 20
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T r e a t i s e  was t h a t ,  w h ile  the  's c ie n c e  o f  man i s  the  only  s o l id  founda­
t io n  f o r  the  o th e r  s c i e n c e s ' ,  a l l  the  s c ie n c e s  put to g e th e r  w i l l  on ly  
t e l l  us so much. And t h a t  i s  a p e r f e c t l y  sound c o n c lu s io n .  The R a t io n a l ­
ism of  the  s c i e n t i f i c  method, fo r  example, has l i t t l e  to  say to  us about 
th e  'o u g h ts '  o f  moral o b l ig a t i o n .
However, not a l l  th e  R a t i o n a l i s t s  of Hume's day were a t h e i s t s .  Capaldi 
w r i t e s : -
"In  Hume's time the  r a t i o n a l i s t  model became a s s o c ia te d  w ith  r e l i g i o n  
in  a number o f  ways. One o f  the  Cambridge P l a t o n i s t s ,  More, had 
in f lu e n c e d  Newton, and Newton's own th e o lo g ic a l  b e l i e f s  as  w e l l  as 
s c i e n t i f i c  d i s c o v e r ie s  were somehow a s s o c ia te d  as i n d ic a t io n s  
both o f  God's p rov idence  and the  d iv in e  o r ig i n  o f  rea so n .
C apa ld i  c o n t in u e s ; -
"Since the  time o f  th e  a n c ie n t  Greeks Western ph ilosophy  has been 
dominated by the  n o t io n  t h a t  th e re  was a cosmos o r  t o t a l i t y  o f  
e x is te n c e  and t h a t  t h i s  cosmos was i n t e l l i g i b l e .  In  s h o r t ,  the  
b e l i e f  a ro s e  t h a t  t h e r e  was a r a t i o n a l e  f o r  e v e ry th in g  and t h a t  
t h i s  r a t i o n a l e  was w i th in  human g rasp , . . .  Even d u r in g  th e  m edieval 
pe r io d  when we know t h a t  the  b e s t  minds were p reoccup ied  w ith  
r e l i g i o u s  i s s u e s ,  i t  was assumed by the  most o u ts ta n d in g  o f  th ese  
men t h a t  r e l i g i o n  i t s e l f  was p a r t  o f  th e  r a t i o n a l e . " ^
At the  c lo s e  o f  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  Capald i concludes t h a t  Hume r e j e c t e d  
th e  'N e o - p la to n ic , or r a t i o n a l i s t ,  o r  Angustinean, o r  C a r te s ia n  t r a d i t i o n ' .  
C apa ld i  gives an o u t l i n e  o f  Hume's r e f u t a t i o n  of  t h i s  kind o f  R a t i o n a l i s t  
model.
1 . I f  reason  o p e ra ted  s o le ly  in  terms o f  the  r a t i o n a l i s t  model 
(m athem atica l  -  d e d u c t iv e ) ,  and
2 . I f  men were guided s o le ly  by reason , then
3 . Men would not a c t .
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4 . T herefo re  t h i s  i s  e q u iv a le n t  to  th e  t r u t h  o f  extreme s k e p t ic is m .
5. But men do a c t .
6 . T herefo re  extreme sk ep tic ism  i s  f a l s e .
7 .  T h e re fo re  e i t h e r  rea son  does no t o p e ra te  s o le le y  in  terms o f  th e
r a t i o n a l i s t  model.
8 . Or men a r e  n o t  guided s o le ly  by r e a s o n ." ^
In more r e c e n t  t im es a n o th e r  group o f  C h r i s t i a n s  has followed th e  
r a t i o n a l i s t  app roach , by s t a t i n g  t h a t  b e l i e f s  a re  o f  g r e a te r  im portance  
to  th e  p ro fe s s io n  o f  th e  F a i th ,  than  s u b je c t iv e  f e e l i n g s  which a r e  s im i la r  
to  th e  i n t u i t i o n i s t  system . Modern th eo lo g ia n s  can be d iv id ed  in to (a )the  
' l a w y e rs '  w i th in  th e  major denominations who a re  je a lo u s  f o r  th e  A r t i c l e s  
o f  f a i t h  p ro fe ssed  by t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n .  They would f in d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  
a c c e p t  a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e i r  b e l i e f s  w ithou t r e f e r e n c e  to  some creed  o r  
c o n fe s s io n .  T he ir  c r i t i c s  would c a l l  them ' c e r e b r a l  C h r i s t i a n s ' ,  because 
they  appear to  be c la im ing  t h a t  ac ce p t in g  th e  C h r i s t i a n  f a i t h  i s  about 
b e l i e v in g  w ith  th e  mind a s e t  o f  o b je c t iv e  t h e o lo g ic a l  p r o p o s i t i o n s . ( b )  At
th e  o th e r  extreme, on th e  c h a r ism a t ic  wing o f  the  Church, c re e d a l  s t a t e ­
ments a re  cons ide red  so unim portan t t h a t  C h r i s t i a n  b e l i e f  i s  t e s t e d  by 
ex p e r ien c e .  I t  i s  what you f e e l  i n s id e  t h a t  m a t t e r s .  Here ag a in  we see  
th e  kind o f  c o n f l i c t  which e x is te d  between the  R a t io n a l i s t s  and I n t u i t i o n ­
i s t s  o f  Hume's day.
Although Hume had been exposed to  th e  a t h e i s t i c  R a tiona l ism  which was 
being  in troduced  on th e  C on tinen t  a t  a f a i r l y  e a r ly  pe riod  in  h i s  c a re e r ;  
i t  i s  o f  th e  u tm ost s ig n i f i c a n c e  t h a t  i t  d id  no t  e n t i c e  him away from th e  
I n tu i t i o n is m  which had reached him through F ra n c is  Hutcheson. Repeated ly  
in  h i s  works we w i l l  f in d  him i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  man's rea son ing  f a c u l ty  i s  
so d e f i c i e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  no t  to  be r e l i e d  upon. Hume was, s t r i c t l y  speaking 
a s c e p t i c .  D i s t r u s t  o f  reason  l a y  a t  th e  h e a r t  o f  h i s  s c e p t ic is m .  And 
y e t  he had taken  on board one o f  the  c e n t r a l  o b j e c t iv e s  o f  th e  s e c u la r  
R a t i o n a l i s t s ;  which was to  see  the  world th rough  th e  eyes o f  m o rta l  man
4. Capaldi op. cit. 33
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and h i s  n a t u r a l  o b s e rv a t io n  o f  i t .  No longer  was i t  n ecessa ry  to  r e l y  on 
th e  Theism o f  F ra n c is  Hutcheson or the  Deism o f  S h a f te sb u ry .
L a ird  begins h i s  d i s c u s s io n  o f  Hume's I n tu i t i o n i s m  by rem inding us 
t h a t  in  i t  he had made an a t te m p t  to accommodate the  new, s c i e n t i f i c  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  man. L a ird  sees  Hume as s ta n d in g  in  a second I n t u i t i o n i s t  
t r a d i t i o n ,  t h a t  o f  D e sc a r te s  and M alebranche. According to  L a i rd ,  both 
Hume and Hutcheson s tu d ie d  Malebranche c lo s e ly .
"Malebranche d i s t i n g u i s h e d  between the  i n c l i n a t i o n s  and the  p a s s io n s .  
Of th e  i n c l i n a t i o n s  he sa id  t h a t  the  f i r s t  and g r e a t e s t  was *L'amour 
du b ien  en g e n e r a l '  (IV I )  given to  man by God to  lea d  man to 
God. The second was ' 1 ' amour p ro p re '  (IV 5 ) and the  t h i r d  
an 'a m i te '  towards o th e r  m en ."^
But, h i s  g r e a t e s t  deb t  was to th e  In tu i t io n is m  o f  Frances H utcheson«• as 
L a ird  i s  a b le  to dem ons tra te  th rough h is  use  o f  Leechman, H utcheson 's  
c o l le a g u e  and b io g ra p h e r .  According to Leechman, Hutcheson was convinced 
t h a t  a t r u e  scheme o f  m orals  " . . . 'm u s t  be drawn from p roper  o b s e rv a t io n s  
upon th e  s e v e r a l  powers and p r i n c i p l e s  which we a re  conscious  o f  in  our 
owfn bosoms, and which must be acknowledged to  o p e ra te  in  some degree  in  
the  whole human s p e c i e s ' . " ^  La ird  i s  a b le  to  i l l u s t r a t e  o th e r  ways in  
which Hume was indeb ted  to Hutcheson. In a d d i t io n  to th e  above example, 
which reminds us o f  Hume's c la im  in  the  Enquiry -  "T ru th  i s  d i s p u ta b le ;  
no t t a s t e ;  what e x i s t s  in  the  n a tu re  o f  th in g s  i s  the  s tandard  o f  our 
judgement; what each man f e e l s  w i th in  h im se lf  i s  th e  s tanda rd  o f  
s e n t im e n t ." ^ ;  L aird  l i s t s  th r e e  o th e r s ,  i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  the  l a s t ,  ' t h e  
o f f i c e  o f  r ea so n ' i s  th e  example which i l l u s t r a t e s  the  deb t  to  Hutcheson 
most.
"According to  Hutcheson, the  human mind was possessed  o f  c e r t a i n  
r e f l e x  and ' s u p e r i o r '  powers o f  ' p e r c e p t i o n ' ,  and rece iv ed  a
5* Hume's Philosophy  o f  Human N atu re .  by J .  L a i rd .  London,
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r e f in e d  but n a t u r a l ,  a u th e n t ic  and o r i g i n a l  p le a s u r e  from beho ld ing  the  
harmony of  th in g s  ( T r e a t i s e  I 2 ) .  This p l e a s u r e ,  he h e ld ,  was a s o r t  o f
t a s t e ,  no t  knowleldge; and in  th e  in s ta n c e  o f  beau ty  could be s h a rp ly
d i s t i n g u is h e d  'from  any knowledge o f  the  p r i n c i p l e s ,  p ro p o r t io n s  o r  causes  
o f  the  u s e fu ln e s s  o f  the  o b je c t
L aird  shows how Hutcheson made use o f  a number o f  S h a f te s b u ry 's  id e a s ,  
f in d in g  t h a t  th e  n o t io n  o f  a e s t h e t i c  t a s t e  which S h a f te sb u ry  had in c o rp o ra ­
ted  in to  h is  I n tu i t i o n i s m  f i t t e d  in  very  w e ll  w ith  th e  system which he 
was de v e lo p in g .  According to  Laird, Hutcheson had d i f f i c u l t y  in  accommoda­
t in g  S h a f te s b u ry 's  f u r t h e r  n o t io n  t h a t  moral judgment should be a s so c ia te d  
w ith  th e  a e s t h e t i c  t a s t e .  For Hutcheson, acco rd ing  to  t h i s  v iew , a 
v i r tu o u s  man must be approved f o r  h i s  own sake and no t  because o f  
o th e r  e s o t e r i c ,  a r t i s t i c  c o n s id e r a t io n s .  From h is  T r e a t i s e  I I ,  130, ^ 
i t  can be seen t h a t  Hutcheson was a rgu ing  f o r  a d i s i n t e r e s t e d  a p p ro b a t io n  
fo r  the  v i r tu o u s  man, as an i n s t i n c t i v e ,  h e a r t - f e l t  response  to  th e  person
h im se lf  fo r  what he i s .  I t  should  be noted t h a t  Hume found in  Hutcheson
the  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h i s  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  a p p roba tion  f o r  th e  v i r tu o u s  man i s  
u n i v e r s a l ,  because t h e r e  i s  a 'fundam enta l  moral tendency in  human n a tu re
i t s e l f .  In a l a t e r  a n a ly s i s  o f  Hume's a n th r o p o lo g ic a l  model i t  w i l l  be 10observed t h a t ,  once the  a t te m p t  i s  made to  g ive  t h i s  ‘d i s i n t e r e s t e d
a p p ro b a t io n '  c o n te n t ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to m a in ta in  i t s  u n i v e r s a l i t y  in  the
way Hutcheson meant i t .  What i t  means in  c e n t r a l 'A f r i c a  may be q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t  to  what i t  meant in  th e  Dublin or Glasgow o f  H u tcheson 's  day.
But i t  was from t h a t  b a s is  t h a t  Hutcheson proceeded to  argue  t h a t  the  
'd e s i r e  of  th e  p u b l ic  good o f  a l l ^ ^ i s  a ls o  deep-seated in  the  human b r e a s t .
To the  in f lu e n c e  o f  S h a f te sb u ry ,  Hutcheson and Malebrache, L a ird  adds 
t h a t  o f  C ic e ro .  Hume had in tro d u c ed  to  I n tu i t i o n i s m  a no the r  maxim, which 
was t h a t  'no a c t i o n  can be v i r t u o u s ,  or m ora lly  good, u n le ss  th e r e  be in
human n a tu re  some motive to  produce i t ,  d i s t i n c t  from the  sense  o f  i t s
m o r a l i t y ' .
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"Hume had found t h i s  argument in  C ic e r o 's  De F in ibus  (BI 115) 
and he c lung  to i t  t e n a c io u s ly .  No a c t i o n ' ,  he s a id  ( 480 , c f  4y8 , 
483), can be v i r tu o u s  but so f a r  as i t  p roceeds from a v i r t u o u s  
m otive . A v i r tu o u s  m otive, t h e r e f o r e ,  must p recede  the  reg a rd  to  
the  m o tiv e ' ,
As ev e r ,  Hume was on ly  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  a dem o n s tra t io n  which t ra c e d  
a p h i lo s o p h ic a l  p r o p o s i t io n  back to  i t s  o r i g i n s .  In t h i s  case  he be l ie v ed  
t h a t ,  f i n a l l y ,  th e  'v i r t u o u s  m otive ' was 'k in d ly  a f f e c t i o n '  " . . . o r  e l s e  
a m otive which, th rough  a r t i f i c e ,  had been g ra f te d  upon a k in d ly  a f f e c t i o n  
o r  one o f  i t s  d e r i v a t i v e s . L a i r d  a rgues  t h a t  Hume meant by 'k in d ly  
a f f e c t i o n '  something a k in  to  ' p u b l i c - s p i r i t e d  a c t i o n ' ,  because t h a t  i s  
how he d e f in e s  i t  in  h i s  w r i t i n g s ,  and t h a t  p rem iss  was a ls o
accep ted  by th e  o th e r  I n t u i t i o n i s t s  of Hume's day.
As we compare Hume's I n tu i t i o n i s m  w ith  t h a t  o f  Hutcheson, a t  f i r s t  s ig h t  
they  appear  ve ry  d i f f e r e n t .  H utcheson 's  could on ly  be defended from 
r e l i g i o u s  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .  To make sense o f  i t  we would have to  say 
something l i k e  -  'man i s  a s p i r i t u a l  being because he i s  the  b e a re r  o f  
th e  D ivine Im a g e ' , o r  'man can d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between r i g h t  and wrong 
because God has given us th e  Ten Commandments'. H u tcheson 's  I n tu i t i o n i s m  
i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a d e m o n s tra t io n  t h a t  the  r e l i g i o u s  view o f  man and the  
world i s  c o r r e c t .  The f a c t  t h a t  man r e f l e c t s  m ora lly  i s  p ro o f  o f  t h a t .  
Hume's was d i f f e r e n t  because he was a t te m p tin g  to  p u t  forw ard a n o th e r  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  t h i s  time w ithou t  the  r e l i g i o u s  p resuppos­
i t i o n s .  To make sense  o f  t h i s  view a l l  t h a t  needs to  be sa id  i s  something 
l i k e  -  'man i s  m ora l ly  a w a r e ' .  Occam's r a z o r  could be adapted to  read -  
' i n  ph i lo sophy , p r e s u p p o s i t io n s  should be kep t to th e  minimum*. That i s  
the  p r i n c i p l e  to  which most ph i lo so p h e rs  s in c e  Hume's time have sought 
to  a dhe re .  Hume's I n tu i t i o n i s m  posed th e  q u e s t io n  -  do we in  moral 
ph ilosophy  need to say more than  'man i s  m ora lly  aw are '?
12 . L a ird  op. c i t .  217
13, " " " 218
69.
There i s  no doubt t h a t  Hume d id  a t  one s ta g e  e n t e r t a i n  the  hope t h a t  
I n tu i t i o n i s m  would be a b le  to s tand  on i t s  f e e t  on th e  b a s is  o f  a formula 
s im i la r  to 'man i s  m o ra l ly  a w a r e ' ;  moreover, many advocates  o f  Hume's 
In tu i t i o n i s m  would defend t h a t  view through the  modern schoo ls  o f  
m oral p h i lo so p h y ,  such as  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  and Emotivism. And y e t ,  as 
we now ta k e  a c lo s e r  look  a t  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  and s i m i l a r i t i e s  between 
H utcheson 's  I n tu i t i o n i s m  and Hume's, th e re  i s  good reaso n  f o r  doub ting  
t h a t  I n tu i t i o n i s m  was ever  a b le  to s tand  on i t s  own in  the  way Hume had 
a t  f i r s t  i n d i c a t e d .
The D i f fe r e n c e s .
The major d i f f e r e n c e  was t h a t  H utcheson 's  I n tu i t i o n i s m  was much more 
s p i r i t u a l .  He may have a roused  the  m isg iv ings  o f  th e  Glasgow P re sb y te ry  
f o r  e x p re s s in g  views which were unconven tiona l  fo r  th e  Scotland  o f  the  
time -  a c co rd in g  to  Norman Kemp Smithy the  Glasgow P re sb y te ry  p ro secu ted  
Hutcheson f o r  te a c h in g  he resy  on two c o u n ts ,  v i z . ,  1 . t h a t  th e  s tanda rd  
o f  moral goodness was th e  promotion o f  the  happ iness  o f  o th e r s ;  and, 2 . 
t h a t  ve could have a knowledge o f  good and e v i l  w i thou t  any p r i o r  knowl­
edge o f  God -  b u t ,  on th e  whole, he h im se lf  was h ig h ly  re s p e c te d  and h is  
work adm ired. He was in  no doubt t h a t  man has a so u l  in  the  C h r i s t i a n  
se n se .  He could  not see man, as Hume was sometimes g u i l t y ,  as  l i t t l e  
h ig h e r  than  an an im al,  to  be s tu d ie d  in  terms o f  h i s  physio logy  and 
environm ent, w i thou t  r e f e r e n c e  to  h is  o th e r  s p i r i t u a l  q u a l i t i e s .  T.H. 
Green and T.H, Grose, two o f  the  le a d in g  Humean s c h o la r s  o f  l a s t  c e n tu ry ,  
have much to  say about Hume's tendency  to p o r t r a y  man as not a  s p i r i t u a l  
being in  any t r u e  se n se ,  in  t h e i r  len g th y  i n t r o d u c t io n s  to a two-volume 
s e t  o f  Hume's A T r e a t i s e  o f  Human N atu re .  Green and Grose were w i l l in g  
to  condemn th e  view o f  human n a tu r e  put forward in  the  T r e a t i s e  on t h a t  
ground. Even i f  the  c a se  argued by Green and Grose now appears a l i t t l e  
d a te d ,  the  T r e a t i s e  view o f  human n a tu re  would f a i l  to  s a t i s f y  s c h o la rs  
who, a t  the  p re s e n t  t im e, would want a f u l l  account o f  the  s ig n i f i c a n c e
l 4 . The PhllosQPhv o f  David Hume, by N.K. Smith, London, 202MacMillan and Co. L t d . ,  in 1941.
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of  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f ,  m oral c o n v ic t io n  and i n s p i r a t i o n  in  th e  f i e l d  o f  the  
A r t s .  The T r e a t i s e  view o f  human n a tu re  i s  o f te n  d e f i c i e n t  in  any such 
accoun t ,  no t  t h a t  t h a t  ever  bo thered  Hume very  much, because he was 
capab le  o f  evading such q u e s t io n s  w ith  a form ula o f  words such as -  
‘i t  i s  s u p e rf lu o u s  to  t r y  and dem ons tra te  any such t h i n g ' .  No se r io u s  
s c h o la r  can, however, be s a t i s f i e d  with  such an u n p h ilo soph ic  resp o n se .  
Hutcheson, on th e  o th e r  hand, would have sa id  t h a t  moral f e e l i n g  had 
been p lan te d  in  man by th e  C r e a to r .  This c a p a c i ty  was but one o f  s e v e r a l  
examples o f  th e  p re se n c e  o f  th e  Imago D e i . Human i n t u i t i o n s  were a c l e a r  
evidence  o f  m an's G o d - l ik e n e s s , and, consequen tly  were to  be taken  very  
s e r i o u s ly .
But we cannot r e f e r  to H u tcheson 's  I n tu i t i o n is m  w ithou t  m entioning  as 
w e l l  th e  s p i r i t u a l  I n tu i t i o n i s m  o f  S h a f te sb u ry  and Rousseau. Lord S h a f te s ­
b u r y 's  op in io n s  had been v e ry  i n f l u e n t i a l  on th e  C o n t in e n t ,  so t h a t  i t  
i s  a lm ost c e r t a i n  t h a t  Rousseau was aware o f  them, i f  only  a t  second 
hand. N eedless  to  say , bo th  S h a f te sb u ry  and Rousseau p laced  a g re a t  d e a l  
o f  con fidence  in  th e  n o b i l i t y  o f  human i n t u i t i o n s ,  b e l ie v in g  t h a t  i f  
ed u ca t io n  and u p b r in g in g  were o f  th e  r i g h t  k in d ,  th e s e  noble  i n t u i t i o n s  
would blossom. "Like P l a to ,  S h a f te sb u ry  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  you must surround 
th e  c i t i z e n s  w ith  an a tm osphere  o f  grace and b e a u t y . I t  i s  a lm ost 
c e r t a i n  t h a t  Hume was aware o f  t h i s  view a t  an e a r ly  s ta g e  in  h is  c a re e r ,  
because he a c q u ired  a th ree -vo lum e s e t  o f  S h a f te s b u ry 's  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
in  1726. Rousseau was convinced t h a t ,  g iven th e  r i g h t  up b r in g in g ,
'E m ile '  would grow up w ith o u t  the  'v i c e s  o f  a d u l t s ' .  Consequently , we 
f in d  in  Rousseau an emphasis on ' n a t u r a l n e s s ' ,  which, once r e -d isc o v e re d  
would e l im in a te  many o f  s o c i e t y ' s  i l l s .  A l l  t h i s  made sense so long as 
i t  was accep ted  t h a t  man i s  h ig h e r  than an an im al, and because o f  t h a t  
human i n t u i t i o n s  a re  ro o te d  in  h i s  s p i r i t u a l  d im ension .
Hume's more s e c u la r  I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  in  and o f  i t s e l f ,  was la c k in g  in  any 
c l e a r  e x p la n a t io n  as to  why human i n t u i t i o n s  a r e  more to  be t r u s t e d  than 
l e t  us say -  r e a s o n .  From one p o in t  o f  view i t  could  be argued th a t  Hume
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evas ive  about t h i s  problem, and as the  c o s t  f o r  f a l l i n g  to  a d d re ss  such 
a major weakness in  any reasoned theo ry  i s  always h igh ; i t  must be 
o b jec ted  t h a t ,  a t  t h i s  p o in t ,  h i s  s e c u la r  I n tu i t i o n i s m  was too s u b je c t ­
iv e .
I t  must be remembered t h a t  he  grew up a t  a time when th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  method was having an e f f e c t  on every  f a c e t  o f  l i f e .  The 
approach  o f  the  P h ilosophes  had f a s c in a te d  him, as  he s t ro v e  to  work out 
how the  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  method would a f f e c t  the  s tudy  o f  man. 
For some, s c ie n c e  now he ld  the  answer to  e v e ry th in g .  I t  was being h a i le d  
as a new r e l i g i o n .  And, a l th o u g h  the  l 8 t h .  c e n tu ry  was no t th e  cen tu ry  of 
th e  I n d u s t r i a l  R ev o lu tio n ,  t h a t  r e v o lu t io n  was now on ly  round th e  c o rn e r .
"The p r a c t i c a l  b e n e f i t s  o f  th e  new sc ie n c e  had been c o n s ta n t ly  
s t r e s s e d  by Bacon, D e s c a r te s ,  and Spinoza, and had a l re a d y  been 
dem onstra ted  in  m ining, m edic ine , and m e ta l lu rg y ,  in  the  a r t s  of 
w a r fa re ,  n a v ig a t io n ,  and a r c h i t e c tu r e . " ^ ^
Hume was v e ry  much p a r t  o f  th e  S c o t t i s h  E n ligh tenm en t, so much so, t h a t ,  
d u r in g  h i s  own l i f e t i m e ,  Edinburgh was being transfo rm ed  by p roper  p lann ing  
and th e  i n t r o d u c t io n  o f  q u i te  o u ts ta n d in g  a r c h i t e c t u r e ;  and S c o t t i s h  
economists such as Adam Smith were s e t t i n g  ou t th e  economic s t r u c t u r e  
which would form the  b a s is  o f  B r i t a i n ' s  r i s e  as  a le a d in g  t r a d in g  n a t io n .  
With so many im p re ss iv e  ev idences  o f  the  trium ph of s c ie n c e  in  h i s  n a t iv e  
c o u n try ,  i t  should h a rd ly  be wondered t h a t  Hume a t  f i r s t  p laced  so much 
f a i t h  in  the  s c i e n t i f i c  method.
I t  was on ly  to  be expected t h a t  p h i lo so p h e rs  would ask :  'what bea ring  
does s c i e n t i f i c  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  have on the  s tudy  o f  man'? As N icholas  
C apald i  e x p la in s  a t  some le n g th  in  h i s  volume David Hume, beginning  w ith  
the  Newtonian u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  how c a u sa t io n  i s  seen to  o p e ra te  in  the 
p h y s ic a l  s c ie n c e s ,  Hume jumped to  the  c o nc lu s ion  t h a t  a s c i e n t i f i c  u n d e rs ­
tan d in g  o f  th e  human body would f i n a l l y  make c l e a r  a l l  th e  m y s te r ie s  of  
human knowledge and b e l i e f .  Here a ga in  we f in d  a v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  b a s is  to
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I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  to  t h a t  found in  S h a f te sb u ry ,  Rousseau and Hutcheson. They 
had begun by s t r e s s i n g  th e  s p i r i t u a l i t y  o f  the  noble  human i n t u i t i o n s ,  
p la c in g  them alm ost above i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  I t  was as though a good d e a l  o f  
th e  methodology o f  s e c u la r  R a tiona l ism  had in f lu e n ce d  Hume as  he s e t  
about the  r e - c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  I n tu i t i o n i s m .  Here we f in d  th e  e m p ir ic a l  
R a t i o n a l i s t  in  Hume.
"From the  beg inn ing  he was e q u a l ly  concerned w ith  de te rm in ing  th e  
law fu l  l i m i t s  o f  human knowledge and b e l i e f  w i th  u n d e rs tand ing  
human p r e f e re n c e s ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and i n t u i t i o n s .  He s t a r t e d  w ith  
th e  c o n v ic t io n  t h a t  experim en ta l  psychology would y ie ld  a theo ry  
o f  human n a tu re  from which s o lu t io n s  to  th e  problems o f  ep is tem o- 
logy and o f  a e s t h e t i c s ,  e t h i c s ,  and p o l i t i c s ,  could a l l  be d e r ived ."^
I t  would be wrong to  suggest  t h a t  t h i s  s c i e n t i f i c  approach was complete­
ly  incom pa tib le  w i th  I n tu i t i o n i s m .  I t  i s ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  o f  th e  g r e a t e s t  
im portance t h a t  Hume adhered so c lo s e ly  to  the  I n t u i t i o n i s t  p o s i t i o n ,  in  
s p i t e  o f  the  e x te n t  o f  h i s  c o n ta c t  w ith  G o n t ie n e ta l  R a tio n a l ism . In 
some r e s p e c ts  h i s  p o s i t i o n  would have appeared more c o n s i s t e n t  i f  he 
had gone over to  s e c u la r  R a t io n a l ism , because one s id e  o f  h i s  i n v e s t i g a ­
t io n s  was b e t t e r  handled from th e  s id e  o f  e m p ir ic a l  R a tio n a l ism . I t  would 
no t  be im poss ib le  to  r e - c o n s t r u c t  Hume's psychology by g iv ing  an account 
f o r  i t  which was m ainly  from t h i s  s id e .  In some ways i t  could be sa id  th a t  
h i s  e m p ir ic a l  R a t io n a l ism  m i l i t a t e d  a g a in s t  the  I n tu i t io n is m  which he 
was p r o fe s s in g  to  d e fe n d .  And ye t  he was s t i l l  an I n t u i t i o n i s t I  I t  
would be q u i t e  wrong to  put him in  the  R a t io n a l i s t  camp. That i s  what 
he s to u  t l y  m ain ta in ed ,  and t h a t  i s  what we f in d  bourne ou t by the  
r e l e v a n t  s e c t io n s  o f  h i s  works, such as the  c e n t r a l  s e c t io n  o f  the  
T r e a t i s e .  He was f u l l y  aware of  the  problems a s s o c ia te d  w ith  defending 
th e  R a t i o n a l i s t  p o s i t i o n .
S h a f te sb u ry ,  Rousseau and Hutcheson were no t of  course  r e l i g io u s  
f a n a t i c s .  T he ir  I n tu i t i o n is m  depended on r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s ,  but not 
t h a t  kind o f  r e l i g i o u s  m ysticism  which c losed  p e o p le s '  minds to  the
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w ea l th  o f  e m p i r ic a l  d a ta  which s c i e n t i f i c  r e s e a rc h  was uncovering . I t  i s  
w e l l  to  remember t h a t  th e  Enlightenm ent had, in  F rance , brought about 
p o l a r i z a t i o n  between th e  P h ilosophes  and the  r e l i g i o u s  f a n a t i c s .  A r e a c t io n  
had s e t  in  a g a in s t  r e l i g i o u s  and academic freedom.
"In  1685 Louis l 4t h .  had revoked the  E d ic t  o f  N antes, a course  which 
had fo rced  many le a d in g  P r o t e s t a n t  s c h o la rs  and d iv in e s  to  take  up 
r e s id e n c e  in  more l i b e r a l  c o u n t r i e s ,  such as England and H olland.
The b u l l  H n igen itus  in  1713» which condemned 101 p r o p o s i t io n s  in  
Q u e sn e l 's  R e f le c t io n s  M orales, s t ru c k  a blow not on ly  a t  Jansen ism , 
but a t  r e l i g i o u s  freedom in  g e n e ra l .  From 1727 to 1732 r a t i o n a l i s t s  
in  France were r e p e l l e d  by th e  r e l i g io u s  h y s t e r i a  which raged over 
m ira c le s  o f  h e a l in g  rumoured to  have occured a t  the  grave o f  Abbe 
P a r i s ,  a J a n s e n i s t  deacon who had been known in  h i s  l i f e  f o r  h is  
g r e a t  c h a r i t y .  In the  few y ears  from I761 to  1766 th e  French , and
p a r t i c u l a r l y  V o l t a i r e ,  were h o r r i f i e d  by a s e r i e s  o f  e s p e c i a l l y
c r u e l  p roceed ings  o f  th e  C a th o l ic  chu rch ." 18
S h a f te s b u ry 's  r e l i g i o n  would have been i n t e l l e c t u a l  and fo rm al,  and 
very  s u s p ic io u s  o f  f a n a t i c a l  g roups. R ousseau 's  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  would
have been vague, ten d in g  towards a r e l i g i o n  o f  n a tu r e .  Hutcheson
would have f i t t e d  in  much more e a s i l y  w ith  the  more l i b e r a l  wing o f  a 
P r o t e s t a n t  n a t i o n a l  church , in  h i s  case  th e  Church o f  S co t lan d .  I t  i s  
u n l ik e ly  t h a t  any o f  them would have been s u s c e p t ib l e  to the  in f lu e n c e  
o f  the  'c h a r is m a t ic *  J a n s e n i s t s  ( a l th o u g h  th e r e  were many J a n s e n i s t s  
who were no t  o f  an extreme o u t lo o k ) ,  nor were they  wholehearted  sup p o rte rs  
o f  the  s e c u la r  P h i lo so p h e s .
Hume too never became a C o n t in e n ta l  R a t i o n a l i s t .  I n s te a d ,  he became 
p a r t  o f  th e  " . . . c r i t i c a l  r e a c t io n  t h a t  had a l r e a d y  d isp la c e d  D escartes  
in  favour o f  Locke and Newton a t  home.'|^ From 'C o g i to ,  ergo sum' D escartes  
had s t a r t e d  to  b u i ld  w ith  " . . .  supreme confidence  in  pure r e a s o n . H u m e , 
however, was to  r e j e c t  the  concept o f  th e  'p u re  o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  l o g i c a l
18. S h a f t e s b u r y  and t h e  French D e i s t s ,  by D.B. S c h le g e l .P ub lished  by th e  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  N orth  C a ro l in a  in  1976.
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th in k in g ' .  He was to begin a 'theory o f  human nature' which would 
be the basis  for  the moral s c ie n c e s .
Here we see the reason for  the considerable  d if fe r e n c e  between Hutches­
on's more s p i r i t u a l ,  T h e is t ic  Intu it ion ism ; and Hume's more secu lar  
In tu it ion ism , which a t  se v er a l  po ints  followed Newton's rad ica l  in te r p r e ­
ta t io n  o f  A r is to te l ia n ism . Hume was never able  to escape Hutcheson's 
in f lu e n c e ,  even although the passage o f  the years was to see them d r i f t  
further  and further  apart. In the end two qu ite  d i f f e r e n t  p o s it io n s  
could be id e n t i f i e d ,  so that Hutcheson no longer f e l t  s u f f i c i e n t ly  c o n f i ­
dent about Hume's p o s i t io n  to allow him self  to be assoc ia ted  with i t  in  
the eyes o f  the general p u b lic .
The S i m i la r i t i e s .
Although for the purposes o f  th is  d iscu ss io n  we have agreed that  
Hutcheson and Hume represented two quite  d i f f e r e n t  In tu it io n ism s , one 
C hristian  and the other secu la r ,  further in v e s t ig a t io n  w i l l  demonstrate 
that the attempt to keep them separate was never e n t ir e ly  s u c c e s s fu l .
At one point Hume may have been convinced that h is  In tu it ion ism  could 
stand on i t s  own.
" . . .h e  hoped to d er ive  passion  and a c t io n ,  lo v e ,  pride, compassion, 
benevolence, and the sense o f  j u s t i c e ,  o b l ig a t io n ,  law and property, 
from the elem ental forces  o f  pleasure and pain and the p r in c ip le  
o f  a s s o c ia t io n  taken to be analagous to the axioms o f  motion and 
the force  o f  g r a v ity .
Having se t  out with the in te n t io n  o f  crea t in g  a new n a t u r a l i s t i c  world 
Hume had to sort  out the mind-body r e la t io n sh ip .  While he may have 
explored the mind-body r e la t io n sh ip  in  greater depth than Hutcheson, th is  
knowledge s t i l l  did not answer the questions which were bound up with 
e th ic a l  and moral i s s u e s .  To judge the success o f  Hume's attempt to 
build a fresh , i t  i s  important to fo llow  again h is  account o f  how we form
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our b e l i e f s ,  from the  fo u n d a t io n  up.
1 . S e v e ra l  o f  the  concep ts  which Hume was ready to  employ to  d e s c r ib e  
what happens when we form b e l i e f s  were a l r e a d y  in  c i r c u l a t i o n ,  some o f  
them in tro d u c ed  by C h r i s t i a n  p h i lo so p h e rs  who were sometimes accused  by 
him o f  having developed s e c u la r  le a n in g s !  " . . . t h e  th in g s  one p e rc e iv e s  
a r e  no t p h y s ic a l  o b je c t s  but m ere ly  p e r c e p t io n s .
Hume's 'phenomenalism' has been debated  a t  some l e n g th ,  and th e  p r e c i s e  
d e t a i l s  a re  no t  o f  im portance  to t h i s  d i s c u s s io n .  For him 'p e r c e p t io n s '  
dem onstra ted  how b e l i e f s  a r e  formed in  th e  b ra in  and th e  nervous system .
I t  could be argued t h a t  he was making a case  f o r  th e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  the  
senses  them se lves ,  because h is  und e rs tan d in g  o f  'p e r c e p t io n s '  made i t  
p o s s ib le  f o r  him to  show how in fo rm a t io n  passed in to  th e  b ra in  to  be 
tu rned  th e r e  i n t o ,  among o th e r  th in g s ,  ' b e l i e f s ' .  I t  was p robab ly  h is  
e x p e c ta t io n  t h a t  w i th in  h i s  l i f e t i m e  psychology would have advanced to  
th e  p o in t  where i t  would be p o s s ib le  to  account from i t ,  a l l  th e  workings 
o f  th e  mind. He may have surmized t h a t  the  c onc lu s ion  o f  t h i s  i n v e s t i g a ­
t i o n  would be the  dem o n s tra t io n  o f  how 'm an 's  moral f a c u l ty  w o rk s ' .  But 
i t  was no t ve ry  long b e fo re  i t  was c l e a r  to  Hume h im se lf  t h a t  t h i s  was 
im p o ss ib le ,  because , even i f  th e  senses  a r e  r e l i a b l e ,  we s t i l l  know 
no th in g  about t h e i r  powers nor th e  range o f  in fo rm a t io n  which may pass  
th rough  them i n to  the  mind in  th e  course  o f  human e x p e r ien c e .  In  o th e r  
words, b e l i e f s  have to  do w ith  A r t i c l e s  o f  F a i th  w r i t t e n  down in  
documents c a l l e d  C reeds, and no t  j u s t  the  p rocess  by which in fo rm a t io n  
p a s se s  th rough  th e  senses  i n to  th e  mind.
2 . I d e a s ,  acco rd in g  to  Hume, a r e  one s ta g e  f u r t h e r  on. F i r s t  we have 
'p e r c e p t io n s '  and then  ' i d e a s ' .  In a d d i t io n  he d id  reco g n ize  a ca tego ry  
o f  id e a s  which a re  o th e r  than  ' im p re ss io n s  and im a g e s ' .  N.K. Smith 
su gges ts  t h a t  Hume was in  c o n s id e ra b le  confus ion  over the  d i s t i n c t i o n : -
" . . . h e  employs the  term 'im p re s s io n '  and ' i d e a '  as i f  they  were
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interchangeable  with the terms that s ig n i f y  independently e x is t in g  
bod ies . He even goes so far  as to speak o f  impressions ac tin g
on the sense organs." 23
Both Berkley and Hume, according to N.K. Smith, had a major problem 
d ef in in g  what they c a l le d  an ' idea ' " . . . i f  we have no other means o f  
doing so than that o f  taking a p a rt icu lar  idea as rep resen ta t iv e  o f  
others resembling i t . T h e  fa r th e s t  Berkley and Hume could progress  
was to take " . . . a  p a r t ic u la r  idea as rep resen ta t iv e  o f  others resembling
“ • " 2 5
3. F in a l ly ,  Hume's system led to ' b e l i e f s ' .  Impressions, according to
th is  system, were formed at  the entrance o f  the senses in to  the mind.
'Ideas' required a l i t t l e  more r e f l e c t io n ,  and were one stage  beyond 
percep tions .  B e l i e f s ,  however, were formed much deeper in the con sc iou s­
n ess ,  although Hume may s t i l l  have expected to find a causal mechanism 
by which to account for them.
"He wavers between looking for  an in te r n a l  d if fe r en ce  between the
two, such as the superior v iv a c i t y  o f  the idea that i s  the b e l ie f ;
and a d i f fe r e n c e  in c h a r a c te r is t ic  e f f e c t s ,  as when he says that
b e l i e f s  are ,  and mere thoughts not, ' the  governing p r in c ip le s  o f
our a c t i o n s ' .  His p h ilo so p h ica l  approach in c l in e s  him to look for
the in te r n a l  d i f f e r e n c e ,  h is  accumen to look for  the e f f e c t s  o f
b e l i e f  upon 'behaviour'."  ,26
By r e s t r ic t in g  the d isc u ss io n  to one d e f in i t io n  o f  ' b e l i e f '  i t  i s  
p o ss ib le  to attempt a demonstration of a causal connection.
" . . .  he i s  able  to d escribe  b e l i e f  as c o n s is t in g  simply in  the  
e n liven ing  o f  id e a s ,  and so to dea l with i t  on the l in e s  o f  
s t r i c t  analogy with h is  doctr ine  o f  sympathy. The only d ifferen ce  
between sense-percep tion  and id eas ,  he would seem to be maintaining, 
i s  a d i f fe r e n c e  o f  force  and l i v e l i n e s s .  A l l  that i s  necessary  
for b e l i e f ,  and what c o n s t i tu te s  i t ,  i s  that ideas should through
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r e la t io n  to impressions r e ce iv e  the required increment o f  v iv a c i ty ."27
Hume may have f e l t  that such a demonstration o f  the causal mechanism 
by which b e l i e f s  are formed in  the nervous system was a great achievement. 
I t  formed the foundation for h is  new in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  In tu it ion ism . The 
p h y s io lo g ic a l  processes  which occur when we f e e l  c e r ta in  emotions or think 
c e r ta in  thoughts were being la id  bare. This new Intu it ion ism  was to 
begin with what i s  a c tu a l ly  taking place w ith in  us when we say -  ' I
ought to do such-and-such*; rather than what a fu s ty  old r e l ig io u s  book 
or a volume on moral philosophy says that we sbuld f e e l  about certa in  
moral o b l ig a t io n s .  In that resp ect  Hume* s and HutchesonS s ta r t in g -p o in ts  
were completely d i f f e r e n t .  Hume was endeavouring to begin with the 
buildingr-blocks o f  f e e l in g s  and b e l ie f s ;  Hutcheson with f ixed  moral 
o b l ig a t io n s .  As was s ta ted  on page 67,  Hume was attempting to defend 
h is  In tu it ion ism  from t h e , bare premiss *man i s  morally aware* (or  
something sim lar);  whereas Hutcheson r e a l ly  required two further  
propositions  -  a') 'man i s  a moral being because he i s  the bearer o f
the Divine Image', or ,l^  'man can d i f f e r e n t ia t e  between r igh t  and wrong 
because God has given us the Ten Commandments' (or something s im i la r ) .
And y e t ,  the basic bu ild in g-b lock s  with which Hume had star ted  could 
not provide him with the m ater ia l  which he needed to demonstrate that  
'man i s  morally aware'; only  'man i s  aware*. He could say that man f e e l s ,  
th in ks , b e l ie v e s  and i s  t o t a l l y  aware; but not that he i s  'morally* 
aware. And that was too l i t t l e  for Hume's purposes. He wanted to be able  
to say that man i s  morally aware, and th ere fore ,  h is  moral responses  
are to be accepted at  face  va lue  and tru sted .  That i s  what Rousseau sa id ,  
but not from a secu lar  s tandpoint. Here i s  where we must ask -  how ach iev­
ab le  i s  a secu lar  Intu it ionism ?
There can be no ser iou s  doubt that Hume was f u l l y  cognisant o f  th is  
d i f f i c u l t y ,  because the in a d m is s ib i l i ty  o f  d er iv ing  an'ought' -  in th is  
in s tan ce  'man i s  morally aware' from an ' i s '  -  in  t h is  instance 'man i s  
aware', was a question on which he was unusually s e n s i t i v e .  He was only
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too w e l l  aware t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a l l  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  world between 
say ing  'man i s  m o ra l ly  aware' and merely 'man i s  aware*. An I n tu i t io n is m  
based on th e  l a t t e r  a lo n e  i s  c e r t a i n l y  c o n ce iv ab le ,  but t h a t  was not the  
k ind o f  I n tu i t i o n is m  which he wanted to  argue  f o r .  I f  we examine h i s  own 
m oral ph ilosophy  i t  w i l l  become ap p a ren t  t h a t  he had to  be a b le  to  say 
'man i s  m o ra l ly  a w a re ' .
"Let a m an's i n s e n s i b i l i t y  be ever so g r e a t ,  he must o f te n  be 
touched w ith  th e  images o f  R ight and Wrong; and l e t  h i s  p r e ju d ic e s  
be ever so o b s t i n a t e ,  he must obse rve ,  t h a t  o th e r s  a re  s u s c e p t ib l e  
o f  l i k e  im p re ss io n s .
For Hume t h i s  i s  a l l  so s e l f - e v i d e n t  t h a t  i t  can s a f e ly  be taken  f o r  
g ra n te d .  That i s  how he w r i te s  abou t i t  f o r  most o f  th e  t im e .  Only 
when co rnered  was he fo rc e d  to  admit the  e x te n t  o f  th e  problem, and then  
he would o f f e r  the  kind o f  g e t - o u t  argument to  which Berkaley 
o b je c te d .  The human f a c u l t i e s  which had been good enough to  a llow  
Hume to  d i s c o u r s e  e f f o r t l e s s l y  a t  l e n g th  on a l l  k inds  o f  s u b je c t s ,  a re  
suddenly  found to  be no t  s u i te d  to  the  so lv in g  of th e  above problem!
"Hume c o n s ta n t ly  employs t h a t  sp e c ie s  o f  s c e p t i c a l  argument to  
which B erke ley  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  o b je c te d ,  the  argument t h a t  the  
f a c u l t i e s  we have a r e  few, and those  designed by n a tu re  f o r  the  
support  and p l e a s u r e s  o f  l i f e ,  and no t  to  p e n e t r a t e  in to  the  
inward essence  and c o n s t i t u t i o n  of t h i n g s . . .
Not t h a t  in  t h i s  c a se  i t  m a t te r s  very  much, because warnings a g a in s t  
committing th e  N a t u r a l i s t i c  F a l la c y  a re  so f o r c e f u l  in  h is  w r i t i n g s .  On 
th e  b a s is  o f  th e s e  warnings a lo n e  i t  should be im poss ib le  to  even a ttem p t  
to  i n f e r  t h a t  'man i s  aware' can be read as 'man i s  m ora lly  a w a re ' .
I f  a n y th in g ,  Hume was anxious to  d r iv e  a wedge between 'm oral d i s t i n c t i o n s '  
and ' r e a s o n ' .  Much o f  Book I  p a r t i  o f  the  T r e a t i s e  i s  taken  up w ith  
defend ing  t h a t  v ie w :-
"Those who a f f i r m  t h a t  v i r t u e  i s  no th ing  but a  conform ity  to reason ;
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that there are e tern a l  f i t n e s s e s  and u n f i tn e s s e s  o f  th in gs,  which 
are the same to every r a t io n a l  being that considers them; that the 
immutable measures o f  r ig h t  and wrong impose an o b l ig a t io n ,  not only  
on human crea tu res ,  but a lso  on the D eity  h im self;  A ll  these  
systems concur in  the op in ion , that m orality , l ik e  tru th , i s  d iscern 'd  
merely by id e a s ,  and by th e ir  ju x ta -p o s i t io n  and comparison. In 
order, th e re fo r e ,  to judge o f  these  system s, we need only consid er ,  
whether i t  be p o s s ib le ,  from reason a lone , to d is t in g u is h  betwixt  
moral good and e v i l ,  or whether there must concur some other p r in c ip ­
l e s  to  enable us to make that d i s t i n c t i o n .
I f  m orality  had n a tu ra lly  no in flu en ce  on human passions and actions  
' twere in  vain  to take such pains to in c u lc a te  i t ;  and nothing, wou'd 
be more f r u i t l e s s  than that m ultitude o f  ru les  and precep ts ,  with  
which a l l  m ora lis ts  abound. Philosophy i s  commonly divided in to  
' sp e c u la t iv e '  and 'p r a c t i c a l ' ;  and as m orality  i s  always comprehended 
under the l a t t e r  d iv i s io n ,  ' t i s  supposed to  in flu en ce  our passions  
and a c t io n s ,  and to go beyond the calm and indo len t  judgments o f  the 
understanding. And t h is  i s  confirm'd by common experience, which 
informs us, that men are o ften  govern'd by th e ir  d u t ie s ,  and are  
deter 'd  from some a c t io n s  by the opinion o f  in j u s t i c e ,  and im pell'd  
to others by that o f  o b l ig a t io n .
Since morals, th e re fo r e ,  have an in f lu en ce  on the a c t io n s  and 
a f f e c t i o n s ,  i t  f o l lo w s ,  that they cannot be der iv 'd  from reason; 
and that because reason a lone , as we have already prov'd, can never 
have any such in f lu e n c e .  Morals e x c ite  p a ss io n s ,  and produce or 
prevent a c t io n s .  Reason o f  i t s e l f  i s  u t t e r ly  impotent in  t h is  
p a r t ic u la r .  The ru les  o f  m orality , th ere fo re ,  are not conclusions  
o f  our reason.
I f  reason in  th is  context i s  equated with Hume's ' i s ' ,  and, morals with 
his  'ou gh t' ,  then we can see from the above passage how wide the gap 
between the two i s  in h is  th in k in g .
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Whether o r  no t  h i s  im a g in a t iv e  account o f  rha way in  which the  s ig n a l s  
pass through the  senses  and e tc h  them selves on th e  memory to  form a 
• b e l i e f  i s  sound o r  n o t ,  t h i s  in fo rm a t io n  t e l l s  us no th ing  i f  'memory' 
or ' r e a s o n '  can have no s i g n i f i c a n t  in f lu e n c e  on th e  r u le s  o f  m o ra l i ty .
"Here, as  in  the  sphere  o f  e th ic s  and a e s t h e t i c s ,  th e  fu n c t io n  o f  
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  en q u iry ,  a s  Hume conceived i t ,  i s  no t  to  j u s t i f y  
our u l t im a te  b e l i e f s ,  but on ly  to  t r a c e  them to  t h e i r  sources  in  
the  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  our human n a tu re ,  and to  show how, a ided  by 
rea so n ,  though them selves  d e f e c t iv e  o f  i t ,  they  c o n d i t io n  and make 
p o s s ib le  th e  d e - f a c to  e xpe r ience  which i s  a t  once the  s u b je c t -m a t t e r  
o f  ph ilo sophy  and t h a t  by which i t s  judgements a lone  can be t e s t e d
And so the  mechanism by which b e l i e f s  a r e  formed in  the  nervous system 
has l i t t l e  to  say to  us ab o u t,  e . g .  moral o b l ig a t i o n .  We may in  any 
case  only be a b le  to  t r a c e  back th e s e  b e l i e f s  so f a r ,  because they  a re  
no t simple and tend to  become mixed up w ith  th e  in fo rm a t io n  a l r e a d y  
p re s e n t  in  th e  mind. I t  i s  im portan t  to  unders tand  th e  mechanism and 
th e  way in  which Hume uses  i t  as th e  founda tion  f o r  h i s  I n tu i t i o n is m ,  
but he h im se lf  was aware t h a t  i t  has ve ry  l i t t l e  l i g h t  to  c a s t  on 
answ ering th e  q u e s t io n  -  'why i s  man m ora lly  aw are '?  That i s  why we 
need to  go back to  th e  e a r l i e r  s e c t io n  which d e a ls  more broadly w ith  
th e  fo rm ation  o f  our b e l i e f s  (pages 31- 46 ) .  In  t h a t  s e c t io n  i t  was 
s t a t e d  t h a t  we need to  g ive  up any p re te n ce  t h a t  we can d isc o v e r  someone's 
b e l i e f s  by examining them p h y s ic a l ly ;  in s te a d  Hume accep ted  t h a t  ed u ca t io n  
p le a s u re  and p a in ,  rea so n  and a s s o c i a t i o n  e t c . ,  a re  th e  f a c t o r s  which 
p lay  a le a d in g  r o l e  i n  th e  fo rm ation  o f  our b e l i e f s .  Already the  
d i s t a n c e  between H u tcheson 's  I n tu i t io n is m  and Hume's i s  narrow ing .
I t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  Hutcheson could have accepted  most o f  Hume's accoun t ,  
bo th  in  the  b a s ic  mechanism theo ry  as w e ll  as in  th e  wider e d u c a t io n a l  
th e o ry ,  with  one e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between them. Whereas Hutcheson 
was a b le  to  e x p la in  why 'man i s  m ora lly  a w a re ' ,  Hume was n o t .  Of what
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v a lu e  then was Hume's s e c u la r  v e r s io n  of In tu i t io n is m ?
I f  i t  i s  remembered t h a t  he accep ted  th e  s p i r i t u a l  In tu i t io n is m
of S h a f te sb u ry  and Hutcheson more o r  l e s s  on t r u s t ,  and t h a t  he remained 
an I n t u i t i o n i s t  a f t e r  a l l  h is  s tu d i e s  and t r a v e l s ,  th en ,  i t  can be seen 
t h a t  the  s e c u la r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  was a ttem pted  a f t e r  he was a l r e a d y  p a r t  
o f  th e  I n t u i t i o n i s t  t r a d i t i o n .  This a t tem p t followed h is  c o n ta c t  w ith  
the  Ph ilosophes when th e  French Enlightenm ent was a t  i t s  h e ig h t  fo r  
reasons  which a r e  p e r f e c t l y  u n d e rs ta n d a b le .  I f ,  th rough i t  a l l  Hume 
remained an I n t u i t i o n i s t  r a t h e r  than  adopt th e  s e c u la r  R a tiona lism  of 
th e  Philosophes, w^ hom he claimed to  admire and who heaped so much p r a i s e  
on him, does th e  ' s e c u l a r '  a s p e c t  o f  h is  I n tu i t io n is m  deserve  to  be 
taken  s e r io u s ly ?  There i s  a s t ro n g  case  fo r  a rg u in g  t h a t  i t  should n o t .
But i t  has ,  and t h a t  i s  why i t  i s  now ne c essa ry  to i n d ic a te  th e  depend­
ence o f  h is  s e c u la r  I n tu i t i o n i s m  on H utcheson 's  s p i r i t u a l  I n t u i t i o n ­
ism, as w e ll  as why Hume's su c ce s so rs  have been wrong to  fo llo w  him so 
so c lo s e l y .
Both Hutcheson and Hume were endeavouring to  say -  'man i s  m orally  
a w a r e ' .  Because o f  t h a t  T.D. Campbell was a b le  to  c l a im : -
" I t  i s  now gensrally acknowledged t h a t  Hutcheson i s  the  ' f a t h e r '  
of the  S c o t t i s h  E n ligh tenm en t.  Hume's e th ic s  a r e  l a r g e ly  
Hutchesonian and Kemp S m ith 's  view t h a t  H utcheson 's  s e n t i m e n t a l i s t  
approach to  m oral th eo ry  was th e  i n s p i r a t i o n  f o r  Hume's e n t i r e  
ep istem ology s t i l l  s t a n d s . . .
A gainst  Hobbes's c la im  t h a t  a l l  human a c t io n  i s  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  Hutcheson 
argued t h a t  " . . .m e n  a r e  capab le  o f  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  lo v e ,  or ' t h e  d e s i r e  
o f  and d e l i g h t  in  th e  Good of o t h e r s ' . I n  t h i s  he was anxious to  
show t h a t  benevolence should be d i s i n t e r e s t e d ;  i . e . ,  " . . . n o t  from the
p le a s u re  the  benevo len t person  g e ts  from see ing  o th e r s  happy, s in ce  
such p le a s u re  p resupposes  a p r i o r  d e s i r e  t h a t  they be happy; hence the  
' d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s '  o f  benevo lence ,  an a f f e c t i o n  which he compares to
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th e  fo rc e  o f  g r a v i ty  in  t h a t  i t  i s  s t ro n g e r  or weaker in  p ro p o r t io n  to  the  
n e a rn e ss  or d i s t a n c e  o f  i t s  o b je c t  and o p e ra te s  whenever t h e r e  i s  no 
equal o r  s t r o n g e r  c o u n te r v a i l in g  f o rc e .
For Hutcheson, benevo len t  a f f e c t i o n  i s  c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  v i r t u e ,  and 
co n seq u en tly  a c t i o n s  which proceed from i t  a r e  to  be approved. I t  should 
be n o t ic e d  t h a t  in  s e c t io n  I I  o f  th e  T r e a t i s e , v e ry  c lo s e  to  the  beg inn ing , 
Hume devo tes  a l o t  o f  d i s c u s s io n  to  Benevolence, and to  th e  a t t i t u d e s  
and a c t io n s  which proceed from i t . ~
"The e p i t h e t s  s o c ia b l e ,  g o o d -n a tu red , humane, m e rc i fu l ,  g r a t e f u l ,  
f r i e n d l y ,  generous, b e n e f i c e n t ,  or t h e i r  e q u iv a l e n t s ,  a r e  known in  
a l l  lan g u a g e s ,  and u n i v e r s a l l y  express  th e  h ig h e s t  m e r i t ,  which 
human n a tu r e  i s  capab le  o f  a t t a i n i n g .
Men, however, a c co rd in g  to  Hutcheson, a r e  a ls o  m otiva ted  by s e l f - l o v e ,  
so t h a t  th e r e  a r e  " . . . ' t w o  fo rc e s  com pelling  th e  same body to  motion* or 
' two calm n a t u r a l  d e te rm in a t io n s  o f  the  w i l l . . . a n  i n v a r i a b l e  c o n s ta n t  
im pulse  towards o n e 's  own p e r f e c t i o n  and happ iness  o f  th e  h ig h e s t  kind*..,*
**. .*the
o th e r  d e te rm in a t io n  a l l e g e d  i s  toward th e  u n iv e r s a l  happ iness  of o thers*  
I t  i s  known t h a t  Bishop B u t l e r ' s  Sermons in f lu e n ce d  H utcheson 's36l a t e r  work, and he may have met th e  Bishop when he was in  Dublin working 
on th e  T r e a t i s e . S e l f - lo v e  and th e  d e s i r e  f o r  th e  u n iv e r s a l  happ iness  
o f  o th e r s  appear  a t  f i r s t  s ig h t  to  be in  c o n f l i c t ,  bu t  Hutcheson s e t s  ou t 
to  dem onstra te  t h a t  t h a t  need n o t  be th e  c a se .  " I t  i s ,  f o r  him, a prime 
aim o f  moral ph ilo sophy  to  show t h a t  u n iv e r s a l  benevolence ten d s  to  the  
happ iness  o f  th e  be ne vol e n t . I s  Hutcheson then  th e  founder of  
U t i l i t a r i a n i s m ?  Many o f  th e  themes which Hutcheson deve lops in  th e  In q u iry  
a r e  p re se n ted  in  a p o l is h e d  form in  Hume's T r e a t i s e .
In  a d d i t io n  to  the  in f lu e n c e  o f  Bishop B u t l e r ' s  Sermons on Hutcheson, 
S h a f te s b u ry 's  in f lu e n c e  was, as  has been noted a l r e a d y ,  even more
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s i g n i f i c a n t .  " I t  has been sa id  o f  Spinoza t h a t  he was in to x i c a t e d  w ith  
th e  id ea  o f  God. I t  might be sa id  w ith  equal t r u t h  of S h a f te sb u ry  t h a t  he 
was in to x i c a t e d  w ith  th e  id e a  o f  V i r tu e ,  and V ir tu e  w ith  him meant, above 
a l l  t h in g s ,  benevolence  and c a re  f o r  o t h e r s . F o r  S h a f te s b u ry ,  God i s  
" . . . a l l  w ise , a l l  j u s t ,  and a l l  m e r c i f u l ,  governing th e  world p r o v i d e n t i a l l y  
f o r  th e  b e s t . . . ^ g  and t h i s  system o f  theology was so much a p a r t  o f  
h i s  e th i c s  and view o f  s o c ie ty  t h a t  " . . . t h i s  D ialogue may, p e rh a p s ,  j u s t l y  
be viewed as sim ply ex tend ing  and confirm ing  the  argument co n ta in ed  in  th e  
In q u iry  concern ing  V i r tu e .  What th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  Man was des igned  to  
be, and ought to  be, t h a t  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  N ature  a c t u a l l y  i s .  Hence 
V i r tu e  o b ta in s  th e  s a n c t io n s  o f  R e l ig io n ,  w hile  R e l ig io n  i t s e l f  i s  but 
th e  r e c o g n i t io n  and i m i t a t i o n  o f  Supreme Goodness.
I f  th e  b e l i e f  in  an a l l  w ise ,  a l l  j u s t  and a l l  m e rc ifu l  God was so 
im por tan t  to  S h a f te s b u ry  and then  Hutcheson i n  t h e i r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  
o f  V i r tu e ;  i n  what sense  i s  i t  a d m is s ib le  to sugges t  t h a t  Hume could 
d isp e n se  w ith  i t ?  The bu lk  o f  th e  m a te r i a l  found i n  Hume's Enquiry  
can be t r a c e d  to  th e  w r i t i n g s  o f  S h af tesbu ry  and Hutcheson, a l b e i t  he 
a l t e r e d  th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  p r e s e n ta t io n  and added some novel and v a lu a b le  
c o n t r ib u t io n s  o f  h i s  own. His e r u d i t io n  and command o f  h is  s u b je c t  mark 
out h i s  works a s  th e  equa l  o f  . t h o se  o f  h i s  i l l u s t r i o u s  m en to rs .  In  them 
he i s  d e l i b e r a t e l y  a t te m p t in g  to  p io n ee r  a new t r a i l .  His works a r e  in  
many ways d i f f e r e n t .  The r o l e  o f  r e l i g io u s  b e l i e f  i n  th e  e t h i c a l  system 
which he was d ev e lo p in g  i s  p layed  down a l l  th e  t im e . N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e se  
works a re  c lo s e l y  r e l a t e d  to  th o se  o f  S h af tesbu ry  and Hutcheson. They 
have l e f t  ou t th e  r e f e r e n c e s  to  r e l i g io u s  b e l i e f ,  but th e  e s s e n t i a l  
arguments have a l t e r e d  v e ry  l i t t l e .  And t h a t  se rv es  to  r a i s e  th e  q u es tio n  
o f  how f a r  i s  i t  p o s s ib l e  f o r  one moral p h i lo so p h e r  to  lea n  so h e a v i ly  on 
th e  work of  two such im p o r ta n t  p re d e c e s so rs ,  and s t i l l  r e j e c t  one o f  t h e i r  
c e n t r a l  c o n v ic t io n s ?  Did Hume succeed in  f a c t  in  fo rm u la t in g  a s e c u la r  
In tu i t io n is m ?
This i s  a v e ry  im p o r ta n t  q u e s t io n  fo r  many in  the  f i e l d  o f  moral philoscçiy
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today . The a p p e a l  o f  Hume's I n tu i t io n is m  has been immense. In th e  words 
o f  one s c h o la r ,  "When Bentham read t h i s  p a r t  of the  T r e a t i s e  he sa id  
t h a t  he f e l t  'a s  i f  s c a le s  had f a l l e n  from h is  e y e s ' . M a n y  
s c h o la r s  have been convinced t h a t  Hume's a ttem pt d id  succeed , and, even 
a lthough  they  may q u a l i f y  t h a t  c la im  by say ing  t h a t  he made some s e r io u s  
m is takes  which have to  be removed from h i s  system, and t h a t  he was o f te n  
no t s y s te m a t ic  and t h i s  led  to  major in c o n s i s t e n c ie s ;  they  s t i l l  hold t o  the 
view tha t  th e  p o s i t i o n  f o r  which he was aiming a t  i s  t e n a b le ,  and t h a t  he 
made huge s t r i d e s  towards e s t a b l i s h in g  i t .
We have been examining t h a t  view c lo s e ly ,  and th e  more m in u te ly  t h a t  view 
i s  ana lysed  th e  l e s s  i t  seems to  s tand  up. There can be no doubt t h a t  Hume 
was a d i s t i n g u i s h e d  I n t u i t i o n i s t .  He was t h a t  m ainly  because o f  h is  
e d u c a t io n a l  background and h i s  c o n ta c t  w ith  F ra n c is  Hutcheson. He was a ls o  
t h a t  by c h o ic e .  I t  would no t  have been p o s s ib le  f o r  him to  have m ain ta ined  
t h a t  p o s i t i o n  so c o n s i s t e n ly  and e lo q u e n t ly  over such a long and v a r ie d  
c a r e e r ,  had he not been thoroughly  convinced of th e  soundness o f  i t s  
c e n t r a l  a rgum ents . The d i f f i c u l t y  l i e s  in  th e  im pression  which i s  l e f t  
when he deve lops  th e s e  arguments most soundly and c o n v in c in g ly .  He does 
not sound a t  a l l  l i k e  one of th e  Ph ilosophes who was in  th e  vanguard of 
th e  s e c u la r  t i d e  on th e  C on tinen t which th re a te n e d  to  sweep away a l l  r e l i g ­
io u s  b e l i e f .  He sounds in  f a c t  l i k e  a S haf tesbury  or a Hutcheson, deve lop ­
ing  an I n tu i t i o n i s m  which s t a r t e d  o f f  w ith  r e l i g io u s  b e l i e f s  as an e s s e n t i a l  
p a r t  o f  i t ,  bu t  now has had th e s e  removed* t h e i r  removal having l e f t  
behind spaces which, somehow, need to  be f i l l e d  i n .  As we have seen a l r e a d y ,  
Hume wanted to  make a smooth t r a n s i t i o n  from 'man i s  aware ' to 'm an  i s  
m ora lly  a w a re ' .  For reasons  which a re  s t a t e d  w ith  g r e a t  f o rc e  and c l a r i t y ,  
he i n s i s t e d  in  h i s  own works t h a t  t h a t  kind o f  movement i s  in a d m is s ib le ;  
because , to  use  th e  language of moral ph ilo sophy , 'you  c a n ' t  d e r iv e  an 
ought from an i s . ' W e  should be g r a t e f u l  to  him, t h a t ,  a l th o u g h  i t  i s  
a p o in t  a g a in s t  h i s  own p o s i t i o n  he i s  p repared  to  i n s i s t  on i t  so s t r i c t l y .  
A f te r  h i s  e x h a u s t iv e  s tudy  of th e  in fo rm a tion  which physio logy  was
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b r in g in g  to  l i g h t ,  he began to  a p p re c ia te  th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of s c ie n c e .  I t  
i s  p robably  t r u e  to  say t h a t  one o f  the  g re a t  c o n t r ib u t io n s  which he made 
to  the  s c h o la r s h ip  o f  h i s  day was to  put the  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  s tudy  of 
psychology on a p roper  f o o t in g ,  bu t t h i s  d id  no th ing  to  advance th e  s tudy  
o f  moral q u e s t io n s  a s  such . S h a f te sb u ry  and Hutcheson had sa id  lo u d ly  
and c l e a r l y  -  'man i s  m o ra l ly  aw are ' -  and they  had t h e i r  r e l i g i o u s  
b e l i e f s  to  e x p la in  why t h a t  i s  so .  They had no d i f f i c u l t y  in  say ing  t h a t  
th e r e  i s  a m oral sense  w i th in  th e  h e a r t  o f  man, j u s t  as  they  had no d i f f i ­
c u l ty  in  say ing  t h a t  th e  world as  man's environment i s  charged w ith  
m oral i m p l ic a t i o n s .  Hume was endeavouring to  say th e  same th in g ,  only  
in  h i s  case  t h e s e  c la im s  j u s t  seemed to  hang in  th e  a i r .  Most f r u s t r a t i n g -  
ly  o f  a l l ,  when p inned  down about t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  he would no t  fa c e  the  
problem.
What then  i s  th e  gap which s e p a ra te s  H utcheson 's  I n tu i t io n is m  from 
Hume's? I f  a l l  a re  ag reed  t h a t  Hume was an I n t u i t i o n i s t  in  th e  Shaftesbury-  
Hutcheson t r a d i t i o n ,  th en  i t  i s  q u e s t io n a b le  whether any gap e x i s t s  a t  a l l .  
A s t ro n g  c ase  could  be made f o r  i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  was a c l e a r  d i s t i n c t ­
io n  between th e  s e c u la r  R a t io n a l ism  of some o f  the  Ph ilosophes  and B r i t i s h  
I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  because t h e r e  th e  problem i s  no t  how th e  t r a n s i t i o n  i s  made 
from 'man i s  aw are ' to  'man i s  m o ra l ly  a w a r e ' .  A number o f  a t h e i s t i c  
R a t i o n a l i s t s  appear  n o t  to  have been unduly concerned about whether o r  no t 
man i s  m o ra l ly  aware. But t h a t  i s s u e  could no t  be ducked w i th in  the  
I n t u i t i o n i s t  camp. Hume had no d e s i r e  to  evade th e  d i s c u s s io n  o f  moral 
q u e s t io n s .  For him th e  d i s c u s s io n  o f  moral q u e s t io n s  was o f  th e  g r e a t e s t  
im portance .  And y e t ,  having  a ttem pted  to  remove th e  r e l i g i o u s  element 
from I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  he was l e f t  say ing  something l i k e  -  'man i s  m ora l ly  
aware, a l though  we c a n ' t  say why'. Not th e  kind of answer to  impress 
any type  of R a t i o n a l i s t !
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When a t te m p t in g  to  d e f in e  ' I n t u i t i o n i s m ' , i t  has been argued in  th e  
t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o r ig in a te d  w ith  S h a f te sb u ry  and was passed to 
Hutcheson and Hume. A l l  t h r e e  appear to  be in  agreement t h a t  we can 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between r i g h t  and wrong because we have a moral c o n s t i t u t i o n .
We w i l l  p r e s e n t ly  obse rve  t h a t  S haf tesbury  in  h is  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
w ro te  t h a t ; -  "Sense o f  R igh t  and Wrong t h e r e f o r e  being as n a tu r a l  to  us as  
N a tu ra l  A f fe c t io n  i t s e l f ,  and being th e  f i r s t  P r i n c i p l e  in  our c o n s t i t u t i o n  
and make." In t h e  in t r o d u c t io n  to  H utcheson 's  An Inq u iry  in to  th e  
O r ig in a l  o f  our Ideas  o f  Beauty and V ir tu e ,  he made t h e  fo llow ing  acknow­
led g e m en t ; -  "( In two T r e a t i s e s ,  In which th e  P r in c ip le s  o f  t h e  l a t e  Earl 
o f  S h a f te sb u ry  a r e  e x p la in 'd  and Defended e tc .  )" and in  t h e  P re fa c e  he 
a s s e r t s ; -  "There  i s  no p a r t  o f  Philosophy Rf more importance,than a j u s t  
knowledge o f  human N a tu re ,  and i t s  va r io u s  powers and D is p o s i t io n s ."  On 
page 78 o f  t h e  t h e s i s  t h e r e  can be found th e  s t a r t  o f  a leng thy  q u o ta t io n  
from Hume's T r e a t i s e . which concludes w ith  a d e fence  o f  In tu i t io n is m  
a g a in s t  R a t io n a l ism » -  "S ince  m ora ls ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  have an in f lu e n c e  on th e  
a c t i o n s  and a f f e c t i o n s ,  i t  fo l lo w s ,  t h a t  they  cannot be d e r iv 'd  from re a s o n ,  
and t h a t  because  reason  a lo n e ,  as we have a l r e a d y  p r o v 'd ,  can never have 
any such i n f lu e n c e . "  There e x i s t s  a c o n s id e ra b le  body o f  w r i t t e n  m a te r ia l  
to  show t h a t  a l l  t h r e e  were a t  some s ta g e  im por tan t  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  o f  th e  
I n t u i t i o n i s t  sch o o l.  The c o n v ic t io n  t h a t  Hume's I n tu i t i o n i s m  was b a s ic a l l y  
s e c u la r  i s  d iscu ssed  a t  l e n g th  in  th e  t h e s i s  (p .  62 -  6 8 ) ,  l e a d in g  to  
t h e  conc lus ion  t h a t  he may never have been s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
had succeeded.
In a BBC Radio S co tland  b ro ad c a s t  on F ra n c is  Hutcheson, P ro fe s so rB ro a d ie  o f  
Glasgow U n iv e r s i ty  made th e  c la im  t h a t  Hutcheson should not be thought o f  
merely as a fo llow er  o f  th e  p o s i t i o n  taken up in  S h a f te s b u ry 's  I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  
because  he may a l s o  have f e l t  some sympathy fo r  'T h e i s t i c  R a t io n a l i s m ' .
P r o f esso r  Broadie  claimed t h a t  Hutcheson was p a r t  o f  t h e  R e a l i s t  S c o t t i s h
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t r a d i t i o n  -  a t r a d i t i o n  which went as f a r  back as Duns Scotus and th e  
S c o t t i s h  s c h o la r s h ip  o f  t h e  Middle Ages. The R e a l i s t s ,  accord ing  to  
P ro f  e sso rB road ie ,  b e lieved  t h a t  moral q u a l i t i e s  were r e a l  q u a l i t i e s  which 
e x is te d  in  t h e  w orld . R e fe re n c e  i s  made to  Hume's need fo r  ' a b s t r a c t  
moral s ta n d a r d s '  i n  th e  t h e s i s  (p . 53)»
As Hutcheson expressed h is  indeb tedness  to  S h a f te s b u ry 's  In tu i t io n ism . 
in h is  i n t r o d u c t io n  to  ~ An In q u iry  in to  th e  O r ig in a l  o f  our Ideas  o f  
Beauty and V i r t u e . , i t  i s  s a f e  to  conclude t h a t  he was in  some sense  an 
I n t u i t i o n i s t .  And, as t h e r e  i s  a s t r i k i n g  s im i l a r i t y  between th e  w r i t in g s  
o f  S h a f te sb u ry ,  Hutcheson and Hume, t h e r e  i s  a ls o  a s t ro n g  case  fo r  
grouping them to g e th e r  as th e  le a d in g  p h i lo so p h e rs  o f  I n tu i t i o n is m .
However, as Hutcheson remained th e  most o r thodox  T h e is t  o f  th e  t h r e e ,  
i t  i s  a lso  h ig h ly  p robab le  t h a t  th e  R e a l i s t  approach  continued  to  in f lu e n c e  
h is  o u t lo o k .  I t  could have been t h a t  he f e l t  t h a t  t h e  two systems were 
complementary, th e  ' r e a l  moral q u a l i t i e s  which e x is te d  in  th e  w orld ' 
confirm ing  th e  moral c o n v ic t io n s  o f  th e  i n d iv i d u a l .
In t h e  same BBC S co tland  Radio  b ro ad c a s t .  P ro fe s so r  S tu a r t  o f  Lancaster  
U n iv e r s i ty  argued t h a t  Hutcheson a ls o  be liev ed  in  th e  Moral Sense th eo ry ,  
which held  t h a t  we can have a conception  o f  goodness in  people  because 
we have a moral se n se .  This moral sense  was though t  to  be s im i la r  to  
our o th e r  senses  on which l i g h t ,  h e a t ,  co lour e t c . ,  impinge. Moral goodness 
was l i k e  ano ther  e x te rn a l  sou rce ,  which could be recogn ized  by th e  human 
moral se n se .  So t h a t  P ro fe s s o rs  Brodie  and S t u a r t  appear to  be a rgu ing  
t h a t  Hutcheson r e l i e d  on two system s. F i r s t ,  t h e  Realism, o f  th e  S c o t t i s h  
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  t r a d i t i o n ;  and, second, th e  Moral Sense th eo ry ,  which com.es 
c lo s e r  to  S h a f te s b u ry 's  I n tu i t i o n i s m .
I t  was t h i s  l a t t e r  view which f e a tu re d  in  t h e  w r i t in g s  o f  Hutcheson which 
in f lu e n c e d  Hume, and which i s  o f  im portance  fo r  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
which has been p re se n ted  in  t h e  t h e s i s .  A sample o f  th e s e  w r i t in g s  can be 
found in  th e  prim ary sources which a r e  quoted in  t h i s  s e c t io n .
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In M ossner 's  The L i f e  o f  David Hume, (op, c i t .  p .  31 ) we a r e  t o ld  t h a t  
"In  1726 Hume a c q u ired  a t h r e e  volume s e t  o f  S h a f te s b u ry 's  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . . . "  
so t h a t  a s tudy  o f  t h e  way in  which th e s e  volumes may have in f lu e n c e d  h is  
th in k in g  on th e  q u e s t io n  o f  I n tu i t i o n i s m  i s  an a p p r o p r i a t e  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  fo r  
t h i s  s e c t i o n .  Volume I  i s  t h e  171I; Dundee e d i t i o n .  On page 39 we have a 
key I n t u i t i o n i s t  a f f i r m a t io n  t h a t  our Notion o f  what i s  m ora lly  e x c e l le n t  
i s  no t  d e r iv e d  from u n t ru s tw o r th y  Reason. On th e  same page we a r e  t o ld  t h a t  
" . . .G o d  i s  so good, as  to  exceed t h e  ve ry  b e s t  o f  u s  i n  Goodness," Volume I I  
begins  w ith  T r e a t i s e  IV, v i z .  an In q u iry  concern ing  V i r tu e  or M e r i t ,  and th e  
year  o f  p u b l ic a t io n  i s  I709 .
, T h is  s e c t io n  c o n ta in s  a d isc la im e r  about t h e  need fo r  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  to  
be v i r t u o u s ,  and, in d ee d ,  r e f e r s  to  t h e  harm ful i n f l u e n c e  o f  some r e l i g i o n s ;  
themes which a r e  f r e q u e n t  in  Hume's w r i t i n g s .  " R e lig io n  and V i r tu e  
appear so n e a r ly  r e l a t e d ,  t h a t  th ey  a r e  g e n e ra l ly  presumed in s e p a r a b le  
Companions." ( p . 5 ) "We have known P e sp le ,  who having th e  Appearance o f  g rea t  
Zeal in  R e l ig io n ,  have y e t  shown them selves  extremely d e g e n e ra te  and c o r r u p t . "  
(p .  6 ) On page 11 S h a f te sb u ry  a t te m p ts  a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  Theism. "To b e l i e v e  
t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  e v e ry th in g  i s  governed, o d e r 'd ,  or r e g u la te d  fo r  th e  b e s t ,  by a 
d e s ig n in g  P r i n c i p l e ,  o r  Mind, n e c e s s a r i l y  good and perm anent, i s  to  be a 
p e r f e c t  TH5IS T ."
Qn human n a tu r e ,  we f in d  an echo o f  th e  D e is t ic  approach in  "Nothing i s  
mare j u s t  than a known say ing  'T ha t i t  i s  as hard to  ' f i n d  a man wholly 111 , 
as wholly G O O d : ' . . ."  Again in  P a r t  I I I  Sec. 1 we f in d  an account o f  r i g h t  
and wrong which makes no r e f e r e n c e  to  r e v e a le d  r e l i g i o n .  "The N a tu re  o f  
V i r tu e  c o n s i s t i n g  (as  has been e x p la in 'd )  i n  a c e r t a i n  j u s t  D is p o s i t io n ,  or 
p r o p o r t io n a b le  A f fe c t io n  o f  a r a t i o n a l  C re a tu re  towards th e  Moral O b jec ts  o f  
R ig h t  and Wrong; n o th in g  can  p o s s ib ly  i n  such a C re a tu re  exclude a P r i n c i p l e  
o f  V i r tu e ,  or re n d e r  i t  i n e f f e c t u a l . . . "  (p .  40 ) And, " . . . n o t h i n g  can 
a s s i s t  o r  advance th e  P r i n c i p l e  o f  V i r tu e ,  bu t what e i t h e r  i n  some manner 
n o u r ish e s  and promotes a Sense o f  R ig h t  and W ro n g ; . . . "
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This  s e n se  i s  n a t u r a l  to u s ,  "Sense o f  R ig h t  and Wrong t h e r e f o r e  being as 
n a t u r a l  to  us as N a tu ra l  A f fe c t io n  i t s e l f ,  and being  th e  f i r s t  P r in c i p l e  in. 
our c o n s t i t u t i o n  and Make." (p .  44 ) Then M ature i s  d icussed  in  r e l a t i o n  to 
th e  f o r c e  o f  custom or e d u c a t io n .  "As th e  second Case, v i z .  The wrong Sense 
or f a l s e  Im ag ina t ion  o f  R ig h t  and Wrong. This  can proceed only from th e  
F orce  o f  Custom and Education i n  o p p o s i t io n  to  N a tu re ."  ( p . 4 J)  He th en  
o f f e r s  t h e  view t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib l e  fo r  a Deity  to  be blamed fo r  b e l i e f s  
t h a t  a r e  u n a c c e p ta b le .  "For whenever any th in g  in  i t s  n a tu r e  od ious  and 
abominable i s  by R e l ig io n  a d v a n c 'd ,  as  t h e  suppos 'd  W il l  or P le a s u r e  o f  a 
Supreme D eity , i f  i n  t h e  eye o f  t h e  B e l ie v e r  i t  a p p e a rs  n o t  indeed  in  any 
r e s p e c t  t h e  l e s s  i l l  or  od ious on t h i s  accoun t;  then must t h e  Deity  o f  
n e c e s s i t y  bear t h e  blame, and be conside red  as a Being n a t u r a l l y  i l l  and 
o d i o u s . . . "  (p .  47)
"For i n s t a n c e ;  i f  J u p i t e r  be He t h a t  i s  a d o r 'd  and r e v e r e n c 'd ;  and i f  h is  
H is to ry  r e p r e s e n t s  him amorously i n c l i n ' d ,  and p e rm i t t in g  h i s  D esires  o f  
t h i s  k ind  to  wander in. th e  l o o s e s t  Manner; ' t i s  im p o s s ib le  bu t h is  
W orshippers b e l i e v in g  t h i s  H is to ry  to  be l i t e r a l l y  and s t r i c t l y  t r u e ,  must 
o f  c o u rse  be ta u g h t  a g r e a t e r  lo v e  o f  amorous and wanton A c ts ,"
He d i s c u s s e s  t h e  example o f  a b e l i e v e r  in  a s t r a n g e  Deity who must always 
m a in ta in  h i s  own sense  o f  r i g h t  and wrong. " I f  in  fo l lo w in g  th e  P re ce p ts  o f  
h i s  suppos 'd  God, or doing what he esteems n e c essa ry  towards t h e  s a t i s f y ­
in g  o f  such h i s  D e ity ,  he i s  com pell 'd  on only  by F e a r ,  and c o n t r a ry  to  h is  
I n c l i n a t i o n ,  perform s an Act which he s e c r e t l y  d e t e s t s  as  barbarous and 
u n n a tu r a l ;  then has he an. Apprehension or Sense s t i l l  o f  R ig h t  and W rong .. ."  
So t h a t  t h e  b e l i e v e r  r e t a i n s  an independent s e n se  o f  r i g h t  and wrong. "For 
whoever th in k s  t h e r e  i s  a God, and p re ten d s  fo rm a lly  to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  he i s  
j u s t  and good, must suppose t h a t  t h e r e  i s  In d ep en d en tly  such th in g s  as 
J u s t i c e ,  and I n j u s t i c e ,  T ru th  and Falsehood, R ig h t  and Wrong; a cco rd ing  to  
which he pronounces t h a t  God i s  j u s t ,  r ig h t e o u s ,  and t r u e . "  (p .  50) He 
then  makes a somewhat a s to n i s h in g  c la im ; -  " . . . R e l i g i o n  (acco rd in g  as th e
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kind may p rove)  i s  c a p ab le  o f  doing g re a t  Good, or Harm; and Atheism no th in g  
p o s i t i v e  e i t h e r  way." (p .  5l )  That i s  a s ta te m e n t  which comes c lo s e  to  
what P h ilo  was to  say in  th e  D ia logues . He then  cla im s t h a t  " . . .  f a l s e  
R e l ig io n  or f a n t a s t i c a l  O pin ion , ( i s )  d e r i v 'd  commonly from S u p e r s t i t i o n  
and C r e d u l i ty . "  ( p . 52) Another theme which can be found i n  Hume.
In  S ec tion  I I I  . . . t h e  N a tu ra l  Sense o f  R ig h t  and Wrong, he c la im s t h a t  
" . . .  to have a Sense  o f  R ig h t  and Wrong, b e fo re  such t im e  as he may have any 
s e t t l ' d  Notion o f  a God, i s  what w i l l  ha rd ly  be q u e s t io n 'd :  . . . "  (p .  53 )
And y e t  t h i s  was t h e  ve ry  q u e s t io n  which th e  Glasgow P re sb y te ry  r a i s e d  w ith  
F ra n c is  Hutcheson, so t h a t  a l r e a d y  we f in d  th e  seeds o f  a S ecu la r  I n t u i t i o n ­
ism which we f in d  in  t h e  e a r ly  Hume. B e l ie f  i n  God appears  to  depend on 
p reconce ived  id e a s  about p e r f e c t i o n .  "E xcellency  and Worth, as  th in k in g  i t  
t h e  p e r f e c t io n  o f  N a tu re  t a  i m i t a t e  and resem ble  him." (p .  54) " I f  t h e r e  
be a B e l i e f  o r  Conception o f  a D e i t y . . .  a concern fo r  t h e  good o f  a l l ,  and 
an a f f e c t i o n  o f  Benevolence and Love towardè th e  Whole; such an example 
( w i l l  s e rv e  to  i n c r e a s e )  . . .  t h e  A ffec t io n  towards V i r t u e . . . "  (p .  $6)
Although many o f  h i s  c o n to n p o ra r ie s  would have suspec ted  him o f  e xp ress ing  
Deism, he c o n t i n u e s : -  "For where t h e  T h e i s t i c a l  B e l i e f  i s  i n t i r e  and p e r f e c t  
t h e r e  must be a s teddy  Opin ion  o f  th e  Super in  tendency o f  a Supreme Being, 
a W itness and S p e c ta to r  o f  human L i f e ,  and conscious 9 f  a l l  t h a t  i s  f e l t  or 
a c ted  i n  th e  U n iv e rs e ."  (p . 57) This i s  a movement back to  th e  p e rsona l  
God o f  re v e a le d  r e l i g i o n .  He con tinues  " . . . ' t i s  very  apparen t  how f a r  
conducting  a p e r f e c t  Theism must be to  V i r tu e ,  and how g re a t  a D efic iency  
t h e r e  i s  i n  A theism ."  (p .  57)*
I n  Book I I  P a r t  I S ec tion  I  he develops two a t  her themes which a r e  
im p o r tan t  i n  I n tu i t i o n i s m .  a )  "We have found, t h a t  t o  deserve  t h e  name 
Good or V i r tu o u s ,  a C re a tu re  must have a l l  h i s  I n c l i n a t i o n s  and A f f e c t io n s ,  
h i s  D is p o s i t io n s  o f  Mind and Temper, s u i t a b l e  and a g re e in g  w ith  th e  good o f  
h i s  K i n d . . . "  (p .  7 7 ) "To s tand  thus  w ell a f f e c t e d ,  and to  have o n e 's  
A f fe c t io n s  r i g h t  and i n t i r e ,  no t  on ly  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  o n e 's  s e l f ,  bu t o f
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S o c ie ty  and th e  P u b l ic k :  This  i s  R e c t i t u d e ,  I n t e g r i t y ,  or V i r tu e ."  There i s  
h e re  an emphasis on e d u c a t io n ,  upb r in g in g  and t r a d i t i o n  which we w i l l  a ls o  
f in d  i n  Hutcheson, b) The s o c i a l  a s p e c t  o f  v i r t u e .  "JTor w i l l  any one deny 
t h a t  t h i s  A f fe c t io n  o f  a C re a tu re  towards t h e  good o f  t h e  Species or common 
N a tu re ,  as i s  p roper  and n a t u r a l  to  him as i t  i s  to  any Organ, P a r t  or 
Member o f  an Anim al-Body." (p .  78)
An e a r ly  work by F ra n c is  Hutcheson which in f lu e n c e d  Hume in  h is  w r i t in g  
o f  t h e  T r e a t i s e  was An I n q u i ry  i n to  t h e  O r ig in a l  o f  our Ideas o f  Beauty 
and V i r tu e .  ( In  two T r e a t i s e s ,  In. which th e  P r in c i p l e s  o f  th e  l a t e  Earl 
o f  S h a f te sb u ry  a r e  e x p la in 'd  and Defended, a g a in s t  t h e  Author o f  t h e  Fab le  
o f  t h e  Bees: and th eIdeas  o f  Moral Good and Evil  a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  According to  t h e  Sentim ents  Of t h e  A ncient M o r a l i s t s .With an Attempt to  in t ro d u c e  a M athem atica l C a lc u la t io n  in. s u b je c t s  o f  M o r a l i t y . ) by F ra n c is  Hutcheson, LLD, London 1725 e d i t io n .
In  th e  P re fa c e  we f in d  th e  a s s e r t i o n : -  "There i s  no p a r t  o f  Philosophy o f  more im portance , than  a j u s t  Knowledge o f  human N a tu re ,  and i t s  v a r io u s  Powers and D i s p o s i t io n s . "  (p .  I l l )  The s t a r t i n g  p o in t  could be sa id  to  be human n a tu r e .
I t  i s  f u r th e r  claimed t h a t  human n a tu r e  i s  in f lu e n c e d  c o n s id e rab ly  by what 
causes us p le a s u r e  and p a in .  "In  r e f l e c t i n g  upon our e x te rn a l  Senses ,  we 
p l a i n ly  se e ,  t h a t  our P e rc e p t io n s  o f  P le a s u re  or P a in ,  do not depend d i r e c t l y  
on our W i l l .  O b jec ts  do not p l e a s e  us acco rd ing  as we i a c l i n e  they  should: 
The p re fe re n c e  o f  some O b jec ts  n e c e s s a r i l y  p le a s e s  us ;  nor can we by our 
W i l l ,  any o th e rw ise  p ro c u re  P le a s u r e ,  or avoid P a in ,  than  by p rocu r ing  th e  
former kind o f  O b je c ts ,  and av o id in g  th e  l a t t e r :  by th e  very  Frame o f  our
N a tu re  t h e  one i s  made th e  occasion, o f  D e l ig h t ,  and th e  o th e r  o f  D i s s a t i s f ­
ac tion .."  (p . V)
These o b s e rv a t io n s  a r e  g iven  a p h y s ic a l  e x p la n a t io n .  "The same Observation, 
w i l l  hold in  a l l  ou t  o th e r  P le a s u re s  and P a in s ;  fo r  t h e r e  a r e  many o th e r
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O b je c ts ,  which p l e a s e ,  o r  d i s p l e a s e  us n e c e s s a r i l y ,  as  m a te r i a l  O b jec ts  do 
when they  o p e ra te  upon our Organs o f  Sense. There  i s  s c a r c e ly  any O b jec t  which 
our Minds a r e  employM abou t,  which i s  no t  thus  C o n s t i tu te d  t h e  n ecessa ry  
occas ion  o f  some P le a s u r e  o r  Pain :  Thus we s h a l l  f in d  o u rs e lv e s  p l e a s 'd  w ith
a r e g u la r  Form, a  p ie c e  o f  A r c h i t e c t u r e ,  o r  P a in t in g ,  a Composition o f  N o te s ,  
a Theorem, an A c t io n ,  an  A f f e c t io n ,  a C h a ra c te r :  and we a r e  conscious t h a t
t h i s  P le a s u re  n e c e s s a r i l y  a r i s e s  from th e  Contem plation o f  t h e  Idea  . . .  t h e  
P le a s u re  a r i s e s  from some U n ifo rm ity ,  O rder, Arrangement, I m i ta t io n ;  and no t  
from t h e  s im ple  Id eas  o f  C olour, or Sound, o r  mode o f  Extension s e p a r a te ly  
c o n s id e r 'd . "  (P. VI) Those who have s tu d ie s  Hume's Tr e a t i s e  w i l l  se e  a t  
once t h a t  h e re  we a r e  ©n f a m i l i a r  t e r r i t o r y .
I f  t h a t  p rec e d in g  s e c t io n  d e a l t  w ith  one a s p e c t  o f  t h e  mechanism o f  p e r c e p t i ­
on , ano the r  seeks to  d e f in e  moral sense .  "THESE d e te rm in a t io n s  to be p l e a s 'd  
w i th  any Forms o r  Id eas  which occur to  our  O b se rv a t io n ,  t h e  Author chus es to  
c a l l  SENSES; d i s t i n g u i s h in g  them from th e  Powers which commonly go by t h a t  
Name, by c a l l i n g  our Power o f  p e rc e iv in g  th e  Beauty o f  R e g u la r i ty ,  O rder, 
Harmony, an I n t e r n a l  Sense; and t h a t  Determ ination  to  be p l e a s 'd  w ith  t h e  
C ontem plation o f  th o s e  a f f e c t i o n s ,  A c tio n s ,  o r  C h a ra c te rs  o f  r a t i o n a l  Agents, 
which we c a l l  v i r t u o u s ,  he marks by th e  name o f  a MORAL SEtrSE."
So f a r  th e  emphasis has been on human n a tu r e  by i t s e l f ,  but now Hutcheson 
a t t r i b u t e s  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n  to  t h e  Author o f  N a t u r e ; -
HIS p r i n c i p a l  Design i s  to  show,That human, n a tu r e  was n.ot l e f t  q u i t e  i n d i f f e r e n t  i n  th e  a f f a i r  o f  V i r tu e ,  to  form to  i t s e l f  O bserva t ions  concern ing  th e  Advantage or D isadvantage o f  Ac­t io n s  and a c co rd in g ly  to, r e g u l a t e  i t sConduct. "The weakness o f  our Reason, and th e  evocations  a r i s i n g  from 
th e  I n f i r m i ty  and H e c e ss i ty s  o f  our N a tu re ,  a r e  so g r e a t ,  t h a t  very  few o f  
Mankind could have form 'd  th o se  long  Deductions o f  Reason, which may show some 
A ctions  to  be in. t h e  whole advantageous to  t h e  Agent, and t h e i r  C on trarys  
p e r n i c io u s .  The Author o f  N a tu re  has much b e t t e r  f u r n i s h 'd  us fo r  a v i r t o u s  
Conduct, than our M o ra l i s t s  seem to  im agine , by a lm ost as  qu ick  and powerful
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I n s t r u c t i o n s ,  as we have fo r  th e  p re s e r v a t io n  o f  Qur Bodys. He has made 
V ir tu e  a lo v e ly  Form, to  e x c i t e  our p u r s u i t  o f  i t ;  and has given us s tro n g  
A f fe c t io n s  to  be th e  Springs o f  each v i r tu o u s  A c t io n ."  (p . V II I)
Hutcheson f e l t  t h a t  S h a f te sb u ry  p laced  « corr@#t emphasis on 
th e  a e s t h e t i c  e lem ent. " Our Gentlemen o f  good T a s te  can t e l l  us o f  a g re a t  
many S enses ,  T a s te s ,  and R e l i s h e s  fo r  Beauty, Harmony, I m i ta t io n  in  P a in t in g  
and P o e try ;  and may no t  we f in d  too i n  Mankind a R e l i s h  fo r  a Beauty i n  
C h a ra c te r s ,  i n  manners? I  doubt we have made Ph ilo sophy , as w e ll  as Religion., 
by our f o o l i s h  management o f  i t ,  so a u s te r e  and u n g a in ly  i n  Form, t h a t  a 
Gentleman cannot e a s i l y  b r in g  h im se lf  to  l i k e  i t ;  and th o s e  who a r e  S tran g  erg 
to  i t ,  can s c a rc e ly  bear to hear our D esc r ip t io n  o f  i t :  So much i s  i t
changed from what was once was th e  d e l ig h t  o f  f i n e  Gentlemen among th e  
A n t ie n t s ,  and t h e i r  R ec rea t io n  a f t e r  th e  Hurry o f  p u b l ic k  A f f a i r s ! "  (p .  Vlli^
For Hutcheson th e  way in  which human i n t u i t i o n  i s  formed, e . g . ,  by u pb r ing ­
ing  ana e d u c a t io n ,  Has a v i t a l  bea ring  or. th e  development o f  our se n se s .
"THF proper  Occasions o f  P e rce p t io n  by th e  e x te r n a l  Senses ,  occur to us as 
soon as  we come in to  th e  World; and thence  perhaps we e a s i l y  look  upon th e s e  
Senses to  be n a t u r a l :  but th e  O bjec ts  o f  th e  s u p e r io r  Senses o f  Beauty and
V ir tu e  g e n e ra l ly  do n o t .  I t  i s  probably  some tim e b e fo re  C h i ld re n  do r e f l e c t  
or a t  l e a s t  l e t  us know t h a t  they r e f l e c t  upon P ro p o r t io n  and S im i l i tu d e ;  
upon A f f e c t io n s ,  C h a ra c te r s ,  Tempers; Or come to  know th e  e x te rn a l  A ctions 
which a r e  Evidences o f  them: And hence we im agioe t h a t  t h e i r  Sense o f  Beauty
and t h e i r  Moral Sentim ents  o f  A c t io n s ,  must be e n t i r e l y  owing to I n s t r u c t io n ,  
and Education; whereas i t  i s  f u l l  as easy to  co n c iev e ,  how a C h a ra c te r ,  a 
Temper, as  soon as  they  a r e  o b s e rv 'd ,  may be c o n s t i t u t e d  by ilATlRE t h e  
n e c es sa ry  occasion, o f  P le a s u r e ,  or an. O bjec t  o f  A pproba tion , as  a T a s te  or 
a Sound; tho i t  be t h e  same tim.e b e fo re  th e s e  O b je c ts  p r e s e n t  them selves to  
our O b s e rv a t io n ."  (p .  IX)
In  Tr e a t i s  e I  v i z .  An I n q u i ry  concern ing  Beauty , Order Ec, we f in d  an 
account o f  p e r c e p t io n  which s im i la e  to  t h a t  put forw ard i n  Hume's T r e a t i s e .
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A r t .  I  "Those Id ea s  t h a t  a r e  r a i s ' d  in  th e  Mind upon th e  p re se n c e  o f  
e x te r n a l  O b je c ts ,  and t h e i r  a c t i n g  upon our Bodys, a r e  c a l l e d  S e n s a t io n s ,
We f in d  t h a t  t h e  Mind in. such Gases i s  p a s s iv e ,  and has not th e  Power 
d i r e c t l y  to  p re v e n t  t h e  P e rc e p t io n  or Id ea ,  o r  to  v a ry  i t  a t  i t s  R ecep tion , 
as long  as we c o n t in u e  our Bodys i n  a s t a t e  f i t  to  be a c te d  upon by th e  
e x te r n a l  O b je c t ."  (p .  1)
In  S e c t .  I l l  Of t h e  Beauty o f  Theorems, t h e r e  i s  a r e f e r e n c e  to  g r a v i t a ­
t io n  " . . .  i n  S i r  I s a a c  Newton's Schem e.. ."  (p . 30 ) Hutcheson supposes th e  
Author o f  N a tu re  b e n e v o le n t ,  " . . .  and then  indeed  th e  Happiness o f  Mankind 
i s  d e s i r a b l e  o r  Good to  t h e  Supreme Cause; and t h a t  Form which p le a s e s  u s ,  
i s  an argument o f  h i s  Wisdom." (p .  60 ) " . . .  s in c e  upon th e  s u p p o s i t io n  o f  a 
Benevolent D e ity ,  a l l  t h e  appa ren t  Beauty p ro d u c 'd  i s  an  Evidence o f  th e  
Execution o f  a B enevolent Design, to  g ive  him t h e  P le a s u re s  o f  Beau ty ."
For Hume, e s p e c i a l l y  i n  th e  D ia logues , t h a t  view o f  t h e  d e i ty  and His 
C re a t io n  i s  no t  w i th o u t  major problems, but w ith  S h a f te sb u ry  and Hutcheson 
i t  was a b a s ic  p re s u p p o s i t io n  in  t h e i r  on to logy . On page 84 Hutcheson 
s t a t e s  t h a t  " . . .E d u c a t io n  and Custom may in f lu e n c e  our i n t e r n a l  S en se s ."  
Thus human i n t u i t i o n  does no t come in to  e x is te n c e  in  a vacuum, but presuppo­
ses  th e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  u p b r in g in g  and educa t ion . On page 39 o f  t h e  t h e s i s  
r e f e r e n c e  was made to  t h e  im portance  which Hume a t ta c h e d  to education  i n  
t h e  forming o f  our b e l i e f s .
In  t h e  T r e a t i s e  I I  v i z .  an  In q u iry  Concerning th e  O r ig in a l  o f  our Ideas  
o f  V i r tu e  or Moral Good, a section, e n t i t l e d  -  an  In q u iry  Concerning Moral 
Good and Evil  -  t e l l s  us t h a t  "The Word Moral Goodness, deno tes  our Idea 
o f  some Q u a l i ty  apprehended i n  A c t io n s ,  which p ro cu re s  Approbation and 
Love toward t h e  A c to r ,  from th o se  who r e c e iv e  no Advantage by th e  A c tion . 
Moral Ev il  den o te s  our Idea  o f  a c o n tra ry  Q u a l i ty ,  which e x c i te s  A version , 
and D is l ik e  toward th e  A c t o r . . . "  (p . 101) Hutcheson goes on to  suggest  
t h a t  such a d i s t i n c t i o n  between good and e v i l  i s  u n i v e r s a l ,  and th e  rea so n  
fo r  b e l i e v in g  t h a t  Hume shared t h a t  view i s  d i sc u s s e d  i n  t h e  t h e s i s  p. 53f*
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'•These D e s c r ip t io n s  seem to  c o n ta in  an u n i v e r s a l l y  acknovledg ' d D if fe re n c e  
o f  moral Good and S v i l , from N a t u r a l .  Allmen who speak o f  moral Good
acknowledge t h a t  i t  produces Love toward th o se  we apprehend p o s s e s s 'd  o f  i t ;
whereas n a tu r a l  Good does n o t .  I n  t h i s  m atte r  Ben must c o n s u l t  t h e i r  own 
B r e a s t s . "  That l a s t  p i e c e  o f  a d v ic e  i s  very  t y p i c a l  o f  th e  Hume method.
In  S e c t .  I I  Concerning th e  immediate Motive to  v i r t u o u s  A c tion , Hutcheson 
d i sc u s s e s  th e  r e l i g i o u s  e x p la n a t io n .  The younger Hume, i t  i s  argued i n  t h e  
t h e s i s ,  a t tem p ted  to  s e p a r a te  t h e 'v i r t u o u s  motive* from r e l i g i o n ,  but i t  i s  
argued t h a t  he was no t  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e  r e s u l t .  Here i s  H utcheson 's  v ie w :-  
"A ll  t h e  A ctions  counted r e l i g i o u s  in  any Country a r e  supposed to fo l lo w  from
some A f fe c t io n s  toward t h e  D eity ;  and whatever we c a l l  s o c ia l  V i r tu e ,  w i l l
s t i l l  suppose to  flow  from A f f e c t io n s  toward our F e l lo w -C re a tu re s ;  fo r  in  
t h i s  a l l  seem to  a g re e ,
' That e x te r n a l  M otions, when accompany'd w ith  no ' A f fe c t io n s  towards God or Man, Or ' evideficing no Want of th e  expected Af- ' f a c t io n s  towards e i t h e r ,  can have no moral ' Good or E v il  in  them. " (p .  125)
According to Hutcheson, i t  i s  t h e  " . . . v e r y  Frame o f  our N ature  (which) 
de te rm ines  us to  lo v e  or h a t s ,  . . . "  (p . 128): a manner o f  express ion  v e ry  
t y p i c a l  o f  Hume. In  I I I  Hutcheson s t a t e s ,  "As to  th e  Love o f  Benevolence, 
th e  very  Name excludes S e l f - I n t e r e s t . "  (p .  129) The passage  " . . . s o  t h a t  
a l l  t h o se  kind A f fe c t io n s  which i n c l i n e  us to  make o th e r s  happy, and a l l  
A ctions  suppos 'd  to  flow from such A f f e c t io n s ,  appear m orally  G o o d . . ."  (p . 
l 50) i s  ve ry  r e m in is c e n t  o f  S ec tio n  I I  o f  Hume's T r e a t i s e  , P a r t  I  Of 
Benevolence.
In  th e  P re fa c e  o f  H u tcheson 's  In q u iry  on I n t u i t i o n i s m ,  he shows th e  
l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  r e a s o n .  "The weakness o f  our Reason, and th e  evocations  
a r i s i n g  from th e  I n f i r m i ty  and N e c e ss i ty  o f  our N a tu re ,  a r e  so g r e a t ,  t h a t  
ve ry  few o f  Mankind could have fo rm 'd  th o se  long  Deductions o f  R e a s o n . . . "
(p . VII)
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♦In  A System o f  Moral Philosophy  , London. Vol I  Hutcheson s t ru c k  a more 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  n o t e ,  when in  Book I ,  Concerning t h e  C o n s t i tu t io n  o f  Human 
N a tu re  and th e  Supreme Good, he w r o te ; -  "The i n t e n t i o n  o f  moral ph ilosophy  
i s  to  d i r e c t  men to  t h a t  c o u rse  o f  a c t i o n  which te n d s  most e f f e c t u a l l y  to  
promote t h e i r  g r e a t e s t  happiness  and p e r f e c t i o n ;  as f a r  as  i t  can be done 
by o b s e rv a t io n s  and c o n c lu s io n s  d i s c o v e r a b le  from t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  n a tu r e ,  
w i th o u t  any a id s  o f  s u p e rn a tu ra l  r e v e l a t i o n ;  t h e s e  maxims, or r u l e s  o f  
conduct a r e  t h e r e f o r e  r ep u te d  as  laws o f  N a tu re ,  and th e  system or c o l l e c t ­
io n  o f  them i s  c a l l e d  t h e  LAW OF NATURE." (p .  1 ) This  was p robab ly  th e  
kind o f  s h i f t  o f  «anphasis which brought Hutcheso.n i n to  t r o u b l e  w ith  Glasgow 
P re s b y te ry .  I t  appears  to  be a s h i f t  towards Deism, a t  t h e  ve ry  l e a s t ,  
because  th e  laws o f  n a tu r e  in  q u e s t io n  could be th o ugh t  to  o p e ra te  q u i t e  
w ithou t  any need fo r  s u p e rn a tu ra l  r e v e l a t i o n .  Very probab ly  t h a t  i s  no t 
what Hutcheson m ean t, but t h i s  p assag e  was open to  t h a t  kind o f  i n t e r p r e t a ­
t i o n .  The aim. i s  to  " . . . e n q u i r e  in to  t h e  s e v e r a l  powers and d i s p o s i t i o n s  
o f  t h e  s p e c i e s . . . "  " . . . t h a t  we may d isco v e r  what i s  i t s  supreme happ iness  
and p e r f e c t i o n . . . "  Cp.2) which may amount to  n o th in g  more th an  unaided 
human o b s e rv a t io n  o f  what c o n t r ib u te s  to  t h a t  e s t a t e .
What ta k e s  p la c e  In. th e  mind i s  a l s o  o f  g r e a t  im p o r ta n c e :-  "These two 
powers o f  p e rc e p t io n ,  s e n s a t io n  and c o n sc io u sn e ss ,  in t ro d u c e  in to  th e  mind all 
i t s  m a te r i a l s  o f  knowledge." (p .  6) People  a r e  govenrned by two im p u ls e s ; -  
" F i r s t ,  an i n v a r i a b l e  c o n s ta n t  im pulse  toward o n e 's  own p e r f e c t io n  and 
happ iness  o f  t h e  h ig h e s t  k in d ."  "The o th e r  d e te rm in a t io n  a l le g ed  i s  
toward th e  U n iv e rsa l  happ iness  o f  o t h e r s . "  (p .  9 ) As Hume i s  often, 
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  t h e  fo rm u la t io n  o f  th e  ' g r e a t e s t  h a p p in e ss '  p r i n c i p l e ,  
pe rhaps  i t  i s  a s  w e ll  to  n o te  t h a t  Hutcheson r e f e r s  to  something
which sounds l i k e  i t .  He o bse rves  t h a t  " . . . a l m o s t  a l l  o th e r  an im als ,  as 
soon as they  come to  l i g h t ,  e x e rc i s in g  t h e i r  s e v e r a l  powers by l i k e  i n s t i n c t s  
i n  th e  way t h a t  t h e  Author o f  N a tu re  i n t e n d e d ; . . . "  (p . 21) He mentions 
t h a t ,  a c co rd in g  to  A r i s t o t l e ,  i t  was God who im plan ted  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  ( p . 26)
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Hutcheson, a f f i rm s  t h a t  we p ossess  a moral f a c u l ty  " . . .  and th e  moral 
f a c u l t y  by which we judge  o f  a l l  t h e  motions o f  t h e  w i l l . "  ( p . 4l )  This 
could  have been th e  human a t t r i b u t e  Hume had i n  mind when he i d e n t i f i e d  
moral d ec is io n -m ak in g  w ith  th e  powers o f  th e  mind, such as  memory and th e  
forming o f  b e l i e f s .
S h a f te s b u r y 's  concep t o f  t h e  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  perform ance o f  duty appears  i n  
t h e  fo l lo w in g  s e c t i o n : -  "From s e l f - l o v e  we d e s i r e  on ly  th e  m.eans o f  our own 
h ap p in e ss .  Now t h e  a c t u a l  happiness  o f  o th e r s  i s  n e i t h e r  th e  cause  nor means 
o f  o b ta in in g  s e l f - a p p r o b a t i o n ,  nor rewards from. God. Our h e a r t s  approve u s ,  
and God prom ises rew ards to  u s ,  n o t  because o th e r s  a r e  i n  f a c t  happy, but 
because  we have such k ind  d i s p o s i t i o n s ,  and a c t  our p a r t s  w e ll  in  t h e i r  
b e h a l f ,  whether in  t h e  event they  a r e  happy or n o t . "  (p .  4-5)
Hutcheson, in  a f a i r l y  len g th y  p assage , t r i e s  to  d i s e n ta n g le  th e  
q u e s t io n  o f  t h e  deg ree  to  which our human c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  r e l i g i o u s ,  
from t h a t  which in f lu e n c e s  human m o t iv a t io n : -
"To a l l  edge h e re  t h a t ,  by our reason  and r e f l e c t i o n ,  we may se e  what 
was t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  Go-d t h e  Author o f  our N a tu re  in t h i s  whole f a b r i c k  
o f  our a f f e c t i o n s ;  t h a t  he p l a i n ly  in tended  u n iv e r s a l  h ap p in ess ,  and 
t h a t  o f  each I n d iv id u a l ,  as f a r  as i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  i t ;  and t h a t  
t h i s  i n t e n t i o n  should be our r u l e ;  t h a t  we should t h e r e f o r e  r e s t r a in ,  
and c o n t r o l l ,  n o t  only  a l l  s e l f i s h  a f f e c t i o n s ,  bu t even a l l  such gene­
rous  p a r t i c u l a r  a f f e c t i o n s ,  w ith in  such bands as  th e  u n iv e r s a l  i n t e r e s t  
r e q u i r e s ;  t h i s  i s  t r u e  i n  f a c t ,  but does n o t  remove th e  d i f f i c u l t y ,  
u n le s s  we a r e  t o ld  f i r s t  from, what de te rm ina tion , o f  s o u l ,  from, what 
m otive, we a r e  to  comply w ith  t h e  d iv in e  i n te n t i o n s ?  i f  from a d e s i r e  
o f  rew ard , th en  th e  s e l f i s h  calm d e te rm in a t io n  i s  t h e  s o le  u l t i m a t e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  a l l  d e l i b e r a t e  counsels  i n  l i f e ;  i f  from a p e rc e p tio n  o f  
h is  moral e x c e l le n c e ,  a d e s i r e  o f  i m i t a t i n g  him, and from lo v e ,  and 
g r a t i t u d e ,  th en  t h e  d e s i r e  o f  moral e x c e l le n c e  must be th e  supreme 
o r i g i n a l  d e te r m in a t io n .  But t h i s  d e s i r e  o f  moral e x c e l le n c e ,  however 
an o r i g i n a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  must p resuppose  some a n te c e d e n t  d e te rm in a t io n s
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o f  th e  w i l l  as i t s  o b j e c t  . And among t h e s e  t h e r e  must be some one 
in  which th e  supreme moral e x c e l le n c e  c o n s i s t s ,  o the r  ways our very  
sense  and d e s i r e  o f  moral e x c e l le n c e ,  s in c e  i t  may recommend p a r t i c u l a r  
a f f e c t i o n s ,  which may i n t e r f e r e  w ith  one a n o th e r ,  w i l l  aga in  le a d  us 
i n to  a new l a b y r i n t h  o f  p e r p l e x i t y . "  (p . 5 l )
In  Chapter IV Hutcheson makes c l e a r  t h a t  i t  i s  p a r t  o f  th e  fu n c t io n  Of th e  
moral f a c u l ty  to  e n q u ire  " . . . s e r i o u s l y  . . .  about t h e  m oral goodness, j u s t i c e ,  
h o l in e s s ,  r e c t i t u d e  o f  th e  D iv ine  N ature  i t s e l f ,  and l ik e w is e  h is  w i l l  or laws" 
(p .  56) and, "These moral p e r f e c t i o n s  then  must be p re v io u s ly  known, or e l s e  
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  by conforming to  them i s  u s e l e s s . "  He goes on to  a r g u e : -  
" 'T i s  v a in  to  a l l e d g e  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  ed u ca t io n ,  custom, or a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  ideas  
as t h e  o r i g i n a l  o f  m oral a p p ro b a t io n ."  (p . 57) Ueason i s  l im i te d  and can 
only  " . . . d i r e c t  to  th e  means; or  compare two ends p re v io u s ly  c o n s t i tu t e d  by 
some o th e r  immediate pow ers."  ( p . 58) " . . .  d e s i r e  o f  t h i s  moral e x c e l le n c e  ."
" . . . a r e  th e  essence  o f  a t r u e  p i e ty  toward God." (p . ?0) "Our moral f a c u l ty  
must be s t r a n g e ly  a s le e p  where th e  d e s i r e  o f  knowing t h e  Supreme E xce llence  
i s  a - w a n t ln g . . . "  (p . 7^)
In  A S hort  I n t r o d u c t i o n  to  Moral Philosophy Glasgow (Second E d it io n  174-7 ) 
Hutcheson r e f e r s  to C ic e r o 's  e s t im a te  o f  th e  p la c e  o f  e th i c s .  P re fa c e  VI -  
"Whereas C icero  e x p re s s ly  d e c l a r e s ,  t h a t  th e  d o c t r in e  concerning v i r t u e ,  and 
th e  supreme good, which i s  to  be found e l s e w h e r e . . . "  I n  Book I  The Eléments 
o f  E th ic s ,  Chapter I  Of Human N a tu re  and i t s  P a r t s ,  Hutcheson s t a t e s  "All 
such a s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  u n iv e r s e ,  and human n a tu r e  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  was 
formed by th e  v;j-«dlom and counsel  o f  a d e i t y ,  must expect to  f in d  in  our 
s t r u c t u r e  and frame some c le a r  e v i d e n c e s , . . . "  (p . 2) " . . .w e  must t h e r e f o r e
s e a rc h  a c c u r a te ly  in to  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  our n a tu r e ,  to  see  what s o r t  o f  
c r e a t u r e  we a re ;  fo r  what purposes  n a t u r e  has formed us ;  what c h a ra c te r  God 
our C re a to r  r e q u i r e s  us to  m a in ta in ."  I l l  " F i r s t  th e n ,  Human n a tu r e  
c o n s i s t s  o f  sou l and body, each ô f  which has i t s  p roper  powers, p a r t s  or
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f a c u l t i e s , "  (p .  3 ) "The enquiry  i n to  t h e  body i s  more easy, and b ^ o n g s  to
t h e  P h y s ic ia n s ."  I l l  "The p a r t s  or powers o f  t h e  s o u l ,  which p r e s e n t  us
w ith  a more g lo r io u s  v iew , a r e  o f  v a r io u s  k in d s ;  but th ey  a r e  a l l  r e d u c ib le
to  two c l a s s e s ,  t h e  U nders tand ing  and th e  W i l l . "  ( p . 4-) Hutcheson a f f i rm s
th e  goodness o f  t h e  C r e a to r ; -  " I f  God t h e r e f o r e  was o r i g i n a l l y  w ise  and
good, he must n e c e s s a r i l y  have p r e f e r r e d  th e  p r e s e n t  c o n t i t u t i o n  o f  our sense
approv ing  a l l  k in d n ess  and b e n e f ic e n c e ,  to  any c o n t r a ry  one; and th e  n a tu r e(p .  21)o f  v i r t u e  i s  thus  as immutable as  th e  d iv in e  Wisdom, and Goodness." This 
was a view which caused Hume g re a t  problem s, but he d id  no t  r e j e c t  i t  
com p le te ly .  " S in c e  th en  God must appear to  us as  t h e  Supreme e x c e l le n c e ,  
and th e  i n e x h a u s t ib l e  f o u n ta in  o f  a l l  good, to  whom mankind a r e  indeb ted  
fo r  innum erable  b e n e f i t s  most g r a t u i to u s ly  bestowed; no a f f e c t io n  o f  th e  
so u l  can be more approved th a n  th e  most a rd e n t  lo v e  and v e n e ra t io n  toward 
t h e  D eity , w i th  a s te a d y  purpose  to  obey h i m . . . "  (p .  22) A " . . .D i v i n e  
Sense or Conscience  n a t u r a l l y  approving  th e s e  more e x te n s iv e  a f f e c t i o n s  
should be the  governing power in  m an . . ."  (p. 2'+)
*********
As was no ted  i n  t h e  t h e s i s  (p . 69) Hutcheson was p rosecu ted  by Glasgow 
P re sb y te ry  fo r  te a c h in g  heresy  on two co u n ts ,  v i z . ,  1 . t h a t  th e  s tandard  
o f  moral goodness was th e  promotion o f  t h e  happ iness  o f  o th e r s :  and, 2.
t h a t  we could have a knowledge o f  good and e v i l  w ithou t any p r io r  knowledge 
o f  God. As was noted  i n  our s tudy  o f  h i s  works, some Qf h is  w r i t in g s  were 
cap ab le  o f  b e a r in g  t h a t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  b u t ,  on t h e  whole, h is  theology 
r e q u i r e s  th e  r e v e a le d  r e l i g i o n  o f  Theism, o r  a t  t h e  very  l e a s t  th e  r e l i g i o n  
o f  N atu re  towards which S h a f te sb u ry  was sometimes te n d in g .  (Deism)
" In  a L e t t e r  from a Gentleman, o f  174-5 , Hume l i s t s  th e  charges made a g a in s t  
th e  T r e a t i s e  by th o s e  who sought to  p reven t  h is  appointment to  t h e  U n iv e r s i ­
ty  o f  E d inburgh ;-
1. U n iv e rsa l  S c e p tic ism . See h i s  A s s e r t i o n s . . .  where he doubts e v e ry th in g  ( h i s  own E x is te n c e  excepted ) and m ain ta in s  th e  f o l l y  o f  p re te n d in g  to  b e l i e v e  any Thing w ith  Certa in ty»
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2 . P r in c i p l e s  l e a d in g  to  downright Atheism, by denying th e  D octrine  o f  Causes and E f fe c ts  . . .  where he m a in ta in s ,  t h a t  th e  N e c e s s i ty  o f  a Cause to  every Beginning o f  E x is ten ce ,  i s  no t  founded on any Arguments d e m o n s t ra t iv e  or i n t u i t i v e .
3 . E r ro rs  concern ing  th e  ve ry  Being and E x is tence  o f  a God. For In s t a n c e  . . .  a s  to  t h a t  P ro p o s i t io n .  God i s ,  he says ( o r ,  indeed as to  any o th e r  Thing which reg a rd s  E x is tence)  'The Idea  o f  E x is tence  i s  no d i s t i n c t  Idea  which we u n i t e  w ith  t h a t  o f  t h e  O b je c t ,  and which i s  c a p ab le  o f  forming a compound Idea  by Union.
4-, E rro rs  concern ing  God's being th e  f i r s t  Cause, and prime Mover o f  t h e  U n ive rse ;  For as to  t h i s  P r i n c i p l e ,  That th e  Deity f i r s t  c r e a ­ted  M a t te r ,  and gave i t  i t s  o r i g i n a l  Im pulse, and l ik e w is e  su p p o rts  i t s  E x is te n c e ,  he sa y s ,  'T h is  Opinion i s  c e r t a i n l y  ve ry  c u r io u s ,  but i t  w i l l  appear  su p e r f lo u s  to  examine i t  i n  i t s  P la c e  8 c ' .
5 . He i s  charged w ith  denying th e  Im m a te r ia l i ty  o f  th e  Sou l,  and Consequences f low ing  from t h i s  D e n i a l . . .
6 .  With sapp ing  t h e  Foundations o f  M o ra l i ty ,  by denying th e  n a t u r a l  and e s s e n t i a l  D if fe re n c e  between B ig h t  and Wrong, Good and E v i l ,  J u s t i c e  and I n j u s t i c e ;  making th e  D if fe re n c e  only a r t i f i c i a l ,  and to  a r i s e  from human. Conven tions  and Compacts." ( Hume's Sentim ents  by P e te r  Jo n e s ,  op .  c i t .  p .  76).
In th e  B obb-M err il l  C o .,  197O e d i t io n  o f  t h e  Dialogues N elson  P ike  i n  
an I n t r o d u c t io n  w r o te ; -  " . . .  i n  th e  same year 174-5 he ap p lie d  fo r  th e  
c h a i r  o f  E th ic s  and Pneum atica l Philosophy a t  th e  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Edinburgh. 
His a p p l i c a t i o n  was opposed by th e  p r in c i p a l  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  who 
accused him o f  a th e ism , h e re sy ,  and s c e p t ic is m .  In  a l e t t e r  uncovered 
by I . e .  Mossjier i n  th e  Edinburgh a r c h iv e s ,  Hum.e a ttem pted  to  defend 
h im se lf  a g a in s t  t h e s e  c h a rg e s ."  (p. X)
I t  i s  d o u b tfu l  i f  h is  a p p l i c a t i o n  ^vould have been re fu se d  by any le a d in g  
u n i v e r s i t y  a t  t h e  p re s e n t  t im e fo r  th e  reasons  g iven  in  th e  l e t t e r  c i t e d  
by P e te r  Jo n e s .  Some o f  th e  reasons  a r e  so com plete ly  o u t - o f - d a t e  t h a t  
no t even Newton would have made an a c c e p ta b le  c a n d id a te .  There i s  no doubt 
t h a t  Hume was a t  t im es c a r e l e s s  i n  h is  manner o f  e x p ress io n ,  und ip lom atic  
i n  h i s  s ta te m e n ts  about th e  Church and Churchmen, and perhaps given to  
a i r i n g  h i s  doubts a l i t t l e  too  f r e e l y .  But i t  has a lre a d y  been argued 
w ith  good rea so n  t h a t  he was never a convinced A th e i s t ,  or S c e p t ic .
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Hume's Philosophy of  R e lig ion .
The view t h a t  Hume had no philosophy  o f  r e l i g io n  worth d i s c u s s in g  comes 
a c ro ss  in  q u i te  a number of tex tbooks  which take  f o r  gran ted  the  view t h a t  
he was a s e c u la r  I n t u i t i o n i s t . Because of  h is  s e c u la r  o u t lo o k ,  i t  i s  
argued t h a t  he had no r e a l  i n t e r e s t  in  the  philosophy o f  r e l i g i o n .  One 
such work i s  Hume, by Huxley, in  which he w r i t e s ; -
"Hume's the ism , such as i t  i s ,  d i s s o lv e s  away in  th e  d i a l e c t i c  r i v e r ,
u n t i l  no th ing  i s  l e f t  but the  v e rb a l  sack in  which i t  was 
c o n ta in e d .
And y e t ,  as we do j u s t  what P ro fe s s o r  Huxley suggested  and tu rn  from
the  N a tu ra l  H is to ry  of R e l ig io n , to  the  T r e a t i s e , th e  . In q u iry , and th e
D ia logues ,  the  s to ry  of what happened to  the  a ss  lad e n  w ith  s a l t ,  who 
took to  th e  w a te r ,  does no t ' i r r e s i s t a b l y  suggest  i t s e l f .  An open-minded 
survey of h is  works w i l l  r e v e a l  t h a t  the  view which i n s i s t s  t h a t  Hume was 
c o n s i s t e n t ly  a h a r d - b i t t e n  a t h e i s t  i s  most c e r t a i n l y  th e  sack which does 
not hold w a te r .  He was not a c o n s i s t e n t  C h r i s t i a n ,  f a r  from i t ,  but n e i th e r
was he as g re a t  an a t h e i s t  as some have made him out to  be. That i s  more
or l e s s  how he put i t  h im se lf .  In f a c t ,  i f  we remember t h a t  much of  h is  
t h in k in g  on r e l i g io u s  q u e s tions  was as a p h i lo so p h e r ,  h i s  'p h i lo so p h y  
o f  r e l i g i o n '  had h i s t o r i c a l  depth  as w e ll  as sy s tem at ic  p r e c i s io n  and 
o rd e r .  That i s  more than can be sa id  fo r  o th e r  t re a tm e n ts  o f  th e  philosophy 
of  r e l i g i o n  from o th e r  more avowedly C h r i s t i a n  pens. His ph ilosophy  of 
r e l i g i o n  was no t taken from th e  Ju d a e o -C h r is t ia n  t r a d i t i o n  a lo n e ,  bu t grew 
out o f  s e v e ra l  r e l i g io n s  found in  th e  a n c ie n t  c i v i l i z a t i o n s .  In t h i s  
connec t ion , h is  m astery  of a n c ie n t  Greek and L a t in  t e x t s  which i s  bourne 
w itness  to  by the  numerous fo o tn o te s  which a re  found in  many of  h is  
w r i t i n g s ,  i s  o f  th e  g r e a t e s t  s ig n i f i c a n c e .  I t  i s  obvious t h a t  he began 
to  read th e s e  t e x t s  soon a f t e r  he had acqu ired  a working grasp o f  Greek 
and L a t in ,  w hile  a t  u n i v e r s i t y .
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Hume's N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n ^ i s  h ig h ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  because i t  i s  
th e  one volume which g ives an o u t l i n e  o f  h i s  'p h i lo s o p h y  of r e l i g i o n ' .
For th o se  who t e l l  us t h a t  he had no ph ilosophy  o f  r e l i g i o n  worth 
m ention ing , t h i s  sm all volume may be something o f  an em barrassm ent. I t s  
e x is te n c e  c e r t a i n l y  makes i t  im poss ib le  to  claim  t h a t  he had no i n t e r e s t  
in  th e  s u b je c t ,  and when i t s  c o n te n ts  a re  examined c a r e f u l l y ,  i t  i s  
s u p r i s in g  to  hear  him speak w i th  such a r e l i g i o u s  to n e  o f  v o ic e .  The 
tone  i s  ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  to  t h a t  found in  some o f  h i s  p ro v o c a t iv e ly  s c e p t i c a l  
works. His N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e lig ion  i s  no tew orthy  f o r  a n o th e r  
rea so n ;  i t  was w r i t t e n  a t  a time when he must have been sk e tc h in g  th e  
f i r s t  o u t l i n e  of th e  D ia logues Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n . As we w i l l  
be examining th e  arguments advanced in  th e  D ia logues a t  a l a t e r  s ta g e  
i t  w i l l  no t  be n ecessa ry  to  a s s e s s  them a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  bu t  i t  must be o f  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  that bo th  of th e s e  works were conceived a t  t h i s  t im e , because 
th e  arguments which were being  used in  the  ph i lo sophy  of  r e l i g i o n  deba te  
must have been going th rough  h i s  mind to g e th e r .  I t  i s  p robab le  t h a t
they  have much l i g h t  to  c a s t  on each o th e r .
As we read th rough th e  N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n  i t  appears  t h a t  
Hume i s  on a s e r io u s  r e l i g i o u s  enqu iry .
"As every enqu iry  which reg a rd s  R e lig io n  i s  o f  th e  u tm ost 
im p o r ta n c e . . .
"The whole frame o f  our n a tu re  bespeaks an i n t e l l i g e n t  a u th o r ;  
and no r a t i o n a l  e n q u ir e r  can, a f t e r  s e r io u s  r e f l e x i o n ,  suspend h is  
b e l i e f  a moment w ith  rega rd  to  th e  prim ary p r i n c i p l e s  o f  genuine 
Theism and R e l ig io n ."
The p h rase  ' t h e  whole frame o f  our n a tu re  bespeaks an i n t e l l i g e n t  
a u th o r '  i s  very  rem in isc e n t  o f  S h a f te s b u ry 's  w r i t i n g s ,  and th e  r e fe re n c e  
to  ' t h e  primary p r in c i p l e s  o f  genuine Theism and R e l ig io n '  support the  
view t h a t  Hume was no t a D e i s t ,  and vjhatever r e l i g i o n  he s t i l l  possessed 
l e a n t  in  favour  of Theism. In  f a c t  th e r e  a re  passages  in  the  N a tu ra l
N a t u r a l . H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n ,  by D. Hume. 'Published by the  Oxford a t  Clarendon P r e s s ,  in  I976 .
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H is to ry  of R e l ig io n  which do no t  look ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  w r i t in g s  
o f  th e  more o rthodox  th e o lo g ia n s ,
" I t  appears  to  me, t h a t  i f  we c o n s id e r  the  improvement o f  human 
s o c ie ty ,  from rude  beg inn ings to  a s t a t e  o f  g r e a t e r  p e r f e c t i o n ,  
po ly the ism  o r  i d o l a t r y  was, and n e c e s s a r i l y  must have been, the  
f i r s t  and most a n c ie n t  r e l i g i o n  o f  mankind."
" 'T i s  a m a t te r  o f  f a c t  u n c o n te s t a b l e , t h a t  about 17OO years  
ago a l l  mankind were i d o l a t e r s .  The d o u b t fu l  and s c e p t i c a l  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  a few p h i lo s o p h e rs ,  o r  th e  Theism, and t h a t  too 
no t  e n t i r e l y  p u re ,  o f  one o r  two n a t io n s ,  form no o b je c t io n  
worth r e g a rd in g .  Behold th en  the  c l e a r  te s t im o n y  o f  h i s t o r y .
The f a r t h e r  we mount up i n t o  a n t i q u i t y ,  th e  more do we f in d  
mankind plunged i n to  i d o l a t r y . "  ^
" I t  seems c e r t a i n ,  t h a t ,  a cco rd in g  to  th e  n a t u r a l  p ro g re s s  of 
human th o u g h t,  the  ig n o ra n t  m u l t i tu d e  must f i r s t  e n t e r t a i n  some 
g r o v e l l in g  and f a m i l i a r  n o t io n  of s u p e r io r  powers, b e fo re  
they  s t r e t c h  t h e i r  concep tion  to  t h a t  p e r f e c t  be ing , who 
bestowed o rd e r  on th e  whole frame of  N a tu re ." ^
Knowing th e  im portance  le a d in g  C h r i s t i a n  s c i e n t i s t s  such as  Newton 
a t ta c h e d  to  th e  Argument from Design, Hume had to  concede i t s  w e igh t,  
even a l th o u g h  i t  d id  no t  lead  him to  a r e l i g i o u s  c o n c lu s io n .
"But t h o ’ I  a l lo w ,  t h a t  th e  o rd er  and frame o f  th e  u n iv e r s e ,  when 
a c c u r a te ly  examined, a f f o r d s  such an argument; y e t  I  can never 
th in k  t h a t  t h i s  c o n s id e r a t io n  could have an in f lu e n c e  on mankind 
when they  formed t h e i r  f i r s t ,  rude n o t io n s  o f  r e l i g i o n , "
Then we come to  one o f  th e  most C h r i s t i a n  passages  to  have come from 
h is  p e n : -
"Adam, r i s i n g  a t  once, in  p a ra d i s e ,  and in  f u l l  p e r f e c t io n  o f  h is
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f a c u l t i e s ,  would n a t u r a l l y ,  as r e p re s e n te d  by M il ton , be a s to n is h e d  
a t  th e  g lo r io u s  appearance  o f  n a tu r e ,  th e  heavens, th e  a i r ,  th e  
e a r th ,  h is  own organs and members; and would be led  to  a sk ,  
whence t h i s  w onderful scene a r o s e . " y
These passages  make i t  abundan tly  c l e a r  t h a t  Hume was capable  o f  w r i t in g
on th e  n a tu r a l  h i s t o r y  of r e l i g i o n  in  a s im i la r  v e in  to  t h a t  found in  
th e  w r i t in g s  of th e  B u t le r s  and th e  B e rk e le y s .*  His N a tu ra l  H is to ry  of 
R e l ig io n  can h a rd ly  be s a id  to have beoiwritbm from a s e c u la r  a n g le .  This 
work was one in  which he was beginning to  exp lo re  th e  s p i r i t u a l  s id e  of 
human n a tu r e .  In  v iew of what has been sa id  a l r e a d y  about th e  t r u e  
n a tu re  o f  h is  I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  t h i s  development was o f  th e  g r e a t e s t  
im portance .
"Any of  th e  human a f f e c t i o n s  may lea d  us i n to  th e  n o t io n  o f  
i n v i s i b l e ,  i n t e l l i g e n t  power; hope as  w e l l  as  f e a r ,  g r a t i t u d e  
as a f f l i c t i o n ;  But i f  we examine our own h e a r t s ,  or observe  what 
passes  around u s ,  we s h a l l  f in d ,  t h a t  men a re  much o f tn e r  thrown 
on t h e i r  knees by melancholy than  by a g re e a b le  p a s s i o n s . " g
As w e ll  a s  r e c o g n iz in g  th e  fo rc e  o f  th e  Argument from Design, and, in  
th e  above passage  a form of th e  Moral Argument; he was d r iv e n  to  admit 
t h a t  th e  Cosmological Argument has a u n iv e r s a l  a p p e a l .
"The only  p o in t  of  theo lo g y ,  in  which we s h a l l  f in d  a consen t  of  
mankind a lm ost u n iv e r s a l  i s ,  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  i n v i s i b l e ,  i n t e l l i g e n t  
power in  th e  w o r l d . . . " ^
Along w ith  S h a f te sb u ry  and Hutcheson, he would have been a g a in s t  most 
forms of p r im i t iv e  s u p e r s t i t i o n ,  which led  him in  th e  fo l lo w in g  
passage  to  make a d i s t i n c t i o n  between t r u e  and f a l s e  r e l i g i o n i s t s .
"These p re tended  r e l i g i o n i s t s  a re  r e a l l y  a k ind  of s u p e r s t i t i o u s
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a t h e i s t s ,  and acknowledge no being, t h a t  corresponds to  our 
idea  of a d e i t y .
He then  e v a lu a te s  Theism d i s p a s s io n a t e ly .  There i s  much about the  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h i s  e v a lu a t io n  which leads  us to  th in k  t h a t  he f e l t  i t  to  
be su p e r io r  among a l l  th e  o th e r  r e l i g io u s  system s.
"Many t h e i s t s ,  even the  most zealous and r e f in e d  have denied  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  p rov idence , and have a s s e r t e d ,  t h a t  the  Sovreign mind or 
p r in c i p l e  o f  a l l  th in g s ,  having f ix e d  gene ra l  law s, by which n a tu re  
i s  governed, g ives  f r e e  and u n in te r ru p te d  course  to  th e s e  law s, 
and d i s t u r b s  n o t ,  a t  every tu rn ,  the  s e t t l e d  o rd er  o f  e v e n ts ,  by 
p a r t i c u l a r V 3 l i t i o n s . From the  b e a u t i f u l  connec t ion , say they , and 
r i g i d  observance  o f  e s t a b l i s h e d  r u l e s ,  we draw th e  c h ie f  
argument f o r  the ism ; and from the  same p r in c ip le s  a r e  enabled to  
answer th e  p r i n c i p a l  o b je c t io n s  a g a in s t  i t . "
"But be ing  ta u g h t ,  by more r e f l e c t i o n ,  t h a t  t h i s  ve ry  r e g u l a r i t y  
and u n i fo rm i ty  iig th e  s t r o n g e s t  p roof o f  d es ign  and o f  a suprane 
i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  th ey  r e tu r n  to  t h a t  b e l i e f ,  which they  had d e s e r te d ;  
and they  a r e  now a b le  to  e s t a b l i s h  i t  on a f i rm e r  and more d u rab le  
fo u n d a t io n .
"Thus th ey  p roceed ; t i l l  a t  l a s t  they  a r r i v e  a t  i n f i n i t y  i t s e l f ,  
beyond which th e r e  i s  no f a r t h e r  p r o g r e s s . . . "  " . . . o n  which a lone  
any r a t i o n a l  worship o r  a d o ra t io n  can be founded."
"Po ly theism  o r  i d o la t r o u s  w orsh ip , being founded e n t i r e l y  in  
v u lg a r  t r a d i t i o n s . . . "
"Theism i s  o p p o s i te  bo th  in  i t s  advantages and d isa d v a n ta g e s .  As 
th a t  system supposes one, so le  d e i t y ,  th e  p e r f e c t io n  o f  reason  and 
goodness, i t  shou ld , i f  j u s t l y  p ro secu ted ,  ban ish  e v e ry th in g  
f r i v o lo u s ,  u n rea so n a b le ,  o r  inhuman from r e l i g io u s  w orsh ip , and s e t
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b e fo re  men th e  most i l l u s t r i o u s  example, as v e i l  as  th e  most 
commanding m otives o f  j u s t i c e  and b e n ev o len ce ."
"I  a sk  th e  T h e i s t ,  i f  he does no t  a llow  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a g r e a t  and 
imm easurable, because incom prehens ib le .  D if fe re n c e  between th e  
. human and d iv in e  m i n d . . . " i j
That then  i s  th e  s id e  o f  Hume's 'p h i lo so p h y  o f  r e l i g i o n '  which 
comes over to  us i n  h is  N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n .  The fo reg o in g  
s e le c t i o n  o f  q u o ta t io n s  i l l u s t r a t e s  ve ry  w e l l  th e  c la im  t h a t  h i s  
•philosophy o f  r e l i g i o n '  was, as  p re se n ted  in  t h i s  s tu d y ,  n o t  so 
ve ry  d i f f e r e n t t o  what wee being propounded by the  B u t le r s  and th e  Hutchesons. 
But what about th e  'ph i lo so p h y  o f  r e l i g i o n '  which i s  p re se n ted  in  the  
D ialogues Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n ? Dnffeil^Dicture p re se n te d  here  
c o n t r a d ic t  th e  above claim? E s t a b l i s h in g  p r e c i s e l y  where Hume stood 
in  the  deba te  which i s  developed in  th e  D ialogues i s  u s u a l ly  done by 
weighing th e  s tra ig ths  and weaknesses o f  th e  arguments brought forward by 
the  d i f f e r e n t  s p e ak e rs .  I t  i s  f r e q u e n t ly  taken  f o r  g ran ted  t h a t  Hume added 
w ith  th e  'w in n e r '  PHILO, w ith  th e  i n e v i t a b l e  im p l ic a t io n  t h a t  he was 
r e a l l y  unsym pathetic  to  both Deism and Theism. Those who argue  f o r  t h i s  
p o s i t i o n  can p o in t  ou t t h a t ,  whereas th e  N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e lig io n  
and o th e r  w r i t i n g s  which appear sym pathetic  to  Theism were pub lished  
o s te n s ib ly  to  appease th e  C h r i s t i a n  c r i t i c s  o f  Hume's s c e p t i c i s m ^ 'p u b l ic ­
a t i o n  o f  th e  D ialogues was held  back u n t i l  h i s  d e a th ,  when i t  could be 
p u b l ish ed  unabridged . Hume had in  th e  p a s t  been persuaded  to  tone  down 
s c e p t i c a l  passages  in  h i s  w r i t in g s  which h i s  f r i e n d s  and p u b l i s h e r s  knew 
would o u tra g e  C h r i s t i a n  o p in io n .  He had gone a long  w ith  t h i s  e x e rc ise  
most r e l u c t a n t l y  and must have hoped f o r  an o p p o r tu n i ty  one day to  speak 
h i s  mind on c o n t r o v e r s i a l  argum ents, Was t h i s  p ro o f  o f  h i s  i n s i n c e r i t y  
about h i s  fundam ental a t t i t u d e  to Theism, because h i s  scep t ic ism  had 
become in c u ra b le ?
His exposure to  th e  s c ep t ic ism  o f  th e  Philosophes came long be fo re  he
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had an o p p o r tu n i ty  to  s tudy e . g . ,  th e  Theism o f  Bishop B u t le r  or encountered 
th e  more t o l e r a n t  ou tlook  o f  th e  Moderates in  th e  Church o f  S co tland . The 
p e r io d  when he had most d i f f i c u l t y  over th e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  s c e p t i c a l  works 
came soon a f t e r  h i s  c o n ta c t  w i th  th e  C o n t in en t .  T h is  was t h a t  e a r ly  
p e r io d  in  h i s  c a re e r  when he had no t  thought th rough  th e  t h e o lo g ic a l  
im p l ic a t io n s  of th e  ’new n a t u r a l i s t i c  w o r ld ' .  His a t t i t u d e  was to  mellow, 
c o n s id e ra b ly  w ith  th e  y e a r s .  As G reig  has a r g u e d , t h e  Moderate 
M in i s te r s  w i th in  th e  Church o f  Sco tland  did much to  rea so n  h i s  a v e rs io n  
to  C h r i s t i a n  b e l i e f  ou t of  him, so t h a t ,  a long  w ith  a much g r e a t e r  
r e s p e c t  f o r  the  C h r i s t i a n  a p o lo g e t ic s  o f  Bishop B u t l e r ,  th e  l a t e r  Hume 
i s  p repared  to  w r i t e  a c o n s e rv a t iv e  N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n . I t  
would have been alm ost im p o ss ib le  f o r  him to  have w r i t t e n  a work o f  t h i s  
n a tu re  when he was w r i t in g  h i s  most c o n t r o v e r s i a l  s c e p t i c a l  works.
B u t , a re  th e  Dialogues Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n  so fundam enta lly  
d i f f e r e n t  to th e  works from th e  e a r l i e r  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  pe r iod?  I f  so , why 
d id Hume f in d  i t  n ecessa ry  to  make p ro v is io n  f o r  th e  e v e n tu a l  unabridged 
p u b l ic a t io n  of t h i s  work? Was he a f r a id  t h a t  p u b l i c a t i o n  du r ing  h is  
l i f e t i m e  might be d i f f i c u l t ?  Was he r e l u c t a n t  to  damage the  image which 
s e v e ra l  o f  h is  C h r i s t i a n  con tem porar ies  had formed o f  him th rough read in g  
h i s  N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n ?  I t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some t r u t h  
i n  a l l  th e s e  su g g e s t io n s .  For t h a t  reason  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  now to  tu rn  to  
th e  D ialogues them selves to  see  i f  they  p rov ide  us w i th  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  
answer.
The f i r s t  o b se rv a t io n  which must be made about t h i s  work i s  t h a t  i t  was 
no t a com plete ly  new work, in  th e  sense  t h a t  Hume's Enquiry Concerning 
Human N ature  was d i f f e r e n t  and f r e s h .  The Enquiry  was b reak ing  
new ground com ple te ly ,  because i n  i t  he v/as endeavouring to  b r in g  to  bear 
upon th e  new, s c i e n t i f i c  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of  the  workings of th e  human 
physio logy  a d i f f e r e n t  ph i lo so p h y .  Today we would want t o  d e s c r ib e  i t  
as a ' ph ilosophy  of p s y c h o lo g y '.  The Dialogues should be seen as
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belo ng ing  to  a d i f f e r e n t  c a te g o ry ; to  th e  'p h ilo so p h y  of r e l i g io n ' d eb a te  
r a th e r  than  to  th e  'p h ilo so p h y  of p sy ch o lo g y 'd e b a te  . Hume's h an d lin g  o f 
bo th  could  be e q u a lly  c o n t r o v e r s i a l ,  bu t they  were tvo  q u ite  s e p a ra te  d eb a tes , 
th e  one new and s tra n g e ; th e  o th e r  o ld  and f a m i l i a r .  I t  would n o t be 
u n f a i r  to  d e s c r ib e  th e  d e b a te  which i s  developed in  th e  D ialogues as an 
old  c l a s s i c a l  d e b a te  d re sse d  up in  a  modern form .
2 .There can be no q u e s tio n in g  th e  f a c t  th a t  Hume was aware o f  th e  f u l l  fo rc e  
o f PHILO'S argum ents a g a in s t  bo th  Deism and Theism . And y e t ,  a s  we fo llow  
th e  main t h r u s t  o f  t h i s  a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  d i a t r i b e ,  i t  i s  c le a r  t h a t  th e  
c e n t r a l  argum ent i s  developed a g a in s t  Deism and on D eism 's te rm s. So th a t  
th e  second o b se rv a tio n  which we must make about th e  D ialogues i s  th a t  th e  
d eb a te  appears  to  be conducted a g a in s t  Deism f i r s t  and fo rem o st. We have 
a lre a d y  examined th e  ca se  t h a t ,  in  th e  N a tu ra l H is to ry  o f R e l ig io n . Hume 
was much more sym pathe tic  to  Theism th an  to  Deism.
The a t t r a c t i o n  o f Deism la y  in  i t s  r a t i o n a l  ap p ea l to  th e  need fo r  a 
c lock-w ork  m otor C re a to r ,  who had wound up th e  w orkings o f th e  u n iv e rs e , 
and, a t  some p o in t  in  th e  f a r  d i s t a n t  p a s t,  s e t  th e  m achinery in  m otion. 
The a t t r a c t iv e n e s s  o f th e  clock-w ork  motor mechanism la y  in  th e  detachm ent 
o f th e  c lo c k 's  owner from i t s  normal w orkings. In  th e  ca se  o f  a c lo ck  
which has to  be wound on ly  once a week, having been f u l l y  wound, th e  c lock  
can th en  be l e f t  to  c a r ry  ou t i t s  work by i t s e l f  as  th e  main s p r in g  unwinds. 
This was seen as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  way in  which a  de tached  C re a to r  
had made th e  u n iv e rs e  and then  l e f t  i t  to  run i t s e l f .  The argum ent from 
D esign was having  g re a t  fo rc e  a t  a tim e when th e  o rd e r  which e x is t s  among 
th e  p la n e ts  w ith in  our s o la r  system  was being d isco v e red  th rough  th e  
te le s c o p e .  The analogy  from th e  c lock-w ork m otor, which was a ls o  being 
developed to  work w ith  e v e r - in c re a s in g  degrees o f p r e c i s io n ,  was too  obvious 
to  ig n o re . To th o se  who found th e  a b s tru s e  T h e is t ic  concep ts  o f  an i n f i n i t e  
d e i ty  too  rem ote to  come to  term s w ith , th e  D e is t ic  u se  o f th e  argument 
from D esign seemed ta i lo r -m a d e . From i t  they  were s a t i s f i e d  th a t  they  knew
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how th e  world was made, and were re a ssu re d  th a t  t h i s  rem ote C r e a to r -d e i ty  
was making c e r t a in  th a t  h is  p e r f e c t  c r e a t io n  rem ained j u s t  t h a t .  The 
D e is t ic  view o f l i f e  was o p t im is t ic  and l ig h t - h e a r t e d .  The D e is ts  l ik e d  
th e  id e a  o f  C re a to r  who k e p t a l i g h t  to u ch .
I t  was to  th a t  th e o lo g ic a l  o u tlo o k  th a t  Hume was a d d re s s in g  h im se lf
f i r s t  and fo rem ost when he s e t  to  w r i te  th e  D ia lo g u e s . The ap p ea l o f
Deisn in  h is  day was immense, and t h a t  was a s i t u a t i o n  which Hume, w ith  th e
t r a in e d  eye o f a p h ilo s o p h e r , sought to  a d d re s s . T hat i s  th e  background 
a g a in s t  which th e  w r i t in g  o f  th e  D ialogues should be p la c e d . The f u l l  
s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  t h i s  i n te r p r e t a t i o n  w i l l  on ly  be seen  a t  th e  c o n c lu s io n  
o f our s tu d y  o f th e  D ia lo g u e s .
Because much o f th e  T h e is t ic  a p o lo g e tic  was l e s s  open to  th e  n e a t ,  l o g ic a l  
d e m o n stra tio n  which th e  D e is ts  had been a b le  to  u se , PHILO found i t  
d i f f i c u l t  to  a t ta c k  Theism d i r e c t l y .  Some o f th e  D e is ts  had proposed a 
' f i n i t e '  d e i t y ,  whose e x is te n c e  could  be proved by r e fe re n c e  to  th e  c lo c k ­
work m otor an a lo g y . The f iv e  T h e is t ic  p ro o fs  which p o in te d  to  an ' i n f i n i t e *  
d e i ty ,  presented a much more fo rm idab le  c h a lle n g e  to  th e  s c e p t i c .  Time and 
tim e a g a in  we w i l l  f in d  th a t  th e  main th r u s t  o f PHILO'S a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  
a t ta c k  i s  d i re c te d  a g a in s t  th e  c e n t r a l  D e is t ic  argum en ts,
DEMSA. could  w e ll have been in ten d ed  to  be a r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f F ra n c is  
H u tch eso n 's  schoo l o f  T h e is t ic  I n tu i t io n is m .
" I t  i s  my o p in io n , I  own, r e p l ie d  DEMEA., t h a t  each man f e e l s ,  in  a 
m anner, th e  t r u t h  o f  r e l i g io n  w ith in  h is  own b r e a s t ;  and from a 
co n sc io u sn ess  o f h is  im b e c il i ty  and m ise ry , r a th e r  than  from any 
re a so n in g , i s  le d  to  seek p ro te c tio n  from th a t  B eing , on whom a l l  
n a tu re  i s  d ep en d en t."
PHILO p re te n d s  to  a g r e e : -
" I  am indeed p e rsu ad ed , sa id  PHILO, t h a t  th e  b e s t  and indeed the
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only method o f b rin g in g  every  one to  a due sense  of r e l i g io n ,  i s  by 
j u s t  r e p r e s e n ta t io n s  o f th e  m isery  and w ickedness o f m en."
PHILO goes on to  enum erate more o f th e  e v i l s  which a re  p re s e n t in  th e  
world : -
"A p e rp e tu a l  war i s  k in d le d  amongst a l l  l iv in g  c r e a tu r e s .  N e c e ss ity , 
hunger, want s t im u la te  th e  s tro n g  and courageous: F e a r, a n x ie ty ,
t e r r o r ,  a g i t a t e  th e  weak and i n f i r m . . . "
DEMEA c o u n te rs  t h i s  argum ent by c la im in g  man to  be " . . . i n  p a r t ,  an 
ex cep tio n  to  t h i s  r u l e .  For by com bination  in  s o c ie ty ,  he can e a s i ly  
m aste r l io n s ,  t i g e r s ,  and b e a rs , whose g r e a te r  s t r e n g th  and a g i l i t y  
n a tu r a l ly  en ab le  them to  p rey  on him ." PHILO d isa g re e s
"Man i t  i s  t r u e ,  can , by com bina tion , surmount a l l  h is  r e a l  enem ies,
and become m aste r o f  th e  whole an im al c re a t io n :  bu t does he no t
im m ediately  r a i s e  up to  h im se lf  im aginary  en im ies , th e  daemons o f
h is  fan c y , who haun t him w ith  s u p e r s t i t io u s  t e r r o r s ,  and b la s t
every  enjoym ent o f  life?"„„"M an  i s  th e  g r e a te s t  enemy of man."
16
CLEANTHES adm its t h a t  much o f what PHILO and DEMEA have been say ing  
i s  t r u e ,  bu t p r o te s t s  t h a t : -
" . . . i t  i s  n o t so common as  you r e p re s e n t  i t . " 17
F i r s t  DEMEiA o b je c ts  to  t h i s  o p t im is t ic  view  o f l i f e ,  then  PHILO a sk s* -
"And i s  i t  p o s s ib le ,  CLEANTHES, sa id  PHILO, th a t  a f t e r  a l l  th e se  
r e f l e c t i o n s ,  and i n f i n i t e l y  more, which m ight be su g g e ste d , you 
can s t i l l  p e rse v e re  in  your Anthropomorphism and a s s e r t  th e  m oral 
a t t r i b u t e s  o f th e  D e ity , h is  j u s t i c e ,  benevo lence, mercy and 
r e c t i t u d e ,  to  be o f  th e  same n a tu re  w ith  th e se  v i r tu e s  in  human 
c re a tu re s? "^ g
CLEANTHES th e  D e is t f i n a l l y  tum bles to  th e  f a c t  th a t  PHILO had been 
a g re e in g  w ith  DEMEA th e  T h e is t ,  i n  o rd e r  to  e r e c t  " . . . a  concealed
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b a t t e r y  a g a in s t  me." As th a t  i s  how Hume h im se lf  s tru c tu re d  th e  d e b a te , 
PHILO'S and DEMEA's c o l lu s io n  a g a in s t  CLEANTHES must be s ig n i f i c a n t .  
CLEANTHES re a f f irm s  h is  b e l i e f  in  th e  goodness o f th e  C re a to r , and because 
o f  t h a t ,  o f  th e  C re a tio n . PHILO b rin g s forw ard a number o f c o u n te r ­
a rgum en ts, The argum ent from D esign was im p ress iv e  PHILO was p repared  
to  a g re e , bu t th e re  was s t i l l  th e  m ajor M oral o b je c t io n  th a t  e v i l  should 
n o t be so pow erfu l in  a c re a te d  u n iv e rs e , i f  th e  d e s ig n  had been as 
f la w le s s  as CLEANTHES was c la im in g  i t  to  be,
CLEANTHES r e p l i e s  t h a t  much of th e  d i f f i c u l t y  on t h i s  q u e s tio n  had 
a r i s e n  because o f T h e is t ic  te rm in o lo g y , which made such e x tra v a g a n t 
c la im s abou t th e  p e r f e c t io n  o f th e  d e i ty  and h is  d e s ig n  fo r  th e  w orld .
As a D e is t ,  he p re fe r r e d  " . . .m o re  a c c u ra te  and more m oderate e x p re s s io n s . 
The term s ad m irab le , e x c e l le n t ,  s u p e r la t iv e ly  g r e a t ,  w ise and h o ly , th e se  
s u f f i c e i n t l y  f i l l  th e  im a g in a tio n s  o f men; and any th in g  beyond, b es id es  
t h a t  i t  le a d s  to  a b s u r d i t i e s ,  has no in f lu e n c e  on your a f f e c t io n s  o r 
s e n tim e n ts ,"  The D e is t ic  th e o lo g ic a l  f ra m e -o f -re fe re n c e  was in  many 
ways d i f f e r e n t  from th a t  held  by c l a s s i c a l  Theism.
"Thus, in  th e  p re s e n t  s u b je c t ,  i f  we abandon a l l  human an a lo g y , as  
seems your in te n t io n ,  DEMEA, I  am a f r a id  we abandon a l l  r e l i g io n ,
and r e t a in  no co n cep tio n  o f th e  g re a t  o b je c t  o f  our a d o ra t io n . I f
we p re se rv e  human ana logy , we must f o r  ever f in d  i t  im p o ss ib le  to  
r e c o n c ile  any m ix tu re  o f e v i l  in  th e  u n iv e rse  w ith  i n f i n i t e  
a t t r i b u t e s ;  much l e s s  can we ever prove th e  l a t t e r  from th e
fo rm er. But supposing  th e  Author o f N ature  to  be f i n i t e l y
p e r f e c t ,  though f a r  exceeding  mankind; a s a t i s f a c to r y  accoun t 
may th en  be g iven  o f n a tu r a l  and m oral e v i l ,  and every  untoward 
phenomenon be ex p la in ed  and a d ju s te d .  A le s s  e v i l  may then  be 
chosen , in  o rd e r  to  avoid  a g re a te r ;  Inconven iences be subm itted  
to ,  in  o rd e r  to  rea c h  a d e s i r a b le  end; And in  a word, benevolence, 
r e g u la te d  by wisdom, and l im ite d  by n e c e s s i ty ,  may produce such a 
world as  th e  p r e s e n t .
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That i s  a f u l l  and f a i r  s ta te m e n t o f th e  Deism held  by many in  Hume's 
day, and tow ards which S h a fte sb u ry  was moving. Hume, however, was never 
g re a t ly  im pressed by th e  c la im s which were being made fo r  Deism, f e a r in g  
th a t  i t  was too g l ib  in  i t s  hand ling  o f th e  m ajor th e o lo g ic a l  an tinom ies, 
That i s  why i t  i s  so im p o rtan t to  fo llo w  th e  th e o lo g ic a l  system which 
i s  under a t ta c k  in  th e  D ia lo g u e s . To th e  defence  o f Deism which we 
have j u s t  been c o n s id e r in g  PHILO responds th a t  CLEANTHES i s  now fo rced  
to  reason  about t h i s  d e i ty  " . . .m e r e ly  from known phenomena, and to  drop 
every a r b i t r a r y  s u p p o s itio n  or c o n je c tu re .
"Did I  show you a house o r p a la c e , where th e re  was n o t one 
appartm ent conv en ien t or a g re e a b le ;  where th e  windows, d o o rs , 
f i r e s ,  p a ssa g e s , s t a i r s ,  and th e  whole oeconomy of th e  b u ild in g  
were th e  source o f n o is e , c o n fu s io n , f a t ig u e ,  d a rk n e ss , and th e  
extrem s of h e a t and co ld ; you would c e r t a in ly  blame th e  
c o n tr iv a n c e , w ith o u t any f a r th e r  exam ination . The a r c h i t e c t  
would in  v a in  d is p la y  h is  s u b td e .ty  and prove to  you, th a t  i f  
t h i s  door o r t h a t  window were a l t e r e d , g r e a te r  i l l s  would 
en su e ."  " I f  you f in d  manydkiconvenienoes and d e fo rm itie s  
in  th e  b u i ld in g , you w i l l  alw ays, w ithou t e n te r in g  in to  any
d e t a i l ,  condemn th e  a r c h i t e c t . "20
PHILO l i s t s  fo u r  flaw s which condemn th e  u n iv e rse  as  th e  work o f 
CLEANTHES's d e i t y : -
1 . " . . . p a i n s  as w e ll  as p le a s u re s ,  a re  employed to  e x c i te  
a l l  c re a tu re s  to  a c t io n ,  and to  make them v i g i l a n t  in  th e  
g re a t  work of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t io n ."
2 . " . . . t h e  conducting  o f th e  world by g e n e ra l law s; and th is
seems nowise n e c e ssa ry  to  a very  p e r f e c t  b e in g ."
3 . " . . . t h e  g re a t  f r u g a l i t y  w ith  which a l l  powers and f a c u l t i e s
a re  d i s t r ib u te d  to  every  p a r t i c u l a r  b e in g ."
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4 . " . . . t h e  in a c c u ra te  workmanship o f a l l  th e  sp rin g s  and
p r in c ip le s  o f th e  g re a t  machine o f n a tu r e ."
T his more c r i t i c a l  approach  to  th e  T e le o lo g ic a l  argum ent was w r i t te n  
some tim e a f t e r  th e  i n i t i a l  im pact o f N ew ton's c la im  from d es ig n  had made 
i t s  m ark. S c h o la rs  were beg inn ing  to  ask  i f  i t  was r e a l l y  as  sim ple and 
s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  a s  Newton had been su g g e s tin g ; was th e  analogy from a 
m achine sound? Kant in  p a r t i c u l a r  was to  s u b je c t  t h i s  argum ent to  very  
thorough s c ru t in y ,  so t h a t  by th e  tim e Hume had made th e  f i n a l  r e v is io n s  
to  th e  D ia lo g u e s , th e  m ajor c r i t ic i s m s  o f th e  T e le o lo g ic a l  argum ent were 
w e ll known. A ll th e  same i t  would be a m istak e  to  conclude th a t  PHILO 
was n e c e s s a r i ly  speak ing  f o r  Hume. In  th e  N a tu ra l H is to ry  o f R e lig io n  
p assage  on t h i s  ve ry  argum ent he p ro fe s s e s  to  a c c e p t th e  argum ent from 
D esign .
"The whole fram e o f  n a tu re  bespeaks an i n t e l l i g e n t  a u th o r; and 
no r a t i o n a l  e n q u ire r  can , a f t e r  s e r io u s  r e f l e x io n ,  suspend h is  
b e l i e f  a moment w ith  regard  to  th e  p rim ary  p r in c ip le s  o f 
genuine Theism and R e lig io n .
P ro fe s s o r  A .J . Ayer commented on such p assag es  from th e  N a tu ra l 
H is to ry  o f R e lig io n  in  t h i s  w ay:-
"Hume nowhere p ro c la im s h im se lf  an a t h e i s t .  On th e  c o n tra ry , in  
th e  'N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e lig io n ' and e lsew here  in  h is  w r i t in g s ,  
he p ro fe s s e s  to  a c c e p t th e  Argument from D esign .
And even P ro fe s so r  H uxley ,w ithm desire  to  portr& y Hume as a b e lie v e r  in  
any o f th e  T h e is t ic  p ro o fs ,  says o f  th e  N a tu ra l H is to ry  o f
R e l ig io n , t h a t  i t  d id  " . . . l i t t l e  more th an  ex p re ss  th e  w r i t e r 's  
conten tm ent w ith  th e  Argument from d e s i g n - I f  P ro fe s so r  Huxley was 
w i l l in g  to  concede th a t  th e re  was a p e rio d  when Hume was p repared  to  
g ive  th e  im pression  th a t  he accep ted  th e  Argument from D esign, then  we
21. D ialogues Hume (Ed, M acIntyre) 32?
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can be fairly certain that any other casual reader of the works in 
question would be drawn to a similar conclusion. Huxley quotes an inter­
esting passage ( IV p. 442) in which Hume discusses two forms of the 
Argument from Design,
"Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent 
power, by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could 
never possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, 
who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted 
all its parts according to one regular plan or connected system.
That is a more or less straightforward statement of Newton’s way of 
expressing the Argument from Desigi. Hume then goes on to compare that 
view with a Polytheistic account of this argument.
"For though, to persons of a certain turn of mind, it may appear 
altogether absurd, that several independent beings, endowed with 
superior wisdom, might conspire in the contrivance and execution 
of one regular plan, yet this merely arbitrary supposition, which, 
even if allowed possible, must be confessed neither to be supported 
by probability nor necessity.
In manuals of natural religion that type of refutation of the poly­
theistic account of the teleological principle which is present in the 
creation, was being developed; and here again Hume would have been 
following the line taken by Newton. That section leads naturally to the 
conclusion;-
"All things in the universe are evidently of a piece. Everything 
is adjusted to everything. One design prevails throughout the 
whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one 
author; because the conception of different authors, without any 
distinction of attributes or operations, serves only to give
2 5. Huxley op, clt, l44
2 6 . " " " 144
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p e rp le x i ty  to  th e  im a g in a tio n , w ith o u t bestow ing any s a t i s f a c t i o n  
on th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g ."
27
J u s t  as Hume e lsew here  r e j e c t s  D e is t ic  argum ents in  fav o u r o f  Theism , so 
in  th e  passage  which Huxley quo tes in  f u l l ,  i t  could  be argued t h a t  Hume 
r e j e c t s  P o ly th e i s t i c  argum ents in  favou r o f  T h e is t ic  T e leo lo g y . N e v e r th e le ss  
Huxley s t i l l  p r e f e r s  to  b e lie v e  t h a t  PHILO, in  th e  sp eech \M ch  concludes 
th e  D ia lo g u es , i s  d e l iv e r in g  Hume's f i n a l  o p in io n .
We can be c e r t a in  t h a t  Hume would have been exposed to  a  number o f v e rs io n s  
and d e fen ces  o f  th e  T e le o lo g ic a l  argum ent. These w i l l  be examined in  
g re a te r  d ep th  when we come to  c o n s id e r  Hume's p o s i t io n  v i s - a - v i s  
a l l  th e  T h e is t ic  a rgum en ts.
When DBME4 r e a l i s e s  t h a t  PHILO in ten d ed  to  use  th e s e  argum ents to  show 
th a t  th e .p h y s ic a l  u n iv e rs e  was " . . . a  b lin d  N a tu re , im pregnated by a 
g re a t  v iv if y in g  p r in c i p le ,  and pou rin g  f o r th  from her l a p ,  w ith o u t d i s c e r n ­
ment o r  p a re n ta l  c a re ,  h e r maimed and a b o r t iv e  c h ild re n '. " ,  he c r ie d  
"HoldI h o ld i I  jo in e d  a l l i a n c e  w ith  you in  o rd e r  to  prove th e  in c o m p re - ' 
h e n s ib le  n a tu re  o f  th e  D iv in e  B eing , and r e f u t e  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  CLEANTHES, 
who would m easure every  th in g  by a  human r u le  and s ta n d a rd . But now I  
f in d  you run n in g  in to  a l l  th e  to p ic s  o f th e  g r e a te s t  l i b e r t i n e s  and 
i n f i d e l s ;  and b e tra y in g  t h a t  ho ly  cau se , which you seem ingly espoused .
Are you s e c r e t l y ,  th e n , a  more dangerous enemy th an  CLEANTHES h im se lf? "
To which CLEANTHES r e p l i e s ; -
"Are you so l a t e  in  p e rc e iv in g  i t ?  . . .  B e liev e  me, DEMEA; your 
f r ie n d  PHILO, from th e  b eg in n in g , has been amusing h im se lf  a t  
bo th  our expense; and i t  m ust be c o n fe sse d , t h a t  th e  in ju d ic io u s  
re a so n in g  o f  our v u lg a r  th eo lo g y  has given him b u t too  j u s t  a  hand le  
o f  r i d i c u l e . "  gg
PHILO b r in g s  th e  d is c u s s io n  to  a c lo s e  w ith  an a n t i - c l e r i c a l  sw ip e ;-
2 7 . Huxley op , c l t ,  l4 4
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"Blame n o t so much, in te rp o se d  PHILO, th e  ig n o ran ce  o f  th e se  
rev e ren d  gentlem en. They know how to  change t h e i r  s ty l e  w ith  
th e  t im e s ."
For s c h o la rs  l i k e  H uxley, th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f PHILO w ith  Hume 
should  n o t be q u e s tio n e d ; and , as  PHILO ’w ins ' s c e p tic ism  i s  seen  to  
trium ph over r e l i g io n .  R e s t r i c t in g  th e  d is c u s s io n  to  th e  D ialogues 
fo r  th e  p r e s e n t ,  t h a t  i n te r p r e t a t i o n  r a i s e s  a t  l e a s t  two m ajor 
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  F i r s t l y ,  th e r e  i s  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f r e c o n c il in g  th e  
a t t i t u d e  abou t th e  w orld which i s  expressed  in  PHILO's g loom iest 
p assag es  w ith  Hume th e  c h e e r fu l  o p t im is t ,  encountered  in  an e a r l i e r  
s tudy  o f  h i s  t r u e  a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  m odel. I t  could  be argued th a t  h is  
a t t i t u d e  to  l i f e  changed in  l a t e r  y e a rs , and because  o f  th a t  PHILO 
can be s a id  to  speak f o r  th e  l a t e r  Hume. The d i f f i c u l t y  w ith  th a t  
argum ent, however, i s  t h a t  o f  lo g ic a l  c o n s is te n c y . To a c c e p t t h a t  Hume 
as a  s ic k , e ld e r ly  man o v e rtu rn ed  th e  f i n e s t  o f h is  work from h is  e a r l i e r  
y e a r s , i s  to  su g g est t h a t  he had no f ix e d  p o s i t io n  w orth d e fe n d in g . Some 
have argued  th a t  t h a t  i s  indeed  th e  c a se , b u t t h a t  i s  a  m in o r ity  v iew . 
Secondly , in  th e  D ia logues DEMEA. and PHILO a re  a b le  to  a g re e  abou t 
q u i te  a number o f th in g s ,  so th a t  PHILO i s  seen to  be c lo s e r  to  DEMEA 
th an  CLEANTHES. Again we a re  com pelled to  wonder about Hume's a t t i t u d e  
to  Deism and Theism . Not on ly  d id  he f in d  th e  T h e is t ic  argum ents more 
d i f f i c u l t  to  r e f u t e ,  bu t h i s  r e l ig io u s  sym path ies, such as  th ey  w ere, 
leaned  much more in  fav o u r o f  Theism. I f  th e  D ialogues were s tru c tu re d  
to  a d d re ss  th e  argum ents used to  defend th e  p o p u lar Deism o f  h is  day , 
can th ey  be sa id  to  d e a l  w ith  Theism in  a s a t i s f a c to r y  manner? The 
s t r u c tu r e  o f th e  D ia logues must be o f s ig n i f ic a n c e .
*************************************
Let us now look  more c lo s e ly  a t  th e  c la im  th a t  Hume's r e j e c t io n  o f 
Theism was much l e s s  d e c is iv e  th an  th e  r e j e c t io n  o f Deism which we 
f in d  in  th e  D ia lo g u e s . I t  seems p ro b ab le  th a t  we can d isc o v e r th e
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s t a r t i n g  p o in t  o f  h is  s p i r i t e d  a t ta c k  on Deism, in  th e  w r i t in g s  o f 
Bishop B u t le r .
"A new book o f  B u t l e r 's  p u b lish e d  w ith in  th e  y e a r . T his was th e  
Analogy o f  R e lig io n  N a tu ra l  and R evealed , to  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  and
C ourse o f N a tu re . (1 7 3 6 ), a  d is p a s s io n a te  and w e ll-rea so n e d  work
designed  to  conv ince  th e  D e is ts  by e m p ir ic a l argum ents t h a t  t h e i r  
r e f u t a t io n s  o f C h r i s t i a n i ty  were e q u a lly  v a l id  a g a in s t  t h e i r  own 
r e l i g io n  o f  N a tu re .
Once th a t  s ta te m e n t i s  s tu d ie d  and exam ination  i s  made o f  Hume's most
f o r c e f u l  s ta te m e n ts  in  th e  D ia logues « v e ry  much th e  same p a t t e r n  i s  
e v id e n t .  Most o f th e  argum ents a re  brought to  bear a g a in s t  Deism and 
th e  r e l i g io n  o f N a tu re . The form o f Hume's a t ta c k  on Deism; " . . .w h a te v e r
i s  n a tu r a l  i s  g o o d . . ."  b ea rs  a s tro n g  resem blance to  B u t l e r 's  a n t i -
Deis t i c  a t t a c k s .  But t h i s  a t t a c k  on 'n a tu r a l i s m ' seems more than  a 
l i t t l e  s tra n g e  i f  M o ssn er 's  i n t e r p r e ta t io n  o f Hume's in te n t io n  to  c r e a te  
a " . . .n e w  w orld , n a t u r a l i s t i c  r a th e r  th an  s u p e r n a t u r a l l s t i c , e m p ir ic a l 
r a th e r  th an  r a t i o n a l i s t i c  based upon a c le a r e r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  
manner in  which th e  mind o f  man r e a l ly  f u n c t i o n s . w e r e  to  be proved 
c o r r e c t .  To have a tta c k e d  every  form o f ' n a tu ra lis m ' would, in  th a t  
c a se , have in v o lv ed  Hume in  sawing th e  branch on which he was s i t t i n g ,  
whereas i t  i s  obvious t h a t  h is  use  o f  B u t l e r 's  argum ents g r e a t ly  weakened 
th e  argum ents from n a tu ra l is m . He d id  n o t a c c e p t in  any case  th e  
argum ent th a t  'w hat i s  n a tu r a l  i s  r i g h t ' .
1 . F in i t e  and I n f i n i t e .
One o f  th e  main i s s u e s  in v o lv ed  in  th e  d e b a te  between th e  T h e is ts  and 
th e  D e is ts  r e l a te d  to  i n f i n i t y .  Leading T h e is t ic  B r i t i s h  p h ilo so p h e rs  
o f Hume's e ra  such a s  H utcheson, B erkeley  and Locke, employed i n f i n i t y  
as a d iv in e  a t t r i b u t e .
" 'F i n i t e  and i n f i n i t e ' ,  says Locke, 'a r e  looked upon by th e
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3 1 . Mossner op . c i t ,  129
121.
mind as  modes o f  q u a l i ty . . .H e  has no s c ru p le  abou t speak ing  o f  them 
a s  a t t r i b u t e s  o f God, o f whom, as being  ' i n  h is  e ssence  sim ple and 
unconfounded’ , he would never have spoken o f a s  ’having  p a r t s ’ ." 32
"Locke adm its  t h a t  th e  term  ' i n f i n i t e '  i s  a p p lie d  ’f i g u r a t i v e l y ’ . 
'When we c a l l  them ( e .g .  His power, wisdom, and goodness) i n f i n i t e ,  
we have no o th e r  id e a  o f I n f i n i t y  bu t what c a r r i e s  w ith  i t  some 
r e f l e c t i o n  on, o r im i ta t io n  o f ,  t h a t  number o r  e x te n t  o f  th e  a c ts  o r 
o b je c ts  o f  G od's wisdom e t c . ,  which can never be supposed so  g re a t  
o r so many which th e s e  a t t r i b u t e s  w i l l  n o t alw ays surm ount, l e t  us 
m u ltip ly  them in  our th o u g h ts  a s  f a r  as  we can w ith  a l l  th e  i n f i n i t y  
o f e n d le ss  number.
Hume's e a r ly  exposure to  B ay le ’ s c r i t i c i s m  o f t h i s  u se  and a p p l ic a t io n  
o f  th e  argum ent from i n f i n i t y ,  p robab ly  ex p la in s  why Hume to o  d id  no t 
a c ce p t i t  in  th e  u n q u e s tio n in g  way in  which some B r i t i s h  T h e is ts  had.
"The d i v i s i b i l i t y  in  i n f i n l t u q  i s  an op in ion  embraced by A r i s t o t l e ,  
and a lm ost a l l  th e  p ro fe s s o rs  o f p h ilo so p h y , in  a l l  u n iv e r s i t i e s  for se - 
v#T@l a g e s . . . . f o r  whenever t h e i r  d i s t i n c t io n s  a re  ex h au sted , w ithou t 
hav ing  ren d e red  t h i s  d o c tr in e  com prehensib le , th ey  s h e l t e r  them selves 
in  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  s u b je c t ,  and a l le d g e ,  t h a t  our u n d e rs tan d in g  
being  l im i te d ,  none ought to  be s u rp r is e d  t h a t  they  cannot re s o lv e  
what r e l a t e s  to  i n f i n i t y . . . "  ,
3^
Put l i k e  t h a t ,  we can see  t h a t  th e  argum ent from i n f i n i t y  can be used to  
e x p la in  away e v e ry th in g , b u t Hume was wrong to  fo llo w  Bayle so c lo s e ly  
on t h i s  q u e s tio n  because as we con tem pla te  th e  v a s tn e s s  o f  o u te r  space 
and th e  c o u n tle s s  aeons o f  e t e r n i t y ,  i t  becomes a b s o lu te ly  c le a r  to  us
th a t  we cannot c o lla p s e  i n f i n i t y  in to  a s im p ler c o n cep t. There i s  a
r ig h t  way and a wrong way o f h and ling  th e  argum ent from in f i n i t y , . a n d  
Hume was in  o rd e r  to  draw a t t e n t io n  to  t h i s  problem , bu t th e  f a c t  remaims 
th a t  th o se  concep ts  which we c la s s i f y  as be long ing  to  a unique ca teg o ry
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w hich some may r e f e r  to  as  th e  realm  o f  th e  t ra n s c e n d e n t ,  a r e  no t a t  a l l  
e a s i ly  u n d e rs to o d , fo r  rea so n s  q u i te  o th e r  th an  th e  powers o f  our senses to  
p ro v id e  us w ith  r e l i a b l e  in fo rm a tio n  about th e  world in  which we l i v e .  Our 
sen ses  a r e  a b le  to  p ro v id e  us w ith  aiough r e l i a b l e  in fo rm a tio n  about our 
world fo r  most o rd in a ry  p u rp o se s . But we a r e  aware t h a t  t h e r e  i s  ano th e r 
l e v e l  which i s  q u i te  b ^ o n d  u s .  In fo rm ation  which we a r e  su re  o f  a t  th e  
f i n i t e  le v e l  i s  no lo n g e r r e l i a b l e  a t  t h i s  o th e r  l e v e l ,  because i t  i s  a 
sp h e re  which tra n sc e n d s  our norm al ways o f  th in k in g .
Bayle* s approach  had been to  say th a t  th e r e  i s  n o th in g  which i s  beyond 
human u n d e rs ta n d in g , because  ev ery th in g  can in  th e  end be brought down to  
th e  f i n i t e  l e v e l .  Even th o s e  m y s te rie s  which we p la c e  in  t h i s  s p e c ia l  
c a te g o ry  which we c a l l  th e  i n f i n i t e ,  could  a l l  be exp la ined  i f  we were a b le  
to  u n d e rs tan d  them in  t h e i r  f i n i t e  p a r t s .  T his argum ent assumes th a t  th e r e  
i s  a sim ple  e x p la n a tio n  fo r  ev e ry th in g . Our problem , th e r e f o r e ,  i s  la c k  
o f  knowledge. In  tim e  a l l  th e  m y ste rie s  o f i n f i n i t y  w i l l  be  made c le a r .
To g iv e  a modern example, a co lo u r t e l e v is io n  p ic tu r e  may s t r i k e  us as  q u i te  
inco m p reh en sib le  i s  we p o ssessed  no knowledge o f  t e l e v is io n  tech n o lo g y . I f  
we came from a p r im it iv e  s o c ie ty  th e  wonder would be even g r e a te r .  We would 
tend , n a tu r a l ly  to  th e  m y ste rio u s  and s u p e rn a tu ra l  fo r  an e x p la n a tio n . B u t, 
were an i n q u i s i t i v e  p r im it iv e  to  come r ig h t  up to  th e  s c re e n , he would see  
n o t a n ic e ,  c le a r  c o lo u r p i c tu r e ,  bu t a c o l le c t io n  o f  b lu e , red  and green 
d o ts  moving around . Very q u ick ly  th e  element o f  in c o m p re h e n s ib ility  would 
begin  to  d is a p p e a r . Up to  a p o in t  B a y le 's  approach would have been v a l id :  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  how a co lo u r t e l e v is io n  works does ta k e  away a l o t  o f  th e  
wonder o u t o f  see in g  c o lo u r p ic tu r e s  fo r  th e  f i r s t  t im e , bu t even h e re , i t  
i s  t r u e  th a t  in  some m easure a 'ch an g e  o f  p roperty*  has tak en  p la c e . T here  
comes a p o in t when th e  co lou red  d o ts  which bombard th e  t e l e v is io n  sc reen  
c e ase  to  be j u s t  d o ts  moving around a t  random and become a medium fo r  human 
c r e a t i v i t y .  A s im i la r  'ch an g e  o f  p ro p erty ' can be i l l u s t r a t e d  in  o th e r  ways. 
When a j e t  engine i s  no t tu rn in g  we can see  c le a r ly  each o f  th e  vanes which 
form p a r t  o f  th e  tu r b in e .  But once th e  engine has s t a r t e d ,  th e  vanes r o ta t e  
so r a p id ly  th a t  th ey  d isa p p e a r , and a l l  t h a t  can be seen  i s  a b lu r r .  When 
some chem icals a r e  mixed to g e th e r  in  a beaker thqy change t h e i r  c h a ra c te r  
com p le te ly , to  form a new su b stan ce  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  p r o p e r t ie s .  When an 
a r t i s t  mixes to g e th e r  two d i f f e r e n t  prim ary  c o lo u rs , th q r  a re  l o s t  in  th e  
c re a tio n  o f  a new c o lo u r . I t  i s  to  t h i s  'change  o f  p ro p e r ty ' which happens 
a s  we move from th e  f i n i t e  to  th e  i n f i n i t e  th a t  th e  p h y sics  o f  r e l a t i v i t y  
i s  now r ig h t ly  ap p ly in g  i t s e l f .
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The advance o f  s c ie n c e  has done much to  underm ine th e  re le v a n c e  o f  A r i s to t le  
• d i v i s i b i l i t y  in  in f in i tu m ' argum ent as w e ll a s  th e  a t t a c k s  w hich were made on 
i t  by s c h o la r s  l i k e  B ay le , Hot even Newton, vd th  h is  immense grasp  o f  th e  
p r in c ip le s  which govern n a tu ra l  f o rc e s ,  a p p re c ia te d  how much, th e  f a r th e r  we 
p ro g re s s  from th e  ' f i n i t e '  to  th e  ' i n f i n i t e ' ,  th e  s im p le s t  o f  f i n i t e  c e r ta in ­
t i e s  a r e  s u b je c t  to  change. There i s  a p h ilo s o p h ic a l  n e c e s s i ty  fo r  d i s t in g u i ­
sh ing  b e teen  som ething f i n i t e  -  a c o n s ta n t f i n i t e  c e r t a in ty  such as  -  'an  
in ch  i s  a tw e lf th  d iv is io n  o f  one f o o t ' , and som ething unknowable because 
i t  i s  i n f i n i t e  -  such  as 'w hat l i e s  b ^ o n d  th a t  which can  be seen  by our most 
pow erfu l space  te le s c o p e  or p ro b e '?  There i s  in  t h a t  com parison a d if fe re n c e  
in  s c a le  which i s  so g r e a t ,  t h a t ,  m erely  to  be a b le  to  communicate i t  in  
o rd in a ry  lan g u ag e  we have to  u se  term s such as ' t h e  f i n i t e '  and ' t h e  infini** 
t e ' .  In  th e  Scotsman o f  2 3 rd . A p r il  1991 i t  was re p o r te d  th a t  a
m y ste rio u s  body f a r  b r ig h te r  th an  e v e ry th in g  e ls e  in  th e  u n iv e rs e  has been 
d isco v e red  by astronom ers a t  th e  Royal Greenwich O b se rv a to ry . The o b je c t  i s  
a quasar and makes our Sun appear very  p a le ,  because i t  em its 1 ,000 ,000 ,000 , 
000,000 tim es as much l i g h t .  I t  i s  so f a r  away th a t  o b se rv e rs  on E arth  a r e  
see in g  i t  as i t  was 12 b i l l i o n  y e a rs  ag o ,"  These a r e  p ro p o rtio n s  which fo rc e  
us to  s e e  th e  m agnitude o f  d is ta n c e s  which a r e  known to  e x is t  in  th e  u n iv e r­
s e , and which t e s t i f y  to  t h a t  which in  ph ilosophy  i s  c a l le d  th e  i n f i n i t e .
Much re s e a rc h  has s t i l l  to  be done, how ever,in  Space, Time and th e  
In c a rn a tio n  P ro fe s s o r  T .F . T orrance  has shown how much our u n d e rs tan d ­
ing  o f th e  u n iv e rse  has changed. "Newton h im se lf spoke o f  space and tim e 
as an i n f i n i t e  r e c e p ta c le  in  term s o f th e  i n f i n i t y  and e te r n i ty  o f God, 
fo r  i t  i s  in  God as  in  a c o n ta in e r  th a t  we l iv e  and move and have our 
b e in g . Thus i n f i n i t e  volume i s  r e la te d  in  h is  thought to  th e  S p i r i t  of 
God and i n f i n i t e  tim e i s  i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  e te r n i ty  -  i n f i n i t e  space and 
tim e a re  in  f a c t  a t t r i b u t e s  o f D e i t y . P r o f e s s o r  T orrance  c la im s 
th a t  Newton re tu rn e d  to  th e  A r i s to te l ia n  and M edieval n o tio n  o f  a 
system o f  re fe re n c e  from a p o in t  o f a b so lu te  r e s t .  N ich o las  C apald i 
has shown th a t  Newton a ls o  p a rte d  company w ith  t r a d i t i o n a l  A r i s to t e l i a n -  
ism in  t h i s  f i e l d ,  but t h i s  was in  r e l a t io n  to  th e  A r i s to te l ia n  account
o f 'c a u s a t i o n '.  As w i l l  be seen a t  a  l a t e r  s ta g e , Newton held  t h a t  i t36i s  n o t m otion bu t change in  m otion th a t  has to  be e x p la in e d . New ton's 
f i r s t  law s ta t e s  t h a t :  'E very  body con tinues  in  i t s  s t a t e  o f  r e s t  o r o f
un ifo rm  m otion in  a r ig h t  l i n e  u n le s s  i t  i s  com pelled to  change th a t  
s t a t e  by fo rc e s  im pressed upon i t ' .  In  Newton we f in d  th e  id ea  o f  u n ifo ­
rm m otion in  a s t r a ig h t  l i n e  as w ell as th e  A r i s to te l ia n  concept o f a 
s t a t e  a t  r e s t .  However, as we come n e a re r  to  th e  2 0 th . cen tu ry  even 
N ew ton's re v ise d  e x p la n a tio n  o f th e  p r in c ip le  o f c a u sa tio n  cannot
35* Space. Time and th e  In c a rn a tio n , by T .F . T o rran ce ,P ub lished  by th e  Oxford P ress in  1969* 3"
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p re s e rv e  th e  recepetacie  th eo ry  o f  th e  u n iv e rse  and th e  f i n i t e  c o n s ta n ts  
which o f te n  went w ith  i t .
"The o th e r  p r in c ip a l  c o n cep tio n  o f  space and tim e i s  th e  r e l a t i o n a l
id ea  which was given  i t s  supreme ex p re ss io n  in  th e  sp ace -tim e
r e l a t i v i t y  th e o ry  when E in s te in ,  fo llo w in g  ou t a l i n e  o f though t
from fo u r-d im e n s io n a l geom etry, found he had to  r e j e c t  th e  n o tio n
o f a b s o lu te  space  and tim e bo th  as ta u g h t by K ant, f o r  whom they
were a p r i o r i  form s o f i n t u i t i o n  o u ts id e  th e  range o f e x p e rien c e ,
as  ta u g h t by Newton, fo r  whom th ey  formed an i n e r t i a l  system
independen t o f m a te r ia l  ev en ts  co n ta in ed  in  them but a c tin g  on
them and c o n d it io n in g  our knowledge o f th e  u n iv e r s e . T his has had
th e  e f f e c t  o f  s h a t te r in g  th e  r e c e p ta c le  id e a  and o f underm ining
th e  r a d i c a l  dua lism  to  which i t  had given r i s e  in  modern ph ilo sophy
and th eo lo g y  as w e ll  as s c ie n c e ."37
T his whole tre n d  in  s c i e n t i f i c  though t has m i l i t a te d  a g a in s t  th e  Deism 
which Hume was c r i t i c i z i n g  in  th e  D ia lo g u e s . and , i f  an y th in g , th e  view 
o f  th e  u n iv e rs e  which we have today  confirm s what P ro fe s so r  T orrance 
a ff irm ed  when he w ro te : " . . .w e  a re  n o t enveloped by f i n i t e  c o n s ta n ts
bu t a re  exposed to  l im i t l e s s  and incom prehensib le  i m m e n s i t i e s .P r o f e s s o r  
T o rran ce  t r a c e s  th e  d iv is io n s  between d i f f e r e n t  p h ilo so p h e rs  on th e  
r e l a t io n s h ip  between th e  f i n i t e  and th e  i n f i n i t e  down th rough  th e  
c e n tu r ie s .  The P y thagoreans and A tom ists sp e cu la te d  th a t  th e re  was an 
‘a c tu a l  i n f i n i t e '  w h ile  to  S to ic  though t i t  seemed ‘u n th in k a b le  and 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ' . However, w ith  Duns Scotus th e re  came a ' dynamic and 
r e l a t i o n a l  concep t o f s p a c e '.
"Thus Duns S co tus approached th e  q u e s tio n  o f space n o t frcra a  p o in t 
o f im m o b ility  in  th e  u n iv e rs e  or im m u ta b ility  in  God bu t from a 
c e n tre  in  G od's a c t iv e  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  w o rld ."
Through th e  M iddle Ages th e o lo g ia n s  had r e ta in e d  th e  'r e c e p ta c le  or 
c o n ta in e r  concep t o f s p a c e '.  Newton was to  p ropose an ' i n f i n i t e
3 7 . Torrance op. c i t .  58
3 8 . " " " 22
39. « » » 5^
125.
r e c e p ta c le ' in  term s o f  th e  ' i n f i n i t y  and e te r n i ty  o f G od'. But h is  
r e te n t io n  o f th e  r e c e p ta c le  co n c ep t, acco rd in g  to  P ro fe sso r  T o rran ce , in  
th e  end paved th e  way fo r  r a t i o n a l i s t i c  Deism.
"Then q u e s tio n s  began to  be asked as to  th e  f i e ld s  o f connection  
in  which th in g s  a re  found , which y ie ld e d  th e  view th a t  they  a re  
no t r e la te d  l i k e  d i s c r e te  bod ies (a lth o u g h  th i s  i s  th e  way in  which 
we observe them) but a re  connected up in  a con tinuous flo w -th ro u g h  
th e  u n iv e r s e . T his gave r i s e  to  th e  r e l a t i o n a l  and dynamic concept 
o f space in  which th e  o ld  re c e p ta c le  id e a  was f i n a l l y  s h a t te r e d .
That c a r r ie s  us in to  th e  sp ace-tim e  r e l a t i v i t y  th e o ry , bu t w e ll 
b e fo re  th en  in  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  a b s o lu te  space had become 
h ig h ly  q u e s tio n a b le  and s t a t i c  s t r u c tu r e s  o f though t began to  be 
d ism a n tle d ." 4-0
In  th e  D ialogues was Hume employing th e  D e is t ic  o b je c t io n  to  
any ap p ea l beyond th e  c o u rt  o f Human reason? What a re  we to  make o f th e  
fo llo w in g  a s s e r t io n :  ' t i s  absurd  to  t a l k  o f any p e rc e p tio n
beyond what th e se  f a c u l t i e s  can judge o f% .."?^^  That sounds very  much 
l ik e  th e  type  o f  c la im  which th e  D e is ts  o f Hume's day would have made.
From such a s ta te m e n t i t  i s  c le a r  to  see t h a t  he p re fe r re d  to  r e s t r i c t  
th e  d isc u s s io n  in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f r e l ig io n  d eb a te  to  p e rc e p tio n s  which 
our f a c u l t i e s  can u n d ers tan d  and work w ith . Y et Green o b je c te d  th a t  
a lth o u g h  Hume a c c e p ts  th e  id e a  o f 'number* in  th e  second p a r t  o f th e  
T r e a t i s e . and a rg u es  from i t  a g a in s t  i n f i n i t e  d i v i s i b i l i t y ,  he c a s ts  
no l i g h t  on th e  type  o f im p ress io n  from which i t  i s  d e r iv e d . Not only  
does he n o t d e s c r ib e  th e  im p re ss io n , o r im p ressio n s bu t he c re a te s  th e  
su sp ic io n  th a t  h is  c a se  a g a in s t  i n f i n i t e  d i v i s i b i l i t y  i s  r e l a te d  to  th e  
a p p a re n t im p lic a tio n  o f an i n f i n i t e  c a p a c ity  o f th e  m ind. I s  i t  from 
th e  m ind 's  l im ite d  c a p a c i ty  th a t  ha a t ta c k s  th e  whole concep t o f I n f in i ty ?
' t i s  u n iv e r s a l ly  a llo w 'd  th a t  th e  c a p a c ity  o f th e  mind i s  
l im ite d , and can never a t t a i n  to  a f u l l  and adequate  co ncep tion  o f 
i n f i n i t y ' . . . " 4-2
4-0. Torrance op. cit. 4.5
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I t  i s  im p o rtan t to  n o te  th a t  Hume's a t ta c k  on the  th e o lo g ic a l  argum ents 
taken  from i n f i n i t y  was th e  p ro d u ct o f h is  s p e c ia l  brand o f s c e p tic ism ,
a sc e p tic ism  which was based on h is  p e s s im is t ic  co n c lu s io n s  about what
the  human mind could  g ra sp . T his was a key is s u e  in  th e  d is p u te s  between
th e  D e is ts  and th e  T h e is ts .  The D e is ts  i n s i s te d  on concep ts which were
w ith in  human com prehension; whereas th e  T h e is ts  o b jec ted  th a t  th e re  may
be v a l id  knowledge which i s  n o t a c c e s s ib le  (o r  n o t a c c e s s ib le  y e t)  to
th e  human mind. Hume adds a f u r th e r  i n te r e s t in g  m athem atica l puzzle  
abou t i n f l n i t y ; -
' t i s  a ls o  obvious t h a t  w hatever i s  cap ab le  o f being d iv id ed
in  in f in itu m , must c o n s is t  o f  an i n f i n i t e  number o f p a r t s ,  and th a t
' t i s  im p o ss ib le  to  s e t  any bounds on th e  number o f  p a r t s ,  w ithou t 
s e t t in g  bounds a t  th e  same tim e to  d iv i s io n '
At l a s t ,  n e a r th e  end o f th e  f i r s t  volume o f th e  T r e a t i s e , he appears 
to  r e l e n t  m om entarily  and concede th a t  th e  mind cannot be s a t i s f i e d  w ith  
f i n i t e  c e r t a i n t i e s : -
" 'My memory o f  p a s t  e r r o r s  and p e r p l e x i t i e s ,  makes me d i f f i d e n t
f o r  th e  f u t u r e . . .b o u n d less  ocean, which runs in to  im m e n s ity '. ''44
2 . Theism and Deism.
Deism was becoming fa s h io n a b le  in  Hume's day . P o e ts , w r i t e r s ,  a r t i s t s ,  
p h ilo so p h e rs  and even some d iv in e s  were becoming e n th ra l le d  w ith  i t .  Soon 
t h e i r  mood would be summed up in  th e  l i n e s : -
G od's in  h is  heaven -  
A l l 's  r ig h t  w ith  th e  world'.
Kant was an example o f a p h ilo so p h e r  who had become a D e is t ,  and t r i e d  
to  win over to  i t  one o f h is  s tu d e n ts  who had been co n v erted  to  e v a n g e li­
c a l  C h r i s t i a n i ty .  Some o f Hume's a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  g e n e ra l iz a t io n s  may 
have been aimed a t  every  a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  s e n tim e n t, b u t Deism most c e r t a in -
‘+3. I r i t i s e  Huae (Ed. Greeii & O rose) V ol. i  op . o i t .  335
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ly  d id  n o t im press him, and h is  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  argum ents which 
were used to  su p p o rt i t  may have been h is  p rim ary  reason  f o r  w r i t in g  
th e  D ia lo g u es . J u s t  as th e r e  i s  in  every  g e n e ra tio n  o f  C h r is t ia n s  
a t t i t u d e s  which w i l l  no t s ta n d  up to  c lo se  exam ination , because one 
g e n e ra tio n  may be s tro n g  on one t r u t h  but weak on a n o th e r ; so too  in  
Hume’ s day many C h r is t ia n s  were being  swept a lo n g  by th e  shallow  optim ism  
which Deism had g e n e ra te d . They had n o t th ough t d eep ly  a t  a l l  about 
t h i s  new creed  f o r  which th e y  were g iv in g  up many t r a d i t i o n a l  b e l i e f s .
W ith a l l  t h i s  w oolly  th in k in g  around many C h r is t ia n s  f e l t  co n fu sed .
T his was a s i t u a t io n  which Hume was n o t slow to  e x p lo i t!  As a p h ilo so p ­
h e r , he was i d e a l ly  equipped to  expose th e  in c o n s is te n c ie s  in  D e is t 
th o u g h t, which he d id  w ith  s ty l e  and in v e c t iv e .  But we have a lre a d y  
observed  from our s tu d y  o f th e  co n c lu s io n  o f  th e  D ia lo g u e s . th a t  PHILO*s 
a t ta c k s  on Deism were in  p la c e s  s im i la r  to  DEME&'s. For t h a t  v e ry  
rea so n  we can see  why i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  c la im  th a t  C a lv in is ts  could  have 
s ided  w ith  Hume in  some o f h is  c r i t i c i s m s  o f Deism. I t  i s  no t be ing  
suggested  th a t  Hume o f fe re d  th e se  c r i t i c i s m s  from a c le a r ly  d e fin ed  
C h r i s t i a n  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  bu t what can be claim ed i s  t h a t  w hatever r e l i g io n  
he p o ssessed  lean ed  in  fav o u r o f  Theism.
In  an a tte m p t to  keep l o g ic a l  ta b s  on what was being  sa id  abou t th e  
d e i ty  a t  every  p o in t .  Deism had proposed a f i n i t e  d e i ty .  Theism in s i s te d  
th a t  th e  t r u e  God i s  an i n f i n i t e  B eing, whose a t t r i b u t e s  cannot be f u l l y  
unders to o d  by f a l l e n ,  f i n i t e  m o r ta ls .  However, as  d is c u s s io n  o f  such 
an i n f i n i t e  Being p re se n te d  a perm anent o b s ta c le  to  r a t i o n a l  argum ent, 
how much more co n v en ien t i f  ph ilo so p h y  o f r e l i g io n  were to  r e s t r i c t  
i t s e l f  to  a 'f i n i t e *  d e i ty !  That approach  d id  n o t s a t i s f y  Hume. In  the  
N a tu ra l H is to ry  o f  R e lig io n  he s e ts  o u t to  d em onstra te  th e  s u p e r io r i ty  
o f  Theism . The fo llo w in g  i s  one o f many passages which i l l u s t r a t e s  th a t  
c la im :-
"Theism i s  o p p o s ite  bo th  in  i t s  advan tages and d isa d v a n ta g e s . As
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t h a t  system  supposes one s o le  d e i ty ,  th e  p e r f e c t io n  o f  reaso n  and 
goodness, i t  sh o u ld , i f  j u s t l y  p ro se c u te d , b a n ish  every  th in g  
f r iv o lo u s ,  u n re a so n a b le , o r inhuman from r e l ig io u s  w orsh ip , and s e t  
b e fo re  men th e  m ost i l l u s t r i o u s  exam ple, as  w e ll as th e  most
commanding m otives o f  j u s t i c e  and b en ev o len ce ."46
The p r ic e  o f  i n s i s t i n g  th a t  a f u l l  ap p reh en sio n  o f  th e  d e i ty  be r e ta in e d  
a t  every  p o in t  in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  r e l i g io n  d e b a te , i s  th e  c lo s in g  o f f  o f 
a l l  t h a t  tran scen d s  f a l l e n ,  f i n i t e  human u n d e rs ta n d in g . Not u n t i l  L o g ic a l 
P o s itiv is m  a ttem p ted  to  e s t a b l i s h  th a t  th e  on ly  m ean ingfu l p ro p o s i t io n s  
a r e  th o se  which a re  c l e a r l y  v e r i f i a b l e ,  was i t  a p p re c ia te d  how much o f  l i f e  
t h a t  approach  was c lo s in g  o u t .  E s p e c ia lly  on th e  f r o n t i e r s  o f  ou r most 
e m p ir ic a l s c ie n c e s , we a re  being  su rp r is e d  a l l  th e  tim e . There our r e s e a rc h  
s c i e n t i s t s  a r e  en c o u n te rin g  paradox  and im p en e trab le  o b s c u r i ty .
The S c r ip tu r a l  d o c tr in e  o f  God i s  o f  a Being whose g lo ry , ' t h e  heavens 
o f  heavens cannot c o n t a i n ; who i s  'w ith o u t beg inn ing  and w ith o u t end 
o f  d a y s ; and whose hand 'no  one can s ta y ,  no r say  what d o e s t th o u '
To an age on th e  eve o f  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  r e v o lu t io n  th e r e  was som ething 
a t t r a c t i v e  abou t th e  id e a  o f  a f i n i t e  God, who had 'wound up th e  
u n iv e rs e  as  one would a c lock-w ork  m o to r ' ,  and th en  ' l e t  i t  go to  unwind 
i t s e l f  by a h o s t o f  n a tu r a l  p r o c e s s e s '.  I t  a ttem p ted  to  d e a l  w ith  c a u sa tio n  
and p rov id en ce  w h i ls t  le a v in g  p le n ty  o f  room fo r  human freedom . What was 
'n a t u r a l '  was c o n s id e red  in  tu n e  w ith  th e  m achinery which God had i n s t i t u t e d  
in  th e  C re a tio n . T here was l i t t l e  p la c e  fo r  th e  D o c trin e  o f  O r ig in a l  S in  
and v e ry  l i t t l e  c o n s id e ra t io n  g iven  to  th e  'p rob lem  o f  e v i l ' .
That was why Hume was soon a b le  to  reduce  th e  D e i s t 's  d e i t y  to  a  m ise ra b le  
c a r i c a tu r e  o f  th e  k in d  o f  d e i ty  which any s e l f - r e s p e c t in g  s c h o la r  o f  th e  
p e rio d  would have found i t  p o s s ib le  to  b e lie v e  i n .  A s o r t  o f  p o t ty  p ro fe s s o r  
whose in v e n tio n s  cou ld  never be made to  work p ro p e r ly .  The clock-w ork  motor 
had been wound up and p u t in to  m otion , bu t no p ro v is io n  had been made 
a g a in s t  'm ech an ica l breakdown' o r any o th e r  u n fo rse e n  co n tin g en cy . No
1+6. The N a tu ra l H is to ry  o f R e lig io n , by David Hume. Published by Oxford a t  th e  C larendon P ress  in  19?6. $9
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p re p a ra t io n  had been made to  d e a l  w ith  th e  d i s r u p t iv e  fo rc e s  o f  th e  
Kingdom o f  D arkness, so t h a t  God had tak en  a gamble which somehow had 
n o t come o f f .
Through having  d im in ish ed  th e  im portance o f th e  problem o f  e v i l ,  th e  
D e is ts  may have f e l t  f r e e  to  p la y  down th e  d i s t i n c t io n s  between r ig h t  and 
wrong. Hume fo llo w s r e l e n t l e s s l y  th e  w eaknesses o f Deism in  th e  
D ia lo g u e s . DEMSA, th e  D e is t  t e l l s  CLEAHTHBS th e  T h e is t  and PHILO th e  
s c e p t i c : -  " fo r  one v e x a t i o n , . . . a  hundred en joym en ts."^^  PHILO f in d s  t h i s  
a t t i t u d e  u n r e a l i s t i c .  He i n s i s t s  t h a t  a l l  r e l ig io n s  must fa c e  up to  th e
t e r r i b l e  r e a l i t y  o f  e v i l  in  th e  w orld , r a th e r  th an  ig n o re  i t  in  o rd e r  to
be a b le  to  d ism iss  i t .  To im agine t h a t  i t  i s  in  o rd e r  to  do w h a t 's
n a tu r a l  because 'w h a t 's  n a tu r a l  i s  good^ as some D e i s t 's  bad
suggested^ was to  have a f a r  to o  o p t im is t ic  view o f  human n a tu r e .  I s  th e re  
a h in t  o f  th e  d e p th  o f  C a lv in i s t i c  in f lu e n c e  in  Hume's th in k in g  in  th e  
sharp  r e jo in d e r :  " . . .n o th i n g  can be more u n p h ilo so p h ic a l th a n  th o se
system s which a s s a r t  t h a t  v i r t u e  i s  n a tu r a l  and v ic e  u n n a tu ra l ."
Seen in  t h a t  l i g h t  th e  D ia logues a re  a  d e v a s ta tin g  a t t a c k  on Deism in  
in  C h r is t ia n  d o c tr in e ,  as  w e ll as  in  th e  c u l t u r a l  and academ ic t r a d i t i o n  
which developed  o u t o f  i t .  A d m itted ly , in  p la c e s  Hume's view  o f  human 
n a tu re  i s  s im i la r  to  th e  D e is t ic  o p t im is t ic  v iew . R eference  has been 
made a lre a d y  to  th e  'c h e e r f u l  d is p o s i t io n *  id e a l  s t a t e  which can be found 
in  h is  a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  m odel. Our s tu d y  o f th e  D ia logues has shown as 
w e ll  t h a t  he was w i l l in g  to  g ra n t a  h e a rin g  to  l e s s  o p t im is t ic  view s o f 
human n a tu r e .  The t r a d i t i o n a l  C h r i s t i a n  te a c h in g  on O r ig in a l  S in  would 
c e r t a i n l y  have i n s i s t e d  th a t  n o t a l l  th e  a c t io n s  which p roceed  from man 
in  some h y p o th e t ic a l  'n a t u r a l '  s t a t e ,  a r e  to  be equated  w ith  v i r t u e .  I t  
i s  c e n t r a l  to  PHILO's aim in  th e  D ia logues to  p rove th a t  human n a tu re  
i s  no t p e r f e c t  and t h a t  th e  w orld i s  n o t p e r f e c t ,  a lth o u g h  in  h is  ca se  
th e  argum ent i s  developed  from th e  p e rs p e c tiv e  o f  a  s c e p t ic  who wants to  
dem o n stra te  th a t  th e  c r e a t io n  could  n o t have been th e  work o f  an a ll -g o o d , 
a l l -p o w e r fu l  d e i ty .
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Some have argued  th a t  Hume a tta c k e d  C a lv in i s t i c  Theism by th e  im p lic a tio n s  
which can be drawn from h is  a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  argum en ts, even a lth o u g h  he d id  
n o t r e f u te  i t  s p e c i f i c a l l y .  T hat would appear to  be M o ssn er 's  p o s i t io n .  
"...H um e was c o n f id e n t ,  would p u t an end to  a l l  such c o n tro v e rs ie s  as  th a t  
between th e  D e is ts  and th e  C h r i s t i a n s  by p ro v in g  t h a t  b o th  s id e s  were 
wrong . . . "^2 I b i s  a s s e r t i o n  i s  u n s a t i s f a c to r y  because i f  Hume had been 
a t ta c k in g  th e  S c r ip tu r a l  D o c tr in e  of God, th en  he would s u re ly  have 
ad d ressed  h im se lf  more d i r e c t l y  to  th e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  argum ents r e l a t i n g  to  
Theism . Simply to  e r e c t  a man o f  s traw  in  o rd e r  to  d em o lish  i t ,  can 
o n ly  im press th e  p e rv e r s e .  The b ru n t o f th e  ca se  in  th e  D ia logues i s  
made a g a in s t  Deism r a th e r  th an  S c r ip tu r a l  Theism .
Had Hume's a t t a c k  on Theism been c o n s is te n t  he would have ended up a d o p t­
in g  a p o s i t io n  c lo s e r  to  t h a t  h e ld  by th e  a t h e i s t i c  P h ilo so p h e s . And when 
t h i s  p o s i t io n  i s  m ain ta in ed  c o n s is t e n t ly  even n a t u r a l i s t i c  e th ic s  must 
be th re a te n e d . A f te r  G.E. M oore, who was among th e  f i r s t  to  see  t h a t  
n a t u r a l i s t i c  e th ic s  m ust be th re a te n e d  when th e  N a t u r a l i s t i c  F a l la c y  i s  
com m itted, m oral p h ilo so p h y  has been se a rc h in g  d e s p e r a te ly  fo r  an accep ted  
s e a t  o f m oral a u th o r i ty .  I t  i s  n o t as though th e r e  was an y th in g  la c k in g  
i n  Hume's u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f t h i s  v e ry  p o in t .  A ll m oral d i s t i n c t io n s  must 
be w him sical and a r b i t r a r y  i f  them is no accep ted  m oral fo u n d a tio n .
3 . The 'T h e i s t i c  P r o o f s '.
I f  i t  i s  accep ted  th a t  th e  a n a ly s is  in  th e  p reced in g  s e c t io n  i s  c o r r e c t ,  
and th a t  w h ile  Hume's a t t a c k  on Deism was s e r io u s ,  h is  a t t a c k  on Theism 
p e r  se was f a r  from f a t a l ;  th en  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  look  a t  th e  'T h e i s t i c  
P ro o fs ' in  o rd e r  to  see  how th ey  r e l a t e  to  h is  c l e a r l y  s ta te d  v iew s,
a .  The C osm ological Argument, o r  th e  argum ent t h a t  an 'uncaused  f i r s t  
c a u se ' -  d iv in e ,  om nipo ten t power -  b rought th e  C re a tio n  in to  b e in g . The 
T h e is t  n o t o n ly  p o s tu la te s  th e  ' s p i r i t u a l i t y  o f  th e  f i r s t  c a u s e ',  bu t 
ex tends th e  d iv in e  invo lvem ent in  th e  C re a tio n  th ro ugh  m yriads o f c a u se -  
a n d -e f fe c t  p ro c e s s e s , down th ro u g h  th e  ages to  th e  p re s e n t  tim e . Hume
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would have khown t h a t  Locke h e ld  to  th e  ' s p i r i t u a l i t y  o f  th e  f i r s t  cau se* .
53'and th a t  B erkeley  he ld  th a t  th e re  must be 'e f f i c i e n t  power somewhere 
Hume was f u l l y  c o n v e rsan t w ith  th e  T h e is t ic  v ie w :-  "The whole fram e o f 
n a tu re  bespeaks an i n t e l l i g e n t  a u th o r ; and no r a t i o n a l  e n q u ire r  can, a f t e r  
s e r io u s  r e f l e x io n ,  suspend h is  b e l i e f  a moment w ith  reg a rd  to  th e  p rim ary  
p r in c ip le s  o f  genuine Theism and R e lig io n .
N icho las C ap a ld i has g iven  c o n s id e ra b le  a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f S i r
Isa a c  N ew ton's in f lu e n c e  on David Hume. That i s  made c le a r  by th e  t i t l e  
o f  a book which d e a ls  w ith  t h i s  q u e s tio n  -  David Humat The Newtonian 
P h ilo so p h e r . Some s c h o la rs  have argued t h a t  he used Newtonian!sm as  
h is  model in  m oral p h ilo so p h y . Newton had made so much c l e a r .  I t  was 
in e v i ta b le  t h a t  h is  in s ig h t s  would have an a p p l ic a t io n  in  many branches
o f  le a r n in g .  Hume must have f e l t  tem pted to  im agine t h a t  a more
s c i e n t i f i c  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  man would make p o s s ib le  a 's c ie n c e ' o f  m oral 
p h ilo so p h y . At t h i s  tim e th e  d e f in i t i o n  o f what c o n s t i tu te s  a sc ie n c e  
was much b roader th a n  i t  i s  to d a y . D uring th e  M iddle Ages f o r  example, 
th eo lo g y  was sometimes r e f e r r e d  to  as  th e  Queen o f  th e  s c ie n c e s . The 
b e l i e f  th a t  e v e ry th in g  cou ld  be f i t t e d  in to  a s c i e n t i f i c  view  o f  th e  world 
has been p re s e n t  in  m oral p h ilo so p h y  from th e  l 8 th .  c e n tu ry  r ig h t  down to  
th e  p re s e n t  day . But was Hume a Newtonian m e th o d o lo g is t?  In  th e  fo llo w in g  
passage  C apa ld i t r a c e s  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  background to  N ew ton's w ork :-
" . . .  th e r e  has been a t r a d i t i o n  o f  m ath em atica l s c ie n c e  in  W estern 
th o u g h t going a l l  th e  way back to  th e  P y th ag o rean s . In  any c a se , 
such  p h ilo s o p h e rs  as  D e s c a r te s , S p inoza, and L e ib n iz  among o th e rs  
were im pressed  w ith  th e  f a c t  th a t  m athem atics seemed to  be th e  key 
to  p h y s ic a l  s c ie n c e , t h a t  m athem atics had a d em o n s tra tiv e  c h a ra c te r ,  
t h a t  i s ,  one can p rove a l l  th in g s  by d em o n stra tin g  how c o n c lu s io n s  
fo llo w  from f i r s t  p r in c ip le s  o r axiom s. T h is , o f  c o u rse , i s  v e ry  
P la to n ic ;  and i t  a ls o  a llow ed th e se  p h ilo so p h e rs  f r e e  p lay  w ith  
r e s p e c t  to  th e  b a s ic  p r in c ip le s  o r axiom s.
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Yet an im p o rta n t s c i e n t i f i c  developm ent fo re v e r  a l t e r e d  th e  e a r ly  
optim ism  abou t t h i s  m odel. The G opernican th e o ry  o f p la n e ta ry  m otion 
c o n s id e ra b ly  com plica ted  th e  sim ple  f a i t h  in  m athem atics. B r ie f ly ,  
we must r e c a l l  t h a t  C opern icus c h a llen g ed  th e  p re v a i l in g  P to lem aic  
th eo ry  in  which i t  was assumed th a t  th e  e a r th  was bo th  s ta t io n a r y  
and th e  c e n tr e  around which th e  o th e r  heaven ly  bod ies re v o lv e d . 
C opern icus p o s tu la te d  a su n -c e n tre d  u n iv e rs e  w herein  th e  e a r th  
rev o lv ed  around th e  sun . C opern icus p u b lish e d  h is  view s in  1543, 
but i t  was n o t u n t i l  th e  l 8 t h .  and 19t h .  c e n tu r ie s  th a t  h is  view  
was co m p le te ly  a c c e p te d ." 56
"For s e v e ra l  hundred y e a rs  bo th  th e  G opernican and P tolom aic 
th e o r ie s  accounted  f o r  a l l  th e  f a c t s ,  and both  o f them were p re se n te d  
in  a s o p h is t ic a te d  m ath em atica l fo rm a t. F re q u e n tly , th e  c o n tro v e rsy  
tu rn ed  on p u re ly  m e ta p h y s ic a l i s s u e s .  The c r u c ia l  im portance o f  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  two m a th e m a tic a lly  and f a c t u a l l y  com patib le  th e o r ie s  could 
e x i s t  a t  th e  same tim e i s  t h a t  i t  undersco red  th e  n e c e s s i ty  f o r  a 
more s o p h is t ic a te d  co n c ep tio n  o f  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  m odel.
The man m ost r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  t h i s  new and s o p h is t ic a te d  model was 
Isa a c  Newton. L ike  h is  p re d e c e s so rs  and c o n tem p o ra rie s , Newton was 
both  a m ath em atica l and t h e o r e t i c a l  gen ius a t  in v e n tin g  co n cep tu a l 
schem es.
Newton’ s u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  ’c a u s a t io n ' was to  have a profound im pact on 
th e  study  o f  p h y s ic s , which u n t i l  t h i s  tim e had depended on th e  A r i s to te l ia n  
view  o f th e  w orld .
"In  A r i s to t e l i a n  lan g u ag e , th e  end o r f i n a l  cause  o f  an o b je c t  i s  to  
r e a l i z e  i t s  e ssen ce  o r fo rm al c a u se . I t  a ls o  means th a t  t h i s  form al 
cause  o r e ssen ce  i s  embodied in  a n o th e r  in d iv id u a l  which p o ssesse s  
an i d e n t i c a l  form o r essen ce  and se rv e s  a s  th e  e f f i c i e n t  cause  o f  i t s  
p ro d u c tio n . I t  i s  t h i s  c o in c id en ce  o f fo rm al and e f f i c i e n t  causes 
which p e rm its  us to  i n f e r  u n e rr in g ly  what a  cause  must n e c e s s a r i ly
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be from mere a c q u a in ta a c e  w ith  th e  e f f e c t .  The fo rm al cause becomes 
in  p r a c t ic e  th e  e x p la n a to ry  p r in c ip le ,  s in c e  what a  th in g  i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  i s  b u i l t  in to  i t .
Locom otion, o r  change o f  p la c e , which fo r  A r i s t o t l e  i s  p resupposed 
by a l l  k in d s  o f  change, cannot be exp la in ed  by im pact a lo n e . The 
m otion  o f  p rim ary  bod ies depends upon th e  f a c t  th a t  each has a 
n a tu r a l  p la c e  in  which i t  f i n a l l y  comes to  r e s t .  S ince  r e s t  i s  
n a tu r a l ,  every  movement r e q u ir e s  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a m over. M oreover, 
i f  th e  w orld has a r a t i o n a l e , ,  th e re  cannot be an i n f i n i t e  s e r i e s ,  
o r  c h a in , o f  causes  and m overs. Hence, th e re  m ust be a s e l f - s u f f i c ­
i e n t ,  s e l f - e x p la n a to r y ,  unmoved (un -caused  in  th e  e f f i c i e n t  sen se ) 
m over. In  s h o r t ,  th e r e  must be a f i r s t  m over. F in a l ly ,  s in c e  
m otion i s  e t e r n a l ,  th e  f i r s t  mover o r  movers must be e t e r n a l .
"W hile A r i s t o t l e  in  some p la c e s  a s s e r t s  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  more th an  
one f i r s t  m over, th e  m edieval p h ilo so p h e rs  who adopted  h is  p h y s ic s  
op ted  fo r  a s in g le  f i r s t  mover* I t  d id  n o t r e q u i r e  much im a g in a tio n  
to  con ce iv e  o f  a  God as th e  f i r s t  cause o r  c r e a to r . ' ' 59
"T his b r in g s  us to  th e  c r u c ia l  q u e s tio n  o f  what r e v o lu t io n  was 
in tro d u c e d  by N ew ton 's p h y s ic s . N ew ton's f i r s t  law  s t a t e s  th a t :  
'E v ery  body c o n tin u e s  in  i t s  s t a t e  o f r e s t  o r  o f  un iform  m otion 
in  a  r i g h t  l i n e  u n le s s  i t  i s  com pelled to  change t h a t  s t a t e  by 
fo rc e s  im pressed  upon i t ' .  The re v o lu t io n a ry  id e a  i s  th a t  un iform  
m otion in  a s t r a i g h t  l i n e  i s  as  n a tu r a l  as  a  s t a t e  a t  r e s t .  I t  i s  
n o t m otion bu t a  change in  m otion th a t  has to  be e x p la in e d . In  
s h o r t ,  change o f  m otion can be exp la ined  in  th e  Newtonian system 
by im pact a lo n e  ( o r  by g ra v i ty  in  th e  ca se  o f  f a l l i n g  o b je c t s ) . " 60
On th e  b a s is  o f  th e  Newtonian fram ework, f iv e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  consequences 
would f o l lo w :-
"1 . There i s  no need fo r  a  f i r s t  cause  o r f o r  a  cau se  o f why
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som ething e x i s t s  o r beg ins to  e x i s t .
2 . S ince th e  change o f  m otion i s  produced by an e x te rn a l  body, no 
exam ination  can re v e a l  a  p o t e n t i a l  to  be moved. There i s  no b u i l t - i n  
n e c e s s i ty  o r  e s se n c e . In  s h o r t  th e re  a re  no form al c a u se s .
3* S ince  change o f  m otion i s  produced by an e x te rn a l  body, no 
exam ination  o f  an i s o la te d  in d iv id u a l  o b je c t  can r e v e a l  i t s  p o t e n t ia l  
to  be a  mover o r  to  move a n o th e r  o b je c t  o r  i t s  power to  be a mover.
In  s h o r t ,  e f f i c i e n t  causes can only  be d isc o v e red  e m p ir ic a lly  and 
a f t e r  th e  f a c t .
. 4 . I f  (3 )  i s  t r u e ,  th en  th e re  i s  ground f o r  th e  assum ption  th a t  
an e f f i c i e n t  cause  must embody th e  same e ssen ce  as th e  e f f e c t .  In 
o th e r  w ords, no o b s e rv a tio n  o f th e  e f f e c t  a lo n e  can j u s t i f y  any 
a s s e r t io n  abou t th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  cau se .
5- I f  th e  r e s t  i s  n o t u n iv e r s a l ly  n a tu r a l ,  th en  th e re  i s  no end to  
be r e a l i z e d .  In  s h o r t ,  th e re  i s  no f i n a l  cau se .
The th e o lo g ic a l  im p lic a tio n s  o f  N ew ton 's th e o ry  o f  c a u sa tio n  were 
c o n s id e ra b le . The t r a d i t i o n a l  co sm o log ica l argum ent had now to  be though t 
th rough  c o m p le te ly . Cosmology had to  become more dynamic* I t  was n o t so 
much th e  i n i t i a l  im pu lse  which s e t  in  m otion th e  t r a i n  o f  even ts  th a t  
m a tte re d , a s  th e  d iv in e  c o n tr o l  o f th e  p r in c ip le  o f  what we c a l l  'c a u sa tio n '. 
T his new u n d e rs ta n d in g  d id  n o t e lim in a te  th e  need f o r  th e  m ajor F ia ts  o f 
C re a tio n , and some have even read  in to  Hume's th e o ry  th e  need fo r  th e  
Big Bang th e o ry . R a th e r , i t  helped  to  d em o n stra te  th e  p r in c ip le  o f
c a u sa tio n  th ro u g h  which th e  F i a t s  came a b o u t. I t  i s  i n t e r e s t in g  to  see
how Hume in te r p r e te d  N ew ton 's u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  c a u s a t io n : -
" I  need n o t examine a t  le n g th  th e  v i s  I n e r t i a e  which i s  so much
ta lk e d  in  th e  new p h ilo so p h y , and which i s  a s c r ib e d  to  m a tte r .  We 
f in d  by e x p e rie n c e , t h a t  a  body a t  r e s t  o r in  m otion c o n tin u e s  fo r  
ever in  i t s  p r e s e n t  s t a t e ,  t i l l  p u t from i t  by some new cause ; and 
t h a t  a body im p e lled  ta k e s  as  much m otion  from th e  im p e llin g  
body a s  i t  a c q u ire s  i t s e l f .  These a re  f a c t s .  When we c a l l  t h i s
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a v i s  I n e r t i a e . we on ly  mark th e se  f a c t s ,  w ith o u t p re te n d la g  to  
have any id e a  o f  th e  i n e r t  power; in  th e  same manner as  when^we t a l k  o f 
g r a v i ty ,  we mean c e r t a in  e f f e c t s , w ith o u t comprehending th a t  a c t iv e  
power. I t  was never th e  meaning o f S i r  I sa a c  Newton to  rob second 
causes o f a l l  fo rc e  and energy; though some o f h i s  fo low ers have 
endeavoured to  e s ta b l i s h  th a t  th eo ry  upon h is  a u th o r i ty .  On th e  
c o n tra ry , th e  g re a t  p h ilo so p h e r had re c o u rse  to  an e th e r i a l  a c t iv e  
f lu id  to  e x p la in  h is  u n iv e r s a l  a t t r a c t i o n s ;  though he was so c a u tio u s
and modest as  to  a llo w , th a t  i t  was a mere h y p o th e s is , n o t to  be
i n s i s te d  upon, w ith o u t more experim en ts. I  must c o n fe s s  t h a t  th e re  
i s  som ethingkthe f a t e  o f  o p in io n s a  l i t t l e  e x tra o rd in a ry . D escates 
in s in u a te d  th a t  d o c tr in e  o f th e  u n iv e r s a l  and s o le  e f f ic a c y  o f th e  
D e ity , w ith o u t i n s i s t i n g  upon i t .  M alebranche and o th e r  C a r te s ia n s  
made i t  th e  fo u n d a tio n  o f a l l  t h e i r  p h ilo so p h y . I t  had, however, 
no a u th o r i ty  in  England. Locke, C la rk e , and Cudworth, never so 
much as took n o t ic e  o f  i t  bu t suppose a l l  a lo n g  th a t  m a tte r  bas a 
r e a l ,  though s u b o rd in a te  and d e riv e d  power. ^2
A s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  th e o lo g ic a l  im p lic a tio n s  o f New ton's 
th e o ry  o f c a u sa tio n  i s  n o t p o s s ib le  in  r e l a t i o n  to  what Hume had to  say
abou t i t ,  because , a lth o u g h  he understood  w a ll th e  e m p ir ic a l b a s is  cfN ewton's
d e m o n stra tio n  -  as  th e  above p assage  shows -  h is  own u n d e rs tan d in g  o f 
p e rc e p tio n  ra is e d  th e  p sy c h o lo g ic a l q u e s tio n  o f how th e  human mind g rasps 
th e  p r in c ip le  o f c a u s a t io n . T hat k ind  o f  q u e s tio n  i s  n o t asked v e ry  o f te n  
by p h ilo so p h e rs  to d a y , bu t in  Hume's tim e i t  came to  assume a v e ry  g re a t  
s ig n i f ic a n c e .  I t  i s  a  key q u e s tio n  ifi th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  Hume's approach 
to  em piric ism , w hich, ac co rd in g  to  Mary Shaw K uypers, " i s  n o t dependent 
th e  p sy c h o lo g ic a l a n a ly s is  in  which i t  i s  em beded."^^ Kuypers i s  respond ing  
to  th e  c r i t i c i s m  t h a t ,  " ...H um e reduced c a u sa tio n  to  w holly  p sy c h o lo g ic a l 
term s and th e re b y  com pleted th e  p ro cess  o f  tu rn in g  th e  o b je c t iv e  world 
in to  a s u b je c t iv e  one which Locke and B erkeley  had i n i t i a t e d  in  England.
Hume led  h im se lf  and h is  com m entators in to  d i f f i c u l t i e s  by a c ce p tin g  th e
6 2 . E nqu iry , by David Hume. Sec. V II P a r t  1 (See Kuypers o p . c i t .  7 8 )
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p rem ises o f  phenomenalism and th en  d is c a rd in g  them a t  th e  m ost im p o rtan t 
p o in ts  in  h is  argum en t."
A ccording to  K ypers, Hume’ s d o c tr in e  o f c a u sa tio n  had two p a r t s  which 
have been in d ic a te d  in  th e  p rec e d in g  p a ra g ra p h , ( a )  There was th e  account 
o f  c a u sa tio n  as an o b je c t iv e  o rd e r , (b )  There was a  d e s c r ip t io n  o f th e  
psychology o f b e l i e f  ' i n  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  c a u s e s '.  Hume d ic u s s e s  th e  
d i s t i n c t io n  in  th e  fo llo w in g  p a s s a g e ;-
"as  to  what may be s a id ,  th a t  th e  o p e ra tio n s  o f  n a tu re  a re  indepen­
d e n t o f our th o u g h t and re a s o n in g , I  a llo w  i t ;  and a c c o rd in g ly  
have obse rv ed , t h a t  o b je c ts  b ea r to  each o th e r  th e  r e l a t io n s  o f 
c o n t ig u i ty  and s u c c e s s io n ; t h a t  l i k e  o b je c ts  may be observed  in  
s e v e ra l  in s ta n c e s  to  have l i k e  r e l a t i o n s ;  and th a t  a l l  o f  t h i s  i s  
in dependen t o f ,  and a n te c e d e n t to  th e  o p e ra tio n s  o f  th e  u n d e rs ta n ­
d in g . But i f  we go any f a r t h e r ,  and a s c r ib e  a  power o r  n e c essa ry  
co n n ec tio n  to  th e s e  o b je c ts ;  t h i s  i s  what we can never observe  in  
them', bu t m ust draw th e  id e a  o f  i t  from what we f e e l  i n te r n a l ly  
in  co n tem p la tin g  them ."
Hume f u r th e r  argued  th a t  our knowledge o f  th e  c a u s e -a n d -e f fe c t  r e l a t i o n  
i s  never due to  a  p r i o r i  r e a s o n in g s , b u t to  e x p e r ie n c e :-
"Adam, though h is  r a t i o n a l  f a c u l t i e s  be supposed , a t  th e  v e ry  f i r s t ,  
e n t i r e l y  p e r f e c t ,  could  n o t have in fe r r e d  from th e  f l u i d i t y  and 
tra n sp a re n c y  o f  th e  w a te r t h a t  i t  could  s u f fo c a te  him, o r from th e  
l i g h t  and warmth o f  th e  f i r e  t h a t  i t  could  consume him. No o b je c t  
e v e r d is c o v e r s ,  by q u a l i t i e s  which appear to  th e  s e n se s , e i t h e r  th e  
causes which produced i t ,  o r  th e  e f f e c ts  which a r i s e  from i t ;  nor 
can our re a so n  u n a s s is te d  by ex p e rien ce  ever draw any in fe re n c e  
c oncern ing  r e a l  e x is te n c e  and m a tte r  o f f a c t . "
T his gave a s p e c ia l  s ta tu s  to  what can be known from e x p e rien ce , a s ta tu s  
which a t  a l a t e r  s ta g e  was to  c r e a te  many problem s f o r  L o g ica l P o s i tiv is m .
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"There i s  n o th in g  in  an o b je c t  co n s id e red  in  i t s e l f ,  which can 
a f f o r d  us a  rea so n  fo r  draw ing a co n c lu s io n  beyond i t ,  and even 
a f t e r  th e  o b s e rv a tio n  o f  th e  f re q u e n t o r  c o n s ta n t c o n ju n c tio n  o f 
o b je c t s ,  we have no reaso n  to  draw any in fe re n c e  concern ing  any 
o b je c t  beyond th o se  o f  which we have e x p e rie n c e .
From one p assag e  in  th e  E nquiry  i t  i s  c le a r  t h a t  Hume was w i l l in g  to  
a c c e p t t h a t  we can i n f e r  from n a tu re  what i s  l i k e l y  to  happen in  a  g iven  
s i t u a t i o n : -
" ( B e l i e f )  m ust be e x c ite d  by n a tu re ,  l i k e  a l l  o th e r  s e n tim e n ts , 
and must a r i s e  from th e  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t io n  in  which th e  mind i s  
p lac e d  in  any p a r t i c u l a r  ju n c tu re .
H ere, th e n , i s  a k in d  o f p r e - e s ta b l i s h e d  harmony between th e  
c o u rse  o f  n a tu re  and th e  su c ce ss io n  o f  our id e a s ;  and though th e  
powers and f o r c e s ,  by which th e  form er i s  governed, be w holly  
unknown to  u s ; y e t ou r th o u g h ts  and c o n cep tio n s  have s t i l l ,  we f in d ,  
gone i n  th e  same t r a i n  w ith  th e  o th e r  works o f  n a tu r e .
On Hume's em phasis upon in fe re n c e  as a p sy c h o lo g ic a l phenomenon r a th e r  
th an  a lo g ic a l  one, Kuypers w r i te s  -  " . . . i t  was th e  common assum ption
o f  t h i s  tim e t h a t  v a l id  rea so n in g  must r e s t  on s e l f - e v id e n t  f i r s t  
p r i n c i p l e s . "  So th a t  Hume was advancing  an ac co u n t which 
l e a n t  tow ards I n tu i t io n is m  . The bu lk  o f  th e  ev id en ce , however, 
su g g e s ts  t h a t  h is  view  o f  c a u s a t io n  was an u n n e c e s s a r i ly  b lin k e re d  o n e , 
because  o f  t h e  s u b je c t iv is m  which was
im p l ic i t  i n  h is  psycho logy  o f  p e rc e p tio n , as w e ll  as  because o f th e  
c e n t r a l  p la c e  which he gave to  ex p e rien c e  in  h i s  th e o ry  o f  how we form 
b e l i e f s .  Because o f  h is  ap p e a l to  what can be known th rough  our im p e rfe c t 
s e n se s , Hume found i t  im p o ss ib le  to  a p p e a l to  a  more o b je c t iv e  and 
r e l i a b l e  a u th o r i ty  -  such  a s  H u tcheson 's  i n t e l l i g e n t  f i r s t  cause -  
w hich, th e  T h e is t  would c la im , i s  re q u ire d  to  e x p la in  th e  o r ig in  and
6 7 . Kuypers op. c i t .
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and i n t e g r i t y  o f th e  w orld in  which we l i v e .
b . The O n to lo g ic a l argum ent, o r ,  to  p a ra p h ra se  A nselm 's d e f in i t i o n  -  
'a  being  g r e a te r  th an  which canno t be conceived n o t to  e x i s t ' .
Hume would have had l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  in  a g re e in g  th a t  i t  was p o s s ib le  
to  conceive  o f  such a B eing, j u s t  a s  he would have had no d i f f i c u l t y  in  
ag re e in g  th a t  i t  was p o s s ib le  to  conceive  o f Heaven, bu t only  in  th e  
sense  th a t  t h i s  Being o r t h i s  Heaven had been c re a te d  in  th e  im ag ina tion . 
As we saw in  th e  C hap ter which d e a ls  w ith  how b e l i e f s  a re  form ed, he 
would have s a id ,  'we j u s t  conceive  o f  such a b e in g '.  They formed no 
p a r t  o f h is  system  o f  b e l i e f s  p ro p e r . That system  t ie d  in  b e l ie f s  w ith  
a v e rs io n  o f what th e  L o g ic a l P o s i t i v i s t s  were l a t e r  to  c a l l  -  ' th e
p r in c ip le  o f  v e r i f i c a t i o n ' .
For rea so n s  which a re  now a l l  too  c l e a r , t h a t  account o f b e l ie f s  was 
too  s u b je c t iv e  and dogm atic . The p ro cess  by which we form b e l ie f s  i s  
v a s t ly  more com plica ted  th an  Hume had a p p re c ia te d , so t h a t  i t  i s  alm ost 
im p o ss ib le  to  d i s t in g u is h  between im a g in a tio n  and b e l i e f s  p ro p er in  th e  
way in  which he su g g e s te d . B e l ie f s  a re  n o t formed in  th e  d i r e c t ,  cau sa l 
way in  which he th o u g h t t l:^  were^or has a c r i t e r io n  coma to  l i g h t  to  enable  
us to  d i s t in g u is h  what i s  th e  p ro d u c t o f  our im a g in a tio n  and what i s  th e  
p roduct o f t h a t  a re a  o f th e  b ra in  'w here b e l i e f s  a re  form ed' .  The 
i n te r - r e l a t i o n s h ip  between a l l  th e  fu n c tio n s  o f th e  b ra in  and nervous 
system  i s  such th a t  we a r e ,  in  th e  end, fo rc e d  to  f a l l  back on th e  
judgem ent o r w itn ess  which we make as  in d iv id u a ls  in  th e  e n t i r e ty  of 
our p e r s o n a l i t i e s .
In  th e  D ialogues Hume s e t  ou t th e  main q u e s tio n s , acco rd in g  to  h is  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  which a re  r a i s ^ b y  th e  O n to lo g ic a l a rgum en t:-
"Whatever e x is t s  m ust have a cause  o r reaso n  o f  i t s  e x is te n c e ; i t  
being  a b s o lu te ly  im p o ss ib le  fo r  any th in g  to  produce i t s e l f ,  or be 
th e  cause  o f i t s  own e x is te n c e .  In  m oimting up, th e re fo re ,  from
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e f f e c t s  to  c a u se s , we must e i t h e r  go on t r a c in g  an i n f i n i t e  
su c c e s s io n , w ith o u t any u l t im a te  cause a t  a l l  o r must a t  l a s t  have 
re c o u rse  to  some u l t im a te  c a u se , th a t  i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  e x i s t e n t : . . .  
What was i t , t h e n ,  which determ ined  som ething to  e x i s t  r a th e r  than  
n o th in g , and bestowed being  on a p a r t i c u l a r  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  e x c lu s iv e  
o f  th e  r e s t ?  E x te rn a l  c a u se s , th e re  a r e  supposed to  be none. Chance 
i s  a word w ith o u t m eaning. Was i t  n o th in g ?  But t h a t  can never 
produce a n y th in g . We m ust, th e r e f o r e ,  have re c o u rse  to  a  n e c e s s a r i ly  
e x is te n t  B eing, who c a r r i e s  th e  rea so n  o f h is  e x is te n c e  in  h im se lf ; 
and who cannot be supposed n o t to  e x is t  w ith o u t an ex p ress  c o n tra ­
d i c t i o n .  There i s  co n seq u en tly  such a B eing, t h a t  i s ,  th e re  
i s  a D e ity ." y g
A gain, in  th e  D ia lo g u e s . Hume ta k e s  e x c ep tio n  to  th e  c la im  th a t  any th in g  
can have a n e c e ssa ry  e x is t e n c e : -
" I  s h a l l  b eg in  w ith  o b se rv in g , t h a t  th e re  i s  an e v id e n t a b s u rd i ty  
in  p re te n d in g  to  dem o n stra te  a m a tte r  o f  f a c t ,  o r  to  prove i t  by 
any argum ents a p r i o r i . N othing i s  dem o n strab le , u n le s s  th e  
c o n tra ry  im p lie s  a c o n t r a d ic t io n .  N othing th a t  i s  d i s t i n c t l y  
co n c e iv a b le  im p lie s  a  c o n tr a d ic t io n .  W hatever we (ca n  d i s t i n c t l y )  
conceive  a s  e x i s t e n t ,  we can a ls o  conceive  a s  n o n - e x is te n t .
There i s  no Being ( i . e .  th in g  we can d i s t i n c t l y  conceive  as  
e x i s t e n t ) ,  th e r e f o r e ,  whose e x is te n c e  i s  d em o n strab le .
The use  o f 'd e m o n s tra b le ' in  th e  above p assage  can be co n sid e red  a 
rough e q u iv a le n t o f th e  'v e r i f i c a t i o n  p r in c i p le ' which i s  found in  L og ical 
P o s i t iv is m . Hume was narrow ing  down 'w hat i s  d em o n strab le ' to  a  bare  
minimum. He was i n s i s t i n g  on th e  s t r i c t e s t  e m p ir ic a l c r i t e r i a .  For Hume 
' i s e s '  and 'o u g h ts ' belonged to  two q u i te  s e p a ra te  c a te g o r ie s .  B ut,
having l a id  down t h i s  s ta n d a rd  so i n f l e x ib ly ,  what had he e s ta b lis h e d ?  I t
was n o t u n t i l  th e  2 0 th . C en tury  t h a t  i t  was a p p re c ia te d  f u l l y  j u s t  how 
much Hume's d e f i n i t i o n  o f  'w hat i s  d em o n strab le ' had rendered  m eanlnglessg
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A great number o f q uestions which had been e x e rc is in g  the minds o f  
th eo log ian s and ph ilosophers for  c e n tu r ie s , were now com pletely  beyond 
in v e s t ig a t io n , i f  Hume's idea  o f  'what i s  dem onstrable' was to  be accep ted .
And y e t ,  i t  would be e q u a l ly  wrong to  suggest  t h a t  C la r k e 's  u se  o f  th e  
a p r i o r i  argument could be used t o  'd e m o n s tra te '  a n y th in g  and e v e ry th in g .  
Hume was r i g h t  t o  i n s i s t  t h a t  th e  c r i t e r i a  used to  d e te rm ine  whether o r  no t  
something i s  'n e c e s s a ry '  o r  'd em o n s trab le '  had to  be t ig h te n e d  up c o n s id e r ­
a b ly .  The T h e is t  might want to  a rgue  t h a t  th e  n e c e s s a ry  e x is te n c e  o f  the  
d iv in e  Being which i s  a f f i rm ed  i n  th e  O n to log ica l  argum ent, i s  a  d i f f e r e n t  
and f a i r l y  unique use  o f  'n e c e s s a r y ' .  When th e  T h e i s t i c  p roofs  a r e  seen 
to g e th e r  r a t h e r  than  in  i s o l a t i o n  a concept such a s  'n e c e s s a ry  e x i s t e n c e '  
i s  unders tood  in  a new l i g h t ,  as  can be seen from th e  n e x t  p a rag rap h .  We 
can a rg u e :  ' i f  such and such i s  t r u e ,  then  such and such must n e c e s s a r i ly
fo llo w * . What i s  n o t  in  doubt i s  t h a t  Hume reduced th e  'what i s  demonstrable* 
c a te g o ry  to  th e  b a re  minimum, and consequen tly  to  an u n ac ce p tab le  de g re e .  In  
th e  2 0 th .  Century p h i lo so p h e rs  came to  r e a l i s e  t h a t  t h i s  was n o t  a 
s e r v i c e a b le  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  th e  p r in c i p l e  of v e r i f i c a t i o n .
Gaskin p o in ts  ou t t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a second way in  which th e  'n e c e s s a ry  
e x is te n c e  o f  th e  Supreme B eing ' could be unders tood . And t h a t  i t  -  th e
e x is te n c e  o f  a Being which has always e x is te d  and w i l l  never  go ou t  o f  e x i s ­
te n c e .  This does no t  prove t h a t  He e x i s t s ,  bu t  t h i s  way o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  
th e  argument e lu c i d a t e s ,  as  Gaskin s u g g e s ts ,  th e  T h e i s t i c  d o c t r in e  o f  God. 
Gaskin i s  p repared  to  a c c e p t  t h a t  Hume's o b je c t io n  to  th e  view o f  how we 
can dem onstra te  the  e x is te n c e  o f  something which i s  i m p l i c i t  in  th e  O nto lo ­
g i c a l  argument, has a n o th e r  d isa d v a n ta g e : -
"This i s  th e  way in  which he c o n f la te s  ( i n  th e  E n q u iry ) th e  
p sy c h o lo g ic a l  n o t io n  o f  i n c o n c e iv a b i l i ty  w i th  th e  l o g i c a l  n o t io n  
o f  ( s e l f )  c o n t r a d ic to ry  and, in  l i k e  manner, t h e  n o t io n  o f  ' p e r f e c t l y  
c o n c e iv a b le '  w ith  th e  n o t io n  o f  ' im p l ie s  no ( s e l f )  c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' .  
T h is  mixing o f  th e  l o g i c a l  and p sy c h o lo g ic a l  shows i t s e l f  in  th e  
prem ise o f  h i s  o b je c t io n  to  G lake 's  a p r i o r i  argum ent, p a t i c u l a r ly  
i n  t h e  p r a n i s e . . . 'N o th ing , t h a t  i s  d i s t i n c t l y  co n c e iv a b le ,  im p lies  a
1>+1.
c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' .
To h i g h l i g h t  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  Gaskin quotes Jo n a th a n  B a rn e s :-
"Although Hume g ives  no s a t i s f a c t o r y  account o f  what he means by 
'c o n c e i v e ' ;  what l i t t l e  he does say i s  enough f o r  our purposes: 
h i s  a n a ly s i s  o f  b e l i e f  shows t h a t  'P  i s  be lieved* e n t a i l s  *P i s  
c o nce ived ' and hence 'P  i s  c o n c e iv a b le ' .  But i t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
p o s s ib l e  t o  b e l i e v e  p r o p o s i t io n s  which a re  l o g i c a l l y  im poss ib le  
(everyone who makes a genuine, m is take  i n  m athem atics o r  lo g ic  
does s o ) ;  and so i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  conce ive  p r o p o s i t io n s  which 
a r e  l o g i c a l l y  im p o s s ib le .
While t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  may n o t  overthrow  com ple te ly  th e  main t h r u s t  o f  
Hume's argum ent, i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s e r io u s  to  show t h a t  i t  was 
fundam en ta l ly  m isconceived . L a te r  a t te m p ts  would be made to  t r y  to  
d e f in e  i n  a  c l e a r - c u t  way what i s  dem onstrab le  and what i s  n o t  -  in  
p a r t i c u l a r  when d e a l in g  w ith  as  a b s t r a c t  a  concep t a s  t h a t  o f  ' a  Being 
which cannot be conceived  n o t  t o  e x i s t * , bu t  t h e s e  a l s o  have never  been 
f u l l y  s u c c e s s f u l .  'What i s  dem ons trab le ' i s  e i t h e r  d e f in e d  too  narrow ly , 
so t h a t  we can only  ever  be r e a l l y  c e r t a i n  about a  v e ry  l im i te d  range  o f  
f a c t s ;  o r ,  i t  i s  d e f in e d  too  b road ly  and becomes w o r th le s s .  The O n to log i­
c a l  argument i s  cap ab le  o f  so many s u b t l e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  t h a t  i t  s t i l l  
r e t a i n s  a  s p e c i a l  f a s c i n a t i o n  f o r  s c h o la r s  o f  th e  ph ilo sophy  o f  r e l i g i o n .
c .  The T e le o lo g ic a l  argument, or th e  argument from d e s ig n .  The T e le o lo -  
g i c a l  argument fo l lo w s  on from th e  Cosmological argum ent, once i t  i s  
accep ted  t h a t  the  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c a u sa t io n  i s  more th an  th e  b l in d  laws o f  
n a tu r e  o p e ra t in g  on t h e i r  own. The T h e i s t i c  view i s  t h a t  th e  workings of 
th e  u n iv e r s e  a r e  governed u l t i m a t e l y ,  by an om nipo ten t God. Once t h a t  
p o s i t i o n  i s  a c c e p te d ,  then  i t  must fo l lo w  t h a t  d i v in e ,  om nipotent power 
o p e ra te s  i n  a c o n t r o l l e d  r a t h e r  than  random way t o  produce th e  world in  
which we l i v e  r a t h e r  than  a u n iv e r s e  o f  p rim eval ch aos .  So t h a t  to  th e
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argument t h a t  d iv in e  omnipotence i s  behind th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c a u s a t io n ,  
t h e r e  must be added th e  T e le o lo g ic a l  argum ent, which i s  t h a t  th e  u n iv e r s e  
d i s p l a y s  q u i t e  amazing o r d e r .
"What Newton had c o n t r ib u te d  to  t h i s  v e n e ra b le  p roo f  -  th e  one o f
A q u in a s 's  F ive  Ways a n t i c i p a t e d  as  f a r  back a s  Anaxagoras -  was
th e  s t r e n g th e n in g  o f  th e  major p rem iss .  Evidence o f  d e s ig n  must 
have im pressed  th e  e a r l i e s t  d i s i n t e r e s t e d  o b se rv e r  o f  th e  n a tu r a l  
o r d e r ,
Hume to o ,  f o r  a  w h ile  a t  l e a s t ,  took t h i s  argument s e r i o u s ly .  Newton 
had become th e  i l l u s t r i o u s  p io n ee r  o f  th e  new p h y s ic s .  He had b u i l t  h is  
s c i e n t i f i c  framework from th e  ground up . He knew i t  i n s i d e  o u t .  So much
so t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  became amazed a t  h i s  grasp  o f  how a h o s t  o f  p h y s ic a l
p ro c e s se s  work. T h is  d e g re e  o f  p r e c i s io n  was unheard o f  i n  th e  p a s t .  
Newton seemed to  have grasped a sound u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  p l a n e t a r y  motion 
and th e  law o f  g r a v i t y .  The one c o n v ic t io n  which was being  s tre n g th e n e d  
by a l l  th e s e  d i s c o v e r ie s  was t h a t  t h e r e  i s  o rd e r  i n  n a tu r e .  The more 
Newton found o u t  abou t th e  workings o f  th e  laws o f  n a tu r e ,  th e  more he 
was impressed by t h e i r  resem blance  to  something which has been made by 
an i n t e l l i g e n t  C r e a to r .  What Newton was say ing  from th e  p h y s ic a l  s c ie n c es  
appeared  to  confirm  what r e l i g i o u s  th in k e r s  had been say ing  in  th e  p a s t .  
Hume, who had n o t  been slow to  expose any weaknesses in  th e  o th e r  T h e i s t i c  
p r o o f s ,  was now k e e n ly  aware o f  th e  co n c lu s io n  which Newton was drawing 
from s c ie n c e .  A .J .  Ayer in  h i s  sm all  volume on Hume i s  ready  to  confirm  
t h i s : -
"Hume nowhere p rocla im s h im se lf  an a t h e i s t .  On th e  c o n t r a ry ,  in  th e  
'N a tu r a l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n '  and e lsew here  i n  h i s  w r i t in g s  ha 
p r o fe s s e s  to  a c c e p t  th e  argument from D es ign ."
This  may be one o f  th e  passages  which Ayer had in  mind: -
"The whole frame o f  our n a tu re  bespeaks an i n t e l l i g e n t  a u th o r ;  and
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no r a t i o n a l  e n q u ir e r  can , a f t e r  s e r io u s  r e f l e x i o n ,  suspend h i s  b e l i e f  
a moment w i th  reg a rd  to  the  prim ary p r in c i p l e s  o f  genuine Theism 
and r e l i g i o n ,
At t h i s  p o in t  i t  has to  be adm itted  t h a t  Hume's dependence on Newton's 
work as  a s c i e n t i s t  was v e ry  c o n s id e ra b le .  And h i s  ad m ira t io n  f o r  Newton 
went beyond h i s  work as  a s c i e n t i s t ,  because he c l e a r l y  admired h i s  
p e rs o n a l  q u a l i t i e s  a s  w e l l .  But even t h a t  w e l l  known f a c t  does n o t  p rev en t  
Noxon a sk in g :  " .. .H um e a c c e p ts  th e  prem iss  ( t h a t  i s  behind Newton's
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  argument from d e s ig n ) ,  bu t  q u e s t io n s  th e  in f e r e n c e .  
Does he , th e n ,  m e r i t  h i s  r e p u t a t i o n  a s  a Newtonian m ethodoioglst?"yy
The answer to  Noxon's q u e s t io n  i s  a lm ost c e r t a i n l y  t h a t  he does ,  because 
h i s  dependence on th e  m a t te r  o f  Newton's th in k in g  as  a s c i e n t i s t  was 
complete -  he had a f t e r  a l l  a s p i r e d  to  become a 'Newton' o f  th e  m oral 
s c ie n c e s .  Moreover, Newton's r e l i g i o u s  c o n v ic t io n s  were t i e d  up so 
com ple te ly  w ith  h i s  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s  t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see how 
Newton's p o s i t i o n  could  be d e f in e d  a p a r t  from th e  e n t i r e  Newton. I t  i s  
no t  as though Hume had r e s e r v a t io n s  about th e  e x c e l le n c e  o f  S i r  I sa a c  
Newton:-
" In  Newton t h i s  I s l a n d  may b o a s t  o f  having produced th e  g r e a t e s t  
and r a r e s t  gen ius  t h a t  eve r  a ro s e  f o r  th e  ornament and i n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  th e  s p e c i e s .  C au tious  in  a d m it t in g  no p r in c ip le s  but such as  
were founded on experim ent;  bu t  r e s o l u t e  to adop t every  such 
p r i n c i p l e ,  however new o r  unusua l;  from modesty ig n o ra n t  o f  h i s  
s u p e r i o r i t y  above th e  r e s t  o f  mankind; and thence  l e s s  c a r e f u l  to  
accommodate h i s  r e a s o n in g s .
And, w h ile  Newton's t h e o r i e s  may n o t  have stood up to  th e  l i g h t  o f  l a t e r  
d i s c o v e r i e s ,  i t  would be absu rd  to  suggest  t h a t  Hume had r e s e r v a t io n s  
about them because he a n t i c i p a t e d  t h a t  they  were too  s t a t i c .  In  t h i s  
whole f i e l d ,  Hume was h e a v i ly  indeb ted  to  Newton. I f  an y th in g ,  soma o f  
Hume's own t h e o r i e s  r e v e a l  th e  ou t look  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  r e c e p ta c le
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th eo ry  o f  space and i t s  i r o n  c la d  law s, which was i n  tim e to  be r e p la c e d  
by a " . . . r e l a t i o n a l  and dynamic concept o f  s p a c e ." y g
To show t h a t  Hume was p repared  to  g ive  a h e a r in g  to  th e  arguments a g a in s t
th e  r e l i g i o u s  i n t e r p e t a t i o n  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t e l e o lo g y ,  i t  i s  on ly  
n e c essa ry  to  r e f e r  to  what PHILO has to  say on th e  m a t te r  i n  th e  D ia lo g u e s .
"Did I show you a house o r  p ^ c e  where t h e r e  was n o t  one
appartm ent conven ien t or a g re e a b le ;  where th e  windows, d o o rs ,  
f i r e s ,  p a s sa g e s ,  s t a i r s ,  and th e  whole oeconomy o f  t h e  b u i ld in g  
were th e  source  o f  n o i s e ,  co n fu s io n ,  f a t i g u e ,  d a rk n e s s ,  and th e  
extremes o f  h e a t  and co ld ;  you would c e r t a i n l y  blame th e  c o n tr iv a n c e  
w ithou t  f a r t h e r  exam ination . The a r c h i t e c t  would i n  v a in  d i s p l a y  
s u b t i l t y  and prove to  you, t h a t  i f  t h i s  door o r  t h a t  window were 
a l t e r e d ,  g r e a t e r  i l l s  would ensue ."  " I f  you f in d  many
inconven iences  and d e fo rm i t ie s  in  t h e  b u i ld in g ,  you w i l l  a lw ays, 
w i thou t  e n te r in g  i n to  any d e t a i l ,  condemn th e  a r c h i t e c t . " qq
P h ilo  l i s t s  fo u r  f law s which condemn th e  u n iv e r s e  a s  th e  work o f  
C le a n th e s 's  d e i t y : -
1 . " . . . p a i n s ,  a s  w e ll  as  p l e a s u r e s ,  a r e  employed to  e x c i t e  a l l  
c r e a tu r e s  t o  a c t i o n ,  and make them v i g i l a n t  in  th e  g r e a t  work o f  
s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n . "
2 . " . . . t h e  conducting  o f  th e  world by g e n e ra l  laws; and t h i s  
seems nowise n e c essa ry  to  a very  p e r f e c t  b e in g ."
3 . " . . . t h e  g r e a t  f u r g a l i t y  w ith  which a l l  powers and f a c u l t i e s  
a r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  to  every p a r t i c u l a r  b e in g ."
4. " . . . t h e  i n a c c u ra te  workmanship o f  a l l  th e  sp r in g s  and p r in c i p le s  
o f  th e  g r e a t  machine o f  n a tu r e .
This more c r i t i c a l  approach to  th e  T e le o lo g ic a l  argument was w r i t t e n  
some tim e a f t e r  th e  i n i t i a l  impact o f  Newton's r e l i g i o u s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
79. Torrance op . c i t .  ' 29
80. D ia lo g u e s . by David Hume (Ed. MacIntyre) op . c i t .  321
8 1 .  "  II It "  3 2 2
l h 5 .
o f  th e  argument from d e s ig n  had made i t s  mark. Scho lars  were beg inn ing  
to  ask  i f  i t  was as  s im ple  and s t r a ig h t f o rw a r d  a s  Newton had been 
su g g e s t in g :  was th e  ana logy  from a machine sound? Kant in  p a r t i c u l a r
was to  s u b je c t  t h i s  argument to  ve ry  thorough s c r u t in y ,  so t h a t  by th e  
time Hume had made h i s  f i n a l  r e v i s io n s  to  th e  D ialogues s e v e r a l  c r i t i c i s m s  
o f  th e  T e le o lo g ic a l  argument were w e l l  deve loped . A l l  the  same, i t  would 
s t i l l  be wrong to  conc lude  t h a t  PHILO spoke f o r  Hume. PHILO may have 
spoken f o r  one p a r t  o f  him, but o th e r  v o ic e s  can be heard speaking  from 
him as  w e l l .  In  th e  passage  from th e  N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n  which
A .J .  Ayer quoted when coming to  th e  co n c lu s io n  t h a t  h e re ,  as  e lsew here ,  
Hume p ro fe s s e d  to  a c c e p t  th e  argument from D esign , we have an example 
o f  a passage  where a n o th e r  o f  th e s e  v o ice s  i s  h e a rd .  Hume would c e r t a i n l y  
have been f a m i l i a r  w i th  a number o f  v e rs io n s  and de fences  of  th e  
T e l e o lo g ic a l  argum ent. W hile he was s tudy ing  in  Edinburgh in  1725»
F ra n c is  Hutcheson p u b l ish e d  The O r ig in a l  o f  our Ideas  of Beauty and 
V i r tu e .
"Hutcheson took h i s  model from th e  n a t u r a l  s c ie n c es  as he 
unders tood  them."
" In  h i s  l e c t u r e s  i n  n a t u r a l  theo logy  he opened to  h i s  s tu d e n ts  
view ' a l a r g e  f i e l d  o f  sc ie n c e  o f  which th ey  had no c o n c ep t io n ' 
when he p o in te d  ou t  to  them ' the  num berless ev idences o f  wonderful 
a r t  and d e s ig n  in  th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  th in g s  and th e  s t i l l  
more a s to n i s h in g  ev idence  o f  th e  w ise s t  c o n tr iv a n c e ,  . . . i n  th e  
whole m a t e r i a l  system co n s id e red  as one design '." 82
In  D e sc a r te s  th e  ana logy  was t h a t  o f  a m ach ine :-
"The p e rc e p t io n  on which we can found an in d u b i t a b l e  judgment 
must be n o ta b ly  c l e a r  but a l s o  d i s t i n c t .  I  c a l l  c l e a r  t h a t  
p e rc e p t io n  which i s  p r e s e n t  and m a n ife s t  to  an a t t e n t i v e  mind, 
j u s t  as we a r e  s a id  to  see  o b je c t s  c l e a r l y  when, being p r e s e n t  
to  th e  gaze o f  our eyes ,  they  o p e ra te  on i t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s t r o n g ly
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. . . B u t  I c a l l  d i s t i n c t  t h a t  p e rc e p t io n  which i s  so p r e c i s e  and so 
d i f f e r e n t  from a l l  o th e r s  t h a t  i t  c o n ta in s  w i th in  i t s e l f  only 
t h a t  which appears  p l a i n l y  and e v id e n t ly  (m an ifes tm en t)  to  
whoever c o n s id e r s  i t  p r o p e r ly . ' '  ,83
"We conceive  i t  as be long ing  to  God's p e r f e c t i o n ,  no t on ly  t h a t  
he should h im se lf  be unchangeable , but a l s o  t h a t  h is  o p e ra t io n  
should occur i n  a supremely c o n s ta n t  and unchangeable m a n n e r . . .  
Consequently  i t  i s  most rea so n a b le  to  hold t h a t ,  from a mere 
f a c t  t h a t  God gave p ie c e s  of  m a t te r  v a r io u s  motions a t  t h e i r  
f i r s t  c r e a t i o n ,  and t h a t  he now p rese rv es  a l l  t h i s  m a t te r  in  being 
in  th e  same way as  he f i r s t  c re a te d  i t ,  he must l ik e w is e  p re se rv e  
in  i t  th e  same q u a n t i ty  o f  m otion.
" . . .w h e n  somebody p o ssesse s  th e  id ea  of a h ig h ly  com plica ted  
machine, we a r e  j u s t i f i e d  in  a sk in g  from what cause he de r ived  
i t ;  d id  he somewhere see  such a machine made by somebody e lse ?
Or i s  i t  t h a t  he has made such a c a r e f u l  s tudy  o f  m echanics, o r  i s  
he so c le v e r  t h a t  he could  in v en t  i t  on h i s  own acco un t ,  a l th o u g h  
he has never seen i t  anywhere.
In Locke the analogy was th a t o f  an a r c h it e c t : -
"But th e  coherence  and c o n t in u i ty  of  th e  p a r t s  o f  m a t te r ,  th e  
p ro d u c t io n  o f  s e n s a t io n  i n  us o f  co lou rs  and s o u n d s . . .b y  impulse 
and m otion, nay, th e  o r i g i n a l  r u le s  and communication of  n a tu r a l  
c onnec t ion  w ith  any id e a s  we have, we cannot bu t a s c r ib e  them 
to  th e  a r b i t r a r y  w i l l  and good p le a s u re  o f  th e  wise A r c h i t e c t . "
O D
In B erkeley  God was th e  'a u th o r  o f  N a t u r e ' : -
"By d i l ig e n t  observation  o f the phenomena w ith in  our view , we 
may d iscover  the general laws o f nature, and from them deduce the  
other phenomena, I do not say dem onstrate; for  a l l  deductions o f  
th a t kind depend upon a su p p osition  th a t the Author o f nature
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always o p e ra te s  un ifo rm ly , and in  a c o n s ta n t  observance  o f  th o se  
r u l e s  we ta k e  f o r  p r i n c i p l e s :  which we cannot e v id e n t ly  know."gy
L e ib n iz  took an approach to  t e l e o lo g y  which was fundam en ta l ly  d i f f e r e n t  
to  t h a t  o f  th e  C a r te s ia n s  and ' o c c a s i o n a l i s t s ' . He belonged t o  th e  
'e m p i r ic i s t*  schoo l a long  w ith  Boyle, Locke, and th e  Newtonians, Berkeley  
and Hume. They be liev ed  t h a t  m a t te r  i s  p a s s iv e  -  " . . . t h e  ve ry  term
'in a n im a te  m atter*  deno tes  t h i s  g e n e ra l  p resuppos i t ion .* 'ggF or  L e ib n iz ,  
" . . . t h e  world obeys, o r  e x i s t s  i n  accordance  w ith ,  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  p e r f e c t io n  
as fash ioned  by God. by 1696 ha w r i te s  in  th e  Tentamen: -
" . . . t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  mechanics them selves cannot be exp la ined  
g e o m e t r ic a l ly ,  s in c e  th ey  depend on more sublime p r i n c i p l e s  which 
show th e  wisdom of th e  Author i n  th e  o rd er  and p e r f e c t i o n  o f  
h i s  work." gg
Kant became deep ly  in f lu e n ce d  by th e  approach which L e ibn iz  had taken .
They were both  *t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s t s * ; Kant an i d e a l i s t  and L e ib n iz  a 
r e a l i s t .  Both gave sc ie n c e  a c e n t r a l  p la c e  and sc ie n c e  as developed 
a long  p a r t i c u l a r  m ethodo log ica l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  such as  ‘ c o n t i n u i t y ,  economy, 
and c a u s a l i t y * .  Mathematics and p a r t i c u l a r l y  geometry played a major p a r t  
in  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  some o f  L e i b n iz 's  t h e o r i e s  about t e l e o lo g y ,  and he 
used t h i s  system to  dem onstra te  t h a t  th e  w o r ld 's  systems c o n t r i b u te  to  
th e  b e s t  p o s s ib le  o rd e r .  He i s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  v iew  t h a t  t h i s  i s  
' t h e  b e s t  o f  a l l  p o s s ib le  w o r ld s ' .  For L e ib n iz ,  some o f  h i s  m athem atica l  
p r in c i p l e s  were seen to  be no th in g  l e s s  than  e t e r n a l  t r u t h s  which were 
p a r t  o f  h i s  m etaphysica l  system . That i s  why he sometimes r e f e r r e d  to  
to  th e  g e n e ra l  o rd e r  a s  be ing  governed by th e  ‘most g e n e ra l  laws o f  God*. 
He d i s t in g u is h e d  between th e s e  and more o rd in a ry  laws o f  n a tu r e ,  which he 
c a l l s  's u b o rd in a te  maxims*. God e s ta b l i s h e d  them and uses  them, but 
I n d i r e c t l y ,  so t h a t  t h i s  system saw God a s  in te rv e n in g  in  N ature  in  a 
l e s s  d i r e c t  way than  t h a t  a n t i c ip a t e d  by Newton and th e  T h e i s t s .  According 
to  Buchdahl, Kant took up a p o s i t i o n  somewhere between Newton’ s idea
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of  space as an empty vacuum and L e ib n iz 's  th e o ry  of  r e l a t i o n a l  space .
Buchdahl a l s o  c la im s t h a t  i t  was Newton's P r in c i p la  which was the  ' f i r s t  
g re a t  s c i e n t i f i c  i n i t i a t o r  o f  K an t’ s t h o u g h t ' .  As Kant h im se lf  pu t i t ,  
he s e t  ou t  to  " . . . d i s c o v e r  th e  s y s te m a t ic  element which l i n k s  th e  g re a t  
members o f  c r e a t i o n  w ith  th e  whole c o n te x t  of  i n f i n i t y .
In  th e  P r in c i p l e  Newton had s t a t e d  t h a t  th e  system which he had uncovered 
behind th e  laws o f  n a tu r e  "cou ld  only  proceed from th e  c o u n se l ,  and 
dominion o f  an i n t e l l i g e n t  and pow erfu l B e i n g . W h e n  Kant r e tu rn e d  to  
t h i s  q u e s t io n  some y e a rs  l a t e r  ha began to  see  th e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  d i f f i c u l t ­
i e s  su rround ing  Newton's a t t e m p t  to  prove t h a t  th e  systems which o p e ra te  
w i th in  th e  u n iv e r s e  demanded an i n t e l l i g e n t  and pow erfu l C re a to r .  Kant 
was no lo n g e r  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  i t  was n e c e s sa ry  to  p o s tu l a t e  th e  e x is te n c e  
o f  God to  e x p la in  th e  n a t u r a l  laws in  q u e s t io n ,  nor could God's e x is te n c e  
be n e c e s s a r i l y  i n f e r r e d  from them. This  d id  n o t  mean t h a t  he had ceased 
to  be im pressed  by th e  T e l e o lo g ic a l  argument, but t h a t  he was no lo n g e r  
prepared  to  ag ree  w ith  Newton t h a t  t e l e o lo g y  le d  to  only  one c o n c lu s io n .
For Kant th e  whole C re a t io n  i s  s t i l l  seen as  a  w onderful ' a r t e f a c t '  or 
p ie c e  o f  n a t u r a l  e n g in e e r in g ;  bu t i t  need n o t  be an y th ing  more than  t h a t  -  
an amazing example o f  n a t u r a l ,  cosmic e n g in e e r in g .  Kant would have been 
ready  to  concede t h a t  n a tu r e  can be seen as  a  t e c h n ic a l  model, and because 
o f  t h a t  he can see  th e  'p u p o s iv e n e ss  o f  n a tu r e '  or th e  ' form al t e l e o lo g y  
o f  n a t u r e ' , bu t  h i s  accoun t o f  what brought t h i s  about i s  no lo n g e r  
along  s t r i c t l y  Newtonian l i n e s .
" F in a l  causes  do no t  ' e x i s t ' :  t h in g s  a r e  n o t  o rgan ised  t e l e o lo g i c a l ly ,  
R a th e r ,  th ey  a r e  to  be viewed by us under th e  guidance o f  th e  n o t io n  
o f  a  t e l e o l o g i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n :  t h i s  p o in t  o f  view a c t i n g  as a
'g u id e  f o r  th e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  n a t u r e ' .
Hume, whose approach  to  t e l e o lo g y  along  w ith  K a n t 's  was more p h i lo so p h ­
i c a l  th a n  s c i e n t i f i c ,  may have come to  a g re e  w ith  Kant on th e  v a l i d i t y  
o f  th e  r e l i g i o u s  T e l e o lo g ic a l  argument. Hume had a f t e r  a l l  awakened th e
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s c e p t i c  i n  Kant. But Newton was th e  e m p ir ic a l  s c i e n t i s t l  They found i t  
d i f f i c u l t  to  a rgue  w ith  much c o n v ic t io n  a g a in s t  Newton's r e l i g i o u s  i n t e r p ­
r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t e l e o lo g y ,  o th e r  than  by r e v e r t i n g  to  t h e i r  
own p h i lo s o p h ic a l  sys tem s. These systems were f a r  from p e r f e c t ,  and in  
p a r t i c u l a r  th ey  were weak when faced w ith  th e  t a s k  o f  e v a lu a t in g  th e  raw 
in fo rm a t io n  which was be ing  su pp lied  by e m p ir ic a l  s c i e n t i f i c  r e s e a rc h .  Out 
o f  r e s p e c t  f o r  Newton, Hume d id  a t t a c h  g r e a t e r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  to  th e  argument 
from d e s ig n  than  Kant h im se lf  and many l a t e r  K a n t ia n s .
d .  The Moral argum ent. Kant i n  p a r t i c u l a r  f e l t  t h a t  th e  Moral argument 
was th e  r i g h t  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  f o r  n a t u r a l  th e o lo g y .  The c o n v ic t io n  t h a t  
th e r e  i s  a  moral power p r e s e n t  in  th e  u n iv e r s e  comes th ro u g h  s t ro n g ly  
in  K a n t 's  e t h i c a l  w r i t i n g s .  This  view presupposes  t h a t  t h e r e  must be a 
be ing , who, as  law g iv e r  and judge , g ives  f o rc e  t o  th e  m ajor  m oral 
im p e ra t iv e s ,
" I f  we assume a m oral n a tu r e  f o r  man, then  we must (Kant a rg u e s )  
a l s o  see t h i s  m o ra l i ty  as  p o s tu l a t i n g  th e  r e a l i t y  o f  a  God, a s  an 
e x p re s s io n  o f  th e  n e c e s s a ry  f u l f i lm e n t  o f  th e  c o n d i t io n s  t h a t  a lone  
can r e a l i s e  t h e  f u l l  e x e rc i s e  o f  m oral a c t i v i t y .
At f i r s t  s ig h t  i t  i s  tem pting  to  imagine t h a t  K a n t 's  approach  had got 
round th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which had a t te n d ed  th e  o th e r  T h e i s t i c  argum ents.
W ith th e  advance o f  s c io n ce  Kant may have f e l t  t h a t  what Hume a t  t im es 
claimed would happen was coming t r u e ;  namely, t h a t  s c ie n c e  was beginning 
to  g ive a reason  f o r  e v e ry th in g ,  removing th e  r e l i g i o u s  h y p o th es is  complet­
e ly  from m y s te r ie s  which up u n t i l  th en  had had no n a t u r a l  e x p la n a t io n .  
Newton had r e v o lu t io n iz e d  th e  A r i s t o t e l i a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  ' c a u s a t i o n ' . .  
F resh  s c i e n t i f i c  i n s i g h t s  were making th e  ana logy  o f  th e  u n iv e r s e  as  an 
a r t e f a c t  which c a l l e d  f o r  th e  c o n s ta n t  a c t i v i t y  o f  a  w ise C re k to r ,  inapp­
r o p r i a t e .  Kant may have f e l t  t h a t  th e  Moral argument would a t  l e a s t  take  
th e  d e fence  o f  th e  b e l i e f  i n  God to  a  p lane  where i t  would no t  be a t  r i s k  
from what sc ie n c e  had s t i l l  to  r e v e a l .
What he succeeded i n  do ing , however, was to  narrow th e  base which
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supported  th e  T h e i s t i c  b e l i e f  in  God, from f i v e  main arguments to  one.
Even t h a t  may be a l i t t l e  generous, because, in s t e a d  o f  th e  Moral 
argument l e a d in g  th e  e n q u ir e r  to  a t r u e  s tudy  o f  God, K a n t 's  system was 
to  d e a l  m ain ly  w ith  th e  f o rc e  o f  something which might be r e f e r r e d  to  as -  
moral o b l i g a t i o n .  I t  could  be argued t h a t  th e  c a t e g o r i c a l  im p e ra t iv e  
l o s t  much o f  i t s  f o rc e  once God, th e  Law g iv e r ,  was removed from th e  
p i c t u r e .  To t h a t  e x te n t  God's e x is te n c e  was v e ry  im por tan t  to  K a n t 's  
system; a l l  t h e  same, th e  K an tian  u n d e rs tan d in g  o f  th e  moral law became 
in c r e a s i n g ly  abou t a m oral code f o r  l i v i n g ,  r a t h e r  than  a r e l i g i o u s  
framework o f  b e l i e f s  o f  which m oral o b l ig a t io n  was m erely  a p a r t .  The 
Moral law, as  t h a t  which p ro v id e s  us w ith  a code on how we should  l i v e ,  
was to  become so c e n t r a l  i n  K a n t 's  ou t look  t h a t  o th e r  t h e o l o g ic a l  q u e s t io n s  
were pushed ou t  o f  th e  p i c t u r e  a lm ost co m p le te ly .  Much of  what Kant had 
to  say abou t th e  Moral Law was ad m irab le ,  and f u l l y  i n  harmony w i th  the  
te a c h in g  o f  J e s u s  in  p assages  such as th e  Sermon on th e  Mount. Some 
may wish to  a rgue  t h a t  h i s  u se  o f  th e  Moral argument presupposed God's 
e x is te n c e  and th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  C h r i s t i a n  f a i t h .  In  a s k e tc h  o f  h i s  l i f e  
John R icharson  was a b le  s a y ; -
"The t r u e  c r i t i c i s m  on h i s  m oral c h a r a c t e r ,  a s  w e l l  as  th e  most
sublim e p a n e g e r ic  t h a t  can be made on him, i s .  That he e a r n e s t l y
and s t e d f a s t l y  endeavoured to  p r a c t i c e  what he p ro fe s s e d ,  to  make
th e  m oral law, th e  g r e a t  comprehensive r u l e  o f  d u ty ,  the  s p r in g  o f
h is  a c t i o n s .  Fo r ,  h i s  l i f e  was, so to  say , a commontor i l l u s t r a t i o n
to  h i s  pu re  d o c t r i n e ,  and alm ost exem p lif ied  i t ,  or was as n e a r ly
le d  up to  i t ,  co n seq u e n t ly  he, by p re c e p t  and example, came as
n e a r  th e  id e a  o f  a  sage ,  o r  o f  a p e r f e c t l y  wise and v i r t u o u s  man,
as perhaps th e  f r a i l t y  in h e r e n t  in  human n a tu re  a l lo w s ."95
N e v e r th e le s s ,  K a n t 's  w r i t i n g s  have the  c a p a c i ty  to  b l in d  us t o  what 
he was doing  to  th e  T h e i s t i c  argum ents . His h ig h ,  t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  Idea l ism  
which could  be so i n s p i r i n g ,  was no t in  tune  w ith  the  Theism o f  a  Bishop 
B u t l e r ,  o r  th e  C h r i s t i a n  a a p i r ic i s m  o f  a  Newton. Kant had been brought
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up in  a p h i lo s o p h ic a l  t r a d i t i o n  which found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  address  
s t r a ig h t fo rw a rd  q u e s t io n s .  The mundane, th e  sim ple and obvious, was 
somehow too o rd in a ry  to  m e r i t  exam ination . Great theo logy  and g re a t  
ph ilosophy  had to  be on a p lane  which was f a r  h igher  than  any th in g  which 
the  average  person  could ta k e  i n .  That was why i t  could only  be w r i t t e n  
in  a s t y l e  f o r  th e  i n i t i a t e d .  Kant was capab le  o f  deve lop ing  arguments 
a t  g re a t  l e n g th ,  w ith  th e  g r e a t e s t  e loquence, which were n e v e r th e le s s  
q u i te  unsound.
At i t s  b e s t ;  K a n t 's  development o f  the  Moral argument occup ies  a unique 
p la c e  in  moral p h i lo sophy , a lm ost making us f o r g e t  t h a t  what r e l i g i o n  he 
p ro fe ssed  was c lo s e r  to  Deism thku Theism. K a n t 's  work on th e  Moral 
argument w i l l  s tand  f o r  a l l  tim e as a f r e s h ,  modern i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  
moral law . Comparing h i s  e t h i c a l  system w ith  Hume's, i t  i s ‘ a l l  too 
ev iden t  t h a t  Hume's I n tu i t i o n i s m  was a poor s u b s t i t u t e  fo r  K a n t 's  
e x p o s i t io n  o f  th e  m oral law . K a n t 's  Groundwork has a no te  o f  moral 
a u th o r i t y  which i s  q u i te  l a c k in g  in  Hume's w r i t i n g s .
For Hume, q u e s t io n s  r a i s e d  by th e  Moral argument extended in to  some of  
th e  o th e r  T h e i s t i c  p roo fs  a s  w e l l .  When d i s c u s s in g  the  Cosmological 
argument he d id  n o t  c o n f in e  h im se lf  to  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  th e  c o r r e c t  theo ry  
o f  c a u s a t io n ,  but went on to  i n s i s t  t h a t  we must no t  only f in d  ou t  about 
th e  f i r s t ,  uncaused c a u se ,  to  whose i n i t i a t i v e  th e  cha in  o f  c a u s e - a n d -e f f e c t  
p ro c e s se s  can be a t t r i b u t e d ;  b u t ,  we must go on to  a sk  -  'what i s  the  
m oral c h a r a c te r  o f  th e  C r e a to r '?  He knew t h a t  h is  own th eo ry  o f  p e rc e p t ­
ion  could no t  d e a l  f u l l y  w i th  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  how God's workings r e l a t e  
to  c a u s e - a n d - e f f e c t  p r o c e s s e s ,  but t h a t  d id  n o t  p rev e n t  him from p o in t in g  
out t h a t  th e  Cosm ological argum ent, by i t s e l f ,  t e l l s  us l i t t l e  about 
what th e  C re a to r  i s  l i k e ; -
" . . . a s s e r t ,  t h a t  a b e in g ,  whose v o l i t i o n  i s  connected w ith  every 
e f f e c t ;  . . . g i v e s  us no i n s i g h t  in to  the  n a tu r e  o f  h i s  power o r  
c o n n e c t io n .
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This can be in terp reted  as a two-pronged a tta c k , f i r s t l y  on the  
Cosm ological argument, and then on the T e le o lo g ic a l argument. In both  
cases the main claim  o f  the argument i s  undermined f i r s t ;  in  the case o f  
the Cosm ological argument -  the need for  an uncaused f i r s t  cause; and, 
in  the case o f  the T e le o lo g ic a l argument -  the need fo r  an in t e l l ig e n t  
Creator to account for  the p r in c ip le  o f t e le o lo g y . Secondly, Hume went 
on to ch a llen ge  the con clu sion  th at, from the Cosm ological argument and 
the T e le o lo g ic a l argument combined, we can prove th at the w ise , omnipot­
ent Creator i s  m orally good. In th is  connection , there are two s e ts  o f  
passages which can be quoted from Hume's w r it in g s . The f i r s t  puts 
forward the n eg a tiv e  c a se . The second an o p tim ist ic  view , moving c lo se r  
to  the L eib n iz ian  view  -  th a t th is  i s  the b est o f a l l  p o ss ib le  w orlds.
The co n tra st between th ese  passages i s  a t tim es f a ir ly  marked, fo rc in g  
us to conclude th a t Hume s tr e sse d  one view a t one stage  in  h is  career  
and the o p p o site  one a t  another. As both s e ts  o f  arguments are developed  
a t con sid erab le  len g th , i t  i s  wrong to be dogmatic that he held only to  
one v iew . I t  has a lready been argued th a t ha favoured a 'ch eer fu l  
d i s p o s i t io n ' , or the o p t im is t ic  v iew , when develop ing h is  an th rop o log ica l 
model; so th a t th ere  i s  good ground for  saying th a t h is  most c o n s is te n t  
view o f  l i f e  was o p t im is t ic .
The T h e is t ic  view  th a t the Creator i s  m orally good does not n e c e s s a r ily  
e n t a i l  the con clu sion  th at human l i f e  i s  p a in le ss  or the Creation f la w le s s .  
I t  does hold th a t the C reation i s  in h eren tly  good, so that the good 
t e le o lo g ic a l  ends which dem onstrate that goodness w i l l  even tu a lly  be 
f u l f i l l e d .  According to  th is  v iew , the good C reation o f which L eibniz  
speaks i s  -  'th e  b est o f  a l l  p o ss ib le  w o r ld s'. This claim  turns back 
the qu estion  on th ose  who would condemn the C reation as the work o f  an 
a ll-g o o d , a ll-p o w e r fu l d e ity  by asking -  ' i s  any other e x is te n c e  p o ss ib le '?
But, the fa c t  th at the C reation i s  the b est o f a l l  p o ss ib le  worlds 
reminds us o f  a b asic  moral d i s t in c t io n ,  which h ig h lig h ts  the e x isten ce  
o f  an e v i l  power in  the cosmos. 'E v il'  i s  the other s id e  o f the c o in .
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I t  i s  th e  dark  to n es  in  th e  p a in t in g  a g a in s t  which th e  b r ig h t e r  co lou rs  
and h i g h l i g h t s  s ta n d  o u t .  To a s s e r t  t h a t  something i s  good i s  to  argue 
f o r  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  e v i l .  T ha t,  f o r  th e  T h e is t  i s  no t  th e  problem. The 
problem a r i s e s  out o f  t h a t  s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s . I t  i s  summed up in  E p ic u ru s 's  
p r e s e n t a t io n  o f  th e  an tinom y:-
" I s  he w i l l i n g  to  p rev e n t  e v i l ,  but no t  ab le ?  then  he i s  im po ten t .
I s  he a b le ,  bu t no t  w i l l i n g ?  then  he i s  m a le v o le n t .  I s  he both 
a b le  and w i l l i n g ?  whence th en  i s  e v i l? " ^ ^
That i s  a  l o g i c a l  s t r a i g h t j a c k e t  from which th e  T h e i s t  cannot escape .
I t  i s  a t r u e  fo rm u la t io n  o f  th e  problem on t h e i s t i c  t e r m s , and th e  only  
answer which th e  T h e is t  can g ive  i s  to  say t h a t  i n  some ways God's power 
i s  l i m i t e d .  There a r e  some th in g s  which He cannot and o th e r s  which He 
w i l l  no t  do. I t  has to  be remembered t h a t  Omnipotence i s  a  concept which 
has been c o n t r ib u te d  to  th eo lo g y  from th e  ph ilosophy  o f  r e l i g i o n  d e b a te ,  
and in  an extreme form does n o t  belong to  b i b l i c a l  theo lo g y .  Theism 
must be d e f in e d  from w i th in  th e  C h r i s t i a n  t r a d i t i o n ,  r a t h e r  than  from
a p h i lo s o p h ic a l  t r a d i t i o n .  Two b i b l i c a l  passages  have helped t o  d e f in e
C h r i s t i a n  t r a d i t i o n  on t h i s  q u e s t i o n : -
"How c l e a r l y  th e  sky r e v e a ls  God's g lo ryI  
How p l a i n l y  i t  shows what he has doneI
Bach day pronounces i t  to  th e  fo llow ing  day;
each n ig h t  r e p e a ts  i t  to  th e  n e x t .
No speech o r  words a r e  used , 
no sound i s  heard ;
Yet t h e i r  v o ic e  goes out to  a l l  th e  world
and i s  heard  to  th e  ends o f  th e  e a r th ."
"Ever s in c e  God c re a te d  th e  w orld , h i s  i n v i s i b l e  q u a l i t i e s ,  both h is  
e t e r n a l  power and h i s  d iv in e  n a tu r e ,  have been c l e a r l y  seen; they  a re
pe rce ived  in  th e  th in g s  t h a t  God has made . . .  So th e s e  people have no
excuse a t  a l l . .
97. D ialogues Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n .  P a r t  X .(Ei.M ecIntyre)
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In  two passages  from A T r e a t i s e  on Human N ature  we can see  how Hume 
unders tood  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  Cosm ological and T e le o lo g ic a l  
a rgum ents , in  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  Moral argument.
"M atte r ,  th ey  say , i s  m i t s e l f  e n t i r e l y  u n a c t iv e ,  and d e p r iv 'd  
o f  any power, by which i t  may produce , or  c o n t in u e ,  o r  communicate 
m otion; But s in c e  th e s e  e f f e c t s  a r e  e v id e n t  to  our s e n se s ,  and 
s in c e  th e  power t h a t  produces them, must be p l a c 'd  somewhere, i t  
must l i e  i n  th e  D e i ty ,  o r  t h a t  d iv in e  be ing , who c o n ta in s  i n  h is  
n a tu r e  a l l  e x c e l le n c y  and p e r f e c t i o n .  'T i s  t h e  d e i t y ,  th e r e f o r e ,  
who i s  th e  prime mover o f  th e  u n iv e r s e ,  and who n o t  on ly  f i r s t  
c re a te d  m a t t e r ,  and gave i t  i t s  o r i g i n a l  im pu lse ,  but l ik e w is e  
by a  c o n t in u 'd  e x e r t io n  o f  om nipotence, su p p o rts  i t s  e x is te n c e ,  
and s u c c e s s iv e ly  bestows on i t  a l l  th o se  m otions ,  and c o n f ig u ra ­
t i o n s ,  and q u a l i t i e s ,  w ith  which i t  i s  endow 'd."100
"There seems on ly  t h i s  dilemma l e f t  to  us i n  th e  p r e s e n t  case ;  
e i t h e r  to  a s s e r t ,  t h a t  no th ing  can be th e  cause  o f  a n o th e r ,  but 
where th e  mind can p e rc e iv e  th e  connexion i n  i t s  id e a  o f  th e  
o b j e c t s :  Or to  m a in ta in ,  t h a t  a l l  o b j e c t s ,  which we f in d  c o n s ta n t ly  
c o n jo in e d ,  a r e  upon t h a t  account to  be regarded  as causes  and e f f e c t s ,  
I f  we chose th e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  th e  dilemma, th e s e  a r e  th e  consequences, 
F i r s t ,  We i n  r e a l i t y  a f f i rm ,  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no such th in g  i n  the  
u n iv e r s e  a s  a  cause  o r  p ro d u c t iv e  p r i n c i p l e ,  n o t  even th e  d e i ty  
h im se lf ;  s in c e  our id e a  o f  t h a t  supreme Being i s  d e r i v 'd  from 
p a r t i c u l a r  im p re s s io n s ,  none o f  which c o n ta in  any e f f i c a c y ,  nor 
seem to  have any c onnec t ion  w ith  any o th e r  e x i s t e n c e .  As to  what 
may be s a id ,  t h a t  th e  connexion between th e  id e a  o f  an i n f i n i t e l y  
pow erfu l be ing , and t h a t  o f  any e f f e c t ,  which he w i l l s ,  i s  necessary  
and unavo idab le ;  I  answer t h a t  we have no id e a  o f  a being endow'd 
w ith  any power, much l e s s  o f  one endow'd w i th  i n f i n i t e  power. But 
i f  we change e x p re s s io n s ,  we can only  d e f in e  power by c o n n e x io n ;
100. T r e a t i s e , by David Hume. V o l.  I .(Ed. Green & Grose) 4 5^4
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and then  in  s a y in g ,  t h a t  the  id ea  o f  an i n f i n i t e l y  pow erfu l being 
i s  connected w ith  t h a t  o f  every  e f f e c t ,  which he w i l l s ,  we r e a l l y  
do no more th an  a s s e r t ,  t h a t  a  be ing , whose v o l i t i o n  i s  connected 
w ith  every e f f e c t ;  which i s  an i d e n t i c a l  p r o p o s i t io n ,  and g ives  us 
no i n s i g h t  i n to  th e  n a tu r e  o f  h is  power o r  connexion. But, second ly ,  
supposing , t h a t  th e  d e i t y  were the  g re a t  and e f f i c a c io u s  p r i n c i p l e ,  
which s u p p l ie s  th e  d e f i c i e n c y  o f  a l l  c a u se s ,  t h i s  lea d s  us i n to  the  
g r o s s e s t  im p ie t i e s  and a b s u r d i t i e s .  For upon th e  same a ccoun t ,  t h a t  
we have re c o u rs e  to  him in  n a t u r a l  o p e ra t io n s ,  and a s s e r t  t h a t  
m a t te r  cannot o f  i t s e l f  communicate m otion, or produce th o u g h t,  v i z .  
because t h e r e  i s  no ap p a re n t  connexion be tw ix t  th e s e  o b je c t s ;  I  say , 
upon th e  v e ry  same a c c o u n t ,  we must acknowledge t h a t  the  d e i t y  i s  
th e  a u th o r  of a l l  our v o l i t i o n s  and p e rc e p t io n s ;  s in c e  they  have 
no more a p p a re n t  connexion e i t h e r  w ith  one a n o th e r ,  o r  w ith  the  
suppos 'd  but unknown su b s tan ce  o f  the  s o u l .  This  agency o f  th e  
supreme Being we know to  have been a s s e r t e d  by s e v e r a l  p h i lo so p h e rs  
w i th  r e l a t i o n  to  a l l  th e  a c t io n s  o f  th e  mind, except . v o l i t i o n . . .  
t h o '  ' t i s  easy  to  p e rc e iv e ,  t h a t  t h i s  ex cep tio n  i s  a mere p r e t e x t ,  
to  avoid  th e  dangerous consequences o f  t h a t  d o c t r i n e .
In  th e  c h a p te r  d e a l in g  w i th  Hume's ph ilosophy  o f  r e l i g i o n ,  a t t e n t i o n  
was drawn to  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  Hume's N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n  and 
h i s  D ia logues Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n  were conceived in  o u t l i n e  
a t  th e  same t im e .  There would appear  to  be a c o n t r a d ic t io n  h e re .  Hume's 
N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n  g ives us th e  f u l l e s t  and most ' t h e i s t i c '  
o u t l i n e  o f  h i s  ph ilo sophy  o f  r e l i g i o n .  The d i f f i c u l t i e s  which he had 
found in  h i s  o th e r  s tu d i e s  o f  th e  Cosmological and T e le o lo g ic a l  arguments 
appear to  have been swept to  one s i d e : -
"The whole frame o f  our  n a tu re  bespeaks an i n t e l l i g e n t  au th o r ;  
and no r a t i o n a l  e n q u ir e r  can , a f t e r  s e r io u s  r e f l e x i o n ,  suspend 
h is  b e l i e f  a  moment w i th  reg a rd  to  the  prim ary p r in c ip le s  o f  
genuine Theism and R e l ig io n .
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Few s c h o la r s  doubt t h a t  he b e l ie v e d  th e  Cosm ological argument to  
m e r i t  s e r io u s  c o n s id e r a t io n .  His I n t u i t i o n i s m  may have l e t  him as  w e l l  
to  i n f e r  t h a t  man's c a p a c i ty  f o r  moral r e f l e x i o n  i s  de r ived  from God, 
t h e  moral C r e a to r .
There would seem to  have been a tu rn in g -p o in t  i n  Hume's a t t i t u d e  to  th e
need f o r  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s .  At some p o in t  b e fo re  he w rote  The N a tu ra l
H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n  -  somewhere i n  m id -c a re e r  -  h i s  o u t lo o k  changed,
j u s t i f y i n g  an o b s e r v e r 's  o p in io n  t h a t  he " . . .w a s  a C h r i s t i a n  a lthough
he d id  no t  know i t . "  The s c e p t i c a l  moods were to  r e t u r n ,  a s  h i s  r e v i s io n s  103o f  t h e  D ia logues would seem to  i n d i c a t e ;  ta k e  f o r  example th e  view o f  l i f e  
p re se n te d  i n  t h i s  p a s s a g e ; -
"A p e r p e tu a l  war i s  k in d le d  among a l l  l i v i n g  c r e a t u r e s .  N e c e s s i ty ,  
hunger, want, s t im u la te  th e  s t ro n g  and courageous; F e a r ,  a n x ie ty ,  
t e r r o r ,  a g i t a t e  th e  weak and in f i rm .  The f i r s t  en tra n ce  i n to  l i f e  
g ives  angu ish  to  a new-born i n f a n t  and t o  i t s  wretched p a re n t :  
Weakness, im potence , d i s t r e s s ,  a t t e n d  each s ta g e  o f  t h a t  l i f e :  and 
' t i s  a t  l a s t  f in i s h e d  in  agony and h o r ro r .
Observe to o ,  says P h i lo ,  th e  c u r io u s  a r t i f i c e s  o f  N a tu re ,  in  
o rd e r  to  e m b i t te r  th e  l i f e  o f  every l i v i n g  b e in g .  The s t r o n g e r  
p rey  upon th e  w eaker, and keep them in  p e r p e tu a l  t e r r o r  and a n x ie ty .  
The weaker to o ,  i n  t h e i r  t u r n ,  o f te n  p rey  upon th e  s t r o n g e r ,  and 
vex  and m oles t  them w ithou t  r e l a x a t i o n .  C onsider  t h a t  innumerable 
r a c e  o f  i n s e c t s ,  which e i t h e r  a r e  bred on th e  body o f  each anim al, 
o r  f l y i n g  about i n f i x  t h e i r  s t i n g s  in  him. These i n s e c t s  have o th e rs  
s t i l l  l e s s  than  th em se lv es ,  which torm ent them. And th u s  on each 
hand, b e fo re  and beh ind , above and below, every  anim al i s  surround­
ed w ith  enemies, which in c e s s a n t ly  seek h i s  m isery  and d e s t r u c t i o n . "
104
PHILO and DEMSA enumerate th e  ca ta lo g u e  o f  woes which a f f l i c t  m u l t i tu d e s .  
DEMEA quotes a g re a t  p o e t ; -
103. Mossner op. c i t .  57O
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" I n t e s t i n e  s to n e  and u l c e r ,  c o l ic -p a n g s .
Demonic f r e n z y ,  moping m elancholy.
And m oon-struck madness, p in in g  a tro p h y .
Marasmus and w ide-w asting  p e s t i l e n c e .
D ire  was th e  t o s s i n g ,  deep th e  groans: DESPAIR
Tended th e  s i c k ,  b u s ie s t  from couch to  couch.
And over  them tr ium phant Death h i s  d a r t
Shook, but d e la y 'd  to  s t r i k e ,  th o '  o f t  invok 'd
With vows, as  t h e i r  c h ie f  good and f i n a l  hope."105
DEMSA f u r t h e r  su g g e s ts  t h a t  d i s o r d e r s  o f  th e  mind, " though more
s e c r e t ,  a r e  no t  perhaps l e s s  d ism al and v exa tious , ."  As i f  to  remind Hume106t h a t  he had once enjoyed much b e t t e r  h e a l t h  and t h a t  h i s  ou t look  had
been q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  th a n ,  GLEANTHES r e p l i e s  " I  can observe  something
l i k e  what you m ention in  some o t h e r s . . . "  " . . . b u t  I  c o n fe s s ,  I  f e e l  l i t t l e  
o r  no th in g  o f  i t  i n  m y se lf ,  and hope t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  so common as  you 
r e p r e s e n t  i t .^ '^^To DEMEA, CLEANTHES sounds l i k e  one o f  J o b ' s  co m fo r te rs ,  
so t h a t  t h i s  answer m erely provokes a f r e s h  o u tb u rs t  o f  com pla in ts  and woes, 
A l l  th e  same a doubt has been sown. A c ra c k  has appeared in  PHILO's and 
DEMSA's d e fe n c e s .  There i s  a n o th e r  s id e  to  t h e  s to r y :  a n o th e r ,  q u i te
d i f f e r e n t  way o f  lo o k in g  a t  th e  w orld . CLEANTHES i s  never  allow ed to  
develop t h i s  a n g le  a t  l e n g th ,  but he i s  a t  l e a s t  p e rm i t te d  to  sum i t  up.
"Your r e p r e s e n ta t i o n s  a r e  exaggera ted ;  Your m elancholy views a re  
m ostly  f i c t i t i o u s :  Your in fe re n c e s  c o n t r a ry  to  f a c t  and expe rience .
H ea lth  i s  more common th an  s ic k n e s s :  P le a su re  than  p a in :  Happiness
than  m ise ry .  And f o r  one v e x a t io n ,  which we meet w i th ,  we a t t a i n ,
upon com puta tion , a  hundred en joym ents."108
I t  i s  no t  too  d i f f i c u l t  to  imagine th e  r e a l  Hume whom we meat i n  most of 
h i s  w r i t in g s  a g re e in g  t h a t  t h a t  i s  a  more o b je c t iv e  way o f  look ing  a t  the  
world . The Dialogues a r e  d ia lo g u e s ,  r a t h e r  than  a p ie c e  o f  sys tem atic  
ph i lo so p h y .  Hume was a h ig h ly  t r a i n e d  d e b a te r ,  used t o  pursu ing  p o in ts  to  
t h e i r  c o n c lu s io n ;  and, when n e c e s s a ry ,  becoming a d e v i l ' s  advocate . Those
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who unders tand  d e b a t in g  t a c t i c s  know f u l l  w e l l  t h a t  a good d e b a te r  can 
make out a  conv inc ing  c ase  f o r  a view which i s  n o t  h i s  own. That i s  why 
th e  arguments which a r e  p re se n te d  in  the  D ia logues must be seen  w ith in  
th e  c o n te x t  o f  an i n t e r p l a y  between the  c h a r a c t e r s .  This  i s  n o t  a
d i a t r i b e  in  which on ly  one p o in t  o f  view i s  h e a rd .  I t  i s  a d ia lo g u e ,  o r
a s e r i e s  of  d ia lo g u e s  on n a t u r a l  r e l i g i o n .  The form at i s  open-ended.
That i s  why i t  i s  a  m is tak e  to  draw too much out o f  th e  D ia lo g u e s .
They must be i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  th e  l i g h t  of Hume's e n t i r e  o u tp u t .
e .  The E th n o lo g ic a l  argum ent. The E th n o lo g ic a l  argument i s  an argument 
from u n iv e r s a l  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f .  I f  b e l i e f  in  God, or gods, o r  a d e i ty  
o f  some kind can be found in  every  human t r i b e  in  the  most f a r - f l u n g  
c o rn e r  o f  th e  w orld , th e n ,  t h i s  proves t h a t  God e x i s t s .  This argument 
i s  s im i l a r  to  th e  K antian  v e r s io n  o f  th e  Moral argum ent, i n  t h a t  i t  
a rgues  from m an's s p i r i t u a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n  to  a b e l i e f  i n  a t ra n sc en d e n t  
h ig h e r  power. Kant can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as say ing  t h a t  i t  i s  from man's 
sense o f  moral awareness t h a t  we can know t h a t  th e  u n iv e r s e  i s  governed 
by m oral p r i n c i p l e s .  And who l a i d  down th e s e  f ix e d  s ta n d a rd s  which a re  
obvious to  us i f  we w i l l  t h in k  about i t ?  The only  answer i s  t h a t  th e re  
i s  a moral fo rc e  p re s e n t  in  th e  u n iv e r s e ,  which corresponds to  th e  sense 
o f  m oral awareness which we f e e l  w i th in  o u r s e lv e s .  In  th e  E th n o lo g ic a l  
argum ent, i t  i s  t h e  b e l i e f  in  God t h a t  we a l l  f e e l  w i th in  o u r s e lv e s .  Does 
t h i s  u n iv e r s a l  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  prove t h a t  God e x i s t s ?
We can a l r e a d y  a n t i c i p a t e  how t h i s  argument would f a r e  when examined 
in  th e  l i g h t  o f  Hume's account o f  how our b e l i e f s  a r e  formed. He would 
no t have ques tioned  t h a t  b e l i e f  in  soma kind o f  d e i t y  i s  u n i v e r s a l .  Today 
t h a t  c la im  might be c h a llen g ed  as  some s o c i e t i e s  have a ttem pted  to  impose 
an a t h e i s t i c  c reed  on a l l  i t s  p e o p le s .  However, th e  s i t u a t i o n  was d i f f e r ­
ent in  Hume's day, because t r a v e l  was b r in g in g  to  l i g h t  th e  number o f  
r e l i g i o n s  which e x is te d  in  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  th e  world , and t h i s  was 
le a d in g  th e  p h i lo so p h e rs  o f  r e l i g i o n  to  say t h a t  t h i s  evidence o f  r e l ig io u s  
b e l i e f  th roughou t th e  world was p roof  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a God.
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But Hume would have gone on to  q u a l i f y  t h i s  adm ission  by i n s i s t i n g  
t h a t  we must d i s t i n g u i s h  between ' b e l i e f  in  God' and th e  kind of c a s t -  
i ro n  b e l i e f  t h a t  we have about a s c i e n t i f i c  experim ent which has been 
dem onstra ted  b e fo re  our eyes .  In  any c a se ,  l e f t  on i t s  own, th e  E thno lo ­
g i c a l  argument m erely  p lunges us i n to  t o t a l  c o n fu s io n ,  because th e  d e i t i e s  
which a r e  b e l ie v ed  in  by a l l  th e  w o r ld 's  r e l i g i o n s  a r e  so numerous and 
v a r i e d ,  t h a t  i t  cannot be claimed t h a t  t h i s  u n iv e r s a l  b e l i e f  i n  God i s  
due to  a r e v e l a t i o n  which one God has made o f  h im s e l f ,
" 'T i s  a m a t te r  o f  f a c t  u n c o n te s ta b le ,  t h a t  about 17OO y e a rs  ago 
a l l  mankind were i d o l a t e r s .  The d o u b tfu l  and s c e p t i c a l  p r in c i p l e s  
o f  a few p h i lo s o p h e r s ,  o r  th e  the ism , and t h a t  too  not e n t i r e l y  p u re ,  
o f  one o r  two n a t i o n s ,  form no o b je c t io n  w orth r e g a rd in g .  Behold 
then  th e  c l e a r  te s t im ony  o f  h i s t o r y .  The f a r t h e r  we mount up in to  
a n t i q u i t y ,  th e  more do we f in d  mankind plunged in to  i d o l a t r y .
" I t  seems c e r t a i n ,  t h a t ,  a cco rd ing  to  th e  n a tu r a l  p ro g re ss  o f  human 
tho u g h t,  th e  ig n o ra n t  m u l t i tu d e  must f i r s t  e n t e r t a i n  some g ro v e l l in g  
and f a m i l i a r  n o t io n  o f  s u p e r io r  powers, b e fo re  th ey  s t r e t c h  t h e i r  
concep tion  to  t h a t  p e r f e c t  be ing , who bestowed o rd e r  on th e  frame 
o f  n a tu r e .
I f  th e  E th n o lo g ic a l  argument g ives  no c l e a r  guidance as  to  th e  n a tu re  
o f  th e  d e i t y  on i t s  own, does Hume h im se lf  p rov ide  us w i th  th e  approach 
to  a s o lu t io n  to  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  when he speaks o f  " . . . b e f o r e  th ey  s t r e t c h  
t h e i r  concep tion  to  t h a t  p e r f e c t  be ing , who bestowed o rd e r  on th e  frame 
o f  na tu re^^^?  May no t mankind be moving to  a c lo s e r  unders tand ing  of 
' t h a t  p e r f e c t  be ing  who bestowed o rd e r  on th e  frsuae o f  n a tu r e '  ? I t  i s  
s t i l l  a c r u c i a l  q u e s t io n ,  and i t  i s  a  q u e s t io n  which enables us to  see 
how u n iv e r s a l  b e l i e f  i n  God can t e s t i f y  to  th e  e x is te n c e  of a  p e r f e c t  
be ing , even a l th o u g h  He i s  unders tood  in  so many d i f f e r e n t  ways by 
th e  w o r ld 's  r e l i g i o n s .
N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n , by David Hume, op- o l t .  26
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l a  what se n se  i s  i t  i n  o rd e r  to  r e f e r  to  Hume as a T h e is t ,  i n  view o f  h is  
in d u lg en ce  th roughou t  h is  c a re e r  in. o u tb u r s t s  o f  a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  d i a t r i b e ?  
Three  arguments can be aduced to  support  t h a t  p r o t e s t .  1. His main 
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  w r i t in g s  were s t r i k i n g l y  s e c u la r  i n  c h a r a c te r ,  so much so 
t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  conven tion  o f  t h e  p e r iod  to  g iv e  s c h o la r ly  w r i t in g s  a 
C h r i s t i a n  f la v o u r ,  he f e l t  no need to  conceal  h i s  s c e p t i c a l  t e i d e n c i e s ,
2 . Although a member o f  t h e  Church o f  S co tlan d  fo r  most o f  h i s  l i f e ,  he 
was no t  a r e g u la r  church-goer  nor outw ardly  a p r a c t i s i n g  C h r i s t i a n .  He 
may have come i n to  c o n ta c t  w i th  t h e  M oderate M in is te r s  o f  th e  K irk  when 
he began to  s e t t l e  i n  Edinburgh, bu t he s t i l l  had to  be coaxed to  a t te n d  
Church S e r v ic e s .  3 . In  h i s  l a t e r  y ea rs  i l l n e s s  reduced h is  c o n ta c t  w ith  
many o f  h is  C h r i s t i a n  f r i e n d s ,  and, w ith  no p u b l is h e r  to  censor h is  
f i n a l  r e v i s io n s  o f  h is  main works, he was a t  l i b e r t y  to  g ive  v en t  to  h is  
a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  arguments w ithou t  r e s t r a i n t .  l a  t h e  L i f e  o f  David Hume 
Mossner (Oxford I 98O) mentions t h a t  Boswell a ttem pted  to  " . . . d r a w  o u t  
th e  p h i lo so p h e r  on th e  s u b je c t  o f  im m o r ta l i ty .  ’He sa id  he never had 
e n te r ta in e d  any b e l i e f  in  r ^ i g i o n  s in c e  he began to  read Locke and 
C l a r k e ' . "  ( p . 597) But s e v e r a l  s c h o la r s  have r i g h t l y  argued t h a t  n o t  too 
much s t o r e  should be s e t  by what Hume may have s a id  to  Boswell I Was th en  
t h e  l a t e r  Hume j u s t  as much o f  a s c e p t i c  as t h e  younger c o n t r o v e r s i a l  
Hume?
Very few s c h o la r s  who have s tu d ie d  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s e le c t i o n  o f  h is  works 
have come to  th e  conc lus ion  t h a t  he could ever have r i g h t l y  been c a l le d  
an A t h e i s t .  I t  m a t te rs  no t  which p e r iod  in  h i s  c a re e r  we may c a re  to 
examine. The q u o ta t io n  from David Hume by J .Y .T ,  Greig (Jonathan Gape, 
London, 1934) i s  h ig h ly  r e v e a l i n g .  "He had met D e is ts ,  p le n ty  o f  them; 
he might a g re e  to  be d e sc r ib ed  as one h im s e lf ,  though upon th e  whole, i f  he 
must be c a l l e d  something, T h e is t  was a b e t t e r  d e s ig n a t io n ;  but as fo r  
A t h e i s t s ,  he r e a l l y  d i d n ' t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  they  e x i s t e d . "  (p .  298 ) Perhaps
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A .J .  Ayer speaks fo r  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  Hume s c h o la r s  when, he w r i te s ;  -  
Hume " . . .n o w h e re  p rocla im s h im se lf  an a t h e i s t .  On th e  c o n t r a ry ,  i n  
The N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n  and elsewhere i n  h is  w r i t i n g s ,  he 
p ro fe s s e s  to  a c ce p t  t h e  argument from Design." ( Hume A .J .  Ayer, Oxford
1980  p . 2 3 ) .
Was he then  a S c e p t ic ?  (This  could be t h e  e q u iv a len t  o f  A g n o s t ic . )
There  i s  a  s e n se  i n  which h i s  ph ilosophy had a deeply  s c e p t i c a l  s id e  to  i t ,  
ro o ted  in  t h e  s c e p t i c i s m  o f  C icero  as w e ll  as a  s c e p t ic is m  about th e  
r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  human s m s  e s . On page 195  o f  t h e  t h e s i s  Hume's claim.; -  
" 'B e s id e s ,  I  am as  c e r t a i n  as  I  can be o f  a n y th ing  (And I  am not such a 
S c e p t ic  as you may im agine) ' " i s  d isc u sse d ,  le a d in g  to  th e  co n c lu s io n
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  c a se  fo r  su g ges t ing  t h a t  he would no t even have been happy 
about be ing  g iven  t h e  l a b e l  'S c e p t i c ' ,
In G a sk in 's  1988 Hume's Philosophy o f  R e l ig io n  th e  c a se  has been argued 
t h a t  Hume was an  'a t t e n u a t e d  D eis t  ' and i n  th e  passage  quoted from Greig 
we saw t h a t ,  f o r  a moment, he seemed prepared  to  c a l l  h im se lf  one. But 
even t h a t  p a ssa g e  shows c l e a r l y  t h a t ,  i f  he was to  be c a l le d  a n y th in g ,  he 
would r a t h e r  be c a l l e d  a T h e i s t .  ( David Hume by J .Y .T , G re ig , Jonathan  
Gape, London, 1934 .)  Gaskin  acknowledges t h e  f o rc e  o f  Hume's r e j e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  D e is t  i n  t h e  in te r v ie w  with Mrs. M a l l e t ; -  " 'Madam', 
he r e p l i e d ,  ' I  am no D e i s t ' . . , "  ( The Philosophy o f  David Hume by N.K. 
Smith, Macmillan 1941 .)  I t  i s  h ig h ly  im probable  t h a t  he was i n  igno rance  
about t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between Theism and Deism by th e  tim e  he made th e s e  
s ta te m e n ts ,  f o r  t h e  s im ple  reason  t h a t  he had been brought up in  a 
community which was s teeped  in  t h e o lo g ic a l  in q u i r y .  The Theism on which 
he had been n u r tu re d  was t h a t  o f  th e  Scots  C onfession , but by th e  t im e  he 
began to  d r a f t  t h e  o u t l i n e s  o f  t h e  H is to ry  o f  N a tu ra l  H e l i s i o n  and th e  
Dialogues Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n  he was a ls o  f a m i l i a r  w ith  th e  
f i v e  T h e i s t i c  p roo fs  o f  s c h o l a s t i c  theo lo g y .  In  t h e  t h e s i s  i t  i s  argued 
t h a t  h i s  ph ilo sophy  o f  r e l i g i o n  was not taken  from th e  J u d a e o - C h r i s t i a n
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t r a d i t i o n  a lo n e ,  but grew " . . . o u t  o f  s e v e r a l  r e l i g i o n s  found i n  th e  
a n c ie n t  w o r l d . . . "  ( p . l0 4 )  and fo r  t h a t  reason  h is  'Theism ' was no t j u s t  
a s t r a ig h t f o rw a r d  e x p o s i t io n  o f  t h e  Theism o f  t h e  Sco ts  C onfession , In 
G r e ig 's  David Hume page 251 t h e r e  i s  a q u o ta t io n  from a l e t t e r  i n  
which Hume w r i te s  " ' . . . a l l  t h e  Godly i n  S co tland  abuse me fo r  ray
account o f  John Knox and th e  R e fo rm a t io n ' . "  He was no 'p h i lo so p h e r  o f  th e  
S c o t t i s h  R e fo rm a tio n ' i n  any s t r a ig h t f o rw a r d  se n se .  But, a c c e p t in g  t h a t  
we can d i s t i n g u i s h  between e .g .  t h e  Theism o f  t h e  Old Testament and t h a t  
o f  th e  New Testam ent w ithou t  s a c r i f i c i n g  th e  concept o f  re v e a le d  r e l i g i o n ,  
and t h a t  t h e  Theism o f  th e  l a t e r  Church was in f lu e n c e d  by a good d e a l  o f  
pagan ph ilo sophy ;  i t  i s  s t i l l  p o s s ib l e  to  accep t  t h a t  Hume he ld  on to  a 
v e r s io n  o f  Theism which r e t a in e d  some o f  th e  c e n t r a l  elements o f  th e  
C h r i s t i a n  d o c t r i n e  o f  God. Some o f  h i s  s e c u la r  adm irers  appear a t  t im es to  
speak w ith  r e g r e t  t h a t  t h a t  i s  t h e  c a se .
"S c o tla n d ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  i t s  C alv in ism , or perhaps r a t h e r  because o f  i t ,  
was i n  many ways c lo s e r  to  Europe than  to  Ehgland; i t  was no e x c ep t io n ­
a l  th in g  fo r  Hume to  t r a v e l  to  P a r i s  in  1734, to  s ta y  in  F rance  fo r  
t h r e e  y e a rs  and to  w r i t e  h i s  f i r s t  book, th e  T r e a t i s e , a t  l a  F leche  
on th e  L o ire ,  where he had th e  u se  o f  t h e  l i b r  a ry  o f  th e  J e s u i t  
c o l l e g e .  I t  rem ains t r u e  t h a t  Hume had to  pass  from th e  narrow pa ths  
o f  a P r e s b y te r i a n  C alv in ism , whose s p i r i t u a l i t y  would o f t e n  c a s t  th e  
shadows o f  a narrow , l e g a l i s t i c ,  and f r i g h t e n i n g  d e i ty ,  in to  th e  u rbane , 
mannered r a t i o n a l i s t i c  world o f  e ig h te e n th -c e n tu ry  l e t t e r s .  And t h i s  
marks Hume fo r  l i f e .  The shadows a r e  never e n t i r e l y  removed." ( Hume's 
E th ic a l  W r i t in g s ,  by A. M acIn ty re , M acm illan, .New York 1965, p . 10)
In  t h e  th eo logy  o f  s c h o la s t i c i s m  r a t i o n a l  argument was 
g iven an a lm ost equal p la c e  a lo n g s id e  r e v e a le d  r e l i g i o n .  That was why th e  
s o - c a l le d  f i v e  T h e i s t i c  p roofs  were given, a p la c e  o f  such im portance . Our 
s tudy  o f  Hume's p ro b ab le  a t t i t u d e  to  t h e  f i v e  'p r o o f s '  i s  r e v e a l in g ,  
because  he a p p a re n t ly  a t ta c h e d  g r e a te r  im portance  to  one o f  them th an ,  e .g .
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Kant, whose id e a s  have been more a c c e p ta b le  to  a number o f  C h r i s t i a n  s c h o la rs .  
I t  was noted  t h a t  even P ro fe sso r  Huxley had to concede t h a t  what we f in d  i n  
Hume's N a tu ra l  H is to ry  of  R e l ig io n  i s  " . . . c o n te n tm e n t  w ith  th e  argument 
from d e s ig n ."  ( Hume by P ro fe s so r  Huxlfy, M acmillan, London. 1909» p . l4 4 )
The passage  in  q u e s t io n  i s : -
"The whole frame o f  our n a tu r e  bespeaks an. i n t e l l i g e n t  a u th o r ;  and no 
r a t i o n a l  e n q u ire r  can, a f t e r  s e r io u s  r e f l e x i o n ,  suspend h is  b e l i e f  a 
moment w i th  reg a rd  to  th e  primary p r in c ip le s  o f  genuine Theism and 
R e l ig io n . "  ( K.H.B. p . 25)
The i n f lu e n c e  o f  Newton on h is  th in k in g  about C a u sa t io n  i s  o f  t h e  g r e a t e s t  
im portance , because  he o b v iously  admired Newton as a  person  and re sp e c te d  h is  
work; so t h a t ,  even a lth o u g h  th e  Cosmological argument had to  be g iven  a 
more dynamic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  i t  s t i l l  f i t t e d  i n  ve ry  w e l l  w ith  th e  argument 
from Design.
I t  was argued i n  th e  t h e s i s  (page  159) t h a t  he was i n  a way sup p o rt in g  
t h e  S th n o lo g ic a l  argument as w ell  when he spoke about non.-Theists such as 
p o l y th e i s t s  s t r e t c h i n g  t h e i r  concep tion  " . . .  to t h a t  p e r f e c t  be ing , who 
bestowed o rd e r  to  th e  frame o f  n a tu re ?"  ( K.H.R. p . 26) A l l  th e  p reced ing  
arguments a r e  combined in  th e  support  o f  t h i s  t h i r d  argument.
The O n to lo g ic a l  argument f a re d  l e s s  w ell  a t  h i s  hands, and, even a lthough  
h i s  r e f u t a t i o n  o f  i t  i s  n o t  w ithou t  weaknesses, he  g ives  l i t t l e  evidence 
o f  b e l i e v in g  t h a t  i t  has much to c o n t r ib u te  i n  th e  de fence  o f  Theism.
In. th e  c a se  o f  th e  Moral Argument, we a r e  l e f t  to  f e e l  t h a t  he 
a t  times gave v e n t  too f r e e l y  to  th e  view t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  prove 
from our s tudy  o f  th e  C re a t io n ,  th e  moral goodness o f  t h e  C re a to r .  I t  
Cannot be den ied  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  long passages i n  th e  Dialogues where t h a t  
view i s  expressed  w ith  no l i t t l e  p a s s io n .  But a r e  we j u s t i f i e d  i n  a rg u in g  that 
t h e  f i n a i v i e w  o f  t h e  C re a t io n  which we f in d  in. t h e  h i s  w r i t i n g s  i s  pessim ­
i s t i c ?  I t  has been shown t h a t  h i s  w r i t in g s  p re s e n t  an o p p o s i t e  view as w e l l / .
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The q u e s t io n  o f  Hume's h a nd ling  o f  th e  Moral argument r a i s e s  t h e  f u r t h e r  
q u e s t io n  o f  h i s  a t t i t u d e  to  Theism and Deism. The Theism o f  r e v e l a t i o n  and 
th e  B ib le  t a u g h t  t h a t  th e  d e i ty  i s  i n f i n i t e ,  and t h i s  made God t ra n s c e n d e n t  
and unknowable in. His e sse n c e .  A ugustine  s a id  t h a t  " . . . i t  i s  e a s ie r  fo r  us 
to  say what He i s  n o t  r a t h e r  th an  what He i s . "  S c h o la s t ic i s m  " . . . a f f i r m e d  
th e  u n k n o w ab ili ty  o f  God's e s s e n t i a l  be in g ."  Lu ther  s t r e s s e d  t h e  d iv in e  
tra n sc en d e n c e  or  o th e r n e s s ,  Deus A bscond itus . G a lv in  " . . .d ee m e d  i t  v a in  
s p e c u la t io n  to  a t te m p t  an 'e x a m in a t io n  o f  God's e s s e n c e ' , "  Because o f  t h a t  
Theism was b e t t e r  s u i t e d  to  d e a l in g  w ith  t h e  problems r a i s e d  by t h e  Moral 
argum ent. I t  d id  n o t  o f f e r  p a t  answers or  t i d y  s o l u t i o n s ,  even a l th o u g h  
th e  problem o f  e v i l  rem ained unanswered. Deism, on t h e  o th e r  hand, tended 
to  b rush  th e  problem  o f  e v i l  a s id e  as i f  i t  did n o t  m a t te r .  I t  has been 
d e sc r ib ed  as  a r e l i g i o n  o f  N a tu re  which had g r e a t  r a t i o n a l  appeal to  t h e  
f r e e th in k in g  academic community o f  th e  l 8 t h .  c e n tu ry .  D e is ts  could see  
how a Watchmaker C rea to r  could have c re a te d  th e  u n iv e r s e  which Newton 
saw th rough  h i s  ex perim en ts .  But, they f e l t ,  as t h i s  God was more detached  
th a n  th e  God r e v e a le d  i n  t h e  B ib le ,  who e n te rs  i n t o  human h i s t o r y  and 
a c t i v e l y  in te r v e n e s  i n  human a f f a i r s ;  He would n o t  be t e r r i b l y  i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  how o rd in a ry  peop le  led  t h e i r  l i v e s .  The D e is ts  tended 
to  th in k  t h a t  N a tu re  was i n h e r e n t ly  good, as was human n a tu re ;  so t h a t  t h e  
problem o f  e v i l  was c o n s id e red  n o t  worth d e b a t in g .  ( See t h e s i s  p. 126f . )
I t  has been argued t h a t  Hume was deeply  unhappy w i th  t h i s  a t t i t u d e  and t h a t  
may have been why c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  Moral argument f ig u r e s  so p rom inen tly  in. 
th e  D ia logues . I f  Hume c o n c e n t ra te d  most o f  h i s  f i r e  on th e  weakness o f  
th e  Moral argum ent, th e n ,  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b le  to  a rg u e  t h a t  he had l i t t l e  
con f idence  i n  t h e  sha llow  optimism which th e  c la im s o f  Deism had c r e a te d .  
Deism had a pow erfu l a t t r a c t i o n  fo r  a number o f  l e a d in g  th in k e r s  h i s  
day, bu t h i s  s u s ta in e d  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  view t h a t  e v i l  does no t e x i s t  in  
OUT w orld , o r  i s  such a l im i t e d  f o rc e  as to  m e r i t  d i s m i s s a l ,  makes i t  
abundan tly  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  had l i t t l e  appea l  fo r  him». The view which i s  
be ing  argued i n  t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib l e  to  concede to  Hume 
many o f  th e  p o in t s  which he i s  making on t h i s  q u e s t io n  w ithou t n e c e s s a r i l y
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i n f l i c t i n g  s e r io u s  damage ôjn t h e  Theism o f  C h r i s t i a n  re v e la t io n . .  The B ib le  
n o t  on ly  a d d re s se s  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  e v i l  i n  t h e  w orld , but seeks to  f in d  an 
answer to  i t .  Deism had c re a te d  a major problem fo r  i t s e l f  by s e r io u s ly  
p la y in g  down th e  r e a l i t y  o f  e v i l .  We f in d  th e  D e is t ic  l i n e  o f  approach i n  
Cleanthes* opening  speech in  s e c t i o n  XI o f  th e  D ia lo gues ; -
" I  s c ru p le  n o t  to  a l lo w , sa id  CLEANTHES, t h a t  I  have been a p t  to  su sp ec t  
t h e  f re q u e n t  r e p i t i t i o n  o f  t h e  word, i n f i n i t e , which we meet w i th  i n  a l l  
t h e o l o g ic a l  w r i t e r s ,  to  savour more o f  p an eg y ric  th an  o f  ph i lo sophy , and 
t h a t  any purposes  o f  r e a s o n in g ,  and even o f  r e l i g i o n ,  would be b e t t e r  
s e rv e d ,  were we to  r e s t  con ten ted  w i th  more a c c u r a te  and more moderate 
e x p re s s io n s .  The te rm s ,  a d m ira b le , e x c e l l e n t , s u p e r l a t i v e l v  e r e a t . w i s e , 
and h o ly : th e s e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  f i l l  th e  Im ag in a t io n s  o f  men; and any th in g  
beyond, b e s id e s  t h a t  i t  le a d s  i n to  a b s u r d i t i e s ,  has no in f lu e n c e  on 
your a f f e c t i o n s  or s e n t im e n ts .  Thus, i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  s u b je c t ,  i f  we 
abandon a l l  human ana logy , as seems your i n t e n t i o n  DEMEA, I  am a f r a id  
we abandon a l l  r e l i g i o n ,  and r e t a i n  no concep tion  o f  th e  g re a t  o b je c t  
o f  our a d o r a t io n .  I f  we p re s e rv e  human ana logy , we must fo r  ever f in d  
i t  im p o ss ib le  to  r e c o n c i l e  any m ix tu re  o f  e v i l  i n  th e  u n iv e r s e  w ith  
i n f i n i t e  a t t r i b u t e s ;  much l e s s  can we ever prove  th e  l a t t e r  from th e  
fo rm er. But supposing th e  Author o f  N a tu re  to  be f i n i t e l y  p e r f e c t ,  
though f a r  exceeding mankind; a s a t i s f a c t o r y  accoun t may then be g iven 
o f  n a tu r a l  and moral e v i l . . . "  ( Dialogues Ed. M acIn ty re , C o l l i e r  p. 32o)
In  t h a t  approach  C lean thes  i s  a rg u in g  fo r  a f i n i t e l y  p e r f e c t  C re a to r ,  and 
i f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  a brand o f  Deism, shows a movement away from th e  
t r a n s c e n d e n t ,  i n f i n i t e  d e i ty  o f  re v e a le d  Theism- As we fo llow  th e  d e b a te  
i n  th e  D ia loges we know t h a t  t h i s  speech p re p a re s  th e  way fo r  a b l i s t e r i n g  
re s p o n s e  from PHILO»
In  th e  T r e a t i s e  Hume has a lre ad y  g iven  e x p re s s io n  to  th e  view t h a t  -  
" . . . n o t h i n g  can  be more u n p h i lo s o p h ic a l  th a n  th o s e  systems which a s s e r t  
t h a t  v i r t u e  i s  n a t u r a l  and v i c e  u n n a tu r a l . "  ( T r e a t i s e  Ed. M acIntyre  p . 201^
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I f  th e  'n a tu c a l isn ^  which Hume has in  mind i s  t h a t  o f  Deism, then, we a r e  
j u s t i f i e d  i n  conc lud ing  t h a t  h is  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i th  Deism began a t  a f a i r l y  
e a r ly  s ta g e  In  h i s  c a r e e r .
So f a r  i t  has been argued t h a t  h i s  'Theism ' was no t  j u s t  th e  s t r a i g h t ­
forw ard Theism o f  C h r i s t i a n  o rthodoxy , but t h a t  i t  drew on s e v e ra l  T h e i s t i c  
s t r a n d s .  1 . Undoubtedly , t h e  Theism o f  t h e  Sco ts  C onfession . 2 .  Some 
o f  t h e  arguments employed i n  t h e  F ive  Ways o f  s c h o l a s t i c  th eo logy , and, 
e s p e c i a l l y  th e  Design argum ent, th e  Goemological argument and to a l im i te d  
d e g re e  t h e  Moral argum ent. 3* The m in im a l is t  Theism o f  th e  Old Testament 
and t h e  f u l l e r  Theism o f  t h e  New Testam ent.
His a t t i t u d e  to  R evea led  C h r i s t i a n i t y  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  as  w e l l .  He f e l t ,  
f o r  example, t h a t  church b u i ld in g s  were im p o r ta n t .  In. M ossner 's  L i f e  o f  
David Hume we f in d  th e  fo llow ing  passage  on page 545 :-
"When i t  was suggested  to  Hume t h a t  i t  was a w aste  o f  money to  spend a 
m.illiom on th e  b u i ld in g  o f  S t .  P a u l ' s  C a th e d ra l ,  he responded -  'Never 
g ive  an op in io n  on s u b je c t s  which you a r e  too  young to  j u d g e ' .  S t .  P a u l ' s ,  
r em o n s tra te d  Hume, 'a s  a monument o f  th e  r e l i g i o u s  f e e l in g  and sen tim ent 
o f  t h e  c o u n try ,  does i t  honour, and w i l l  endure. We have wasted m i l l io n s  
o f  pounds on a s in g l e  campaign i n  F la n d e rs ,  and w ithou t  any good r e s u l t i n g  
from i t ' . "
A gains t  t h e  s ta te m e n t  about t h e  a f t e r - l i f e  which he i s  supposed to  have 
made to  B osw ell, ano the r  can be s e t  which exp resses  a d i f f e r e n t  po in t  o f  
v ie w :-  I n  Of t h e  Im m o rta l i ty  o f  th e  Soul he w r i te s  " ' By th e  mere
l i g h t  o f  mere re a s o n  i t  seems d i f f i c u l t  to  p rove  t h e  Im m orta li ty  o f  th e  
S o u l . . .  I t  i s  t h e  gospe l and th e  gospel a lo n e ,  t h a t  has brought l i f e  and 
im m o r ta l i ty  to  l i g h t ' . "  ( Essays Ed. by Grose and Green Vol I I  p . 399)
As t h i s  p ro ce s s  o f  p roducing  one s e t  o f  q u o ta t io n s  to  prove one i n t e r p r e ­
t a t i o n  and a n o th e r  to  prove ano ther  can be con tinued  a t  g re a t  l e n g th  
w ith o u t  hope o f  a c o n c lu s iv e  answer, i t  i s  in  o rd e r  to  ask  p o in te d ly  -  'was
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he a S e c u la r  I r . t u i t i o n i s t  or a B e l i g i o u s  I n . t u i t i o n . i s t '?  I f ,  as  has been 
argued on page 1 o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  he s e t  ou t t r y i n g  to  become a S ecu la r  
I n t u i t i o n i s t ,  th e n ,  e i t h e r  he con tinued  to  be one th roughou t  h is  c a r e e r ,  or 
a t  some s t a g e  abandoned th e  a t tem p t  because he f e l t  such a n  I n tu i t i o n i s m  
could no t  be a c h ie v e d .  I t  has been argued t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  th e  c a se ,  
and t h a t  a l l  h i s  major works should be read  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h a t  deve lop­
ment, The r e a s o n  fo r  h is  change o f  o u t lo o k ,  i t  has been, su g g es ted ,  was 
h i s  exposure o f  t h e  N a t u r a l i s t i c  F a l la c y ,  f o r  which he has been held  
r e s p o n s i b le  by moral p h i lo so p h e rs  from th e  l 8 t h .  c e n tu ry  down to  th e  
p r e s e n t  day . Th is  c a se  has been argued i n  t h e  t h e s i s  from page 77 f .
His major works have to  be read  i n  th e  l i g h t  o f  t h a t  problem, because i t  
i s  Ein i n s u p e r a b le  o b s t a c l e .
How does t h a t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a f f e c t  th e  s t a t u s  o f  th e s e  works? They a r e  
s t i l l  b e ing  re a d  by moral p h i lo so p h e rs  a l l  over t h e  world as  i f  Hume was 
s a t i s f i e d  w ith  them co m ple te ly ,  and t h a t  i t  i s  i n  o rd e r  to  u se  them w ith  
l i t t l e  or no a l t e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  b u i ld in g  up o f  e th i c a l  system s. But i s  t h a t  
sound? I f  he saw f i t  t o  h ig h l ig h t  th e  N a t u r a l i s t i c  F a l la c y  and th e  near  
f a t a l  e f f e c t s  i t  would have on th e  system he had been deve lop ing , would 
he have expected h i s  su c ce sso rs  to  con tinue  w i th  t h e  system w ithou t  ta k in g  
t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n to  account?
Was he aware o f  th e  problem? Some s c h o la r s  accused him o f  ig n o r in g  i t ,
bu t  were th ey  r i g h t ?  I t  i s  such a major problem t h a t  i t  i s  most u n l ik e ly
t h a t  he was no t  f u l l y  aware o f  what he was doing when, exposing th e
N a t u r a l i s t i c  F a l la c y .  What we can be su re  o f  i s  t h a t  he did no t s e t  out
to  a rg u e  fo r  a com ple te ly  new system . I n s t e a d ,  he  remained w i th in  th e  
I n t u i t i o n i s t  camp, conten.t ,  i t  would a ppear ,  to  rem ain  i n  t h e  shadow o f  
h i s  famous c o n te m p o ra r ie s ,  t h e  R e l ig io u s  I n t u i t i o n i s t s  S h a f te sb u ry  and 
Hutcheson. We can s t i l l  read  Hume's main works i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h a t  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and f in d  t h a t  they  make good se n se ,  bu t only when i t  i s  
a c cep ted  t h a t  he was no t a c o n s i s t e n t  s e c u l a r i s t ,  and t h a t  he was a t  t im es 
a fo rm id ab le  c r i t i c  o f  t h e  s e c u l a r i s t  p o s i t i o n .
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I t  has to  be ad m itted  t h a t  few o f  h i s  works were p u b lished  e xac t ly  in  th e  
form in  which they  were w r i t t e n ,  e i t h e r  because he changed h is  mind in  a way 
which made him seem u n s u re  o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  o r ,  more f r e q u e n t ly ,  because  f r i e n d s  
had seen t h e  f i r s t  d r a f t s  and urged him to a l t e r  them. I t  i s  very  p ro b ab le  
t h a t  h i s  p u b l i s h e r s  would no t have accep ted  them in  t h e i r  unabridged  form. In 
The L i f e  o f  David Hume (Oxford I 98O) JS, C. Mossner w i t  es "B efore  a t te m p t in g  
to  meet B u t l e r ,  Hume subm itted  h is  m anuscrip t to  d r a s t i c  su rg e ry ,  a s e c t io n  on 
m ira c le s  which he had composed a t  La F leche  being c u t  o u t . "  (p .  112) R efer  pac­
es to  such a l t e r a t i o n s  abound i n  works which dea l  w ith  t h e  t e x t  o f  Hume's 
w r i t i n g s .  He was c o n s ta n t ly  r e v i s in g  what he had w r i t t e n .  This undoubtedly  
c r e a te s  a problem when i t  comes to  o f f e r in g  a c o n s i s t e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  which he was d e ve lop ing , but we a r e  helped by two c o n s id e r a t io n s .  1 .
In t h e  1976 Oxford e d i t io n  o f  The N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n  (op. c i t )  in 
an In t r o d u c t io n  found on page 7 A. Wayne Golver w r o te ; -  "With t h e  com position 
o f  t h e  N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n  and th e  Dialogues s u b s t a n t i a l l y  completed 
b e fo re  he was f o r t y ,  Hume's c a re e r  as an o r i g i n a l  p h i lo so p h e r  was a t  an end. 
A part from h is  H is to ry  o f  Eh g la n d , t h e  s ix  volumes o f  which appeared between 
1754 and 1 7 8 2 , he undertook  no o r i g i n a l  work o f  any consequence. For th e  
rem ainder o f  h i s  l i f e  he devoted h im se lf  to  what became an endless labou r  o f  
r e v i s in g  and p o l i s h in g  h i s  w r i t i n g s . "  So t h a t  h is  im portan t  p h i lo s o p h ic a l
work was undertaken  in  t h e  e a r l i e r  p a r t  o f  h is  c a r e e r .  Not a few Humean 
s c h o la r s  have suggested  t h a t  he was f a r  from happy w ith  th e  system he had 
developed , because  what he had a ttem pted  was in  some ways misconceived r i g h t  
from th e  o u t s e t .  T h is  aim has been r e f e r r e d  to  as t h e  a s p i r a t i o n  to  become 
a 'Newton o f  th e  moral s c i e n c e s ' .  I t  has been suggested  in  t h e  t h e s i s  (p .  70f,] 
t h a t  he began to  move away from t h a t  aim as h is  c a re e r  p ro g re s sed .  I f  t h a t  i s  
so then  h is  T r e a t i s e  and Ehquiry must be read  in  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h a t  change 
o f  view . 2. In  s p i t e  o f  t h e  r e v i s io n s  to  most o f  h is  works, he can be seen 
to  be p ro g re s s in g  l o g i c a l l y  and c o n s i s t e n t ly  to  a f i n a l  p o s i t i o n ,  which, i t  
has been argued in  t h e  t h e s i s ,  i s  c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to t h e  I n tu i t io n is m  of  
S h a f te sb u ry  and Hutcheson. He shows a good d e a l  o f  c o n s is ten c y  on t h a t  p o in t .
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So t h a t  i t  i s  wrong to  say t h a t  he showed no c o n s is te n c y .  There  i s  in co n s ­
i s t e n c y  which i s  t h e  p roduct o f  a confused mind, and t h e r e  i s  a lso  t h e  in co n ­
s i s t e n c y  o f  a mind which i s  g a in in g  a f irm er  grasp o f  an i n s i g h t  which i s  
worth p o s s e s s in g ,  and a g re a t  number o f  s c h o la r s  have come to  t h e  conc lu s ion  
t h a t  th e  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  which we f in d  in  Hume's works belong to  t h e  l a t t e r  
c a te g o ry .
But what about h i s  in c o n s i s te n c y  on r e l i g i o u s  m a t te r s?  Was he a t  h e a r t  a 
S ecu la r  I n t u i t i o n i s t ?  From t h e  e a r l i e r  o b s e rv a t io n  about t h e  amount o f  
re -w ork ing  which he had to  u n d e r ta k e  a t  an e a r l i e r  pe r io d  in  h is  c a r e e r ,  i t  
can be claimed t h a t  h i s  p u b l ic  image was in  many ways f a l s e .  Had he been 
p e rm it ted  to  p u b l i s h  h is  most c o n t r o v e r s i a l  s c e p t i c a l  w r i t in g s  he may w e l l ,  
f o r  example, have brought upon h im se lf  f irm  d i s c i p l i n a r y  a c t io n  by th e  General 
Assembly. Why then  d id  h is  f r i e n d s  make i t  p o s s ib l e  fo r  him. to  p u b l is h  th e s e  
h ig h ly  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  w orks, once t h e  most a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  s e c t io n s  had been 
taken  ou t?  S e v e ra l  o f  th e s e  f r i e n d s  were Church o f  Sco tland  M oderates,
There  can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  they  were convinced t h a t  what he had to  say 
was o f  g re a t  im portance ,  and deserved  th e  a t tem p t to  improve i t s  p r e s e n t a t io n .  
I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s ib l e  t h a t  many o f  h i s  con tem porar ies  f e l t  t h a t  th e  s c e p t i c a l  
o u tb u r s t s  were n o t  to  be taken  s e r io u s ly  because  " . . .D a v id  was a good 
C h r i s t i a n  a t  h e a r t . "  (Mossner op. c i t .  p. 174), J u s t  as th e  A th e is t s  on th e  
C on tinen t  f e l t  t h a t  he had s t i l l  ' t o o  much r e l i g i o n ' ,  so ,  many who knew 
him w e ll  in  Sco tland  found th e  c la im  t h a t  he was a S c e p t ic  unconvincing .
Had he been a d y e d - in - th e -w o o l  S c e p t i c ,  i t  i s  ve ry  s t r a n g e  t h a t  he should 
have been so i n t e r e s t e d  in  what Bishops thought o f  h i s  works and t h a t  so 
many o f  h is  f r i e n d s  were Church o f  S co tland  M in i s t e r s .  "Hume's most in t im a te  
and p e rso n a l  f r i e n d s  were Adam Smith and G i lb e r t  E l l i o t ,  but th e  l a r g e s t  
number o f  h is  a c q u a in ta n c e s  were M in is te r s  o f  th e  Church o f  S c o t la n d ,"  (Studie* 
s in  th e  E ig h te e n th  Century Background o f  Hume's Empiricism, by M.S. Kuypers, 
R u s s e l l  and R u s s e l l  1966 p . 13) He had t h e  r e p u t a t i o n  o f  being an enfant 
t e r r i b l e  o f  t h e  A r t s ,  who gave enjoyment to h i s  f r i  m ds by h i s  a n t i - C h r i s t ­
ian  and a n t i - C l e r i c a l  s a t i r e ;  and, h is  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  r e l i g i o n  a r e  too
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s p i r i t e d  to  be d ism issed  as o f  no consequence. But, t h e r e  a r e  M in is te rs ,  to 
th e  p re se n t  day, who have had to  accustom thans e lves  to  a c e r t a in  deg ree  o f  
a n t i - C l e r i c a l  r i b a l d r y  in  s o c ie ty  a t  l a r g e ,  and even w ith in  th e  ranks o f  th e  
E ld e rsh ip ,  making i t  necessa ry  to  ask what s ig n i f i c a n c e  should be a t ta c h e d  to  
th e  a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  passages  which we f in d  in  Hume’s works? There were th o se  
w ith in  h is  c i r c l e  o f  f r i e n d s  who had i t  w i th in  t h e i r  power to i n i t i a t e  an 
a c t i o n  a g a in s t  him by th e  Church o f  S c o t la n d ,  but they  never thought t h a t  
such a s tep  would be j u s t i f i e d .  Seldom, in  th e  h i s to r y  o f  th e  Church o f  
Sco tland  has i t  been f e l t  t h a t  no C h r i s t i a n  should ever have doubts or pe riods  
o f  s p i r i t u a l  d a rk n e ss ,  which could le a d  to  t h e  u t t e r a n c e  o f  views which a re  
c o n tra ry  to  th e  C h r i s t i a n  Gospel; because t h a t  i s  no t  t h e  tes tim ony o f  
expe rience .  The im portan t  q u e s t io n  i s  whether t h a t  C h r i s t i a n  con tinues  to  
express th e s e  views so t h a t  he becomes confirmed in  them.
In Hume's d e fen ce  i t  can be sa id  t h a t  a )  he d id  a g re e  to changes in  h is  
e a r ly  works which h is  C h r i s t i a n  f r i a n d s  ad v ise d ,  and t h a t  he was w ell  p leased  
to  l e a r n  t h a t  C h r i s t i a n  s c h o la r s  and even Bishops were i n t e r e s t e d  in  what 
he had i v r i t t en; b) he did w r i t e  a f a i r l y  c o n s e rv a t iv e  N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  
R e l i s io n  a t  a t im e  when he was being considered  fo r  a U n iv e rs i ty  C ha ir ,  
and a number o f  h is  works o f  t h i s  pe riod  show a more sym pathetic  a t t i t u d e
to  C h r i s t i a n  Theism, c) a t  f a c e  v a lu e  a t  l e a s t ,  a C h r i s t i a n  i s  given th e  
l a s t  say in  th e  D ia logues. (T hesis  199f , )
Another i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Hume's p o s i t io n  has gained widespread a c c e p t ­
ance t h i s  c e n tu ry  (a l th o u g h  t h e r e  a r e  s ig n s  t h a t  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  being 
q ues tioned  s e r io u s ly  aga in )and  i t  ho lds  t h a t  he  became a S ecu la r  I n t u i t i o n i s t  a t  
an e a r ly  s ta g e  in  h is  c a re e r  and t h a t  he con tinued  in  t h a t  c o n v ic t io n  r i g h t  
up u n t i l  t h e  end. According to  t h i s  view he agreed  to  g ive  h is  main p h i lo s o ­
p h ic a l  works a l e s s  s e c u la r  appearance ,  no t  o u t  o f  c o n v ic t io n ,  but to  make 
t h e i r  p u b l ic a t io n  p o s s ib l e  and so as  no t to  o ffend  h i s  C h r i s t i a n  f r i e n d s .  But, 
in  view o f  t h e  con fidence  w ith  which he s t a t e s  arguments which a r e  c l e a r l y  
s u p p o r t iv e  o f  h i s  'p h i lo s o p h ic a l  the ism * , t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  r a i s e s  s e r io u s  
q u e s t io n s  about h i s  c h a r a c te r .
' Si
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I t  i s  no lo n g er  a q u es tio n  o f  th e  in c o n s is te n c y  which could be accep ted  in  
th e  o u tp u t  o f  a s c h o la r  who had a f a i r l y  leng thy  c a r e e r ,  but o f  ve ry  s e r io u s  
c o n fu s io n ,  l a c k  o f  courage and d e c ep t io n .  I t  i s  by no means t r u e  t h a t  h is  
most d i sc e rn in g  con tem poraries  thought him confused , l a c k in g  in  courage or 
ca p ab le  o f  such d e c e p t io n ,  and, in  more r e c e n t  tim es, i t  was noted in  t h e  t h e s i s ,  
t h a t  A .J ,  Ayer d e sc r ib ed  him as th e  ‘g r e a t e s t  B r i t i s h  p h i lo so p h e r* .  (T hesis  
p .  189), I t  would be hard to  se e  how such a c la im  could be j u s t i f i e d  were 
Hume to  have ignored  t h e  count e r f  l e t  ing  e f f e c t  o f  l y in g  to  which he r e  f e r s  
on page 385 o f  th e  187^ e d i t io n  o f  A T r e a t i s e  on Human N a tu re , pub lished  by 
Longman's Green and Go. According to  P e te r  Jones  in  Hume's Sentim ents  ( o p .c i t .
p. 30) he was ready  to  adopt four gen e ra l  th e s e s  o f  C icero  which in c lu d ed
Hon es turn and H o d e ra t io , and as he w rote  about t h e  im portance  o f  honesty  in.
s e v e r a l  o f  h is  works, i t  cannot be claimed t h a t  he had n o t  r e f l e c t e d  on th e
e th i c a l  im portance  o f  being h o n e s t .  In a s e c t io n  in  th e  t h e s i s  which begins 
on page I92 we see  a p o r t r a y a l  o f  Hume as b a s ic a l l y  open, s o c ia b le  and hones t .
I t  has no t o f te n  been suggested  t h a t  we need to  dl'Si^&et h is  w r i t in g s  to  get 
a t  what he r e a l l y  meant. These p re se n t  us with  c o n t r a d ic t io n s  and in c o n s i s te n ­
c i e s ,  but they  a r e  th o se  o f  someone who i s  given to  speaking  h is  mind f r a n k ly .
As h i s  v r r i t ings  f a l l  i n to  two periods  o f  t im e a )  th e  pe riod  b e fo re  he was 
f o r t y ,  by which time a l l  h is  major works had been completed a t  l e a s t  i a  
o u t l i n e ;  and, b) t h e  pe riod  a f t e r  he was f o r t y ,  when he re v ise d  and po lished  
th e s e  works, t h e r e  can be no doubting  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he had to  remove th e  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  passages  from h is  f i r s t  works in p r i n t .  We 
then come to  h i s  ra id -career  when he w rote  The N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  B e l i e i o a  
a work so open to  th e  argument from Design as to  be considered  c o n s e rv a t ­
i v e .  îlot a n t i - r e l i g i o u s .  Was he going th rough  a r e l i g io u s  phase, or was 
he hoping t h a t  th e  p u b l ic a t io n  o f  such a work would he lp  h i s  a p p l i c a t io n  fo r  
a u n i v e r s i t y  Chair?  Both e x p lan a tio n s  a r e  p o s s ib l e ,  and they may to  some 
e x ten t  c o in c id e .  C le a r ly  h e re  was p i c t u r e  o f  Hume as  someone who could be 
taken  s e r io u s ly  as  a c a n d id a te  fo r  a u n i v e r s i t y  C h a ir ,  in  a coun try  w ith  
as c o n s e rv a t iv e  C h r i s t i a n  views as S c o t la n d .  The p u b l ic  image o f  him had
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changed c o n s id e ra b ly .  But h i s  a p p l i c a t i o n s  were n-ot s u c c e s s f u l ,  and he now 
found h im se lf  w ith  tim e to  r e v i s e  h is  m ain .w orks, because  h i s  appointm ents  
from th e  e a r ly  1750 's  u n t i l  t h e  l a t e  1760 's  were not unduly burdensome 
and gave him a c ce s s  to  good l i b r a r i e s .  With no p r e s s u r e  to  f in d  a p u b l is h e r  
f o r  h i s  works, as t h e i r  e a r l i e r  p u b l ic a t io n  had won him fame throughout 
B irope as w e l l  as f i n a n c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  he was now f r e e  to  i s s u e  f u r th e r  
e d i t io n s  which had th e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  passages  r e s t o r e d .  Why 
did he f in d  i t  n e c essa ry  to  do t h i s ?  I t  was w ith  r e l u c t a n c e  t h a t  he had 
agreed  to  t h e  a l t e r a t i o n s  which had to be made to  t h e  f i r s t  i s s u e s ,  so was 
he now p u t t i n g  th e  rec o rd  s t r a i g h t  and p u b l is h in g  what he had in ten d ed  to  
w r i te ?  Or, were h i s  o ld  a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  a t t i t u d e s  beg inn ing  to  come to  th e  
s u r f a c e  once a g a in ?  There i s  a sense  in  which th e  problem w ith  th e  e a r l i e r
c o n tro v e  r s i a l  Hume meets us aga in  in  th e  o ld e r  Hume, now t h a t  he has
secured  t h e  freedom to  w r i t e  and p u b l is h  w ithou t r e s t r a i n t .  And y e t ,  as 
we go back to  t h e  younger Hume we remember t h a t  fo r  many a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  
s c h o la r s  he had ' to o  much r eligiojn ' .  The younger Hume re a c te d  w ith  
d i s b e l i e f  to  t h e  sug g es t io n  t h a t  th in k in g  men could be a t h e i s t s .  I f  he had 
p e r io d s  o f  doubt they  do not appear to  have l a s t e d  v e ry  long .
In t h e  t h e s i s  much s ig n i f i c a n c e  has been a t ta c h e d  to  th e  posthumous
p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  D ia logues . I f  any work can t e l l  us  h i s  s t a t e  o f  mind on
r e l i g i o u s  m a t te r s ,  then  i t  must be th e  D ia logues. The f i n a l  d r a f t  was not 
f in i s h e d  u n t i l  j u s t  b e fo re  h is  d e a th .  Because he vras so anxious t h a t  i t  
should be p u b l is h e d ,  he made s p e c i f i c  p ro v is io n  f o r  p u b l i c a t i o n .  Why? 
Because he cons ide red  i t  to  be an o u ts ta n d in g  example o f  B r i t i s h  l i t e r a t u r e ,  
which, in d ee d ,  i t  i s  now g e n e ra l ly  taken  to  be? S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  i t  i s  a 
work about r e l i g i o n !  I f  he had h is  p e r io d s  o f  a n t i - r e l i g i o u s  s c e p t ic i s m  
then  th ey  d id  no t b a n ish  co n s id e  r a t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  q u e s t io n s  from h is  
t h in k in g .  But what i s  h i s  a t t i t u d e  to  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  D ia logues?
A c a se  has been made in  th e  t h e s i s  (p . I 99f* )  fo r  a c c e p t in g  th e  
c onc lud ing  speech by G lean thes  a t  f a c e  v a lu e ,  and t h a t  h i s  p r in c i p l e s  
" . . . a p p r o a c h  s t i l l  n e a re r  th e  t r u t h . "  l e a d in g  Humean s c h o la r s  have
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d i f f e r e d  t o t a l l y  about who should be s e le c te d  th e  'winner* among th e  personae  
o f  t h e  D ia lo eues.
" 'Every educated reader could d iscern  a t  th e  tim e o f  i t s  posthumous 
p u b lica tio n  th a t Hume's D ialogues Concerning Natural R e lis io n  was 
modelled on C icero 's  De Natura Deorumi."  ( Hume's Sentim ents , Jones 
op , c i t .  p. 29)
I n  t h e  B o b b s -K e r r i l l  197O i s s u e  o f  t h e  D ia lo g u e s , Helson Pike i n  an 
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f f e r s  t h e  v ie w :-  "There i s  a c l e a r  s e n se  i n  which Berkeley 
was t h e  hero o f  Hume's f i r s t  major p h i lo s o p h ic a l  work -  a T r e a t i s e ."  " I t  
may be t h a t  i t  i s  B erkeley  who tu rn s  ou t  to  be t h e  he ro  o f  Hume's l a s t  major 
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  work." "perhaps t h e  winner ( i f  t h e r e  i s  one) i s  Bishop 
B erk e le y ."  ( p . 238)
In  t h e  i n t r o d u c t io n  to  th e  B obbs-M err i l l  1970 e d i t io n  o f  th e  D ialogues, 
n e lso n  P ike  o f f e r s  th e  view t h a t ,  "According to  K o s s n e r . . .  G leanthes  v o ices  
th e  views o f  Joseph  B u t le r  as they  a r e  p re se n ted  i n  h i s  Analogy o f  R e l ig io n . 
Mgssner a rgues  t h a t  a t  t h e  tim e Hume w rote  t h e  D ialogues B u tle r  was th e  
l e a d in g  exponent o f  t h e  a p o s t e r i o r i  method in  th eo lo g y  . . .  F u r th e r ,  
Mossner reminds u s ,  Hume l i s t e d  B u t le r  among t h e  major p h i lo s o p h ic a l  t a l e n t s  
Of t h e  p e r io d .  He was tho rough ly  f a m i l i a r  w ith  and k e e n ly  i n t e r e s t e d  in. 
B u t l e r ' s  t h e o lo g ic a l  w r i t i n g s . "  (p .  XVII) In  o th e r  w r i t in g s  Mossner has 
draw^n a t t e n t i o n  to  t h a t  s p e c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between Hume and B u t le r  which 
always made him g lad  when B u t le r  had responded p o s i t i v e l y  to  something he 
had W i t t e n ,  so t h a t ,  i f  G lean thes  v o ice s  th e  views Qf B u t le r ,  t h e r e  may 
be even s t ro n g e r  ground fo r  c o n s id e r in g  him th e  w inner. The view taken  in  
th e  t h e s i s  i s  t h a t  g r e a t  c a re  should be taken  i n  pronouncing any s in g le  
c h a ra c te r  ' t h e  w in n e r ' ,  but t h a t  i f  Hume was l e s s  c r i t i c a l  o f  Theism than 
he o f t e n  was o f  Deism, then, th e  door has been l e f t  open fo r  th e  winner to  
come from th e  s i d e  o f  r e l i g i o n .
Hume's fondness fo r  t h e  d ia lo g u e  form. iJS ve ry  r e v e a l i n g .  I t  r e v e a ls  him.
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as  a  man o f  l e t t e r s  as much as a c o ld ly  l o g i c a l  academ ic. He was as  i n t e r ­
es ted  i n  t h e  form in  which th e  argument was p re se n ted  as in  winning th e  
argum ent. This  i s  seen in  S ec tio n  I I  o f  th e  E nqu ir ie s  (2nd. Edition.
Oxford 1963, p. 132) where t h e  argument i s  pursued once aga in  th rough
t h e  d ia lo g u e  form. I t  s u i t e d  him because he could develop any argument he 
wished to t h e  f u l l e s t  e x te n t  p o s s ib l e  w ithou t  r e v e a l in g  h i s  hand. Do we in  
f a c t  f in d  t h e  r e a l  Hume i n  a  s u p e r f i c i a l  r e a d in g  o f  any o f  h is  works? The 
r e a l  Hume always appears  a l i t t l e  detached from th e  d e b a te  i t s e l f ,  above 
th e  sound o f  r a i s e d  v o ic e s ,  d e l i c a t e l y  ba la n c in g  t h i s  argument a g a in s t  t h a t .  
And, as  t h e  D ialogues show, m a t te r s  concern ing  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  a r e  o f  th e  
g r e a t e s t  im portance  to  t h e  r e a l  Hume,
In David Hume (Jonathan Cape, London 193^) J.Y .T , Qreig s ta te s  that  
"He tr ie d  to be a T h e ist."  (p . 167 ) In an e a r lie r  se c tio n  he quotes
Professor A.E. T a y lo r;-
" ' I t  i s  as c e r ta in ' he d e c la r e s , 'as anything in biography can be 
th at Hume was, in. p o in t o f  f a c t ,  no a n t i - c le r ic a l  z e a lo t ,  but an 
am iable and easy-go ing  man o f  th e  world whose chosen c ir c le  co n sisted  
la r g e ly  o f  th e  Moderates among the Edinburgh P resb y ter ia n s'."  (p . l6 2 )
According to  Grieg  he was tu rned  from a P r e s b y te r ia n  i n to  a " . . .som ew hat 
vague and d o u b tfu l  T h e i s t ' , "  (p .  72) And t h a t  i s  about as f a i r  a d e s c r i p ­
t io n  o f  where t h e  r e a l  Hume s tood  as can be found. Some w r i t e r s  have made 
much o f  a l e t t e r  which he s e n t  to  S i r  G i lb e r t  E l l i o t  da ted  10t h .  March 1751, 
in  which he " . . . a l l  bu t d i r e c t l y  confirmed t h e  i n d e n t i f i c a t i o n
o f  ( t h e  P h ilo  o f  t h e  D ia lo g u e s ) w ith  th e  a u th o r . "  (Belson P ike  op . c i t .  p. 
XVI ) .  I f  t h e  c a se  fo r  h i s  be ing  an a t h e i s t  depends upon evidence  o f  t h a t  
s o r t :  ' a l l  bu t  d i r e c t l y  c o n f i rm e d ' ,  th e n ,  i t  could  be a rgued , i t  can
never be c o n c lu s iv e .  I f  we t a k e  t h e  ev idence  as a whole, covering  h i s  e n t i r e  
c a r e e r ,  then th e  ev idence  o f  what he sa id  p l a i n ly  i n  d i r e c t  speech  supports  
t h e  view t h a t  he t r i e d  to  rem ain a t h e i s t , e v e n  a l th o u g h ,  i n G r e i g ' s  
d e s c r i p t i o n ,  he became a 'vague  and d o u b t f u l '  one.
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D i f f e r e n t  Approaches to  Hume.
In Hume's day h i s  s e c u la r  I n tu i t i o n is m  met w i th  a  mixed resp o n se .  A 
few c lo s e  adm irers  g ree ted  th e  p u b l ic a t i o n  o f  h i s  m ajor works w i th  ex c i ted  
acc la im . Hume, they  were s u re ,  was th e  p io n ee r  whose le a d  o th e r  moral 
p h i lo so p h e rs  would fo l lo w .  But many more were h ig h ly  c r i t i c a l  o f  h is  
work on account o f  i t s  s e c u la r  c h a r a c te r ,  some of  i t  d i r e c te d  p ro v o c a t iv e ly  
a g a in s t  e s ta b l i s h e d  r e l i g i o u s  a t t i t u d e s .  Many C le r i c s  and n o t  a  few 
people  o f  in f lu e n c e  belonged to  t h i s  band o f  c r i t i c s .  To them Hume was 
an example o f  th e  type  o f  f r e e th i n k e r  whose id e a s  were undermining the  
foundations  o f  m o ra l i ty .  A sm a l le r  group of  C l e r i c s  were more sym pathetic  
to  him, because they  were more keen ly  aware o f  th e  s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  h is  
work. As t h e i r  number in c re a s e d ,  even r e l i g i o u s  le a d e r s  o f  th e  s tand ing  
o f  Bishop B u t le r  could  be heard  encouraging th e  re a d in g  of some o f  h i s  
works. At no p o in t ,  however, d id  he enjoy th e  p u b l ic  s tan d in g  which Kant 
had a t t a in e d  in  Germany. In  the  main his work was g ree ted  w ith  c o o ln e s s .
By th e  19t h .  c e n tu ry  a group o f  B r i t i s h  m oral p h i lo so p h e rs  dec ided  to  
make a f r e s h  a t te m p t  a t  b u i ld in g  on Hume's fo u n d a t io n :  t h a t  o f  s e c u la r  
I n tu i t i o n i s m .
"Hume s t a r t s  from th e  p o s i t i o n  so c e n t r a l  in  th e  tea c h in g  
o f  S h a f te sb u ry  and Hutcheson, t h a t  th e  fundam ental c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  o f  a l l  our goods, whether n a t u r a l ,  a e s t h e t i c  or m ora l ,  
i s  t h a t  they  a re  im m ediately  p le a s in g ,  as  de term ined  by th e  
' p a r t i c u l a r  f a b r i c  and c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  human s p e c i e s ' .
They too held  to  the  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  'p l e a s u r e  i s  co n d it io n ed  by 
o b je c t iv e ly  d i r e c te d  p a s s io n  and no t  v i s a  v e r s a * .  To th e  q u e s t io n  
-  'why i s  j u s t i c e  approved? ' Hume would have answered -  i n s t i n c t  and 
' u t i l i t y ' .  With so many r e f e re n c e s  to  what i s  now known as U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  
in  Hume's works, h is  in f lu e n c e  on 19 th . c e n tu ry  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  can ha rd ly  
be in  doub t.  In  Hume A .J .  Ayer i n s i s t s  t h a t  he was n o t  th e  fo re runner  
of  . U t i l i t a r i a n s  l i k e  Benthag* and M i l l .  We s h a l l  see  t h a t  he a s s o c ia te s
pas®
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th e  co n v e n tio n a l  v i r t u e  o f  j u s t i c e  w ith  reg a rd  to  th e  p u b l ic  i n t e r e s t ,  but 
he by no means ta k e s  i t  to  be a g e n e ra l  f e a t u r e  o f  th e  o b je c t s  o f  our moral 
a p p ro b a t io n  t h a t  they  promote a n y th ing  o f  th e  o rd e r  o f  th e  g r e a t e s t  
happ iness  of th e  g r e a t e s t  number*'!^ Although Hume may n o t  have r e f e r r e d  to  
the  ' g r e a t e s t  happ iness  p r in c ip le *  d i r e c t l y ,  he p laced  ' u t i l i t y *  in  a 
u n iv e r s a l  c o n te x t  so o f te n  t h a t  i t  can f a i r l y  be sa id  t h a t  he a n t i c ip a t e d  
the  g r e a t e s t  happ iness  p r i n c i p l e .
J u s t  as  Hume had assumed i t  to  be su p e rf lu o u s  to  prove t h a t  th e  ' b a ie v -  
o le n t  o r  s o f t e r  a f f e c t i o n s  a r e  e s t im a b le '  , so th e  U t i l i t a r i a n s  a t  f i r s t  
imagined i t  u n necessa ry  to  d e f in e  ha p p in e ss .  I t  was as  though ' secu r in g  
th e  g r e a t e s t  happ iness  o f  th e  g r e a t e s t  number* p re se n ted  th e  r e a l l y  s e r io u s  
problem. I f  i t  i s  i n  any sense  t r u e  t h a t  Hume* s I n tu i t i o n is m  only  made 
sense f i n a l l y  a g a in s t  a p a r t i c u l a r  r e l i g io u s  background, i t  may be more 
than  c o in c id en c e  t h a t  th e  g radua l  demise o f  e a r ly  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  kep t  
pace w ith  th e  d e c l in e  o f  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  i n  B r i t a i n .
Even i f  we suppose t h a t  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  had been a b le  to  supply  a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  h ap p in ess ,  would t h a t  n e c e s s a r i ly  have secured 
an easy  t r a n s i t i o n  to  th e  second s te p  -  th e  s e cu r in g  o f  th e  ' g r e a t e s t  
happ iness  o f  th e  g r e a t e s t  number * ? The o b je c t iv e s  which i n s p i r e  th e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l i e f  b o d ie s ,  such as th e  U nited  N a t io n s ,  OXFAM, and th e  
Red Cross a r e  o b j e c t iv e s  which could be s a id  to  r e p r e s e n t  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
consensus about what c o n t r ib u te s  to  -  ' t h e  g r e a t e s t  happiness  o f  the  
g r e a t e s t  number*. As i d e a l s  t h e s e  o b je c t iv e s  may have much to  commend 
them, but f r e q u e n t ly  th ey  appear to  be v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to  implement in  
p r a c t i c e .  I n t e n t io n s  a r e  o f te n  good, but the  c a r ry in g  o u t  o f  them o f ten  
lea v e s  much to  be d e s i r e d .  'The g r e a t e s t  happ iness  o f  th e  g r e a t e s t  number* 
sounds much b e t t e r  as a s logan  than  as a c a l l  to  a c t i o n .
C r i t i c s  o f  e a r l i e r  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  found i t  easy  to  advance a c a r i c a t u r e  
o f  th e  th eo ry  by s t a t i n g  t h a t ,  in  i t s  most b a s ic  form, i t  was preoccupied 
w ith  th e  ' lo w e r  p l e a s u r e s ' .  To meet t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  a ' f e l i c i f i c  calculous*
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w as ad d ed  t o  d e m o n s tr a te  t h a t  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  a t t a c h e d  g r e a t e r  im p o r ta n c e  
t o  t h e  'h ig h e r  p l e a s u r e s ' .  E ven  s o ,  w it h o u t  t h e  d r i v i n g  f o r c e  o f  
r e l i g i o u s  c o n v i c t i o n s  s t a t e d  in  c l e a r  t e r m s ,  s e c u l a r  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  
waned i n  i n f l u e n c e  and p r e p a r e d  t h e  way f o r  t h e  e t h i c a l  t h e o r i e s  o f  
t h e  2 0 t h .  c e n t u r y .
S e c u la r  I n t u i t i o n i s m  r e v iv e d  i n  t h e  20t h .  c e n t u r y  i n  a  num ber o f  d i f f e r ­
e n t  f o r m s .  G .J .  W arnock lu m p s t o g e t h e r  G .E . M o o re , H .A , P r ic h a r d  and  
W.D. R o ss  a s  b e lo n g in g  t o  t h e  e a r l y  I n t u i t i o n i s t  cam p , d e s p i t e  M o o r e 's  
i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  h e  d id  n o t  b e lo n g  t o  t h a t  g r o u p . Many o f  t h e  o ld  p ro b lem s  
in  e t h i c s  had r e tu r n e d
"For P r ic h a r d  t h e r e  i s  n o r e a s o n  why w hat i s  r i g h t  i s  r i g h t  s o ,  
f o r  M oore, t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n  why w h at i s  good  i s  g o o d ." ^
R o ss  w as c h a r g e d  w it h  h a v in g  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  'g o o d '  and t i g h t '  d ep en d  on  
o t h e r  c h a r a c t e r s ,  and th e n  n o t  e x p la in in g  "what t h i s  p u z z l in g  k in d  o f  
d e p e n d e n c e  o f  som e c h a r a c t e r s  on  o t h e r s  m ig h t  b e .  T h ough  h e r e c o g n is e d  
t h e  p o i n t  he c a s t  no l i g h t  u pon  I t . " ^
F or a  h o s t  o f  r e a s o n s  t h e  b a ld  P o s i t i v i s m  o f  A y e r ' s  L a n g u a g e . T ru th  
and L o g ic  so o n  l o s t  i t s  e a r l y  i n f l u e n c e ,  a  d e v e lo p m e n t  w h ic h  A yer  
h i m s e l f  h a s  a c c e p t e d  a s  r i g h t .  I t  f a i l e d  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  p r i n c i p l a l  
c o n d i t i o n s  w h ic h  i t  had l a i d  down s o  i n f l e x i b l y .  I t  t o o  d id  n o t  b e lo n g  
t o  t h e  'tw o  s p e c i e s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  p r o p o s i t i o n s ' .
In  t h i s  way I n t u i t i o n i s m  had p r e p a r e d  t h e  way f o r  P o s i t i v i s m ,  w h ich  
l e f t  an  u n w elcom e l e g a c y  f o r  m o ra l p h i l o s o p h y .  A y er  w as t o  w r i t e : -
" . . .m o d e r n  l o g i c a l  r e s e a r c h e s  w as t o  make som e p h i lo s o p h e r s  
d e s p a ir  o f  m o r a ls  a s  a  r a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t y . " ^
S c h l i c k  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  " . . . s o - c a l l e d  m o ra l ju d g m e n ts  r e a l l y  
fo r m u la te d  r u l e s ,  and t h a t  t h e  o n ly  r e a l  q u e s t io n  f o r  a  ' s c i e n c e  o f  
e t h i c s '  w as t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  q u e s t io n  why c e r t a i n  r u l e s  c a w ^ e  a d o p t e d . 9
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The onerous r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  moral education was being committed 
in c re a s in g ly  to  preachers and pedagogues, w h ile  th e  r e a lly  great 
minds addressed the main q u estion s which were now thought to  be bound 
up w ith  a n a ly s is .  The new preoccupation was w ith  the 'language o f  
m orals' rather than the ' f a i t h  o f m o ra ls '.
Warnock w r ite s : -
"We wish to  know what moral goodness i s ,  or what i t  i s  fo r  an 
action  to  be o b lig a to r y , and we are not to ld ;  fo r  the 'q u a l i t i e s ' ,
we are t o ld ,  are in d e fin a b le .
Warnock w r ite s : -
"In becoming aware th a t some proposed course o f  a c tio n  i s ,  say , 
o b lig a to r y , I have, on t h is  theory , added to  my inform ation , I 
have come to  know a tru th  about the world. But what has th is
tru th  th at I reco g n ise  to  do w ith my behaviour?
Why should I adopt th a t course o f a c tio n  rath er than some other?
The fa c t  th a t the course o f  a c tio n  i s  o b lig a to ry  i s  presumably meant
to  be a reason fo r  adopting i t ;  the f a c t  th a t i t  would, i f  adopted
s ta r t  on a Wednesday presumably i s  n o t. But why the d ifferen ce?
Why i s  some inform ation about the p n p erties o f  th in gs and a c tio n s
ir r e v e la n t  to  q uestions about what i s  to  be done, w h ile some
other inform ation i s  not? Moral judgments, i t  seems, l ik e  other
judgments, convey inform ation: what i s  i t  about the inform ation
they convey which makes i t  important fo r ,  or even re lev a n t to ,  our
d e c is io n , our c h o ic e s , our ad v ice, or our recommendations? We fin d ,
once aga in , th at in tu it io n ism  has nothing to  say here: in  th at
theory, the relvan ce o f  moral judgment to  conduct appears as a bare
assumption, about which, as indeed about alm ost everything in  the
su b ject, th ere  i s  nothing to  be sa id ."8
This outlook had the e f f e c t  o f  c lo s in g  o f f  every reasonable approach
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in  the search for  answers to moral problems, k c leavage had developed  
between the o lder approach to  m ora lity , p u b lic  and p r iv a te , in  communities 
where r a tio n a l argument had been used in  the defen ce o f  C h ristian  stand­
ards; and th is  newer approach, which bad a l l  the a t t itu d e s  necessary  
to make e x is te n tia lis m  accep ta b le .
I t  i s  p r e c is e ly  in  th is  tw en tieth  century s e t t in g  th a t the f r u i t s  o f  
the secu lar  in flu en ce  in  moral philosophy can be seen a t th e ir  p la in e s t .  
Hume's aim had been to  p lace  moral philosophy on a new b a s is . I t  was 
now on th a t b a s is .  But the secu lar  in flu e n c e  made i t  in c r e a s in g ly  
d i f f i c u l t  to  pronounce w ith c e r ta in ty  on any moral q u estion . That i s  
why the presence or absence o f  r e lig io u s  co n v ictio n s  in  the study o f  
moral philosophy i s  a m atter about which we cannot be in d if f e r e n t .
********************
In a len gthy  In trod uction  to  one e d itio n  o f  the T re a tise  o f  Human
N ature. T.H. Green led  h is  readers to  draw unfavourable con clu sion s
from the whole d r i f t  o f  Hume's th in k in g . The con clu sion  such as " . . .h e
so empties m orality  o f i t s  a c tu a l c o n te n ts . . ."  was in d ic a t iv e  o f  how9many s t i l l  reacted to  Hume's view o f  human nature in  the n in eteen th  century, 
a con clu sion  which threw in to  question  the leg itim a cy  o f  h is  e n q u ir ie s , 
or a t l e a s t  how he went about pursuing them.
There was by Hume's day a changed outlook to  su b jec ts  r e la t in g  to  the 
study o f  man. The human body was becoming l e s s  m ysterious. The sc ien ce  
o f  physio logy  was making c le a r  the ex ten t to  which a whole host o f  b od ily  
processes operated on a fu n c tio n a l cause and e f f e c t  b a s is .  I t  could be 
seen th at pressure on c e r ta in  parts o f  the brain produced p a rticu la r  
sen sa tion s or r e a c t io n s . C r it ic s  l ik e  Green were not then condemning 
him for  sharing w ith  Locke and B erkeley, the new in te r e s t  in  physiology; 
but, ra th er , fo r  the way in  which he d e a lt  w ith  the questions in vo lved . 
There was nothing q u estion ab le  about the leg it im a cy  o f  the is su e s  which 
he had r a is e d . On the contrary . These were v a lid  enqu iries which were 
being pusued by th in k in g  men in  a l l  academic in s t i t u t io n s .  I t  took
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honesty and courage to  ta lk  about them in  the f i r s t  p la c e , but i t  a lso  
took mature judgment to  d ea l w ith  them s a t i s f a c t o r i ly .  Hume's p ioneering  
con trib u tion  to  the p h ilo so p h ic a l study o f  psychology, from a sound em piri­
c a l b a s is ,  was con sid erab le  and has been r ig h t ly  acclaim ed.
At the same tim e, he did not f u l ly  ap p recia te  the dangers o f  u sing  in  a 
fr e e  and unguarded manner, the su p p osition  th a t we can look  on man as 
nothing more than the sum o f  h is  p h y sica l p a r ts . There are many s itu a tio n s  
in  which those who have to  handle the dead t is s u e s  o f  the human body are  
compelled to  th ink o f  the body in  th a t way. Not on ly  does the anatom ist 
have to  adopt a d isp a ss io n a te  a t t itu d e  to  the corpse which he i s  to  d is s e c t  
in  h is  lab ora tory , but, a whole army of tra in e e  surgeons, doctors and 
nurses must fo llo w  the same approach. Because a C h ristian  has chosen the 
p ro fess io n  o f p h y s io lo g is t ,  we do not norm ally f e e l  compelled to question  
the s in c e r ity  o f h is  or her r e lig io u s  c o n v ic t io n s . These co n v ictio n s may 
be stron g , and y e t ,  fa ith fu ln e s s  to  duty may fo rce  them to handle parts 
o f the human body as i f  they were mere l i f e l e s s  m atter. The reward fbr th is  
d i f f i c u l t  work i s  the knowledge th a t through i t  the h e a lth  o f  p a tie n ts  
can be improved. The work o f  anatomy and physio logy  can be undertaken 
w ith a good end in  v iew , i f  i t  lead s to  an improvement in  the h ea lth  o f  
p a t ie n ts . And th u s , fa r  from d e tra c tin g  from the d ig n ity  o f  the human 
body, th is  work can enhance i t .
The problem a r is e s  when, through a l l  the d e ta ile d  d is s e c t in g  o f the  
t i s s u e s ,  the anatom ist cea ses  to  ap p recia te  what the human body i s  when 
whole and p e r fe c t . The human body i s  not ju s t  the c o l le c t io n  o f  i t s  
anatom ical p a r ts , bu t, fo r  the C h r istia n , 'home' for  the so u l. The 
C h ristian  sees man as th e  bearer o f the imago d e i . and because o f  that 
even the dead t is s u e s  o f a corpse should be handled w ith  r e p e c t . There 
i s  indeed the p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t too much preoccupation w ith  the body and 
i t s  workings w i l l  d im in ish  those s p ir i tu a l  a sp ects  o f the human person ality  
which are bound up w ith  the imago d e i . and Hume's error o f judgment may
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have been in  th is  area . I t  may have been h is  exp ecta tion  that w ith in  h is  
own l i f e t im e ,  psychology would have advanced to  the point where i t  would 
be p o ss ib le  to  account from i t ,  fo r  a l l  the workings o f  the mind. He may 
have imagined th a t a stra ightforw ard  causa l exp lanation  would be fo r th ­
coming to  account for  the workings o f the mind -  ju s t  as in  the natural 
sc ie n c e s , c a u se -a n d -e ffe c t  exp lanations were being esta b lish ed  on every 
hand. He may have supposed that the conclu sion  o f  h is  in v e st ig a tio n s  
would be the stra ightforw ard  dem onstration o f  how man's 'moral fa c u lty ' 
works.
Deeper in v e s t ig a t io n  in to  t h is  whole area was to  make the p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f supplying th a t dem onstration, more not l e s s  remote; as Hume came to  
ap precia te  why the appeal to  Newton's achievem ents in  the natural s c ie n c e s , 
was, in  the sphere o f  moral ph ilosop hy , w holly in appropriate . This must 
have come as a major disappointm ent. Ju st as we would become concerned 
about the outlook  o f an anatom ist who had come to  take an o b sessiv e  
in te r e s t  in  dead bodies and the d is s e c t in g  o f  human t is s u e s  -  because 
the an atom ist's  aim should be to  go beyond th is  e x e r c ise  to  the promotion 
o f  the h ea lth  o f  the l iv in g :  so , to o , in  Hume's c a se , the fea r  must be
expressed th at he f a i le d  to  go beyond the p r im itiv e  view  th at " ...m en  are  
nothing but a bundle or c o l le c t io n  o f d if fe r e n t  percep tions th at succeed 
each other w ith  in con ceivab le  r a p id ity , to  an ap p recia tion  o f  the  
f u l l  p o te n tia l  o f man., the bearer o f  the imago d e l , as seen from the 
C h ristian  stan d p oin t.
***************
The breadth o f  Hume's appeal g iv es  us some in d ic a t io n  o f  the extent o f  
h is  in flu e n c e . Some Humean sch o lars have charged him w ith  in con sisten cy  
because much o f h is  work was exp loratory , rather than system atic  or 
d e f in a t iv e . His work was s y n c r e t i s t i c .  That i s  why so many scholars have 
been ab le to  in te r p r e t  him from so many d if fe r e n t  a n g le s . There i s  a 
great d ea l o f  evidence to  support most o f th ese  in te r p r e ta t io n s , which
TreatJ.s.e,, by David Hume op. c i t .  Vol. II
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prompts the qu estion  -  'what did  he r e a lly  b e lie v e '?  This leads to  a 
fu rth er  question  -  ' to  what ex ten t did he change h is  ground as he d isco v ­
ered new id e a s'?  The d i f f i c u l t y  about accep ting  one in te r p r e ta tio n  of 
Humean philosophy as the f in a l  one i s  that the champions o f the other 
in te r p r e ta t io n s  w i l l  im m ediately o b ject that th at view  i s  wrong, and bring 
forward evidence to  show why th e ir  in te r p r e ta t io n  should be accepted* There 
i s  l i t t l e  doubt th at Hume did change h is  mind a number o f tim es about issu e s  
which were o f c e n tr a l importance to  what ha understood h is  f in a l  p o s itio n  
to  be, but th ere  was one q u estion  on which he did remain c o n s is te n t ,  
and th a t was h is  In tu itio n ism ; th at fa c t  i s  v i t a l  to the argument
which we w i l l  be fo llo w in g  in  th is  f in a l  s e c t io n .
Although Hume's in f lu e n c e  in  h i s  own l i f e t i m e  was enormous, and remained 
a powerful f o rc e  i n  B r i t i s h  ph i losophy  from then  on, a  thorough s tudy  of 
a l l  h i s  works was no t u n de r taken  u n t i l  th e  l a t a  1 9 th .  c e n tu ry .  Even then , 
h i s  views a roused  g re a t  c o n tro v e rs y ,  so t h a t  s ta n d a rd  works on what he 
had w r i t t e n  were o f te n  u n sy m p a th e tic .  Two a u th o rs  o f  such works were 
T.H. Green and T.H. Grose, whose len g th y  in t r o d u c t io n s  to  a  two-volume 
s e t  o f  Hume's A T r e a t i s e  on Human N a tu re , s e t  out to  dem olish  much of 
what he had s e t  ou t to  e s t a b l i s h .  Green and Grose made a thorough s tudy  
o f  Hume's w r i t i n g s ,  p ro v id in g  th e  19 th . c e n tu ry  s tu d e n t  w ith  an a u t h o r i t a ­
t i v e  guide to  h i s  works w h ile  a t  th e  same time e v a lu a t in g  th e  s i g n i f i c ­
ance o f  t h i s  o u tp u t  from t h e i r  own p h i lo s o p h ic a l  s ta n d p o in t .  I f  Humean
s c h o la r s  can be pu t  i n t o  two camps -  those  who a r e  f i n a l l y  unsympathetic
to  Hume's p o s i t i o n  and th o se  who a re  n o t .  Green and Grose belonged
f i rm ly  to  the  fo rm er.  In t h e i r  i n t r o d u c t io n  to  th e  second volume of the  
T r e a t i s e  they  c o n c lu d e d ; -
"He has made a b stra c tio n  o f  everything in  the o b jec ts  o f human 
in te r e s t  by th e ir  r e la t io n  to  our nervous i r r i t a b i l i t y  -  he has 
l e f t  nothing o f the b e a u tifu l in  nature or a r t but that which i t  
has in  common w ith  a sweetm eat, nothing o f th a t which i s  lo v e ly  
and of good report to  the sa in t  or statesman, but what they share
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w ith  the  dandy or  th e  d in e r - o u t  -  y e t  he cannot p re se n t  even
t h i s  poor res id iu m  o f  an o b je c t ,  by which a l l  a c t i o n  i s  to  be e x p la i ­
ned, except under th e  c h a ra c te r  i t  d e r iv e s  from th e  th in k in g  so u l,  
which looks b e fo re  and a f t e r ,  and de te rm ines  ev e ry th in g  by r e l a t i o n  
to  i t s e l f ,  '•
We have a l r e a d y  seen t h a t  Hume may have been too  p reoccupied  w ith  ques­
t io n s  such as 'how th e  body w o rk s ' ,  so t h a t  s p i r i t u a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s  
tended to  be put to  one s i d e .  The q u e s t io n  which has to  be answered i s  -  
was he r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  c r e a t i n g  t h i s  a t t i t u d e ,  o r  was he simply p a r t  o f  
a w e ll  e s ta b l i s h e d  t re n d  in  B r i t i s h  ph ilosophy? There can be no doubt 
t h a t  Hume was caught up i n  a  g e n e ra l  change o f  o u t lo o k ,  because most o f  
th e  terms which he used to  d e f in e  h i s  id e a s  in  h i s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  psychology 
were a l r e a d y  in  c i r c u l a t i o n  by th e  tim e he began to  w r i t e .  Physiology as 
an exac t  sc ie n c e  had been deve lop ing  r a p id ly  a t  most European u n i v e r s i t i e s .  
The view t h a t  m an's conscious  l i f e  has i t s  b a s is  i n  th e  nervous system 
stunned many o f  Hume's c o n te m p o ra r ie s .  I t  i s  c l e a r  from G reen 's  and G ro se 's  
r e a c t io n  to  t h a t  v ie w p o in t ,  t h a t  i t  s t i l l  c re a te d  major problems f o r  
some s c h o la r s  in  th e  19t h ,  c e n tu ry .  By th e  tw e n t i e th  c e n tu ry ,  however, no 
s c h o la r  would q u e s t io n  th e  t r u t h  o f  much o f  what Hume had been say ing  in  
t h i s  a r e a .  The modern d o c to r  o r  surgeon would th in k  i t  v e ry  s t r a n g e  i f  i t  
were suggested  t h a t  no accoun t be taken  o f  t h e  body 's  systems in  th e  
t re a tm e n t  o f  th e  u n w e l l .  P a t i e n t s  and o th e r  members o f  th e  p u b l ic  would 
be ou traged  i f  a d o c to r  were to  ig n o re  human physio logy  or f a i l  to  e x p lo i t  
th e  l a t e s t  i n s i g h t s  o f  modern m edical  sc ie n c e  in  t r e a t i n g  a p a t i e n t .  To 
a ve ry  c o n s id e ra b le  e x te n t  what Green and Grose had to  say on t h i s  p o in t  
i s  now o u t - o f - d a t e .
At th e  beginning  o f  th e  i n t r o d u c t io n  to  v o l .  2 , Green and Grose t ra c ed  
Hume's th eo ry  of human m o tiv a t io n  to  L ocke 's  d o c t r in e  o f  animal p lea su re  
or p a in .  Locke a s s o c i a te d  Good w i th  p le a s u re  and E v i l  w ith  p a in ,  a 
d e f i n i t i o n  which re -a p p e a re d  in  1 9 th .  c e n tu ry  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m .  In  a d d i t io n ,
11. A T r e a t i s e  on Human N ature, by David Hume, V ol. I I  53
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Locke recogn ized  t h r e e  types  of l a w î -
1. "D ivine Law ‘promulgated by men in  th e  l i g h t  o f  n a tu re  o r  
v o ic e  o f  r e v e l a t i o n ' . . . "
2 . C i v i l  Law.
3 . " 'The law o f  op in ion  o r  r e p u t a t i o n '
The q u e s t io n  o f  m oral goodness was bound up f o r  Locke w ith  th e  
keep ing  o f  one o f  t h e s e  r u l e s .
Hobbes' u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  how we make moral cho ices  was s im i la r  to  
L o c k e 's ,  but i n  h i s  c a se  'p l e a s u r e '  was seen to  be th e  p r in c i p a l  
m o tiv a to r  in  human b eh av io u r .  T heories  be long ing  to  t h i s  group were 
known as H e d o n is t ic ,  S h a f te sb u ry  opposed t h i s  view because he wanted 
to  f e e l  su re  t h a t  th e  p le a s u r e  i n  q u e s t io n  was equated w ith  a  p u b l ic  
r a t h e r  than  p r i v a t e  system . The 'good* o f  t r u e  happ iness  i s  a  s o c i a l  
good which in c lu d e s  -  " . . . p a r e n t a l  k indness  and concern  f o r  th e  n u r tu re  
and p ro p ag a t io n  o f  th e  y o u n g . . . "  and th e  p le a s u re  which i s  to  s a t i s f y  
one i n d iv id u a l  i s  " . . . t h e  consc iousness  t h a t  a n o th e r  i s  p le a s e d ." i j
B u t le r  looked to  'c o n s c ie n c e '  t o  make c l e a r  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
good and e v i l .  We a re  a t  once reminded o f  one a s p e c t  o f  Hume's I n t u i t ­
ion ism . B u t le r  c a l l e d  t h i s  " . . . t h e  r e f l e x  f a c u l ty  o f  a p p ro b a t io n .
F ra n c is  Hutcheson i n c l in e d  to  a  p o s i t i o n  c lo s e  to  S h a f te s b u ry 's ,  
b e l ie v in g  t h a t ,  t h a t  which we approve c o n s i s t s  o f  " . . . t h e  a f f e c t i o n s  
ten d in g  to  th e  happ iness  o f  o th e r s  and th e  moral p e r f e c t io n  o f  th e  mind 
p o sse s s in g  them ."
Green dem onstra ted  v e ry  f u l l y  t h a t  in  fo llow ing  B erke ley , Hume had 
been led  to  m ajor problems in  knowing how to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between ques tions  
about 'how th e  body w o rk s ' ,  and more s p i r i t u a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s .
"Having no c o n cep t io n ,  th e n ,  of S p i r i t  o r  S e l f  be fo re  him but t h a t  
o f  th in k in g  su b s ta n c e ,  o f  which Berkeley  h im se lf  had confessed
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t h a t  i t  was not a  p o s s ib l e  id e a  or o b je c t  o f  an id e a ,  Hume had only
to  app ly  th e  method by which B erkeley  h im se lf  had d isposed  o f
extended su bs tance  to  g e t  r i d  o f  S p i r i t  l ik e w is e .  This  could  be
done in  a s e n te n c e ,  bu t having done i t ,  Hume i s  a t  f u r t h e r  pa ins
to  show t h a t  i m m a te r i a l i ty ,  s im p l i c i t y ,  and i d e n t i t y  cannot be
a s c r ib e d  to  th e  so u l ;  as  i f  t h e r e  were a so u l  l e f t  t o  which
a n y th in g  could be a s c r i b e d . "  ,16
Having charged Hume w i th  fa v o u r in g  an u n s p i r i t u a l  view o f  man, Green 
and Grose r e j e c t e d  h i s  system in  favou r  o f  th o se  propounded by Kant and 
Hegel. This  r e a c t i o n ,  w h ile  in  keeping  w ith  th e  p o s i t i o n  developed in  
th e  I n t r o d u c t io n s  to  th e  T r e a t i s e , f a i l e d  to  take  i n to  account th e  f a c t  
t h a t ,  Hume's p o s i t i o n ,  when broken down i n to  i t s  c o n s t i tu e n t  p a r t s ,  was, 
as we have been obse rv ing  a g a in  and a g a in ,  indeb ted  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  to  
l e a d in g  B r i t i s h  p h i lo so p h e rs  o f  h i s  t im e . That i s  why l a t e  i n  th e  20t h .  
c e n tu ry  Hume i s  embraced by B r i t i s h  p h i lo so p h e rs  a s  one o f  th e  o u ts ta n d in g  
and t r u l y  B r i t i s h  p h i lo so p h e rs  o f  a l l  t im e . I t  may have been t h a t  some o f  
G reen 's  and G ro s e 's  more p e rc e p t iv e  c r i t i c i s m s  were v a l i d  a g a in s t  the  
p h i lo so p h e rs  who in f lu e n c e d  him as w e l l ;  t h a t  i s  a lm ost c e r t a i n l y  th e  
c a se .  However, t o  blame him f o r  a l l  th e  shortcom ings o f  B r i t i s h  moral 
ph ilo sophy  o f  t h e  l 8t h .  c e n tu ry  r e q u i r e s  a  more conv inc ing  d e fence  than  
was o f f e r e d  in  th e s e  I n t r o d u c t io n s .
By way o f  complete c o n t r a s t ,  in  Norman Kemp S m ith 's  The Philosophy 
of  David Hume, and E rn e s t  Campbell M ossner 's  The L i f e  o f  David Hume, 
we have two f u l l ,  modern s tu d i e s  of  Hume and h i s  ph ilo sophy  which seek 
to  v i n d ic a t e  h i s  main id e a s .  A q u o ta t io n  from A .J .  Ayer g ives  us an 
e s t im a te  o f  t h i s  s c h o o l - o f - th o u g h t 's  view o f  Hume. For Ayer, Hume should 
be c o n s id e red  " . . . t h e  g r e a t e s t  o f  a l l  B r i t i s h  p h i lo s o p h e rs . . .  "^^These 
two major s tu d i e s  a r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  a huge body of  l i t e r a t u r e  on Hume 
w r i t t e n  t h i s  c e n tu ry ,  i n  suppo rt  o f  what i t  i s  be lieved  the  S c o t t i s h  
p h i lo so p h e r  a f f i rm e d .  Because o f  t h a t ,  th e  s c e p t i c a l  tone which i s  
o f te n  p r e s e n t  in  h is  works i s  n o t  considered  an embarrassment; r a t h e r ,  i t
^8» Z fG ^ t ise  o f  Human N atu re .  by David Hume V d . I  292
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i s  admired. The fa c t  th a t so many works have been published in  support 
o f  a p h ilo so p h ic a l system which i s  'n a tu r a lis t ic *  rather than s p ir i t u a l ,  
i s  a reminder o f how much tim es have changed. These w r iters  do not say 
that Hume saw the com plete p ic tu r e , nor are they prepared to  j u s t i f y  a l l  
h is arguments because th e ir  shortcomings are d iscu ssed  a t len gth ; but 
what they  do say i s  th a t he was on the r ig h t l in e s .  By acclaim ing him 
'th e  g r e a te s t  o f  a l l  B r it is h  ph ilosop hers' they  mean th a t he, o f a l l  
the B r it is h  ph ilosophers o f  h is  day, saw w ith g r e a te s t  c la r i ty  where 
the new id eas which were coming to  l ig h t  a t th is  tim e were c e r ta in ly  
lea d in g . He was the outstand ing B r it is h  philosopher because o f  the  
q u a lity  o f h is  work and the range o f  f ie ld s  which he was ab le  to  master 
so com pletely; but more than th a t , they b e lie v e  th a t he was cen tu ries  
ahead o f  h is  tim e and th at he a n tic ip a ted  in  la rg e  measure the system  
which they them selves favour and seek to  develop . In The Philosophy o f  
David Hume Norman Kemp Smith ou tlin ed  Hume's understanding o f  the fu nction  
o f  philosophy th u s ;-
"Here, as in  the sphere o f e th ic s  and a e s th e t ic s ,  the fu nction  o f  
p h ilo so p h ic a l enquiry, as Hume conceived i t ,  i s  not to  j u s t i f y  
our u ltim ate  b e l i e f s ,  but on ly  to  tra ce  them to  th e ir  sources in  
the c o n s t itu t io n  o f  our human nature, and to  show how, aided by 
reason , though them selves d e r e c t iv e  o f  i t ,  they con d ition  and make 
p o ss ib le  the de fa c to  experience which i s  a t  once the subject-m atter  
o f  philosophy and th a t by which i t s  judgments can alone be te s te d .
Norman Kemp Smith was the f i r s t  Humean scholar to h ig h lig h t the extent 
to  which Hume had been in flu en ced  by Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson's 
in flu e n c e  played a v i t a l  r o le  in  the form ation o f  Humean In tu ition ism , 
so th a t th is  d iscovery  has been o f  help in  id e n tify in g  what i s  v i t a l  to  
Hume's main co n tr ib u tio n  as a ph ilosop her. Sm ith's The Philosophy o f  
David Hume i s  coming to  be regarded as a key modern work on Humean 
philosophy, as i t  g ives  one o f the most coh esive  and c o n sisten t  
a n a ly tic  ex p o sitio n s o f  Hume's p o s it io n . For modern philosophers who
1®- Smith op. c i t . 4%
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would seek to  b u i ld  on t h a t  p o s i t i o n ,  Sm ith’ s c o n t r ib u t io n  r e p r e s e n t s  
a rem arkable  ach ievem ent, because i t  g ives evidence  o f  a defence  o f  
Humean ph ilosophy  from w i th in .  To th o se  who o b je c t  t h a t  Hume's p o s i t i o n  
was too  r id d l e d  w i th  i n c o n s i s t e n c ie s  to  ever be p re se n ted  as  a u n i ty .  Smith 
appears  to  o f f e r  an im p ress iv e  answer. What i s  t r u e  i s  t h a t  he came to  
g r ip s  w i th  what Hume was s t r i v i n g  to  sa y .  There a r e  tim es when Smith 
can sound l i k e  a modern Hume. He i s  s teeped  i n  Hume’ s background. This  
i s  where many s tu d i e s  o f  Humean ph ilosophy  f a l l  s h o r t .  They a r e  s tu d i e s  
which have been p repared  in  a  l i b r a r y  which i s  d i s t a n t ,  g e o g ra p h ica l ly  
and c u l t u r a l l y ,  from th e  S co tland  i n  which Hume grew up. That i s  no t 
th e  ease  w ith  The Ph ilosophy  o f  David Hume. I t  p la c e s  Hume e x a c t ly  
a g a in s t  th e  r i g h t  background. Smith a l s o  w r i te s  a s  an adm irer  o f  Hume. 
Whereas a F ra n c is  Hutcheson would have recognized  Hume's g i f t s  as t o t a l l y  
e x t r a o rd in a ry ,  t h i s  adm ission  would have been made w ith  a  measure o f  
r e s e r v a t io n ,  so t h a t ,  f o r  example, when i t  came to  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  Hume's 
a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  th e  C ha ir  o f  E th ic s  and Pneum atica l  Philosophy a t  the  
U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Edinburgh, he s ided  w ith  the  P r in c i p a l  o f  th e  U n iv e r s i ty  
in  opposing i t .  Sm ith would have supported  i t ;  bo th  f o r  h i s  ad m ira t io n  
f o r  Hume as  a pe rso n ,  and even more because o f  th e  appea l  o f  t h e  p o s i t i o n  
which he was deve lop ing  a s  a p h i lo s o p h e r .  That i s  why S m ith 's  w r i t in g  
s t y l e  resem bles  t h a t  o f  a  modern Hume; t h e r e  i s  th e  same thorough grasp 
o f  th e  p o in t  a t  i s s u e  and th e  same f low ing , e le g a n t  p r e s e n t a t io n  o f  the  
argum ent. So t h a t  f o r  modern d i s c i p l e s  o f  Hume, t h i s  i s  a  c l a s s i c  work.
I t  d em ons tra tes  t h a t  Hume's p o s i t i o n  i s  a co h e ren t  p o s i t i o n ,  and i t  argues 
t h a t  view i n  a l i v e l y ,  u p - to - d a te  s t y l e .  In  view o f  th e  im press ion  which 
had been c r e a te d  by th e  Green and Grose s tu d ie s  i n  th e  1 9 th .  c en tu ry ,  
Norman Kemp S m ith 's  c o n t r ib u t io n  has in  many ways been a  v a lu a b le  c o r r e c t ­
i v e .
As w e l l  as dem o n s tra t in g  th e  c r u c i a l  im portance o f  F ra n c is  Hutcheson 's 
in f lu e n c e  on Hume's whole c a r e e r ,  e s t a b l i s h in g  him as  an I n t u i t i o n i s t  in  
th e  S h a f t  es bury-Hutche s on t r a d i t i o n .  Smith t r a c e s  th e  impact made by
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o th e r  S c o t t i s h  p h i lo s o p h e rs  such a s  Reid* Again, t h i s  a t te m p t  to  ro o t  
Hume i n  th e  S co tland  i n  which he was born and grew up i s  a  much needed 
c o r r e c t i v e  to  th e  o th e r  Hume s ,  such as  th e  s u b je c t iv e  i d e a l i s t  conceived 
by K ant, c re a te d  " . . . p a r t l y  o f  im p e r fe c t  knowledge o f  Hume's w r i t i n g s ,  
p a r t l y  o f  p re p o s s e s s io n s  d e r iv e d  from a long  p rev io u s  t r a i n i n g  in  German 
r a t i o n a l i s m ." 19
Hume's aim, a c c o rd in g  to  Sm ith, was t o  develop a  s c ie n c e  o f  human 
n a tu r e ,  and h i s  p h i lo sophy  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as be ing  " . . . f u n d a m e n ta l ly  
s c e p t i c a l ;  i t  i s  p o s i t i v e  and n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  and , we may h ere  add, 
hum anis tic  i n  t e n d e n c y . I n  embracing such a p h i lo s o p h ic a l  system 
Norman Kemp Smith was s e t t i n g  th e  to n e  f o r  o th e r  a s se s s m e n ts ’ o f  Hume 
which were to  fo l lo w  in  th e  20t h .  c e n tu ry .
In  The L i fe  o f  David Hume. E rn e s t  Campbell Mossner f i l l s  i n  th e  
background to  Hume's u p b r in g in g  and e d u c a t io n .  Again we f in d  th e  h igh  
e s t im a te  o f  h i s  in f lu e n c e  which we encountered  in  The Philosophy of  
David Hume. "Hume's a l l - i n c l u s i v e  'S c ie n c e  o f  Human Nature* has now 
become th e  s tudy  o f  s p e c i a l i s t s  i n  many f i e l d s . . . " g ^  Mossner conveys 
w e l l  Hume's s e a rc h  f o r  t h i s  new p h i lo s o p h ic a l  system -  a  s e a rc h  which 
was to  ta k e  him i n t o  th e  most unexpected p la c e s  to  meet th e  most u n l ik e ly  
pe o p le .  The e a r l i e r  p a r t  o f  Hume's c a re e r  read s  l i k e  a l a r g e r - t h a n - l i f e  
a d v e n tu re .  So much so t h a t  i t  would be easy to  conclude t h a t  t h e r e  was a 
p a r t  o f  him t h a t  was q u i t e  u n s e t t l e d .  I f  e x te n s iv e  t r a v e l  th roughout 
Europe was co n s id e red  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  th e  t r a i n i n g  o f  a prom ising 
p o e t ,  p a i n t e r ,  composer o r  m a n - o f - l e t t e r s ;  then  Hume must have been 
regarded  as w e l l - t r a i n e d .  And y e t ,  M ossner 's  own evidence  makes i t  c le a r  
t h a t  Hume was on ly  ever p repared  to  move so f a r  from h is  r o o ts  and no 
f u r t h e r .  T h is  can be i l l u s t r a t e d  from a h o s t  o f  b io g ra p h ic a l  d e t a i l s  
which a re  to  be found in  The L i f e  o f  David Hume.
"Yet o f  D a v id 's  k ic k in g  over th e  s a b b a t i c a l  t r a c e s  as a  boy, th e r e
i s  no t the  s l i g h t e s t  indication.**
22
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"On h is  ovn word, he was ' r e l i g i o u s  when he was y o u n g ' . . .  «
"Taking h is  r e l i g i o n  u n u su a l ly  s e r i o u s l y ,  t h e  young David Hume was 
a t t r a c t e d  t o  t h e  t a s k  o f  s o u l - s e a r c h in g ."  23
There I s  every  reaso n  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  Hume enjoyed h i s  c o n ta c t  w ith  the  
C o n t in e n t ,  b o th  because o f  the  c u l t u r a l  s t im u la t io n  which he rece iv ed  
from m eeting s o c ie ty  and th e  le a d in g  s c h o la r s  o f  th e  day in  c i t i e s  such 
as P a r i s ,  a s  w e l l  as because o f  th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  i t  gave him to  develop h is  
id ea s  in  a p a r t  o f  Europe where he was to  ach ieve  much fame. In  th e o ry  
he should have been i n  h i s  element among s c e p t i c s  and a t h e i s t s  who had 
become le a d in g  l i g h t s  i n  th e  Enligh tenm ent, but we have a l r e a d y  noted th e  
com pla in t  t h a t ,  whereas i n  Sco tland  he was c ons ide red  as  having too  l i t t l e  
r e l i g i o n ,  on th e  C o n t in en t  he was, in  c e r t a i n  c i r c l e s ,  though t to  have too 
much. This  was a s ta g e  when he began to  exp lo re  n a t u r a l  theo logy  q u i te  
s e r i o u s l y .  He enjoyed good r e l a t i o n s  w ith  th e  J e s u i t s ,  He a l s o  came in to  
c o n ta c t  w ith  th e  J a n s e n i s t s .
"Abbe Pluche was indeed  a lea rn e d  man, a J a n s e n i s t  and an a n t i - C a r t ­
e s i a n ,  having  he ld  th e  c h a i r s  o f  Humanity and R h e to r ic  in  the  
U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Rheims. He i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  notew orthy f o r  h is  
S p e c ta c le  de l a  N a tu re  ( 1732) ,  a s e r i e s  o f  d ia lo g u e s  on n a tu ra l  
t h e o lo g y ."2^
His s ta y  on th e  C o n t in en t  was no t  always a g re e a b le ,  because t r a v e l  was 
n o t  always ea sy .  On a t  l e a s t  one o ccas ion  d u r in g  h i s  I t a l i a n  v i s i t  he was 
so d e l i r i o u s  w ith  a  f e v e r  t h a t  th e  back door o f  h i s  q u a te r s  had to  be 
locked  and he had to  be fo rced  back to  bed; th e r e  were tim es when he found 
th e  h igh  c o s t  o f  l i v i n g  in  some o f  th e  g re a t  c i t i e s  beyond h i s  means; and, 
th rough  i t  a l l  he missed th e  Annandale home. On one o f  h i s  r e tu r n s  to  
Edinburgh he w r o t e ; -  " In  Edinburgh, 'The Quid T o u n ' , . . . ' I  am he re ,  Body 
and Soul, w i th o u t  c a s t i n g  th e  l e a s t  Thought o f  R egreat  to  London, or 
even P a r i s ' . W h e n  he d id  e v e n tu a l ly  s e t t l e  in  S co tland  a g a in  h i s  i n t e r e s t  
in  n a t u r a l  theo logy  was to  deepen.
" . . . y e t  Hume was g r e a t ly  i n t e r e s t e d  in  l e a r n in g  Dr. B u t l e r ' s  op in ion  
o f  h i s  p h i lo so p h y .  He had a l r e a d y  w r i t t e n  to  Henry Home about B u t le r
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and was p leased  to  f in d  t h a t  Henry to o  he ld  th e  same h igh  
op in ion  o f  t h a t  d iv in e ;
I t  i s  a t  t im es d i f f i c u l t  to  r e c o n c i l e  th e  s c e p t i c  o u t l in e d  by
Mossner in  t h i s  p a s s a g e : -  " . . . h i s  th in k in g  does n o t  end in  s c ep t ic ism
but proceeds to  b u i ld  up a new w orld ,  n a t u r a l i s t i c  r a t h e r  than  s u p e rn a tu r -
a l i s t i c ,  e m p i r ic a l  r a t h e r  than  r a t i o n a l i s t i c  based upon th e  c l e a r e r
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  the  manner in  which the  mind o f  man r e a l l y  f u n c t i o n s , " ,  .27w ith  the  r e a l  Hume we see  emerging from many b io g ra p h ic a l  d e t a i l s .  Near ' 
t h e  end o f  The L i fe  o f  Hume oddly  enough, Mossner su p p l ie s  a  w ea lth  
o f  such d e t a i l s .  When i t  was suggested  to  Hume t h a t  i t  was a  w aste  o f  
money to  spend a m i l l i o n  (pounds?)- on th e  b u i ld in g  o f  S t .  P a u l ' s  
C a th e d ra l ,  he responded -  "Never g ive  an o p in io n  on s u b je c t s  which you 
a r e  too young to  judget S t .  P a u l ' s , r e m o n s t r a t e d  Hume, 'a s  a  monument 
o f  th e  r e l i g i o u s  f e e l i n g  and sen tim en t  o f  th e  c o u n try ,  does i t  honour, 
and w i l l  en d u re .  We have wasted m i l l io n s  on a s in g l e  campaign i n  F la n d e rs ,  
and w ithou t  any good r e s u l t i n g  from i t ' . And th e n ,  as  a  rem inder o f  
th e  way o f  l i f e  i n to  which Hume had s e t t l e d  in  Sco tland , Mossner reco u n ts  
t h a t ,  "Perhaps i t  was on a l e s s  crowded v i s i t  to  In v e ra ra y  t h a t  David 
Hume, a t  th e  exp ress  i n v i t a t i o n  o f  th e  p a r i s h  m i n i s t e r ,  went to  church 
in  th e  company o f  Lady E l iz a b e th  Ham ilton.
To sum up Hume's p h i lo s o p h ic a l  p o s i t i o n ,  Mossner o f f e r s  th e  fo llow ing  
a n a l y s i s : -
"He i s  a l s o  p o in t in g  ou t  t h a t  h i s  th in k in g  does not end in  
s c e p t ic is m  but p roceeds to  b u i ld  up a new w orld , n a t u r a l i s t i c  
r a t h e r  than  s u p e r n a t u r a l i s t i c , e m p ir ic a l  r a t h e r  than  r a t i o n a l i s t i c  
based upon th e  c l e a r e r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  manner i n  which th e  
mind o f  man r e a l l y  f u n c t io n s . "
When d e c id in g  on th e  s t r e n g th  o f  M ossner 's  case  and the  v a l i d i t y  o f  
th e  view which has been expressed  in  the  p reced ing  pa rag rap h , i t  i s  as 
w e l l  to  bear in  mind one o f  Hume's comments which was made a lm ost a s  an
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a s i d e : -  " 'B e s id e s ,  I  am as c e r t a i n  as I  can. be o f  any th ing  (And I  am 
no t  such a S c e p t i c ,  a s  you may, perhaps i m a g i n e ) I n  M ossner 's  
a n a ly s i s  we a r e  t o ld  t h a t  Hume's th in k in g  does no t  end in  s c e p t ic is m ,  
so t h a t  h i s  c a se  does n o t  r e s t  on any c la im  t h a t  he i s .  I t  i s  a lm ost 
c e r t a i n  t h a t  Hume would have unders tood  the  l a b e l  'S c e p t i c '  i n  two ways.
1 . A p h i lo so p h e r  who had a low e s t im a te  o f  what th e  human f a c u l t i e s  
can take  i n .  Hume's d e s c r i p t i o n  was -  the  wretched c o n d i t io n  o f  our 
f a c u l t i e s . ^2 ^ k a t  i s  why i n  our u n d e rs tan d in g  o f  why we make c e r t a i n  
d e c i s io n s  on m oral q u e s t io n s ,  we have to  be s a t i s f i e d  w ith  s u p e r f i c i a l  
answ ers . I t  i s  a lm ost c e r t a i n  t h a t  he would have accep ted  t h a t  he was 
a 'S cep tic*  i n  t h i s  s e n se .  2 . Someone who i s  s c e p t i c a l  about r e l i g i o u s  
b e l i e f s .  T h is  i s  th e  sense  which we f in d  in  th e  passage  in  which Mossner 
speaks about Hume's th in k in g  n o t  ending in  s c e p t ic is m ,  but p roceed ing  to  
b u i ld  up a new w orld , n a t u r a l i s t i c  r a t h e r  than  s u p e r n a t u r a l i s t i c , e m p ir ic a l  
r a t h e r  than  r a t i o n a l i s t i c .  The r e j e c t i o n  o f  the  ' s u p e r n a t u r a l i s t i c ' i s  
meant, presum ably , to  i n d i c a t e  a r e j e c t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s .  T d i s ­
c la im  i s  h ig h ly  q u e s t io n a b le .  There i s  every  l ik e l ih o o d  t h a t  Hume was 
th in k in g  abou t r e l i g i o u s  s c e p t ic is m  as  w e l l  as  a s c e p t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  
th eo ry  about th e  way i n  which we form our b e l i e f s ,  when he sa id  "(And I  
am n o t  such a S c e p t i c ,  as  you may, perhaps im a g in e ) ."  Seme o f  th e  p assag ­
es which we have been c o n s id e r in g  from The L i f e  o f  Hume suggest  as  much.
*************************************
G reen 's  and G ro s e 's  thorough s tudy  o f  Hume in  the  19 th .  c en tu ry  had 
th e  e f f e c t  o f  r e i n f o r c i n g  one view of  Hume -  t h a t  he was an o u trageous ,  
s e c u la r  s c e p t i c  -  and t h i s  in  tu rn  encouraged h is  s e c u la r  adm irers  
to  c la im  him f o r  t h e i r  c a u se .  C h r i s t i a n  s tu d e n ts  o f  Hume, r e p e l l e d  by 
by t h i s  s t e r e o ty p e  o f  someone who was a g a in s t  r e l i g i o n  o f te n  accep ted  
th e  image u n c r i t i c a l l y ,  and f u r t h e r  p e rp e tu a te d  i t ;  o r ,  sh ied  c le a r  of 
th e  s tudy  o f  Hume's views a l t o g e t h e r .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  Green and Grose 
have a good d e a l  to  answer f o r .  Even i f  i t  i s  a c cep ted  thatxtKe'^D ia lo g u e s  
show a d i f f e r e n t  approach  to  th e  s tudy  o f  th e  ph ilo sophy  o f  r e l i g i o n  to  that
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found in  The N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n , th e  conc lud ing  exchanges in  
the  D ia logues could never support  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  which Green and 
Grose would be bound to  p la c e  upon them. I f  th e  Dialogues a r e  seen 
as  in  some sense  a f i n a l  s ta te m e n t  o f  Hume’s m ature  s c e p t ic i s m ,  i t  i s  by 
no means th e  case  t h a t  any o f  th e  c h a ra c te r s  invo lved  in  th e  deba te  i s  
the  c l e a r  w inner .  Having shown h im se lf  i n  h i s  t r u e  c o lo u rs  PHILO f e e l s  
f r e e  to  condemn r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  w ithou t r e s t r a i n t : -
"How happens i t  th e n ,  s a id  P h i lo ,  i f  v u lg a r  s u p e r s t i t i o n  be so 
s a lu t a r y  to  s o c ie ty ,  t h a t  a l l  h i s t o r y  abounds so much w ith  
accoun ts  o f  i t s  p e rn ic io u s  consequences on p u b l ic  a f f a i r s ?
F a c t io n s ,  c i v i l  w ars , p e r s e c u t io n s ,  su b v e rs io n s  o f  government, 
o p p re s s io n ,  s la v e ry  -  t h e s e  a re  the  d ism al consequences which 
always a t t e n d  i t s  p rev a len c e  over th e  minds o f  men. I f  the  
r e l i g i o u s  s p i r i t  be ever  mentioned in  any h i s t o r i c a l  n a r r a t i o n ,  
we a r e  su re  to  meet i t  a f te rw a rd s  w ith  a d e t a i l  o f  the  m is e r ie s  
which a t t e n d  i t .  And’ no p e r io d  o f  tim e can be h a p p ie r  or more 
p rosperous  th an  th o se  in  which i t  i s  never  regarded  o r  heard o f 33
In the  m iddle  o f  a n o th e r  lo n g e r  speech , once a g a in ,  th e  fo rc e  o f  PHILO is  
t i r a d e  a g a in s t  Theism i s  underm ined :-
"True r e l i g i o n ,  I  a l lo w , has no such p e rn ic io u s  consequences; but 
we must t r e a t  o f  r e l i g i o n  as  i t  has commonly been found i n  th e
t3^w orld , — "
The tone  w ith  which CLBANTHES answers PHILO i s  th e  very  o p p o s i te ,  and, 
a s  soon as  we hear  i t  we a r e  reminded o f  Hume in  h i s  l e s s  s c e p t i c a l  moods.
"Take c a r e ,  P h i lo ,  r e p l i e d  C lean th es ,  take  c a re ;  push no t  m a t te rs  
too  f a r ,  a llow  no t your z e a l  a g a in s t  f a l s e  r e l i g i o n  to  undermine 
your v e n e ra t io n  f o r  th e  t r u e .  F o r f i e t  n o t  t h i s  p r in c i p l e  -  the  
c h i e f ,  the  only  g r e a t  com fort in  l i f e  and our p r i n c i p a l  support  amids 
a l l  th e  a t t a c k s  o f  ad v e rse  f o r tu n e .  The most a g re e a b le  r e f l e c t i o n  
which i t  i s  p o s s ib l e  f o r  human im ag ina tion  to sugges t  i s  t h a t  o f
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genuine theism , which rep resen ts us as the workmanship o f  a Being
p e r fe c t ly  good, w ise , and powerful; who created us fo r  happiness;
and who, having implanted in  us immeasurable d e s ir e s  o f  good, w i l l
prolong our e x is te n c e  to  a l l  e te r n ity , and w i l l  tr a n sfe r  us in to
an i n f i n i t e  v a r ie ty  o f scen es , in  order to  s a t i s f y  th ose  d e s ir e s
and render our f e l i c i t y  com plete and durab le . Next to  such a Being
h im se lf ( i f  the comparison be a llow ed ), the happ iest l o t  which
we can imagine i s  th a t o f  being under h is  guardianship and protection *
3 5
PHILO adm its that th e se  appearances are " ...m o st  engaging and a l lu r i n g . . ’’ 
But i t  happens here, as in  the former ca se , th a t , w ith  regard to  the  
greater  part o f  mankind, the appearances are d e c e i t f u l ,  and th a t the  
terro rs  o f  r e l ig io n  commonly p r e v a il above i t s  com forts."  In the middle 
o f  h is  concluding speech he o b serv es;-
"To know God, says Seneca, i t  to worship him. A ll  other worship i s  
indeed absurd, s u p e r s t i t io u s , and even im pious. I t  degrades him 
to  the low con d ition  o f mankind, who are d e lig h ted  w ith en trea ty , 
s o l i c i t a t io n ,  p r e sen ts , and f la t t e r y .  Yet i s  th is  im piety  the  
sm a lle s t  o f  which su p e r s t it io n  i s  g u i l t y .  Commonly, i t  depresses  
the D eity  fa r  below the con d ition  o f  mankind, and rep resen ts him 
as a ca p r ic io u s  demon who e x e r c ise s  h is  power w ithout reason and 
w ithout humanity1 And were th a t D ivine Being d isposed  to  be 
offended a t  the v ic e s  and f o l l i e s  o f  s i l l y  m orta ls, who are h is  
own workmanship, i l l  would i t  su re ly  fa re  w ith  the v o ta r ie s  o f  
most popular s u p e r s t it io n s . Nor would any o f human race m erit h is  
favour but a vary few , the p h ilo so p h ica l t h e i s t s ,  who en ter ta in  
or rath er indeed endeavour to  e n ter ta in  su ita b le  n otion s o f  h is  
d iv in e  p e r fe c t io n s . As the on ly  persons e n t it le d  to  h is  compassion 
and indulgence would be the p h ilo so p h ica l s c e p t ic s ,  a s e c t  almost 
eq u a lly  rare, who, from a natural d if f id e n c e  o f  th e ir  own cap ac ity , 
suspend or endeavour to  suspend a l l  judgment w ith  regard to such 
sublime and such extraordinary su b jec ts ." 36
35 . H u . .  ( M .  P ile .)  op. O lt.
36 . " P a r t  XII 
P a r t  XII
198.
The w it  and c o lo u r  i n  t h a t  s e c t i o n  o f  PHILO's speech can on ly  be 
a p p re c ia te d  a g a in s t  the  ph i losophy  o f  r e l i g i o n  d e b a te  o f  Hume's day . In 
a way, the  speech i s  a p o in t - s c o r in g  e x e rc i s e ;  but i t  does s e rv e  a t  
l e a s t  one u s e f u l  purpose -  i t  s e rv e s  a rem inder t h a t  c o ld ,  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
argument by i t s e l f  w i l l  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  l e a d  to  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f .  Hume 
accep ted  more o f  th e  ' t h e i s t i c  p r o o f s '  th an  K ant. But PHILO i s  reminding 
us in  t h i s  passage  t h a t  th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  i s  more 
than  about s c o r in g  p o in t s  around th e  ' t h e i s t i c  p r o o f s ' .
"A p erson , seasoned w ith  a j u s t  sense  of  th e  im p e r fe c t io n s  of
n a t u r a l  r e a s o n ,  w i l l  f l y  to  re v e a le d  t r u t h  w i th  th e  g r e a t e s t
a v i d i t y ;  w h ile  th e  haughty d o g m a t is t ,  persuaded t h a t  he can
e re c t  a complete system o f  theo logy  by th e  mere help  o f
p h i lo sophy , d i s d a in s  any f u r t h e r  a id  and r e j e c t s  h i s  a d v e n t i t io u s
i n s t r u c t o r .  To be a p h i lo s o p h ic a l  s c e p t i c  i s ,  in  a  man o f  l e t t e r s ,
th e  f i r s t  and most e s s e n t i a l  s te p  towards being a sound, b e l ie v in g
C h r i s t i a n  -  a p r o p o s i t io n  which I  would w i l l i n g l y  recommend to
th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  Pamphilus; and I  hope C le a n th e s  w i l l  f o rg iv e
me f o r  i n te r p o s i n g  so f a r  in  the  e d u c a t io n  and i n s t r u c t i o n  o f
h i s  p u p i l . "37
What sense  a r e  we to  make o f  PHILO's c la im , t h a t ,  ' t o  be a p h i lo so p h ­
i c a l  s c e p t i c  i s ,  i n  a  man o f  l e t t e r s ,  th e  f i r s t  and most e s s e n t i a l  
s te p  towards being a sound, b e l i e v in g  C h r i s t i a n '?  I s  PHILO 
sug g es t in g  t h a t  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  s c e p t ic is m  i s  a  s u r e r  way f o r  a  man of  
l e t t e r s  to  become a C h r i s t i a n  than  the  haughty dogmatism o f  some 
v e rs io n s  o f  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  Theism? The q u e s t io n  i s ,  would any a t h e i s t i c  
s c e p t i c  be v e ry  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  how to  become a 'sound , b e l ie v in g  
C h r i s t i a n * ?  T h a t ,  s u r e l y ,  would be ru le d  out by h i s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  
p re s u p p o s i t io n s ?  So t h a t  t h e r e  i s  something s t r a n g e  about PHILO's 
s c e p t ic i s m .  I t  i s  a  s c e p t ic i s m  which tak e s  s t ro n g  o b je c t io n  to  the  
arguments which a r e  used in  th e  de fence  o f  Deism; i s  much l e s s  
f o r c e f u l  in  i t s  r e j e c t i o n  o f  th e  arguments which a r e  used to  defend
D ia logues  Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n .  by David Hume, E d ited  and w ith  commentary by, Nelson P ik e .  Pub lished  by the  Bobbs- M a r r i l l  Company, i n c . ,  i n  1970. .. ,P a r t  XII
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p h i lo s o p h ic a l  Theism, a l th o u g h  i s  s t i l l  s u s p ic io u s  about arguments 
which a r e  used to  defend r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  o f  any k ind ;  and f i n a l l y  
ends up c la im ing  t h a t  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  sc e p t ic ism  i s  ' t h e  f i r s t  and most 
e s s e n t i a l  s t e p  towards being  a sound, b e l ie v in g  C h r i s t i a n '  1 Even 
a c c e p t in g  t h a t  PHILO was i n  some p lac e s  speaking  f o r  Hume, th e  
s c e p t ic is m  we a r e  l e f t  w ith  h a rd ly  l i v e s  up to  what Green and Grose 
were c la im ing  abou t i t .  But was PHILO speaking f o r  Hume? This  i s  how
th e  D ia logues a r e  c o n c lu d e d : -
"C lean thes  and P h i lo  pursued no t t h i s  c o n v e rsa t io n  much f u r t h e r ;  
and as  n o th in g  ever made g r e a t e r  im pression  on me th an  a l l  th e  
r e a so n in g s  o f  t h a t  day, so I  confess  t h a t ,  upon a  s e r io u s  rev iew
o f  th e  whole, I  canno t bu t th in k  t h a t  P h i l o ' s  p r in c i p le s  a r e
more p robab le  than  Demea's, but t h a t  those  o f  C lean thes  
approach  s t i l l  n e a re r  to  th e  t r u t h . "  _30
What a r e  we to  make o f  t h i s  c lo s in g  paragraph? I t  was argued i n  an
e a r l i e r  passage  i n  which th e  arguments used in  th e  D ia logues were
examined, t h a t  th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  arguments was a l l - i m p o r t a n t .  I t
was s a id  t h a t  Hume was c lo s e r  to  t h i s  speaker th an  to  t h a t  sp e ak e r .
That i s  th e  k ind  o f  a n a ly s i s  which Hume h im se lf  p ro v ides  us w i th  in  
t h i s  c r u c i a l  p a ra g ra p h .  " . . . I  cannot bu t th in k  t h a t  P h i l o ' s  p r in c i p l e s  
a r e  more p ro b ab le  than  Demea's, bu t  t h a t  those  o f  C lean thes  approach 
s t i l l  n e a re r  to  th e  t r u t h . "  Soma have suggested  t h a t  Hume was no t 
s in c e r e  when he added t h i s  summary, and t h a t  th e  d i s c e r n in g  r e a d e r  
would be a b le  to  g a th e r  from rea d in g  th e  D ialogues as a whole where 
h i s  t r u e  sym path ies l a y .  That i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  no t only  des troys , the  
l i t e r a r y  u n i ty  o f  t h i s  work, bu t does much to  undermine th e  w r i t e r ' s  
i n t e g r i t y .  In  what i s  a complete l i t e r a r y  m a s te rp ie c e ,  such an 
a b e r r a t i o n  i s  hard  to  e x p la in ,  i f  on ly  f o r  th e  rea so n  t h a t  Hume spent 
so long  p e r f e c t i n g  i t  and was so s p e c i f i c  about how i t  should be 
p u b l ish e d .  The id ea  t h a t  i t  was somehow an a f t e r - t h o u g h t  o r  an a c c id e n t ,  
i s  simply n o t  t e n a b l e .  The sug g es t io n  t h a t  he had to  add something l i k e  T t
3 8 . D ialogues Hume (Ed. P ik e) op. c i t . Part XII
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in  o rder  to  make h i s  work a c c e p ta b le  in  what was s t i l l  a f a i r l y  co n se rv ­
a t i v e ,  C h r i s t i a n  c o u n try ,  runs i n to  th e  same d i f f i c u l t y ,  because  t h a t  
would s t i l l  r e p r e s e n t  a s e r io u s  m u t i la t io n  o f  th e  work he in tended  to  
w r i t e .  What would he have gained? The s p e c i a l  measures which he took 
to  ensure  e v e n tu a l ,  unabridged p u b l ic a t io n  would s u re ly  have made i t  
unnecessary  t o  concea l  what th o se  c l o s e s t  t o  him knew to  be h i s  t ru e  
o p in io n s .  The t r u t h  would have come o u t  sooner or  l a t e r .  The whole 
p o in t  of h a n d lin g  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  th e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  Dialogues 
in  th e  way in  which Hume s t i p u l a t e d ,  was t h a t  he would be a b le  to  speak 
h i s  mind f r a n k ly .  T h is  he had been p reven ted  from doing on v a r io u s  
occas ions  e a r ly  on in  h i s  c a r e e r .  This  was one way o f  p u t t in g  t h a t  
r i g h t .  The D ia logues  were e q u a l ly  im portan t  to  Hume, th e  m a n - o f - l e t t e r s , 
because they  re p re s e n te d  a l i t e r a r y  tr ium ph . They a r e  designed  to  be 
read and a p p re c ia te d  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s .  Someone, f o r  example, who 
has no i n t e r e s t  in  th e  ph ilosophy  of  r e l i g i o n  d e b a te s  can s t i l l  app re ­
c i a t e  t h i s  work as superb  l i t e r a t u r e .  Another f e a t u r e  which was of 
o u ts ta n d in g  im portance  t o  Hume th e  c l a s s i c i s t ,  was th e  employment o f  th e  
form o f  d ia lo g u e .  As he says h im se lf  i n  th e  l e t t e r  from Pamphilus to  
Brmippus, " I t  has been remarked, my Hermippus, t h a t ,  though th e  
a n c ie n t  p h i lo so p h e rs  conveyed most o f  t h e i r  i n s t r u c t i o n  in  th e  form of  
d ia lo g u e ,  t h i s  method o f  com position  has been l i t t l e  p r a c t i s e d  in  l a t e r  
a g e s . . . " j g  To conduct t h i s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  deba te  u s in g  th e  a n c ie n t  
form of d ia lo g u e ,  r e p re s e n te d  an enormous trium ph f o r  Hume. This  showed 
a spark  of o r i g i n a l i t y .  A l l  t h i s  se rv e s  t o  u n d e r l in e  th e  argument 
t h a t  he would n o t  have allowed h im se lf  too  many l i b e r t i e s  in  a work 
which m atte red  to  him so ve ry  much.
The need to  q u e s t io n  Hume's s i n c e r i t y  in  th e  f i n a l  paragraph  i s  f e l t  
most by those  who have a p h i lo s o p h ic a l  axe to  g r in d .  For them, i f  PHILO 
could be shown to  speak c l e a r l y  and unam bigiously  f o r  th e  mature Hume, 
then  t h e i r  c la im s about th e  s c e p t i c a l  n a tu re  o f  h i s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  p o s i t io n  
would be e s t a b l i s h e d ,  and th ey  could s a f e ly  b u i ld  on the  s e c u la r  found-
39. M alofiu es Hume (Ed. Pike:Pam philus to Herm ippus).
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which he had l a i d .  I t  i s  f a r  from c e r t a i n  t h a t  they  would be s a f e  in  
doing t h i s .  What was Hume t r y in g  to  do through the  D ia logues? I t  can 
s a f e l y  be accep ted  t h a t  he was a t te m p t in g  a number o f  t h in g s ,  th e  l a s t  
of which may have been th e  s e t t l i n g  o f  some a b s t r u s e  p o in t  in  th e  
ph ilosophy  of  r e l i g i o n  d e b a te .
They need to  be i n t e r p r e t e d  in  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  ways. When 
t h a t  i s  done, t h e n , t h e  a l l - i m p o r t a n t ,  in te n s e  co n c lu s io n  about th e  f i n a l  
p a rag raph  w i l l  be seen to  be l a r g e ly  i r r e l e v a n t .  The q u e s t io n  r a i s e d  
about t h i s  pa rag raph  i s  a s e r io u s  one, but i t  i s  one about which Hume 
h im s e lf  may have been unconcerned. Not to  have n o t ic e d  t h i s  i s  to  have 
m is - read  th e  D ia lo g u e s .
In  th e  In t r o d u c t io n  a l i s t  was made o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  ways in  which 
Humean ph ilosophy  has been i n t e r p r e t e d ;  some see th e  C l a s s i c a l  t h in k e r ,  
o th e r s  th e  I n t u i t i o n i s t , and a n o th e r  group th e  Newtonian p h i lo s o p h e r .  In 
a p o s t s c r i p t  to  th e  e d i t io n  o f  th e  D ialogues which he e d i te d  w i th  a 
commentary, Nelson Pike r a i s e s  a n o th e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  "There i s  a 
c l e a r  s e n se ,"  he w r i t e s ,  " . . .  in  which Berkeley  was th e  hero o f  Hume's 
f i r s t  major p h i lo s o p h ic a l  work, A T r e a t i s e  o f  Human Na t ur e . I n  t h i s  
p o s t s c r i p t  i n  which he d i s c u s s e s  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  whether o r  no t we should 
be lo o k in g  f o r  a s in g l e  hero  among th e  personae  re p re s e n te d  in  th e  
D ia lo g u e s , he a rgues  t h a t  i t  may be Berkeley who tu rn s  ou t  to be th e  
hero o f  Hume's l a s t  major p h i lo s o p h ic a l  work. P ike c la im s t h a t  P h i lo  
seems to  speak f o r  Hume in  most p l a c e s ,  C lean thes  he sees  as s h i f t i n g  
h i s  p o s i t i o n  from th e  'e x p e r im e n ta l  the ism ' o f  D ialogue I I ,  to  th e  
p o s i t i o n  marked out by B erke ley  in  p a r t  IV of  th e  A leephron. I f  
C lean thes  i s  taken  as  r e p r e s e n t in g  ' experim en ta l  th e ism ' then  we should 
regard  him as the  l o s e r ;  b u t ,  i f  we should judge him by th e  B e rk e le y - l ik e  
t h e i s t  o f  th e  D ialogue I I I  s e c t i o n ,  then  C lean thes  and P h i lo  should 
be seen  to  share  th e  honours in  the  work as a whole. And so, who wins 
the  argument? P ike su g g es ts  -  "Perhaps the  winner ( i f  th e re  i s  one) 
i s  Bishop B erk ley . R egard less  of whether o r  no t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  ag ree
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w ith  t h a t  view, Pike does a t  l e a s t  make i t  c l e a r  how unsa fe  i t  i s  to  
conclude  as P ro fe s s o r  Smith d id  t h a t  P h ilo  i s  th e  w inner.
There can be no doubt t h a t  Green and Grose made a s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r ib u t io n  
to  our modern u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  Hume. T he ir  s tudy  o f  h i s  voluminous outpu t 
was thorough and a u t h o r i t a t i v e .  "Many of  t h e i r  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  Hume’s 
shortcom ings were p e r c e p t iv e .  A l l  th e  same t h e i r  work was b ia s e d .  %% 
was s t r u c tu r e d  to  lea d  to  lead  f i n a l l y  to  an u n favo u rab le  and damning 
c o n c lu s io n .  T h e i r  aim was to  d i v e r t  a t t e n t i o n  away from what they imagined 
to  be a h o p e le s s ly  flawed p o s i t i o n ,  to  t h e i r  own, which would support  
r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  much b e t t e r .  What they  ach ieved  in  f a c t  was to  make i t  
much more d i f f i c u l t  to  examine th e  r o le  which i s  p layed by r e l i g io u s  
b e l i e f  in  Hume's system . A f u l l  s tudy  o f  Hume's works r e v e a ls  t h a t  
h« l e f t  th e  door open to  th e  need f o r  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s .  That door i s  
s l i g h t l y  open r a t h e r  than  t i g h t  s h u t .  An a t te m p t  has been made to  show 
how t h a t  can be dem onstra ted  by approaching  h i s  u p b r in g in g ,  t r a i n i n g  
and w r i t in g s  from a d i f f e r e n t  and in  many r e s p e c t s  more n a tu r a l  an g le  
to  t h a t  taken  by Green and G rose. This  approach i s  a l s o  a c o r r e c t i v e  to  
many o th e r  r e c e n t  s e c u la r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .
What cannot be doubted i s  t h a t  Hume remained an I n t u i t i o n i s t  th rough  a l l  
th e  changes o f  an e v e n t f u l  c a r e e r .  During a l l  t h i s  time he remained a 
member o f  th e  Church o f  S c o t la n d .  I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s ib le  to  be q u i t e  s p e c i f i c  
abou t th e  I n tu i t i o n i s m  to  which he adhered . This  was n o t  e x a c t ly  the  
D e i s t i c  I n tu i t i o n i s m  of  S h a f te sb u ry ,  nor was i t  th e  T h e i s t i c  In tu i t io n is m  
o f  Hutcheson. We have seen t h a t  a t  f i r s t  he a t tem pted  to  c r e a t e  a  new 
I n tu i t i o n i s m  which was s e c u l a r .  For a w hile  he pe rseve red  w ith  t h i s  
a t t e m p t .  I t  was never a complete s u c c e s s .  Hume a p p re c ia te d  t h i s  b e t t e r  
than  anyone e l s e .  I n tu i t i o n i s m  somehow presupposed a r e l i g i o u s  view of  
l i f e .  I t  depended on t h a t .  I t s  main c la im s were w ithou t  foundation  i f  
t h e r e  was no t something unique abou t human i n t u i t i o n s .  I n tu i t io n is m  was 
th@ rock  on which a l l  p u re ly  s e c u la r  views o f  man foundered 1 That had to
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be t r u e  of Hume's I n tu i t i o n i s m  as  w e l l .  This  i s  what Green and Grose 
f a i l e d  to  see .  Hume defended h is  h i s  e t h i c a l  th eo ry  on the  b a s is  o f  
I n tu i t io n is m !  S e c u l a r i s t s  have b u i l t  on what they  imagine to have 
been Hume's s e c u la r  I n tu i t i o n i s m  w ithou t  a sk in g  i f  th e re  i s  such an 
I n tu i t i o n i s m .  I t  i s  ve ry  d o u b tfu l  i f  Hume was f i n a l l y  s a t i s f i e d  
t h a t  th e r e  i s .  That i s  why he must be regarded  as  no t on ly  a g re a t  
B r i t i s h  p h i lo s o p h e r ,  bu t  as a g re a t  I n t u i t i o n i s t ,  in  the  t r a d i t i o n  of  
S h a f te sb u ry  and Hutcheson.
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Recent S tu d ie s .
A number o f  r e c e n t  s tu d i e s  on Hume's ph ilosophy  o f  r e l i g i o n  p ro v id e  ev idence  
o f  a growing i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  h i s  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s .  In  Hume's 
Ph ilosophy  o f  R e l ig io n  J .C .A , Gaskin has u n d e r ta k a i  a thorough s tudy  o f  
Hume and r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f .  Kenneth R, M e r r i l l  o f  t h e  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Oklahoma 
and Donald G. W ester Qf Oklahoma B a p t i s t  Univ. w ro te  an a r t i c l e  -  'Hume on th e  
R e la t io n  o f  R e l ig io n  to  M o ra l i ty '  in  198O, which was p u b l ish e d  in  t h e  
Jo u rn a l  o f  R e l ig io n  No. 160, In  1983 The P h i lo s o p h ic a l  Q u a r te r ly  p u b l is h e d  
an a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d  'N a tu ra l  B e l i e f  and R e lig io u s  B e l i e f  in  Hume's Philosophy 
In  a l l  t h e s e  s tu d i e s  t h e  view taken i s  t h a t  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  element in
Hume's work has n o t  been in v e s t ig a t e d  w ith  su ff ic ien t  s e n s i t i v i t y ,
Gaskin r a i s e s  two q u e s t io n s  o f  im portance  in  r e l a t i o n  to  t h a t  c la im . The 
f i r s t  i s  t h e  v iew t h a t  Hume in  some sense  a n t i c ip a t e d  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
n a tu r a l  s e l e c t i o n . ^  We do f in d  in  t h e  Dialogues one p assag e  which f i t s  th e  
modern account o f  how n a tu r a l  s e l e c t i o n  o p e ra te s  in  th e  an im al w o r ld ; -
"The s t ro n g e r  p rey  upon t h e  weaker, and keep them in  p e rp e tu a l  
t e r r o r  and a n x ie ty .  The weaker to o ,  in  t h e i r  t u r n ,  o f t e n  prey upon 
t h e  s t r o n g e r ,  and vex and m oles t  them w ithou t r t a x a t i o n .  Consider th a t  
innum erab le  r a c e  o f  i n s e c t s ,  which e i t h e r  a r e  b red  on t h e  body o f
each a n im a l,  o r  f ly in g  about i n f i x  t h e i r  s t i n g s  i n  him. These
i n s e c t s  have o th e r s  s t i l l  l e s s  than  thons e lv e s ,  which to rm ent th an .
And th u s  on each hand, b e fo re  and beh ind , above and below, every 
an im al i s  surrounded w ith  enemies, which i n c e s s a n t ly  seek h i s  m isery 
and d e s t r u c t i o n . "2
This has been i n t e r p r e t e d  as  a double-pronged a t t a c k  on Theism. A mod<ern 
s e c u la r  b i o l o g i s t  m ight f in d  in  t h a t  passage  a s t r i k i n g  accoun t o f  what 
appears  to  t a k e  p l a c e  i n  N ature , by a hos t  o f  random p r o c e s s e s .  There  i s  
l i t t l e  ev idence  h e re  to  show th e  gu id ing  hand o f  a C h r i s t i a n  C re a to r .  This 
o b je c t io n  i s  sharpened  s t i l l  f u r t h e r  in  ano ther  passage  found in  t h e  Dia logues
page
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"The whole presen ts nothing but th e  idea o f  b lin d  Nature, 
impregnated by a great v iv ify in g  p r in c ip le , and pouring fo rth  
from her la p , w ithout discernment or parental care, her maimed 
and a b o r tiv e  ch ild ren l
Although few s c ie n t i s t s  today would question th e  p rocess o f  natura l s e le c t ­
io n , as seen in  th e  changes which have taken p la c e  in  a number o f  sp e c ie s  
over a long period o f  tim e, i t  should not be taken fo r  granted th a t th e  
theory o f  natural s e le c t io n  i s  w ithout any d i f f i c u l t i e s .  F ir s t ly ,  i t  not 
easy to  se e  hOw natural s e le c t io n  can explain a l l  th e  changes th a t have 
taken p la c e  in  p lan ts and anim als. That i t  can account fo r  many changes i s  
now beyond d isp u te . I t  i s  not y e t c lea r  th at i t  can account for  a l l  o f  then* 
Secondly, th e  archaeoLogical record does not y e t provide a c le a r  p ic tu r e  o f  
natural s S e c t io n  having taken p la c e . I t  i s  argued th a t t h is  i s  because  
th e  early  l i f e  forms had s o f t  bodies which have not been preserved in  the  
f o s s i l  record . N e v e r th ^ e ss , w h ile  th e  record remains incom plete th e  theory  
o f  natural s e le c t io n  lack s th e  support o f  con c lu siv e  ev id en ce, and th e  lack  
o f  such evidence has not been w ithout i t s  problons b efore  in  th e  f i e ld  o f  
natural h is to r y . T h ird ly , th ere  are  b arriers in  nature which make i t  
im p ossib le  for  us to  assume th a t , given su ffic ien t tim e, natural s e le c t io n  
could account for a l l  th e  changes which we se e  in  l iv in g  organism s. Time 
i s  one such b a rr ie r . The tim ing o f  th e  changes i s  v i t a l  tothe theory o f  
natural s e le c t io n .  The changes must f i t  in  w ith the tim ing la id  down in  
th e  archaeological record . I t  would be wrong to  claim  th a t a l l  th e  evidence  
f i t s  in  n e a tly  w ith  th e  theory o f  natural s e le c t io n . That q u a lif ic a t io n  has 
to  be entered b efore we can s a fe ly  go on to  a sse s s  th e  r o le  which an early  
v ersio n  o f  th e  natural s e le c t io n  theory may have played in  Hume's view  o f  
th e  natural world.
I t  was n oticed  e a r lie r  th a t i t  was Newton's revo lu tion ary  understanding o f  
'causation* th a t challenged  fundamentally th e  T h e is t ic  C osm ological argument# 
Most o f  a l l  i t  e lim inated th e  need for  an 'uncaused, f i r s t  c a u se '. I f  thatwei!
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indeed th e  ca se , th en , th e  need for a guiding hand in  th e  story  o f  crea tion  
became unnecessary. The new understanding o f  causation  could explain  every­
th in g . Newton's reaction  to  t h is  d iscovery  was not to  conclude th a t th ere  
was now no need to  b e l ie v e  in  a C reator, but rather to  i n s i s t  th at Qod had 
put in  p la ce  th ose  fo rces  through which the created  order has come in to  being. 
I t  was th e  c o n stitu tio n  o f  the natura l order which so im pressed Newton tlbfet 
he found in  i t  th e  order which led  to  b e l ie f  in  th e  C reator. Hume was w e ll  
aware o f  a l l  t h i s .  He knew p r e c is e ly  where Newton stood on a l l  th e se  
q u estio n s , and we can in  fa c t  fin d  Newton's arguments in  Hume's works.
There i s  an exact p a r a l le l  between Newton's understanding o f  th e  p r in c ip le  
o f  causation  and th e  modern understanding o f  natura l s e le c t io n .  The 
im p lica tio n s for th e  T h e is t ic  view  o f God as th e  'uncaused, f i r s t  cau se’ 
are exa ctly  th e  same. Natural s e le c t io n  may be th e  mechanism by which l i f e  
has developed , but what about th e  forces  in  nature behind th a t mechanism?
Are they good or bad; do they p o in t to  b ^ i e f  in  a Creator or away from i t ?  
Newton b e lieved  th at they are good and that they do, th e r e fo r e , p o in t to  th e  
workings o f  a good and w ise  C reator, so that th e se  new d isc o v e r ie s  did not 
lead  n e c e ssa r ily  in to  scep tic ism  or atheism . So th a t th e  su ggestion  th a t  
Hume may have a n tic ip a ted  th e  theory o f natural s e le c t io n  does not tak e  us 
any furth er  forward in  our understanding o f  how i t  may have a ffe c te d  h is  
philosophy o f  r e l ig io n .  The main is s u e s  are a lready th e re  in  h is  handling  
o f  Newton.
I t  has to  be adm itted th a t we find  in  Hume's w r itin g s  th e  view  th a t 'Nature 
i s  b l i n d w h i c h  can be taken to  mean that i t  i s  a t  b est m orally n a îtr a i ,  
and, a t w orst, m orally e v i l .  This la t t e r  view i s  s im ila r  to  th at taken by 
th e  G nostics who b e liev ed  th at th e  Creation was in h eren tly  e v i l .  Equally, 
Hume g ives  f u l l  weight to  th e  counter-argum ent»-
"Your rep resen ta tio n s are  exaggerated; Your m ^ancholly  view s 
most f i c t i t i o u s :  Your in feren ces  contrary to  fa c t  and experience. 
H ealth i s  more common than sick n ess; p leasu re  than pain; Happiness 
than m isery. And for one v e x a tio n , which ve  meet w ith , we a tta in
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upon com puta tion , a hundred enjoyments,"
The o th e r  major q u e s t io n  which i s  r a i s e d  by Gaskin i s  t h a t ,  i f  Hume d id  
have some r ^ i g i o n  l e f t  in  him, he was more l i k e l y  t o  have favou red  Deism 
th an  Theism, G a sk in 's  view i s  not w ithou t  ev idence , because; ( a )  h i s  
I n tu i t i o n i s m  can be t r a c e d  to  S ha f te sbu ry  who had D e i s t i c  l e a n in g s ;  ( b )  
Newton, who had a profound in f lu e n c e  on Hume, vjas, in  t h e  eyes o f  some. 
Opening th e  door to  Deism; and, ( c )  Deism was becoming f a s h io n a b le  i n  Humek 
d ay , because  i t  had c o n s id e ra b le  r a t i o n a l  a p p e a l  t o  th o s e  who had grown t i r e d  
o f  t h e  complex d e i t y  found in  Theism; (d) I t  has been argued t h a t  t h e  
g iv in g  o f  t h e  l a s t  word toGlaanthes i s  no t w i thou t  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  and, 
a l th o u g h t  i t  may be a  m is tak e  to  say  do g m atic a l ly  t h a t  any o f  th e  
c h a r a c te r s  i n  t h e  Dialogues ho lds  c o n s i s t e n t l y  to  one view , on page 113 
o f  t h e  t h e s i s  i t  i s  argued  t h a t  C lean thes  appears  to  be a D e i s t ,
However, t h e  ev idence  a g a in s t  t h i s  view i s  s t r o n g ,  ( a )  Hume's own
s p e c i f i c  r e j e c t i o n  o f  Deism :- " I  am no D ^ s t , , . "  ( b )  In  h i s  account5o f  how our b e l i e f s  a r e  formed, Hume, a long  w ith  s e v e r a l  o th e r  p h i lo s o p h e rs
o f  h i s  day b e l ie v e d  t h a t  th e  r o l e  o f  educa t ion  i s  c r u c i a l .  He d id  n o t  say
t h a t  i t  i s  im p o ss ib le  to  change th e  b e l i e f s  which one has been t a u g h t
th rough  educa t ion  i n  ch ildhood , bu t he d id  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  d i f f i c u l t ,
e s p e c i a l l y  when th e  new b e l i e f s  which one i s  i n v i t e d  t o  a c c e p t  a r e  n o t
obv iously  more c r e d i b l e .  Taking h i s  works a s  a  whole, he  shows no g r e a t
enthusiasm f o r  Deism, whereas he appears  t o  approve what he r e f e r s  t o
as  " . . . t r u e  Theism," As he had a  P r e s b y te r i a n  background h i s  n a t u r a l  leaning6would have been towards Theism, ( c )  He chose  i n  l a t e r  l i f e  t o  s e t t l e  
in  Edinburgh, s t i l l  a P r e s b y te r ia n  s tro n g h o ld ,  and i t  was in  Edinburgh 
t h a t  he made f r i e n d s  among th e  M in is te r s  o f  t h e  Church o f  S c o t l a n d .*
In  a sk ing  t h e  q u e s t io n  -  'was Hume an a t t e n u a t e d  D e i s t ' ?  Gaskin has 
asked a v a l i d  q u e s t io n ,  but t h e  r i g h t  answer may be t h a t  he was an 
• a t te n u a te d  T h e i s t ' ,
* S e e  a l s o  p . 28
5, Gaskin (1988 e d i t io n )  op, c i t ,  245
6, N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  Religion, by D, Hume, London, Oxford 
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In view o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  S c o t la n d  cannot c la im  a p la c e  among th e  w o r ld ’s 
a n c ie n t  c i v i l i z a t i o n s ,  t h e  development o f  a movement which became known 
as t h e  S c o t t i s h  Enlightenm ent in  t h e  l 8 t h .  c e n tu r y ,  deserves  c lo s e  study#
In th e  t h e s i s  i t  has been argued t h a t  t h e  Reform ation played a major r o l e  
in  c r e a t in g  th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c l im a te  fo r  t h i s  movement (p . 7 f • ) I t  has to  
be adm itted  t h a t  a g r e a t  f low er ing  o f  th e  i n t e l l e c t  took p la c e  in I t a l y  
du r ing  th e  l 5t h .  c en tu ry  R en a issan ce ,  and i t  too embraced th e  A rts  and 
Sc iences  in a way which transfo rm ed  th e  o u t lo o k  o f  t h a t  age, b u t ,  as i s  
no ted  on page l 4 , t h e  p io n ee r in g  o f  new id e a s  in t h e  sc iences  met w ith  
r e s i s t a n c e  from th e  Roman C a th o l ic  church , so t h a t  th ey  were accep ted  
w i th  d i f f i c u l t y .  By th e  tim e  th e  S c o t t i s h  Enlightenment took p la c e  
t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  method was no lo n g er  under s u s p ic io n ,  paving th e  way fo r  
t h e  o u ts ta n d in g ly  s u c c e s s fu l  S c o t t i s h  s c i e n t i s t s  and in v e n to rs  o f  th e  
I n d u s t r i a l  R e v o lu t io n .  A c lo s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  Eeform ation and 
t h e  S c o t t i s h  Enlightenment can f u r th e r  be d ém o n trâ ted , because t h e  S c o t t i s h  
Reformers l i k e  Knox had d i r e c t  c o n ta c t  w ith  t h e  C o n t in e n ta l  l e a d e r s  o f  th e  
Reform, such as C a lv in ,  whose hum anis tic  c r e d e n t i a l s  cannot be qu es tio n ed .
In Calvin  (London, C o l l in s  1963) F ranco is  W end e l  w ro te : -
"One could c i t e  numerous in s ta n c e s  o f  t h i s  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  hum anis tic  
te n d e n c ie s .  \>jhatever has s in c e  been sa id  o f  i t ,  Calvin re ta ined , th e  
no tion  o f  n a tu r a l  law t h a t  he had a c q u ired  from th e  S to ic s ,  and did  no 
more than accommodate i t  to C h r i s t i a n  p r i n c i p l e s .  Though he defended 
h im se lf ,  w ith  good re a so n ,  a g a in s t  th o s e  who accused him o f  having 
brought th e  S to ic  no tion  o f  f a t e  in to  h is  d o c t r i n e  o f  p r e d e s t in a t i o n ,  we 
have been a b le  to  d iscover  a whole s e r i e s  o f  p assag es ,  even in th e  
I n s t i t u t e s , which a r e  m a n i f e s t ly  i n s p i r e d  by t e x t s , o f  E rasm us ,"(p .33) 
And ;
"Before  h i s  convers ion  he took  humanism to  be t h e  end in  i t s e l f ;  a f t e r  
t h a t  event i t  was no more than  a means; and as has been s a id  o f  him, 
no l e s s  c o r r e c t l y  than t e r s e l y ,  'b e  employs humanism to  combat humanism.',
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He con tinues  to  admire th e  ph i losophers  o f  a n t i q u i t y ,  he s t i l l  r e s p e c ts  
Erasmus and h is  d i s c i p l e s ,  and a l l  h is  l i f e  he w i l l  never cease  to  
admire and make u se  o f  t h e i r  labou rs  and w r i t in g s :  but he w i l l  always
ta k e  c a re  never to go too f a r  with  them; he w i l l  always p o in t  out t h a t  
i t  i s  b e t t e r  'n o t  to  fo llow  th e  ph ilo so p h e rs  f a r t h e r  than  i s  
p r o f i t a b l e ' , "  (p .  44)
I t  was not uncommon fo r  t h e  Reformers to  denounce s u p e r s t i t i o n ,  in terms 
alm ost as s c a th in g  as we f in d  in  th e  Works o f  S h a f te sb u ry ,  Hutcheson and Hume,
In t h e  Works o f  John Knox VOL 4 , Edinburgh, Johnstone  and Hunter MCCCCLV 
page 162 we se e  s u p e r s t i t i o n  condemned. Hume was by no means i s o l a t e d  in  
h ig h l ig h t in g  t h e  e v i l  in f lu e n c e  o f  s u p e r s t i t i o n  in  some r e l i g i o n s :  s im i la r  
condemnations had come from r e l i g i o u s  l e a d e rs  from th e  tim e o f  th e  Reformation»
I t  was argued on page 7 o f  t h e  t h e s i s ,  t h a t ,  as E nglish  P u r i ta n ism  was a l s o  
sometimes r e a c t i o n a r y  i n  i t s  re sponse  to  th e  s c i e n t i f i c  method, Knox's c o n ta c t  
w ith  Calv in  had enabled th e  e d u c a t io n is ts  o f  th e  S c o t t i s h  Reform ation to 
r a i s e  academic s ta n d a rd s  to a l e v e l  which was f u l l y  on a par wdth th e  b es t
in  Europe, By Hump's day th e  in f lu e n c e  of English  P u r i ta n ism  w ith in  S c o t t i s h
P re sb y te r ia n ism  had in c re a se d  c o n s id e ra b ly ,  and t h e r e  i s  good reason  fo r  |
b e l ie v in g  t h a t  he r e a c te d  s t ro n g ly  a g a in s t  i t .  I t  had l i t t l e  to o f f e r  him IIas he pursued  h is  own more p h i lo s o p h ic a l ly  o r i e n t a t e d  s tu d i e s .  But th e  legacy  |Io f  th e  e a r ly  S c o t t i s h  Reform ers meant t h a t  theacadem ic  c l im a te  in  v.^hich he grew |
up favoured th e  e n q u ir ie s  wtiich produced th e  S c o t t i s h  Enlightenm.er_t. j
In. Experience and Enlightemnent (Edinburgh U n iv e r s i ty  P ress  1983) Chau-l e s  j
Caraic exp lores  in  dep th  t h e  a t  times s t r a n g e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between S c o t t i s h  j
Calvin ism  and th e  new id eas  o f  th e  E n l ig h te n a e n t , S c o t t i s h  C a lv in ism  has |
earned fo r  i t s e l f  t h e  r e p u ta t i o n  o f  being extrem ely  c o n s e rv a t iv e  t h e o l o g ic a l ly ,  !
and i t  cannot be d isp u te d  t h a t  i t  has produced churchm en 'w ith  extreme f
te n d e n c ie s ;  and y e t ,  as we go back to  Knox, M e lv i l l e  and Henderson, we a r e  I
brought f a c e - t o - f a c e  w ith  th e  f a c t  t h a t  they  in tro d u c ed  to  S co tland  th e  novel |
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approaches which p repared  th e  way fo r  th e  S c o t t i s h  ©alightenmeu t.  Garnie 
quotes T a l c o t t  P a r s o n s ; -  " ' The Reform ation  was t h e  cu lm ina tion  . . .  o f  
t h e  t re n d  o f  s o c i a l  and c u l t u r a l  change away from th e  medieval system and 
towards m o d ern i ty ' . "  ( p . l )  "The R eform ation" Camic argues "was indeed
th e  w atershed in  t h e  emergence o f  modern s o c ie ty  and c u l t u r e . "  ( p . 2 ) He 
goes on to  complain o f  th e  " . . . n e g l e c t e d  r o l e  o f  t h e  Ehlightenment in  th e  
fo rm ation  o f  v a r io u s  a t t i t u d e s ,  v a lu e s ,  v ie w p o in ts ,  and o r i e n t a t i o n s  t h a t  
a r e  now regarded  as  i n t e g r a l  f e a tu r e s  o f  modern c u l t u r e . "  ( p .4 ) He r i g h t l y  
i n s i s t s  t h a t  " S c o t t i s h  C a l v in i s t  c u l t u r e  was no t monochromatic," ( p . 30 )
Such was t h e  exposure  o f  t h e  S c o t t i s h  academic community to  t h e  l a t e s t  
European s c h o la r s h ip ,  a rgues  Camic, t h a t  " . . . t h e r e  were few^  major p h i lo s o ­
p h ic a l ,  l e g a l  or s c i e n t i f i c  c u r r e n ts  t h a t  had l e f t  S co tland  untouched by 
th e  1 7 3 0 's ."  (p .  35 )
But t h i s  was not a t  th e  expense o f  c o n fe s s io n a l  r o o t s .  Garnie c laim s 
"The C a l v in i s t  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  dependency was a l s o  p rese rved  in  th e  w i t i n g s  
o f  t h e  most a v a n t-g a rd e  e a r ly  e ig h te e n th -c e n tu ry  S c o t t i s h  p h i lo s o p h e rs .  
Gershom Carmichael (1672-1729) was, fo r  example, a very  generous proponent 
o f  th e  p h i lo s o p h ie s  o f  G ro tious  and P ufendorf ,  L e ib n iz  and D e sc a r te s ,  Locke 
and Newton, Through ifem a l l ,  however, he remained ' wrapt irt  . . .C a l v i n i s m ' , "  
(Rae 1895, P« 12) (p .  37) "Andrew Baxter ( 1686- 1750) was o f  a s im i la r
i l k .  Having immersed h im se lf  in  L e ib n iz ,  C la rk e ,  Locke, and Newton, he then 
used th e s e  u p - to - d a t e  sources  to  e s t a b l i s h ;  ' t h e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  in c e s s a n t  
P rov idence  . . .  t h e  c e a s e le s s  a c t i v i t y  o f  th e  D ivine c a u s e ' .  (L a u r ie  1902, 
pp. 3 6 ,3 9 ) . "  (p .  37) F ra n c is  Hutcheson, Camic c la im s " . . . accep ted  th e
most e s s e n t i a l  p rem ises o f  C a lv in ism ."  (p . 38)
Moving on to  t h e  s c h o la r s  o f  th e  S c o t t i s h  Enlightenm ent, Camic pu ts  
Adam Ferguson f i r s t ,  Hume second, John M il la r  t h i r d ,  W illiam  Robertson 
f o u r th  and Adam Smith f i f t h .
" . . .  t h e  c u l t u r a l  change re p re s e n te d  by th e  term  Enlightenment
appeared in  th e  w r i t in g s  or c u l t u r a l  p ro d u c t io n s  o f  f i v e  men:
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Adam Ferguson (1723 -  l 8i 6 ) ,  a  c r u s ty ,  m o r a l i s t i c  h igh lander  who 
occupied th e  c h a i r  o f  pneumatics and moral ph ilosophy  a t  t h e  U n iv e r s i ty  
o f  Edinburgh; David Hume ( 1711 -  7&), t h e  c h e e r f u l  and c o n t r o v e r s i a l  
s k e p t i c a l  p h i lo so p h e r  who was h is  a g e 's  most v e r s a t i l e ,  cosm opolitan , 
ana accom plished m a n - o f - l e t t e r s ;  John M il la r  (1735 -  l 80i ) ,  a wide- 
rang ing  h i s t o r i a n ,  outspoken  p o l i t i c a l  commentator, and lo n g - t im e  
p ro fe s s o r  o f  c i v i l  law a t  Glasgow U n iv e r s i ty ;  W illiam  Rober tson  
(1721 -  93) ;  a  re s e rv e d  P r e s b y te r i a n  m in is te r  and eloquent modern 
h i s t o r i a n ,  who was p r i n c i p a l  o f  Edinburgh U n iv e r s i ty  du r ing  i t s  golden 
age; and Adam Smith Cl?23 -  90) ,  a beloved Glasgow p ro fe s s o r  o f  moral 
ph i lo so p h y ,  and an absentrainded commissioner o f  S c o t t i s h  Customs and 
s a l t  d u t i e s ,  and a prem ier s tu d e n t  o f  r h e t o r i c ,  psychology, j u r i s p r u d ­
ence, and p o l i t i c a l  economy." " . . .  a l th o u g h  Ferguson, Hume, M i l l a r ,  
Robertson  and Smith knew one ano the r  and were fo r  t h e  mast p a r t  bound 
. to g e th e r  by t i e s  o f  f r i e n d s h i p ,  they  n e i th e r  formed a co h es iv e  group 
nor t y p i c a l l y  regarded  them selves  as u n i te d  in  a common c u l t u r a l  
e n t e r p r i s e , "  (p .  48)
The p i c t u r e  which Camic conveys  t o  us  i n  t h e s e  p a r a g r a p h s  i s  t h a t  o f  a 
s i n g l e ,  i n f o r m a l  S c o t t i s h  academic  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  which drew e q u a l l y  on t h e  
C a l v i n i s m  o f  Knox, M e l v i l l e  and Henderson ,  a s  w e l l  as  on t h e  humanism o f  
t h e  E h l i g h t  enment.
"The b e l i e f  t h a t  humans and t h e i r  world a r e  a b s o l u t e l y  dependen t  on 
God, was, as  Weber t a u g h t ,  a n y t h i n g  bu t  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i th  t h e  ’ s p i r i t  
o f  e n t e r p r i s e ' .  Inde ed  t h e  two oierged i n  t h e  l i v e s  o f  many devou t  
C a l v i n i s t s ,  and t h e  S c o t t i s h  im p ro v e r s  were  f r e q u e n t l y  men o f  t h i s  
b r e e d ,  even a s  t h e y  were  u n w i t t i n g  a l l i e s  o f  t h e  S c o t t i s h  E n l i g h t e n m e n t /( p . 86)
"The B n l ig h t em e n t  found a  second s e t  o f  s u p p o r t e r s  i n  t h e  M o d e r a t e s , 
t h e  group o f  m i n i s t e r s  g e n e r a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  Modera te  p a r t y  
o f  t h e  Church o f  S c o t l a n d . "  ( p .  87)
Camic a r g u e s  t h a t ,  d u r i n g  t h e  m i d - e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  t h e  .Moderates were
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attempting to bring Calvinism, u p -to -d a te ,  " . . .  by breaking down ' th e  
r ig i d i t y  o f  the  old C a lv in is t  c a te g o r ie s '  and ad ju stin g  them to the  new 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  developments o f  the  age (Clark 1970 p. 205; see  a lso  Clark 
1964, p, 2 4 i ) ,"  (p. 87 ) Following C lark's in te r p r e ta t io n  Camic i l l u s t r a ­
te s  that claim by s ta t in g  that the Moderates r e v ise d  the  t r a d it io n a l  view 
o f  the e f f e c t s  o f  the  f a l l ,  presented a more promising view o f  human 
c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  and, above a l l ,  developed an e x te n s iv e  commitment to universal-  
isra. "The i n f l u e n t i a l  14oderate d iv in i ty  professor  a t  Glasgow, William Zeesh-  
man, for example, a sser ted  that 'whenever th ere  was any one found, even 
in  the  Heathen world . . .  earn est ly  panting a f te r  l i g h t  and pu r ity ,  that  
god never did deny h is  grace to such a person'."  (p . 87 )
Camic goes f u r t h e r .  He c l a im s  t h a t ,  not  o n l y  d i d  t h e  Moderates  " . . .  endor­
s e  t h e  b u lk  o f  t h e  W e s tm in s t e r  C o n f e s s i o n . . . "  b u t ,  " . . .  t h e y  c o n t i n u a l l y  
a f f i r m e d  t h e  C a l v i n i s t  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  dependency and. t h e  t h e o l o g i c a l  
p o s t u l a t e s  t h a t  accompan ied  i t . "  ( p .  88)  F o l l o w i n g  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
t h e  Mode rat es  d id  n o t  s e t  C a l v i n i s m  and E n l ig h te n m en t  t h o u g h t  a g a i n s t  one  
a n o t h e r ,  bu t  f e l t  t h a t  t h e y  cou ld  c o - e x i s t  s i d e - b y - s i d e ,  i f  a  l i t t l e  
u n e a s i l y  a t  t i m e s ; -
" I f  not as p e s s im is t i c  about human n a tu r e  as t h e i r  a n c e s to r s ,  and 
t h e i r  E v an g e lica l  co n tem p o ra r ie s ,  th e s e  l i b e r a l  m ins te rs  s t i l l  he ld  
t h a t  ' t h e  newborn i n f a n t '  begins l i f e  i n  ' g u i l t  and e r r o r ' ,  and 
t h e r e a f t e r  con tinues  in  a s t a t e  o f  ' i g n o ra n c e ,  weakness, g u i l t ,  and 
d a n g e r ' ,  t h e  v i c t i m  o f  ' i r r e g u l a r  a p p e t i t e s  and p a s s i o n s ' .  'Above 
t h i s  so r ry  c r e a tu r e  t h e  Moderates c o n s ta n t ly  p laced  ' t h a t  g re a t  
be ing  who a lo n e  can bestow e te r n a l  h a p p in e s s '  (Gerald 1761 p. 325) 
Time and aga in  they  recoun ted  ' a l l  h i s  g lo r io u s  p e r f e c t io n s :  h is  
power and wisdom, h is  h o l in e s s ,  h is  j u s t i c e ,  h is  t r u t h '  (S co tland  
p. 7 2 ) .  This t r u t h ,  they  i n s i s t e d  a g a in s t  th e  Enlightenm ent, was 
not to  be found in  t h e  'a i r y  schemes o f  p h i lo s o p h y ' , th o se  ' f a l s e  
and a r t i f i c i a l  rem edies ' t h a t  p lunge mankind ' i n t o  an unfathom able
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abyss o f  m isery  and despair*  (Sommerville c ,  1776, p. 103; see  a lso
Leechman 1758, p . 224) .  The word o f  God, r a t h e r ,  was th e  key. For th e
M o d e r a t e s ,  t h e  B i b l e  ever rema ined ' t h e  r u l e  o f  f a i t h  and l i f e ' : , , , "
( p .  8 6 )
I t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  to  comment t h a t  Hume's c lo s e s t  a s s o c i a t e s  when he s e t t l e d  
in  Edinburgh were t h e  M oderate M in is te r s  o f  th e  Church o f  S c o t la n d ,  and th e  
sympathy which i t  was claimed i n  t h e  t h e s i s  he f e l t  f o r  t h i s  sy n th e s is  o f  
C a l v in i s t  and Enlightenm ent them es, seems only  n a t u r a l  in  th e  l i g h t  o f  t h a t  
f a c t .  J u s t  as (o r  so i t  has been argued in  t h e  t h e s i s )  Hume was never 
e n t h u s i a s t i c  about th e  n e o -D e is t ic  b e l i e f  in  th e  innocency o f  human n a tu re ,  
as w i tn esse d  to  in  th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  ' 'p e r fe c t ly  b rought up c h i ld r e n ,  so too 
th e  Moderates b e l ie v e d  t h a t  th e  newborn i n f a n t  begins  l i f e  in  g u i l t  and e r r o r ,
Caraic makes a v a l id  claim, fo r  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  t h i s  combination o f  C a lv in ­
i s t  and Enlightenment id ea s  when he w r i t  e s : -
"For most o f  th e  pe riod  from th e  R eform ation  to  th e  e a r ly  e ig h t 'e e n th  
c e n tu ry ,  S c o t l a n d 's  f i v e  u n i v e r s i t i e s ,  whatever t h e i r  o the r  d i f f e re n c e s ,  
gave th o s e  who did a t te n d  an education  t h a t  was h igh ly  t r a d i t i o n a l  
in  bo th  c o n te n t  and form. Above and beyond C a lv in s t  v e r i t i e s ,  th e  
t y p i c a l  A rts  cu rr icu lum  o f  th e  age c o n s is te d  o f  a year o f  Greek and a 
yea r  o f  each o f  t h r e e  branches -  lo g ic  and r h e t o r i c ,  moral p h i lo s o p h y ,6  
n a tu r a l  ph ilosophy  -  o f  an expurgated A r i s t o t e l i a n  philosophy t h a t  
absorbed modern i n t e l l e c t u a l  developments very  slow ly. " (p . i 65)
( a s )  " . . . s p e c i a l i s t  p ro fe s s o r s  a cq u ired  e x p e r t i s e  in  t h e i r  v a r io u s  s u b je c t s ,  
they  r a p id ly  abandoned th e  a n t iq u a te d  A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m ,  i n s ip id  
d i c t a t i o n s ,  and m echanical assignm ents o f  t h e  r e g e n ts  in  favour o f  
s t im u la t in g  l e c t u r e s  on th e  novel p h i lo s o p h ic a l  developments o f  th e  
age and th ough t-p rovok ing  o r a l  and w r i t t e n  e x e r c i s e s , "  (p . 174)
In The Mind o f  Man and th e  Works o f  God ( C larendon, Oxford I987)
Edward C ra ig  exp lo res  t h a t  a s p e c t  o f  human n a tu re  which i s  c e n t r a l  to  Hume's 
I n tu i t i o n i s m ,  because  i t  d e a ls  w ith  th e  foundation  o f  our moral b e l i e f s .
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On. page 71 we f in d  a d i sc u s s io n  o f  a passage  quoted from th e  T r e a t i s e ; -
" v i r t u e  i s  no th ing  but a conform ity  to  reason ;  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e
e te r n a l  f i t n e s s e s  and u n f i t n e s s e s  o f  th ings ',  which a r e  th e  sane to  
every r a t i o n a l  be ing  t h a t  c o n s id e rs  them; and t h a t  th e  immutable 
measures o f  r i g h t  and wrong impose an o b l ig a t i o n ,  no t only  on human 
c r e a t u r e s ,  bu t a ls o  on t h e  Deity  h i m s e l f . , . '  " (ed . Se lby -  Bigge
2nd. Ed. r e v i s e d  by P.H. M idd iteh , Oxford 1978; Bk I I I  P t ,  I  Sec. I
p. 456) .
C ra ig  comments;- "God and man a r e  a l i k e  in  p o in t  o f  t h e i r  re a so n ,  and 
consequen tly  a ls o  in  p o in t  o f  t h e i r  m o ra l i ty ,  Hume then  goes on, a d m it te d ly ,  
to  sh e lv e  t h e  t h e o lo g ic a l  a s p e c t  o f  th e  ques tion  and simply a rgue  t h a t
human reason  w i l l  not by i t s e l f  g e n e ra te  human m o ra l i ty , "  This i s  p r e c i s e ly
t h e  q u e s t io n  which i s  r a i s e d  in  th e  t h e s i s  (p . 77 f ° )  and as proof t h a t  
he a t  l e a s t  r e f l e c t e d  on i t ,  C ra ig  quotes p a r t  o f  a speech made by Deraea in  
th e  D ia logues ; -  " ' I  s h a l l  be so f r e e . . .  as to t e l l  you, t h a t  from th e
beg inn ing , I  could no t  approve o f  your conc lus ion  concern ing  th e  s im i l a r i t y  
o f  t h e  Deity to  m e n . . . '  " .  ( Dialogues ed. N.K. Smith, Nelson 1947 -  now
B o b b s - K e r r i l l , P. l 43 P a r t  I I ) .  The view which S h af tesbu ry  and Hutcheson 
would d o u b t le s s  have supported  i s  sum.raed by C ra ig  as f o l lo w s ; -  " . . .  th e
possess io n  o f  reason  i s  one o f  th e  main l in k s  between th e  human and th e  
d iv in e  n a tu r e s .  Reason in  human beings i s  to  be t h a t  same f a c u l ty  which i s  
p re -e m in e n tly  found in  God. I t s  o p e ra t io n  in  man may be s lu g g ish  and 
l im i te d  i n  scope, bu t s t i l l  i t  i s  t h e  d iv in e  spark  p re s e n t  in u s , . . . "  (p .  89)
F i n a l l y ,  i n  S t u d i e s  i n  t h e  P h i lo s o p h y  o f  t h e  S c o t t i s h  E n l i g h t e n m e n t ,
EDITED BY M.A. S t u a r t ,  (Clarendon P re s s ,  Oxford 1990) Kund Haakonssen, in  
an a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d  'N a tu ra l  Law and Moral Realism : th e  S c o t t i s h  Synthesis* 
r a i s e s  aga in  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  t h e  foundation  o f  moral b e l i e f s ,  t h i s  tim e 
as d e a l t  w ith  by P u fendo rf .  " I f  t h e  moral realm  i s  imposed by God's w i l l  
in  t h e  form o f  n a tu r a l  law, then  t h i s  w i l l  can be a u t h o r i t a t i v e  fo r  one o f  
two re a so n s ;  e i t h e r  because  i t  i s  backed by a su p e r io r  power, or because i t
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i t  has  some n a t u r a l  f o r c e . "  ( p .  68)
Haakonssen g o es  on to  c l a i m ; -  " . . .  Hutcheson i s  q u i t e  p re p a r e d  to  acknow­
l e d g e  t h a t  when men a c t  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  P u f e n d o r f ' s  b a s i c  law o f  n a t u r e ,  
t h e i r  b eh a v io u r  a p p e a r s  m o r a l .  The good p roduced i s  however ,  a n a t u r a l  
and n o t  a m ora l  good a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  t h i s  p a t t e r n  o f  beh av io u r  
i s  p r u d e n t i a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  m o r a l . "  ( p .  70) He goes  on t o  add -  " In  t h e  
l i g h t  o f  t h i s  i t  i s  h a r d l y  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  l aw - b as ed  e t h i c s  i s  seen i n v a r i a ­
b l y  e g o i s t i c  by H u tch eso n ."
On p . 203 t h e  t h e s i s  co n c lu d e s  w i t h  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  Hume may neve r  have 
been s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  a f u l l y  s e c u l a r  I n t u i t i o n i s m  i s  p o s s i b l e .  S h a f t e s b u r y  
and Hutcheson were  a t  t im e s  a b i t  vague  abo ut  how t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  
C r e a t i o n  and t h e  mora l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  C r e a t o r  i n f l u e n c e  us  i n  t h e  way -wre 
make moral  c h o i c e s ,  but  t h e y  were s u r e  t h a t  a c o n n e c t i o n  o f  some k in d  does 
e x i s t .  In. o r d e r  t o  av o id  h av in g  to  de f en d  a moral  sys tem  based on. a s e c u l a r  
l u t u i t i o n i s m ,  Hume tagged,  a lo n g  w i t h  S h a f t e s b u r y  and Hutcheson,  a c c e p t i n g  
many o f  t h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  bu t  neve r  f u l l y  s p e l l i n g  o u t  how t h e y  were 
a r r i v e d  a t .
Thus S c o t t i s h  s o c i e t y  found i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  accommodate two v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  
movements,  wh ich ,  t o g e t h e r  c o n t r i b u t e d  g r e a t l y  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  modern, 
n a t i o n .  T h e r e  was a  c e r t a i n  amount o f  c o n v e rg en c e ,  such as i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  
s u p e r s t i t i o n ,  and t h e  two movements sough t  p e a c e f u l  c o - e x i s t e n c e  r a t h e r  than,  
s e r i o u s  c o n f l i c t .  For Hume o p p o s i t i o n  t o  s u p e r s t i t i o n  in c lu d e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n ­
i n g  o f  t h e  whole  f o u n d a t i o n  t o  c l a im s  abou t  mlraff i-es ; whereas  c o n s e r v a t i v e  
C a l v i n i s t s  would have r e t a i n e d  gen u in e  m i r a c l e s  w h i l e  a t  t h e  same tim_e 
r e j e c t i n g  s u p e r s t i t i o n .  Hume was v e ry  much p a r t  o f  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  In. t h e o r y  
he  sho ul d  ba.ve been a co m p le t e  o u t c a s t ,  whereas  in. p r a c t i c e  h e  was l i s te n .e d ,  
t o  a t t e n t i v e l y  as one o f  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  S c o t t i s h  En l igh te nm en t .
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Chapter Summaries.
In trod u ction .
Humean philosophy has been defined  in  th e  fo llow in g  ways, (a )  A sy sten  
based on th e  c la s s ic a l  in f lu a i  ce o f  C icero, (b ) An attempt to  o f fe r  a 
p a r a lle l  in  moral philosophy to  S ir  Isaac Newton's contribution  to  th e  physical 
sc ie n c e s , ( c )  In tu ition ism  in  th e  Shaft esbury/Hutcheson t r a d it io n .
I f  we consider h is  work as a whole, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  s e le c t  one o f  Hume's 
works and claim  th at i t  represents a d e f in i t iv e ,  f in a l  p o s it io n . The approach 
which i s  taken in  th is  study i s  th at o f  fo llow in g  th e  development o f  Hume's 
th in k in g , from h is  early  education u n t i l  th e  com pletion o f  a l l  i l l s  jnajor 
works. When th is  approach i s  follow ed i t  becomes obvious th at th e  secu lar  
in te r p r e ta tio n  o f  Humean philosophy which has gained widespreaa acceptance  
i s  not always convincing . He in  fa c t  wrote a f a ir ly  co n serv a tiv e  work on 
Natural R e lig io n , Moreover, h is  In tu ition ism  makes l i t t l e  sen se  w ithout th e  
r e lig io u s  foundation which Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had taken for  granted.
He did make a s ig n if ic a n t  contribution  to  th e  p h ilo so p h ica l study o f  psychology.
Chapter 1 .
(Hume's Educational Background)
I t  i s  important to  se e  Hume as working in  an educational t r a d it io n , S c o tt ish  
hum anistic. Reformed, His fam ily was P resbyterian: th e  young Hume would 
have received  a good C h ristian  tr a in in g . Although not considered an 
outstand in gly  bright p u p il, he attended Edinburgh U n iv ersity  a t  an early  age 
anisoon developed a voracious a p p e tite  for sch o la r ly  l i t e r a t u r e .  The a t tim es 
deeply in tr o sp e c tiv e  s id e  o f  h is character may w e ll have come from h is  
Presbyterian  background.
As h is  reading widened so th e  fa it h  o f  h is  childhood weakened. His 
development as an o r ig in a l philosopher began w ith th e  d iscovery  o f  sev era l 
key works, At an early  s ta g e  in  h is  career he developed a deep resp ect for  
C icero . C icero 's  in flu e n c e  can be found in  Hume's
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s c e p t ic is m  and h i s  c l a s s i c a l  methodology. But i t  was Newton
who was s e t t i n g  th e  world a l i g h t  w ith  h i s  d i s c o v e r ie s  i n  the  
n a tu r a l  s c ie n c e s ,  Hume was f u l l y  aware o f  t h i s .  What Newton was 
say ing  was tu rn in g  ph ilosophy  upside-down, Newton's accoun t o f  
c a u sa t io n  d i f f e r e d  fundam en ta l ly  to  t h a t  ta u g h t  by A r i s t o t e l i a n  
o rthodoxy . In  view o f  t h a t ,  s e v e r a l  s c h o la r s  have been compelled to 
ask  -  d id  Hume a s p i r e  to  become a 'Newton o f  th e  moral s c i e n c e s '?
I f  so ,  i t  d id  no t t a k e  him long  to  see  t h a t  such an am bition  was 
m isconceived fu ndam en ta l ly ,  because  th e  realm  o f  s c ie n c e  and t h a t  o f  
moral ph ilo sophy  have no d i r e c t  c o n n e c t io n .  I n s t e a d ,  Hume re tu rn e d  to 
th e  I n tu i t io n is m  o f  F rancisH utcheson , which accep ted  human f e e l i n g s  
and responses  a t  t h e i r  fa c e  v a lu e ,  w i thou t  f in d in g  i t  n e c e s sa ry  t o  
j u s t i f y  them, o r  g ive a r a t i o n a l  e x p la n a t io n  to  accoun t f o r  them.
I f  C icero  was a s c e p t i c ,  Newton was a C h r i s t i a n  and Hutcheson a 
P r e s b y te r i a n .  There can be no doubt t h a t  H u tcheson 's  I n tu i t i o n is m  
was roo ted  in  h i s  C h r i s t i a n  f a i t h ,  I n tu i t i o n i s m  had come to  Hutcheson 
from S h a f te sb u ry ,  who was a member o f  th e  Church o f  England, but 
open to  some D e i s t i c  i d e a s .  According to  S h a f te s b u ry ,  human i n s t i n c t s  
a t  t h e i r  n o b le s t  a r e  to  be t r u s t e d .
Hume's New N a t u r a l i s t i c  World,
By Hume' s day, man h im se lf  had become p a r t  o f  th e  g e n e ra l  s c i e n t i f i c  
e n q u iry .  For some, s c ie n c e  was being  h a i l e d  as  a  new r e l i g i o n ,  Hume 
soon came to  a p p r e c ia t e  t h a t  pure s c ie n c e  would have l i t t l e  to  say 
on moral q u e s t io n s .  In  h i s  aim to  r e l a t e  s c ie n c e  and e th i c s  to  one 
a n o th e r ,  he began w ith  a s tudy  o f  what we can l e a r n  about how man 
makes moral d e c i s io n s ,  by s tu d y in g  th e  workings o f  th e  human body.
This  approach may seem R a t i o n a l i s t i c ,  but Hume was never t h a t  fo r  
lo n g .  He r e j c t e d  th e  concept o f  th e  pure  o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  l o g i c a l
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t h in k in g ,  in  favou r  o f  a b a t t e r  u n d e rs tan d in g  o f  human n a tu r e .
I f  Hume d id  come to  a c c e p t  th e  need f o r  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
ph ilosophy  and psycho logy , where d id  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  how we form 
our b e l i e f s  f i t  in ?  He s t a r t e d  w ith  a c a u s a l  mechanism which 
would account f o r  th e  way i n  which ' i d e a s '  a r e  transform ed in to  
' b e l i e f s ' .  There i s  i n  Hume a s t ro n g  a s s o c i a t i o n  between 'memory' 
and ' b e l i e f s ' .  This  was no t  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  our u l t im a te  
b e l i e f s ,  bu t an a t te m p t  to  t r a c e  them to  t h e i r  source  in  our 
human n a tu r e .  I f  we a r e  to  go beyond such a b a s i c ,  t e c h n ic a l  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  ' b e l i e f s '  to  c o n s id e r  th e  raw m a te r i a l s  ou t  o f  which 
they  a r e  made, o f  what use  i s  t h i s  f i r s t  d e f i n i t i o n ?
1 . D iv ine  R e v e la t io n .  Hume would have ques tioned  th e  c la im  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  a  v a l i d  sou rce  o f  in fo rm a t io n ,  bu t no t  r e je c te d  i t  com p le te ly .
To beg in  w ith ,  th e  'c a u s a l  th e o ry  o f  p e rc e p t io n '  i s  n o t  a  q u e s t io n  
on which Hume and th e  T h e i s t  would have p a r te d  company. Hume 
would have been ready  to  concede t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  contem pla te  
God's e x i s t e n c e .  We can have an id e a  o f  such a  b e in g .  But, b e l i e f s  
be longing  to  t h i s  c a te g o ry  come b e fo re  ' b e l i e f s  p ro p e r* .  In  h i s  
system we p ro g re s s  from 'im a g e s '  to  ' i d e a s '  to  ' b e l i e f s ' .  How a re
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we to  judge between id e a s ?  Hume had no c l e a r  answer, and t h i s  i s  j
what l a y  a t  th e  h e a r t  o f  h i s  s c e p t i c i s m .  His s c ep t ic ism  was more |
1than the p h ilo so p h ic a l scep tic ism  o f  C icero . I t  had to do w ith  the j
I
way in  which b e l i e f s  a r e  formed in  th e  mind. G radua lly  he began to  i
Iunde rs tand  t h a t  we need an account which ta k e s  i n  th e  whole o f  l i f e :  
what we e x p e r ien ce  and r e f l e c t  upon, a s  w e l l  a s  how we form our 
b e l i e f s  w i th  our  b r a in .
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T h e o lo g ic a l ly ,  t h i s  problem has been unders tood  i n ,  f o r  example, th e  
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  r e l a t i n g  man's f i n i t u d e  to God's i n f i n i t y :  a  d i f f i c u l t y  
which th e  C h r i s t i a n  would c la im  has been so lved  in  th e  In c a r n a t io n .
2 . M u c a t io n ,  E v e n tu a l ly  Hume tu rn ed  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  away from t r y in g  
to  d i sc o v e r  'how we can e x p la in  th e  fo rm a tion  o f  ou r  b e l i e f s  from th e  
workings o f  th e  m in d ' ,  to  a more e lem entary  e x p la n a t io n  -  ed u ca t io n . 
E duca tion  can be seen to  p lay  a c r u c i a l  r o l e  i n  th e  way i n  which we 
form our b e l i e f s .  I f  Hume was eager  to  show t h a t  t h i s  v iew was v a l id  
f o r  most p e o p le ,  th e n  we a r e  e n t i t l e d  to  a sk  how much th e  r o l e  o f  h i s  
P r e s b y te r i a n  u p b r in g in g  p layed  i n  th e  fo rm ation  o f  h i s  own views? I s  
t h i s  in f lu e n c e  d e t e c t a b l e ,  f o r  example, i n  h i s  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  conc lu ­
s io n s?  I t  can c e r t a i n l y  be argued t h a t  h i s  a c cep tan ce  o f  a  v e r s io n  o f  
F rances  H u tcheson 's  I n tu i t i o n i s m  was ev idence  o f  a  C h r i s t i a n  
i n f l u e n c e .
3 . P le a s u re  and P a in .  Working from th e  ' s e n s i t i v e '  s id e  o f  human 
n a tu r e ,  Hume accep ted  from Locke th e  view t h a t  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  our 
b e l i e f s  i s  c o n s id e ra b ly  in f lu e n c e d  by th e  emotions o f  p l e a s u r e  and 
p a in .
Reason.
5. A s s o c ia t io n .
6 .  R e c a p i tu la t io n .
In a d d itio n  to  Hume's account o f  the way in  which our b e l ie f s  are  
formed and the C h ristian  in feren ces  which we can read in to  i t ;  h is  
an th rop o log ica l model as w e ll  was much more the product o f  h is  C h rist­
ian  background than o f  the Enlightenm ent. I t  did contain  sev era l  
Enlightenment emphases, but there were important C h ristian  elem ents 
in  i t .
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The P re su p p o s i t io n s  Behind Hume's Model.
I t  could  be argued t h a t  two major p re s u p p o s i t io n s  were th e  p roduct 
o f  h i s  C h r i s t i a n  background, ( a )  An I n tu i t i o n i s m  which held  to  a  
r e l i g i o u s  view o f  man. (b )  The p resence  o f  something a k in  to  K a n t 's  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  m oral o b l i g a t i o n .  Hume can be pinned down as  to  
what he meant by th o s e  q u a l i t i e s  which%#e mwgkpraise and th o se  which 
a r e  to  be condemned. I n  su p p o rt  o f  th e  fo rm er,  he would g ive  two 
r e a s o n s : -  ( a )  t h e i r  a n t i q u i t y ;  and, (b )  t h e i r  u n i v e r s a l i t y .
H u tcheson 's  I n tu i t i o n i s m  and Hume's.
There was a p o l a r i s a t i o n  i n  th e  18t h .  c e n tu ry  between R a tiona l ism  
and I n tu i t i o n i s m .  R a t io n a l ism  p laced  th e  emphasis on th e  mind. 
I n tu i t i o n i s m  on f e e l i n g s .  F ra n c is  Hutcheson he ld  to  a  s p i r i t u a l  I n t ­
u i t io n is m  which had been developed i n  a  T h e i s t i c  t r a d i t i o n .  S h a f te s ­
bury had been th e  moving s p i r i t  i n  t h i s  camp. In  h i s  c a s e ,  he 
was much more open to  Deism th an  were th e  p h i lo so p h e rs  who follow ed 
th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  approach . Some o f  them were R a t i o n a l i s t s ,  a l though  
a s e c u la r  R a t io n a l ism  was g a in in g  ground on th e  C o n t in e n t .  Hume had 
been exposed to  t h i s  s e c u l a r  R a t io n a l ism  a t  an e a r ly  p e r io d  i n  h i s  
c a r e e r .  But he never  became a p a r t  o f  t h i s  movement, and t h a t  i s  o f  
g r e a t  im portance  to  th e  p r e s e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  He could  no t  accep t  
t h a t  men a r e  guided s o l e l y  by re a s o n .
L a ird  reminds us  t h a t  Hume's I n tu i t i o n is m  d i f f e r e d  from H utcheson 's  
because i t  made a  s e r io u s  a t te m p t  to  accommodate th e  new, s c i e n t i f i c  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  human n a tu r e .  L a ird  a l s o  shows how much S haf tesbury  
had in f lu e n c e d  H utcheson. This I n tu i t i o n i s m  was o p t im is t i c  about 
human n a tu r e .  Both S h a f te sb u ry  and Hutcheson held  t h a t  th e  d e s i r e  
f o r  th e  p u b l ic  good o f  a l l  i s  d e e p -se a te d  in  th e  human b r e a s t .  From 
C icero  Hume d e r iv e d  th e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  no a c t i o n  can be v i r tu o u s  
u n le s s  i t  p roceeds from a  v i r t u o u s  m otive .
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At f i r s t  s ig h t  we a re  con fron ted  w ith  two In tu i t io n is m s  -  Hutche­
s o n 's  s p i r i t u a l  and Hume's s e c u l a r .  C lo se r  s tudy , however, w i l l  
r e v e a l  t h a t  th e  a t te m p t  to  keep them s e p a r a ta  was never e n t i r e l y  
s u c c e s s fu l .  Hume may w e l l  have e n te r ta in e d  th e  hope t h a t  th ey  
could be s e p a r a te d , but t h e r e  i s  much to  sugges t  t h a t  he was 
d isa p p o in te d  i n  t h i s .  In  h i s  account o f  how we form our b e l i e f s ,  
he begins  w ith  ' p e r c e p t i o n s ' ,  then  p ro g re s s e s  to  ' i d e a s ' ,  and 
f i n a l l y  a r r i v e s  a t  ' b e l i e f s ' .  That i s  th e  mechanism by which he 
thought b e l i e f s  a r e  form ed. And y e t  we s t i l l  have to  go on to  
ex p la in  m oral o b l i g a t i o n .
In  Hutcheson th e  e x p la n a t io n  was a long  th e  fo llo w in g  l i n e s : -  'Man 
i s  a  moral be ing  because he i s  th e  b e a re r  o f  t h e  d iv in e  im a g e '.
Hume had a ttem pted  to  reduce  t h a t  t o : -  'Man i s  m ora l ly  a w a re ' .  
E v e n tu a l ly ,  he came to  th e  co n c lu s io n  t h a t ,  w hile  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  
to  s a y : -  'Man i s  aware*, a  major jump has to  be taken  to  go on to 
s a y ; -  'Man i s  m o ra l ly  a w a r e ' .  This  i s  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  which he 
sought to  ad d ress  i n  h i s  exposure  o f  th e  N a t u r a l i s t i c  F a l la c y .
How then  d id  he a d d re ss  t h i s  fo rm idab le  problem. He chose th e  
ro u te  to  which B erke ley  in  p a r t i c u l a r  o b je c te d ,  which was to  
p r o t e s t  t h a t  ou r  f a c u l t i e s  a r e  so d e fe  c t i v e  t h a t  we cannot give 
an answer. He i n  f a c t  evaded th e  i s s u e .  I f  he was unab le  to  
ex p la in  why man i s  m o ra l ly  aware, what then  was th e  v a lu e  o f  h is  
s e c u la r  I n tu i t io n is m ?  That i s  a key q u e s t io n  in  t h i s  examination 
o f  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  and s i m i l a r i t i e s  between H utcheson 's  and Hume's 
I n tu i t i o n i s m s .  I f  th e  b e l i e f  in  an a l l - w i s e ,  a l l - j u s t ,  and 
a l l - m e r c i f u l  God was so im portan t  to  S h a f te sb u ry  and then Hutcheson 
in  t h e i r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  V i r tu e ,  i s  i t  r e a so n a b le  to  suggest 
t h a t  Hume could d isp e n se  w ith  it% The bu lk  o f  th e  m a te r i a l  found 
in  Hume's Enquiry  can be t r a c e d  to th e  w r i t in g s  o f  Shaf tesbury  
and Hutcheson.
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Hume's Philosophy o f  R e l ig io n .
To th o se  who cla im  t h a t  Hume had no ph ilosophy  o f  r e l i g i o n  worth 
m en tion ing , h i s  The N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n ,  p r e s e n ts  something 
o f  an embarrassment, because in  t h i s  volume we f in d  h i s t o r i c a l  dep th  
as w e l l  as sy s te m a t ic  p r e c i s io n .  I t  shows t h a t  Hume thought a  good 
d e a l  about th e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  by the  ph ilosophy  o f  r e l i g i o n  d e b a te .  The 
ph ilosophy  o f  r e l i g i o n  which we f in d  o u t l in e d  in  t h i s  Volume i s  o f  a  
T h e i s t i c  r a t h e r  than  D e i s t i c  complexion.
I t  was w h ile  he was w r i t i n g  The N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n ,  t h a t  he 
conceived th e  o u t l i n e  o f  th e  D ia logues Concerning N a tu ra l  R e l ig io n .  Here 
th e  s ta n d p o in t  i s  r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t .  They have been used to  dem onstra te  
t h a t  the  o ld e r  Hume was as s c e p t i c a l  about r e l i g i o u s  q u e s t io n s ,  as  th e  
th e  younger, c o n t r o v e r s i a l  Hume. A c lo se  r e a d in g  o f  th e  Dialogues w i l l  
make c l e a r  t h a t  ve ry  g re a t  c a re  has to  be tak e n  b e fo re  drawing hard-and 
- f a s t  co n c lu s io n s  from them, i n  favour  o r  a g a in s t  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s .
In  g e n e ra l ,  i t  i s  t r u e  to  say t h a t  Hume l e a n t  much more in  favou r  o f  
Theism than  Deism. This  i s  o f  s ig n i f i c a n c e  because  v a r io u s  d e b a te s  
between th e  T h e i s t s  and th e  D e i s t s  were r a g in g  a t  t h i s  t im e .  The T h e is ts  
argued f o r  an i n f i n i t e  d e i t y ,  who, because o f  h i s  t ra n sc en d e n c e ,  could 
on ly  be p a r t l y  known. The D e is ts  proposed a  f i n i t e  d e i t y ,  whose a t t r i b u t ­
es could be eva lu a te d  r a t i o n a l l y .  Hume was f a m i l i a r  w ith  th e  a t t a c k  on 
i n f i n i t y  which tu rned  s e v e r a l  C h r i s t i a n  t h in k e r s  o f  s ta n d in g  to the  
D e i s t i c  camp* At tim es he h im s e lf  employed th e  D e i s t i c  o b je c t io n  to  
th e  use o f  any 'p e rc e p t io n *  which was beyond human u n d e rs tan d in g .  He 
conceded t h a t ^ i n d  can n ever  a t t a i n  an adequate  concep tion  o f  i n f i n i t y .
And y e t ,  in  The N a tu ra l  H is to ry  o f  R e l ig io n ,  we f in d  him defend ing  j
what appears  to  be a T h e i s t i c  t h e o lo g ic a l  s t r u c t u r e .  On s e v e ra l  o c c as io n -  {is he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  i f  be was to  be c a l l e d  an y th in g ,  he should be c a l l e d  |
a T h e i s t .  I
The T h e i s t i c  ' p r o o f s ' .  I
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I f  Hume was then  in  any sense  a T h e i s t ,  what was h i s  a t t i t u d e  to the  
T h e i s t i c  'p r o o f s '?
a .  The Cosmological a rgum ent. Hume was aware o f  the  changes which 
Newtonian cosmology had imposed on th e  A r i s t o t e l i a n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  a 
f i r s t ,  uncaused c a u se .  Newtonian physics  was d em ons tra t ing  t h a t  i t  i s  
n o t  motion but change o f  motion which has to  be accounted f o r .  Because 
o f  t h i s  t h e r e  i s  no ' f i r s t  c a u s e ' .  This  d id  no t  e l im in a te  th e  need fo r  
th e  major F i a t s  o f  c r e a t i o n ;  some s c h o la r s  having even read  in to  
Hume's p o s i t i o n  a need fo r  th e  Big Bang th e o ry .  I n s t e a d ,  Newtonian 
phys ics  he lped  to  d em o n s tra te  b e t t e r  the  p r in c i p l e  o f  c a u sa t io n  
th rough  which th e  F i a t s  came a b o u t .
b. The O n to lo g ic a l  argum ent. Hume would have had l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  
in  a g re e in g  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  conceive o f  a be ing , ' g r e a t e r  than  
which cannot be b e l ie v ed  no t  to  e x i s t ' .  The q u e s t io n  which he then  
wanted to  a sk  was -  'what s t a t u s  should be given to  such a c o n c e p t io n ’? 
Can we dem ons tra te  t h a t  such a being e x i s t s ?  His answer would have been 
t h a t  i t  i s  no t  p o s s ib le  to  dem onstra te  e m p i r ic a l ly  such a  c o n cep t io n ,  
and, t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  cannot have th e  s t a t u s  o f  concep tions  o f  c o n c re te  
o b j e c t s .  But even on t h i s  q u e s t io n ,  Hume's a t te m p t  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  
between th e s e  two ty p es  o f  concep tion  was n o t  com ple te ly  s u c c e s s fu l ,  
because some c o ncep tions  do n o t  f a l l  n e a t l y  i n to  e i t h e r  o f  th e  two 
c a t e g o r i e s .  The main c o n t r ib u t io n  which the  O n to lo g ic a l  argument makes 
i s  to  e lu c id a t e  th e  T h e i s t i c  concep tion  o f  God.
c .  The T e le o lo g ic a l  argum ent. The argument from d e s ig n  was break ing  
on th e  s c i e n t i f i c  world o f  Hume's day i n  a f r e s h  and com pelling  way, 
because o f  what was being  d isc o v e red  about p l a n e ta r y  motion and th e  
law o f  g r a v i t y .  There  can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  Hume, ou t o f  de fe re n ce  
to  Newton's e x p o s i t io n  o f  th e  argument from d e s ig n ,  n e a r ly  always 
w rote about i t  as  one ready  to  be convinced by i t .
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Hume a ls o  gave expression, to  the  coun te r -a rgum en ts .  In  th e  Dialogues 
f o r  example, PHILO advances a f r o n t a l  a t t a c k  on the  id ea  t h a t  th e  
u n iv e rse  d i s p la y s  th e  handiwork o f  an a l l - g o o d ,  a l l - w i s e ,  a l l - p o w e r f u l  
C re a to r .  But th e r e  a r e  s t ro n g  reasons  f o r  no t  a c c e p t in g  the  view t h a t
PHILO always spoke f o r  Hume.
d . The Moral argum ent. Hume would have been aware t h a t  Kant he ld  to  
th e  view t h a t  th e  Moral argument was th e  c o r r e c t  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t  f o r
n a tu r a l  th eo lo g y .  Many have assumed t h a t  K a n t 's  use  o f  th e  Moral
argument presupposed a  d iv in e  law -g iv e r  and judge, who g ives fo rc e  to  
th e  moral im p e ra t iv e s .
For s c h o la r s  who found weaknesses in  th e  o th e r  T h e i s t ic  ' p r o o f s ' ,
K a n t 's  approach he ld  s e v e r a l  a t t r a c t i o n s .  The Moral argument was no t 
s u s c e p t ib le  to  th e  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  new s c i e n t i f i c  i n s i g h t s .  And y e t ,  
K a n t 's  p reo ccu p a tio n  w ith  one argument was tend ing  to  undermine a l l  
th e  argum ents. This  can be i l l u s t r a t e d  from Hume's Dialogues where 
we f in d  PHILO o b je c t in g  to  th e  T e le o lo g ic a l  and Moral arguments t o g e t h e r ,  
a t  th e  same t im e. By d e a l in g  w ith  the  argument from Design he was a b le  
to  dem onstra te  th e  weaknesses o f  the  Moral argument as  w e l l .
I f  i t  i s  accep ted  t h a t  Hume's view of  l i f e  was o p t im is t i c  -  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  th e  b e s t  o f  a l l  p o s s ib l e  worlds -  then  i t  seems rea so n a b le  
to  conclude t h a t  he would have agreed w ith  much o f  what Kant was say ing  
about th e  Moral argum ent.
a .  The E th n o lo g ic a l  a rgum ent. The argument t h a t  th e  presence  o f
a r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  i n  every  branch  o f  th e  human r a c e  proves the  
e x is te n c e  o f  God, i s  s im i l a r  to  th e  K antian  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  
Moral argum ent. I t  a rgues  from man's s p i r i t u a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  to  a 
b e l i e f  i n  a t r a n s c e n d e n t ,  h ig h e r  power. Does t h i s  u n iv e r s a l  b e l i e f  
prove t h a t  th e r e  i s  a God? In  Hume's day t r a v e l  was b r in g in g  to  l i g h t  
th e  number and v a r i e t y  o f  r e l i g i o n s  which a re  t o  be found in  d i f f e r e n t  
p a r t s  o f  th e  w orld . But t h i s  evidence  was co n fu s in g ,  because i t
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could no t  be used to  dem onstra te  t h a t  i t  was a r e v e l a t i o n  which 
the  one, t r u e  God had made o f  H im self .  Even here  Hume appears  to  
o f f e r  a  s o lu t i o n ,  because he su g g es ts  t h a t  mankind may be moving 
to  a c lo s e r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  a p e r f e c t  be ing , who bestowed o rd e r  
on the  frame o f  n a tu r e .
D i f f e r e n t  Approaches to  Hume.
I f  Hume's s e c u la r  I n tu i t i o n i s m  met w ith  a mixed response  i n  h i s  
own day, in  th e  2 0 th .  C entury  i t  has genera ted  much i n t e r e s t .  I t  
was du r ing  th e  19t h .  Century  t h a t  a group o f  B r i t i s h  m oral p h i lo so p h e rs  
decided  to  b u i ld  a f r e s h  on Hume's fo u n d a t io n .  They too he ld  t h a t  
our s tan d a rd s  a r e  decided by what i s  im m ediately  p l e a s in g ,  a s  w e l l  
as  by th e  ' u t i l i t a r i a n *  p r i n c i p l e .  No need was f e l t  to  ap p e a l  to  
r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  to  defend t h i s  system o f  e t h i c s .
However, 19 t h .  C entury  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  had a number o f  shortcom ings 
which, f o r  a t im e ,  led  to  i t s  f a l l i n g  ou t o f  f a v o u r .  I t  had f a i l e d  
to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between h ig h e r  and lower p l e a s u r e s .  I t  d id  n o t  d e f in e  
what i t  meant by ' t h e  g r e a t e s t  happ iness  o f  th e  g r e a t e s t  number' .
In the  2 0 th .  C en tury , U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  re-emerged w ith  some o f  th e s e  
d e fe c t s  rem edied . The in t r o d u c t io n  o f  a  ' f e l e c i f i c  c a l c u l u s '  made 
i t  p o s s ib le  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between d i f f e r e n t  k inds  o f  p le a s u r e ,  some 
approved, o th e r s  n o t .  A lready  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  was being  made s u b je c t  
to  c e r t a i n  v a lu e s .  These d id  not grow out o f  th e  U t i l i t a r i a n  p r in c i p l e  
i t s e l f ,  bu t  were imposed upon i t  to  ren d e r  i t  a c c e p ta b le  to  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  t r a d i t i o n  i n  m oral ph ilosophy; t h a t  t r a d i t i o n  which, a long  
w ith  Kant, held  t h a t  some th in g s  a r e  always r i g h t  and o th e r s  always 
wrong.
This helped somewhat to  d e f in e  in  broad term s what was meant by 
' t h e  g r e a t e s t  happ iness  p r in c i p l e * .  But t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  has never 
r i s e n  beyond sounding l i k e  a s logan  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o -o p e ra t io n .
229,
I f  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  Hume's I n tu i t i o n is m  on ly  made sense a g a in s t  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  r e l i g i o u s  background, i t  may be more than  co in c id en ce  
t h a t  th e  g e n e ra l  demise o f  e a r ly  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  kep t  pace w ith  the  
d e c l in e  o f  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f  in  B r i t a i n .
Hume's s e c u la r  I n tu i t i o n i s m  led  to  L og ica l  P o s i t iv i s m ,  which i n s i s t e d  
t h a t  h i s  narrower d e f i n i t i o n  o f  how b e l i e f s  a r e  formed be adhered to  
s t r i c t l y .  The P r in c i p l e  o f  V e r i f i c a t i o n  as  expounded by th e  P o s i t i v i s t s  
would have s a t i s f i e d  Hume's d e f i n i t i o n  o f  how b e l i e f s  p roper  a re  
formed q u i t e  adm irab ly .  And y e t  P o s i t iv is m  as  w e ll  was to  f a l l  
ou t  o f  f av o u r ,  a s  th e  a la rm ing  t r u t h  sank in  t h a t  i t  too d id  no t 
conform to  the  P r in c i p l e  o f  V e r i f i c a t i o n .  I t  too  was n o t  a  m eaningful 
p r o p o s i t io n .  And, i f  even i t  was excluded , then  how much e l s e  o f  
what i s  good and m eaningfu l in  l i f e  was i t  s e t t i n g  a s id e ?  Hume had 
a l r e a d y  a n t i c ip a t e d  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  when he fo rm ula ted  th e  N a t u r a l i s t i c  
F a l l a c y .  I t  can h a rd ly  be claimed t h a t  th e se  a t te m p ts  to  b u i ld  on 
Hume's ' s e c u la r  In tu ition ism * have been s u c c e s s f u l .
C onclus ion .
L as t  Century  Humean ph ilosophy  s t i l l  met w i th  a  mixed r e c e p t io n .
T.H. Green and T.H. Grose accused him o f  emptying m o ra l i ty  o f  i t s
c o n te n t s .  Because they  were le a d in g  a u t h o r i t i e s  on h i s  works, t h e i r
1views c a r r i e d  a l o t  o f  i n f lu e n c e .  In  th e  2 0 th .  Century  t h a t  a t t i t u d e
iwas to  change, as Humean ph ilosophy  came to  th e  c e n t r e  o f  a t t e n t i o n  
in  B r i t i s h  moral ph i lo so p h y .  N.K. Smith p o r tra y ed  a much more |
c r e d ib le  p i c t u r e  o f  Hume, over a g a in s t  th e  o th e r  images o f  him which |
1had gained accep tance  on th e  C on tinen t  -  such as  th e  s u b je c t iv e  i d e a l i s t  1
1in  the  K antian  t r a d i t i o n .  The e x te n t  o f  F ra n c is  H utcheson 's  in f lu e n c e  |
I
on him was being a p p re c ia te d  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e .  E.C. Mossner d id  j
much v a lu a b le  r e s e a rc h  as w e l l ,  which uncovered J
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b io g ra p h ic a l  m a t e r i a l  which had no t p re v io u s ly  been in  c i r c u la t io n *  
Hume's s e c u la r  I n tu i t i o n is m  had no t  been the  embarrassment f o r  Smith 
and Mossner which i t  had been f o r  Green and Grose. To t h e i r  c r e d i t ,  
they  d id  no t  a t te m p t  to f o rc e  i t  i n to  a mould, but expla ined  i t  
v e ry  much a long  Hume's l i n e s .  They may have sought to  modernize i t  
and e l im in a te  some o f  i t s  more g la r in g  weaknesses, w ithou t a l t e r i n g  
th e  u n d e r ly in g  c a s e .  They b e l ie v ed  t h a t  Hume's th in k in g  does no t  end 
in  s c e p t ic i s m ,  bu t proceeds to  b u i ld  a new w o r ld , based on how th e  
human mind r e a l l y  f u n c t io n s .  Smith and Mossner have been among a 
group o f  Humean s c h o la r s  who have responded p o s i t i v e l y  to  the  ge n e ra l  
o u t l i n e  o f  h i s  p h i lo so p h y .  As modern e t h i c a l  th e o r i e s  have f a i l e d ,  
so t h i s  group has looked to  Hume's system f o r  t h e i r  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t .
S e c u la r i s t s  have b u i l t  on what they  imagine to  have been Hume's 
s e c u la r  I n t u i t i o n i s m ,  w ithou t  a sk in g  i f  h is  I n t ^ t i o n i s m  was t r u l y  
t h a t .  I t  i s  d o u b t fu l  i f  Hume was ever  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t h e r e  can be 
a f u l l y  s e c u la r  I n t u i t i o n i s m .  That i s  why he must be regarded  as  
not on ly  a g r e a t  B r i t i s h  p h i lo s o p h e r ,  bu t a  g r e a t  I n t u i t i o n i s t  i n  
the  t r a d i t i o n  o f  S h a f te sb u ry  and Hutcheson.
**********************
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